An Integrated Model for Transmission Sector using Cooperative Game Theory (original) (raw)
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Modeling transmission sector of electricity markets is a challenge due to issues like violation of network operating limits, information asymmetry and conflict of incentives. A model that addresses these concerns is a significant solution because it integrates the power business seamlessly when transmission also is competitive. In this paper, a model for transmission zone restructure is proposed. It incorporates market mechanisms to tackle network issues. A differential, elastic Transmission Service Charge (TSC) to reduce line loss and power deficit is also presented. Using this TSC as a common incentive or coalition value, transmission is modeled in a Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) environment. Counter-flow data is generated using graph theory based power vectors and information asymmetry is resolved. The method when applied to a 24 bus Indian power system gave a set of trades addressing above concerns.
Coop Game Theory Multilateral Sudha
Modeling transmission sector of electricity markets is a challenge due to issues like violation of network operating limits, information asymmetry and conflict of incentives. A model that addresses these concerns is a significant solution because it integrates the power business seamlessly when transmission also is competitive. In this paper, a model for transmission zone restructure is proposed. It incorporates market mechanisms to tackle network issues. A differential, elastic Transmission Service Charge (TSC) to reduce line loss and power deficit is also presented. Using this TSC as a common incentive or coalition value, transmission is modeled in a Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) environment. Counter-flow data is generated using graph theory based power vectors and information asymmetry is resolved. The method when applied to a 24 bus Indian power system gave a set of trades addressing above concerns.
Coordination of multilateral trades in electricity markets via power vectors
European Transactions on Electrical Power, 2011
A transmission restructure model is presented, which resolves line abuse, conflict of incentives and information asymmetry in electricity markets. It uses market compatible game theory, graph theory, market mechanism, multilateral trade structure, etc. rather than conventional tools. The model is useful to emulate any active, competitive transmission sector. It has more relevance in countries like India with high T&D loss and power deficit problems. Cooperative game theory (CGT) is holistically applied in organizational, operational, commercial and planning aspects of restructure. A three phase CGT environment to model entity interactions, an elastic transmission service charge (TSC) to penalize abuse and a powerful power vector to resolve information asymmetry are some proposals developed in this context. In the scheme, Discos use power vectors to play the game and negotiate for agreeable TSC share and engineer fruitful mergers. A stable set of coalitions contracting optimal trades at lowest TSC is finally obtained. The method is illustrated on a 5 bus and successfully tested on a 24 bus Indian power system. The outcome is that agents aggregate sequentially, to safeguard network security as a common agenda, despite market activities starting at diverse locations. These results are important because transmission is the most difficult zone to model in electricity markets due to several issues and this model addresses most of them. Copyright
International Review of Electrical Engineering-iree, 2013
In deregulated electricity markets there is a strong need for effective allocation of fixed costs to market participants. The conventional usage based methods currently employed in market scenario may fail to send right economic signals. Hence in this paper, cooperative game theory is applied for power system fixed cost allocation. Increasing competition in the energy market can help maximize customers’ payoffs. This can be achieved by applying game theory. In this regard, two solution methodologies such as Nucleolus and Shapley value are adopted in a Multi-lateral market. Both the methods have their pros and cons, while it can be inferred that Shapley value is a more preferable method when the solution is in the core of the game. In this paper, these methods are applied in case of IEEE 14 bus, New England 39 bus and Indian 75 bus power system and the results obtained are compared with the conventional usage based methods
Definition of an Efficient Transmission System Using Cooperative Games Theory
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2006
Under a context of transmission open access, a methodology to define a common transmission trunk system using economic and technical criteria is proposed. A transmission trunk system is defined as a unique and common system constituted by electrical lines and substations that are economically efficient and necessary to allow the development of an electrical market and the supply of demand in the respective electrical system at a minimum cost and in an efficient manner. The principles of cooperation and interaction between agents that are the base for the cooperative games theory are used. Simple games and the Shapley Value approach are used. The proposal responds to the need to identify a common main system, common to supply and demand agents, needed in system open access schemes in electricity markets.
2014 Eighteenth National Power Systems Conference (NPSC), 2014
In deregulated electricity markets there is a strong need for effective allocation of transmission embedded costs to market participants. The conventional usage based methods such as MW-Mile and ZCF methods which are currently employed in market scenario may fail to send right economic signals. Hence in this paper, cooperative game theory based approaches are demonstrated. The existing game theory based approaches like Nucleolus and Shapley Value methods are found to be inefficient for transmission embedded cost allocation, due to their own pros and cons. Therefore Proportional Nucleolus (P-N) method which is also a cooperative game theory approach is proposed in this paper to overcome the drawbacks of aforementioned methods. All the methods presented in this paper are tested on IEEE 14 bus system, and a comparative study was carried out with the obtained results.
Transmission cost allocation by cooperative games and coalition formation
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2002
The allocation of costs of a transmission system to its users is still a pending problem in many electric sector market regulations. This paper contributes with a new allocation method among the electric market participants. Both cooperation and competition are defined as the leading principles to fair solutions and efficient cost allocation. The method is based mainly on the responsibility of the agents in the physical and economic use of the network, their rational behavior, the formation of coalitions and cooperative game theory resolution mechanisms. The designed method is applicable to existing networks or to their expansion. Simulations are made with sample networks. Results conclude that adequate solutions are possible in a decentralized environment with open access to networks. Comparisons with traditional allocation systems are shown, cooperative game solutions compare better in economic and physical terms.
Power System Optimization Problems: Game Theory Applications
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems, 2020
We look at the conflict situation in power system problems from an optimization perspective and use Game Theory (GT) concepts for modelling and solving the problem. In order to model the conflicts effectively, we first identify the players, the optimizing quantity and the optimizing platform. This paper details two power system problems and present a case study. We also identify two more areas where the same principles may be applied. Though our work focuses on Cooperative Game Theory (CGT), an extension to the Non-Cooperative Game Theory (NGT) platform is possible. Since GT is more relevant to a market structure, we use market engineering principles including multilateral trades, differential pricing, inverse elasticity rule, graph theoretical allocation, etc. as tools for organizing the optimization process. A useful addition for inducing stability in the decision making process is the concept of 'Power Vectors' borrowed from sports and game parlance for ceding players. Results are encouraging, with a transmission loss reduction of more than 70% in a five bus and 40% in a 24 bus system. We conclude that both versions of GT, the CGT and NGT are powerful tools for optimization in a practical scenario with conflicts and contradictory incentives.