Risk structure compensation in Germany's statutory health insurance (original) (raw)
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Incomplete risk adjustment and adverse selection in the German public health insurance system
2002
The German statutory health insurance market was exposed to competition in 1996. To avoid adverse selection, a prospective risk compensation scheme was introduced in 1994. Due to their low contribution rates, company-based sickness funds were able to attract a lot of new members. We analyze -using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel -the determinants of these transitions from 1995 to 2000. By estimating a simultaneous two equation system, we find that health status positively, and significantly, affects the probability of changing to a company-based sickness fund, especially after controlling for age. Thus the risk compensation scheme does not fully control for the health status of the changers. Consequently, the comparative advantages of company-based funds will increase over time. This observation provides evidence for the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium.
Health Economics, 2003
In many countries, social health insurance systems are being reformed in favor of more competition among insurers, while premiums are community rated by regulation. The implicit incentives for insurers to engage in risk selection can only be curtailed using appropriate systems of risk-adjusted equalization payments among insurers. To develop these systems, predictors of individual utilization patterns have to be identified, e.g. via regression analysis using previous utilization data. In some countries such as Germany, such data are hardly ever available. In the early nineties, a number of sickness funds participated in an experiment in which individual utilization data were collected. Our data set covers more than 70 000 members of company sickness funds over a 5-year period. We analyze sociodemographic determinants of utilization which could be used as risk adjusters in a risk equalization scheme. Our results suggest that besides age and sex, the set of risk adjusters should include income, family status and a dummy for the last year of life.
Financial incentives in the German Statutory Health Insurance: New findings, new questions
Health Policy, 2010
Objectives: This paper presents findings of a mandatory three-year evaluation of a prevention bonus scheme offered in the German Statutory Health Insurance (SHI). Its objective is to describe the rationale behind the programs, analyze their financial impact and discuss their implications on potentially conflicting goals on solidarity and competition. Methods: The analysis included 70,429 insured enrolled in a prevention bonus program in a cohort study. The intervention group and their matched controls were followed for a three-year period. Matching was performed as nearest neighbor matching. The economic analysis comprised all costs relevant for Sickness Funds (SF) in the SHI and was carried out from a SHI perspective. Differences in cost trends between the intervention and the control group were examined applying the paired t-test. Results: Regarding mean costs there was a significant difference between the two groups of D 177.48 (90% CI [D 149.73; D 205.24]) in favor of the intervention group. If program costs were considered cost reductions of D 100.88 (90% CI [D 73.12; D 128.63]) were obtained. Conclusions: The uptake of a prevention bonus program led to cost reductions in the intervention group compared to the control group even when program costs were considered. However, the results must be interpreted with caution as in addition to financial aspects, socio-economic and health-status, selection bias and the function and use of bonus programs as marketing tools, as well as their long-term sustainability should be considered in future assessments.
Disease Management Programs In Germany's Statutory Health Insurance System
Health Affairs, 2004
The introduction in 1996 of free choice among sickness funds in Germany was accompanied by a "risk structure compensation" (RSC) mechanism based on average spending by age and sex. Because chronically ill people were not adequately taken into account, competition for newly insured consumers concentrated on the healthy. The introduction in 2002 of disease management programs addresses this problem: Insured people in such programs are treated as a separate RSC category, making them a more "attractive" group that no longer generates a deficit. The degree of sickness fund activities and the fierce dispute with physicians are valid indicators that the incentives work.
Health affairs
The introduction in 1996 of free choice among sickness funds in Germany was accompanied by a "risk structure compensation" (RSC) mechanism based on average spending by age and sex. Because chronically ill people were not adequately taken into account, competition for newly insured consumers concentrated on the healthy. The introduction in 2002 of disease management programs addresses this problem: Insured people in such programs are treated as a separate RSC category, making them a more "attractive" group that no longer generates a deficit. The degree of sickness fund activities and the fierce dispute with physicians are valid indicators that the incentives work.
The new risk adjustment formula in Germany: Implementation and first experiences
Health Policy, 2013
In Germany risk adjustment is a core element of the regulatory framework of competition between sickness funds. It shall create a level playing field between funds with very heterogeneous risk structures. Prior to 2009 risk adjustment was mainly by a demographic model. In 2009 morbidity based risk adjustment was introduced, embedded in a broader reform of the statutory health insurance system. The new formula covers 80 "severe" or "costly and chronic" diseases structured in a system of hierarchical groups.
Risk adjustment and risk selection on the sickness fund insurance market in five European countries
Health Policy, 2003
From the mid-1990s citizens in Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland have a guaranteed periodic choice among risk-bearing sickness funds, who are responsible for purchasing their care or providing them with medical care. The rationale of this arrangement is to stimulate the sickness funds to improve efficiency in health care production and to respond to consumers' preferences. To achieve solidarity, all five countries have implemented a system of risk-adjusted premium subsidies (or risk equalization across risk groups), along with strict regulation of the consumers' direct premium contribution to their sickness fund. In this article we present a conceptual framework for understanding risk adjustment and comparing the systems in the five countries. We conclude that in the case of imperfect risk adjustment */as is the case in all five countries in the year 2001 */the sickness funds have financial incentives for risk selection, which may threaten solidarity, efficiency, quality of care and consumer satisfaction. We expect that without substantial improvements in the risk adjustment formulae, risk selection will increase in all five countries. The issue is particularly serious in Germany and Switzerland. We strongly recommend therefore that policy makers in the five countries give top priority to the improvement of the system of risk adjustment. That would enhance solidarity, cost-control, efficiency and client satisfaction in a system of competing, risk-bearing sickness funds. # (W.P.M.M. van de Ven). Health Policy 65 (2003) 75 Á/98 www.elsevier.com/locate/healthpol 0168-8510/02/$ -see front matter # 2002 Elsevier Science Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 1 6 8 -8 5 1 0 ( 0 2 ) 0 0 1 1 8 -5
Lancet (London, England), 2017
Bismarck's Health Insurance Act of 1883 established the first social health insurance system in the world. The German statutory health insurance system was built on the defining principles of solidarity and self-governance, and these principles have remained at the core of its continuous development for 135 years. A gradual expansion of population and benefits coverage has led to what is, in 2017, universal health coverage with a generous benefits package. Self-governance was initially applied mainly to the payers (the sickness funds) but was extended in 1913 to cover relations between sickness funds and doctors, which in turn led to the right for insured individuals to freely choose their health-care providers. In 1993, the freedom to choose one's sickness fund was formally introduced, and reforms that encourage competition and a strengthened market orientation have gradually gained importance in the past 25 years; these reforms were designed and implemented to protect the ...