Coordination of multilateral trades in electricity markets via power vectors (original) (raw)
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Modeling transmission sector of electricity markets is a challenge due to issues like violation of network operating limits, information asymmetry and conflict of incentives. A model that addresses these concerns is a significant solution because it integrates the power business seamlessly when transmission also is competitive. In this paper, a model for transmission zone restructure is proposed. It incorporates market mechanisms to tackle network issues. A differential, elastic Transmission Service Charge (TSC) to reduce line loss and power deficit is also presented. Using this TSC as a common incentive or coalition value, transmission is modeled in a Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) environment. Counter-flow data is generated using graph theory based power vectors and information asymmetry is resolved. The method when applied to a 24 bus Indian power system gave a set of trades addressing above concerns.
An Integrated Model for Transmission Sector using Cooperative Game Theory
2010
Restructured power systems require a separate model to analyze organizational, economic, operational and planning concerns in transmission sector of electricity markets. Grid operation in these markets is affected by violation of network operating limits, conflict of incentives and information asymmetry since commercial considerations overrule engineering needs. This paper proposes a model for transmission restructure that addresses these concerns and integrates the power business seamlessly. It incorporates market mechanisms to tackle network issues. A differential, elastic Transmission Service Charge (TSC) to reduce line loss and power deficit is presented and used as a coalition value to model transmission in a Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) environment. Counter-flow data is generated using graph theory based power vectors to resolve information asymmetry. The method was applied to a 24 bus Indian power system and gave a set of trades addressing above challenges.
International Review of Electrical Engineering-iree, 2013
In deregulated electricity markets there is a strong need for effective allocation of fixed costs to market participants. The conventional usage based methods currently employed in market scenario may fail to send right economic signals. Hence in this paper, cooperative game theory is applied for power system fixed cost allocation. Increasing competition in the energy market can help maximize customers’ payoffs. This can be achieved by applying game theory. In this regard, two solution methodologies such as Nucleolus and Shapley value are adopted in a Multi-lateral market. Both the methods have their pros and cons, while it can be inferred that Shapley value is a more preferable method when the solution is in the core of the game. In this paper, these methods are applied in case of IEEE 14 bus, New England 39 bus and Indian 75 bus power system and the results obtained are compared with the conventional usage based methods
Coop Game Theory Multilateral Sudha
Modeling transmission sector of electricity markets is a challenge due to issues like violation of network operating limits, information asymmetry and conflict of incentives. A model that addresses these concerns is a significant solution because it integrates the power business seamlessly when transmission also is competitive. In this paper, a model for transmission zone restructure is proposed. It incorporates market mechanisms to tackle network issues. A differential, elastic Transmission Service Charge (TSC) to reduce line loss and power deficit is also presented. Using this TSC as a common incentive or coalition value, transmission is modeled in a Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) environment. Counter-flow data is generated using graph theory based power vectors and information asymmetry is resolved. The method when applied to a 24 bus Indian power system gave a set of trades addressing above concerns.
Viewing Power flow in an Electricity Market as Confluence of Stable Multilateral Trades
This paper contributes a new method to appraise the impact of trades in an electricity market within multilateral trade structures. We propose that the conventional power flow problem be redefined or re-interpreted as a consequence of a confluence of trades, coordinated by the Transmission Provider (TP). Though commerce of power is between end-users, impact is on the facilitator of competition, the grid. The TP prevents abuse of the network using Transmission Service Charges (TSC) modelled as a flexible financial instrument as per market engineering principles. Our scheme envisions formation of stable coalitions based on fruitful synthesis of separately evaluated trades. We finally illustrate our methodology with a 5 bus and 24 bus examples in a cooperative game theory (CGT) environment. .
Power Vector Coordination of Socially Stable Multilateral Trades
2008 Joint International Conference on Power System Technology and IEEE Power India Conference, 2008
This paper presents a new set of methodologies and tools to implement multilateral trades in a restructured electricity market. Loss minimization is made an objective, realized through elasticized transmission charge. This charge is designed to acts as a financial instrument that penalizes deviation from least loss formulation. To reduce its impact coalition formation is envisaged in a cooperative game theory environment. Power vectors are derived to guide coalitions. Marginal vectors are used as socially stable pay-off vectors to share the charges. This model that exemplifies an electricity market is proposed as most suitable since all aspects are based on market engineering principles. A five bus power system is used to illustrate the suitability. Index Terms INSPEC Controlled Indexing game theory , power markets , power transmission economics Non Controlled Indexing cooperative game theory , electricity market , financial instruments , five bus power system , power vector coordination , socially stable multilateral trades , transmission charge
Transmission cost allocation by cooperative games and coalition formation
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2002
The allocation of costs of a transmission system to its users is still a pending problem in many electric sector market regulations. This paper contributes with a new allocation method among the electric market participants. Both cooperation and competition are defined as the leading principles to fair solutions and efficient cost allocation. The method is based mainly on the responsibility of the agents in the physical and economic use of the network, their rational behavior, the formation of coalitions and cooperative game theory resolution mechanisms. The designed method is applicable to existing networks or to their expansion. Simulations are made with sample networks. Results conclude that adequate solutions are possible in a decentralized environment with open access to networks. Comparisons with traditional allocation systems are shown, cooperative game solutions compare better in economic and physical terms.
“Design and Allocation of Transmission prices in Electricity Markets”
2012
This paper reports a novel design for Transmission Service Charge (TSC) and its allocation in electricity markets. The transmission sector of a multi-agent market is vulnerable to congestion, loss, voltage instability etc. In our design TSC penalizes such abuse and has a versatile and intuitive role in negotiation and coalition formation. We present an innovative method to elasticize TSC with respect to demand. It is one of the two instruments introduced to organize efficient trades in the market, modelled in a Cooperative Game Theory environment. We propose algorithms for construction and execution of the TSC via the elastic curve in compliance with the multi-objective functions of a coalition value. Illustration is on a five bus power system.