Precis of Moral Realism: A Defence (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2003) (original) (raw)
Related papers
From Scepticism to Anti‐Realism
Dialectica
ONE TYPE OF OPPOSITION TO MORAL REALISM
Thanks, We're Good: Why Moral Realism Is Not Morally Objectionable
Philosophical Studies
DECONSTRUCTİNG MORAL ANTİ-REALİSTS' DENİAL OF MORAL FACTS
OLUSOLA V I C T O R OLANIPEKUN
ETHOS: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social sciences , 2024
A Normative Approach to Moral Realism
The Epistemological Challenge to Metanormative Realism
Philosophical Studies, 2010
Rationalist Realism and Constructivist Accounts of Morality
Philosophical Studies, 2005
The Philosophical Review, 1986
Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism
2004
A Criticism of the Idea That Realism Is an Amoral and Bellicose Doctrine
Agent-focused Moral Realism Defended: Responses to my Critics
Australasian Philosophical Review, 2024
Review Kevin De Lapp Moral Realism
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2017
Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth, and Objectivity
Acta Analytica, 2017
On Moral Realism Without Foundations
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1986
Simon Blackburn Encountering Chinese Philosophy, 2024
Five Kinds of Epistemic Arguments Against Robust Moral Realism
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism,, 2023
The Explanatory Challenge: Moral Realism Is No Better Than Theism
European Journal of Philosophy, 2018
A Unique Metaphysical Problem for Moral Realism
Human Action And Moral Realism
2017
Cognitivist Presumptions of Moral Realism in Justification of Moral Truths
Beytulhikme International Journal Philolosopy, 2024
From Epistemic to Moral Realism
The Case against Evaluative Realism
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History …, 2006
An Anti-Realist View of the Moral Law
On the Epistemic Status of Considered Moral Judgments
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1991
Evolutionary Debunking of Normative Realism. Not a Real Threat for Realists
2017
Towards Cognitive Moral Quasi-Realism
Philosophies
Realism and Reality: Some Realistic Reconsiderations
Journal for The Theory of Social Behaviour, 1990
Striking coincidences: How realists should reason about them
Striking coincidences: How realists should reason about them, 2019
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2005
Review of "Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 9"