The " Free and Open Indo-Pacific " Strategy and Japan's Emerging Security Posture An Amorphous Concept (original) (raw)
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FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy
Asia-Pacific Review, 2019
The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) is the most important feature of Japan’s foreign policy under the Abe Administration. One of the most important questions is whether this vision aims to contain a rapidly rising China. Along with the amelioration of the relationship between Japan and China, this diplomatic strategy has been evolved from the quadrilateral security cooperation among leading democracies in this region, namely the US, Japan, Australia, and India, to a more comprehensive regional cooperation. This article regards the latter diplomatic strategic as the “FOIP 2.0” and that there emerges a possible harmony between Japan’s FOIP and China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”: Reality before the Rhetoric?
Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 2017
Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" was announced as recently as November 2016. However, it may be argued that Japan has been acting in accordance with this principle for over a decade in the Indo-Pacific region. While the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and the "quadrilateral" initiative could be called the latest and more visible manifestations of this strategy, they are definitely not the first. This paper explores two core elements of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, namel, regional connectivity and proactive contribution to peace, and highlights Japan's initiatives in this regard in the Indo-Pacific.
The Origin and Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Vision
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION: STATES’ STRATEGIES AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS VOLUME I: STATES’ STRATEGIES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION, 2024
Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision (FOIP) has moved to the forefront of Japan’s foreign policy since 2017. Nonetheless, it re- mains elusive as a tangible strategy as activities that fall under FOIP continue to evolve. This chapter investigates critical junc- tures in FOIP’s evolution between 2005 to today as it marks a de- marcation point for articulating the use of the term Indo-Pacific. Key lines of enquiry include: 1) What and why have critical junc- tures pushed FOIP to evolve?; and 2) Are these changes being insti- tutionalised? Findings suggest that Japan’s FOIP vision evolution cannot solely be explained through neorealism or liberal institu- tionalism, rather, Japan’s maritime strategy and its FOIP are sensi- tive to power distribution changes associated with China’s re-emer- gence as the dominant power in the region and the relative decline of the U.S. and that it adapts to these changes through a hybrid ap- proach. This approach includes: 1) a selective accommodation of China’s rise; 2) deeply integrating Japan into the Indo-Pacific politi- co-economy and rules-making process; 3) tightening the Japan-U.S. alliance and cementing the U.S. into the region; and 4) diversifying and deepening its strategic partnerships.
Japan's 'Indo-Pacific' question: countering China or shaping a new regional order
International Affairs, 2020
Japan's primary objective of the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called ‘tactical hedging’. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future.
The United States' Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy: Challenges for India and Japan
ISAS Insights, 2018
Executive Summary The Donald Trump administration in the United States (US) has expanded its articulation of a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) region by announcing strategic investments and economic cooperation. India and Japan are fundamental to the realisation of the US vision of the region. For India and Japan, however, a deeper commitment to the US vision would depend on several factors. These include the prospects of the FOIP becoming a security-oriented strategy to counter China, as opposed to a regional connectivity programme; avoiding the legitimacy issues encountered by China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); and acquiring an inclusive character. The BRI has been inviting considerable criticism for pushing countries into debt traps and extracting strategic concessions for infrastructure funds. Coupled with developments like the revival of the 'Quad' Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan and the US, the FOIP has the possibility of becoming a security-centric anti-China initiative. This would be to the discomfort of India and Japan, which would hesitate to take sides. Both countries would also wish for greater economic legitimacy and vision of a broader regional economic order from the FOIP, as opposed to it being an initiative for expanding US commercial presence in the region. Notwithstanding announcements of regional infrastructure investments and cooperation efforts, India's repeated emphasis on an 'inclusive' FOIP, Japan's decision to selectively engage with the BRI and their respective geopolitical approaches to the region and strategies towards China, will decide their commitment to the FOIP. However, staying engaged in the FOIP can give both an opportunity of enhancing geo-political and geo-economic contribution through an agenda of regional connectivity.
Japan’s New Security Policy: Toward Regional Involvement at Sea?
Strategic Security Analysis, 2016
In less than three years, Tokyo has recovered the right to defend an ally under armed attack and the ability to cooperate with other countries on security issues without geographical constraint. A ban on arms exports that had prevented Japan from engaging strategic partners for decades has been removed. What does this revamped security architecture imply for Japan’s security policy? This analysis approaches this question from the perspective of Tokyo’s response to challenges in the South China Sea, where tensions are growing amid the rise of China. It shows how the Japanese government is pursuing a strategy of “offshore balancing,” hoping that the military assets of its regional partners can deter Beijing from taking destabilising initiatives. The analysis concludes that, depending primarily on the evolution of China’s behaviour, Japan may well become directly involved in the South China Sea in the near future.
Executive Summary The Donald Trump administration in the United States (US) has expanded its articulation of a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) region by announcing strategic investments and economic cooperation. India and Japan are fundamental to the realisation of the US vision of the region. For India and Japan, however, a deeper commitment to the US vision would depend on several factors. These include the prospects of the FOIP becoming a security-oriented strategy to counter China, as opposed to a regional connectivity programme; avoiding the legitimacy issues encountered by China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); and acquiring an inclusive character. The BRI has been inviting considerable criticism for pushing countries into debt traps and extracting strategic concessions for infrastructure funds. Coupled with developments like the revival of the 'Quad' Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan and the US, the FOIP has the possibility of becoming a security-centric anti-China initiative. This would be to the discomfort of India and Japan, which would hesitate to take sides. Both countries would also wish for greater economic legitimacy and vision of a broader regional economic order from the FOIP, as opposed to it being an initiative for expanding US commercial presence in the region. Notwithstanding announcements of regional infrastructure investments and cooperation efforts, India's repeated emphasis on an 'inclusive' FOIP, Japan's decision to selectively engage with the BRI and their respective geopolitical approaches to the region and strategies towards China, will decide their commitment to the FOIP. However, staying engaged in the FOIP can give both an opportunity of enhancing geo-political and geo-economic contribution through an agenda of regional connectivity.
Japan's Security Reforms under Abe Shinzo: Setting the Stage for Proactivism in the Indo-Pacific
Strategic Analysis, 2022
As the longest-serving Japanese Prime Minister so far, Abe Shinzo will be remembered for the unprecedented shifts he brought about in Japan's security policies. From creating new institutions to fundamental changes in decision-making and from constructing a new framework for defense strategy and acquisition of offensive military capabilities to restrengtheng Japan's alliance with the US, Abe left an indelible and long-lasting mark. He also came up with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision and the Quad, which have become the key facets of regional security. Abe's proactive security initiatives were surely challenging, but will they lead Japan to charter a new radical path?