Pittsburgh School Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
This essay argues that acknowledging the existence of mind-independent facts is a matter of vital importance, in that acquiescence before the layout of the world is something demanded of knowing agents from the most elementary empirical... more
This essay argues that acknowledging the existence of mind-independent facts is a matter of vital importance, in that acquiescence before the layout of the world is something demanded of knowing agents from the most elementary empirical deliverance to the most abstract construct. Building on the idea that normativity requires the presence of more than one option to choose from, the essay shows how the cessation of one's life is the disjunctive alternative of any experiential episode. This much has been missed, it argues, because of a generalized failure to appreciate how even the simplest atomic contents embroil their subjects in acts of assent. Its account thus casts a new light on relativism and skepticism, revealing them to be provisional luxuries supported only by the cognitive labor of others.
In Mind and World McDowell aims to answer the question of how both our experience of the world and the world our experience is about can be conceptually framed through and through, and yet the world can be understood as independent from... more
In Mind and World McDowell aims to answer the question of how both our experience of the world and the world our experience is about can be conceptually framed through and through, and yet the world can be understood as independent from our empirical judgements. McDowell suggests that, to answer this question, we need to steer our way between " bald naturalism " and " rampant platonism " as two extreme ways to explain our capacity to use concepts and respond to reasons. In this paper, I claim that the idea of conceptual content, which McDowell uses to reconcile the two opposing extremes, lends itself to two conflicting interpretations. I suggest that, in order to accommodate both of these interpretations, McDowell needs to offer an account of the evolution of the normative which would explain the relationship between the idea of language as a set of social practices and the idea of objective conceptual contents.
Brandom's idea of objectivity, as presented within the framework of his normative pragmatism, accommodates two claims. According to Brandom, discursive norms are instituted by practical attitudes of the members of a social group; and, at... more
Brandom's idea of objectivity, as presented within the framework of his normative pragmatism, accommodates two claims. According to Brandom, discursive norms are instituted by practical attitudes of the members of a social group; and, at the same time, the objectivity of these norms is not reducible to social consensus. The central challenge for Brandom is to explain how the norms that all members of a group take to be correct differ from those that are correct objectively. I show that Brandom's distinction between correct and incorrect moves in what he calls the " scorekeeping game " doesn't yield objectivity unless supported by the Peircean idea of the end of inquiry. It is this idea that is capable of successfully reconciling the social character of the game and the objectivity of meanings shared by scorekeepers. I further suggest that, in the absence of this idea, Brandom's approach results in a discrepancy between inferential roles played by linguistic expressions and institutional roles played by scorekeepers.
John McDowell’s conceptualism has suffered some modifications since its initial formulation. Our objective in this paper is to show that as a result of these adjustments, John MacDowell’s so-called new conceptualism displays the... more
John McDowell’s conceptualism has suffered some modifications since its initial formulation. Our objective in this paper is to show that as a result of these adjustments, John MacDowell’s so-called new conceptualism displays the conceptual content of its justifying nature.
This paper argues that there is a conflict between two theses held by John McDowell, namely i) the claim that we are under a standing obligation to revise our beliefs if reflection demands it; and ii) the view that veridical experience is... more
This paper argues that there is a conflict between two theses held by John McDowell, namely i) the claim that we are under a standing obligation to revise our beliefs if reflection demands it; and ii) the view that veridical experience is a mode of direct access to the world. Since (i) puts no bounds on what would constitute reasonable doubt, it invites skeptical concerns which overthrow (ii). Conversely, since (ii) says that there are some experiences which we are entitled to trust, it undermines the prescriptive scope of (i). Drawing on C. S. Peirce’s distinction between genuine and contrived doubt, I maintain that critical revisions of beliefs should be triggered only by unwanted disruptions of habits, thereby restoring unity between McDowell’s two theses.
In a recent article in this journal, Marc Champagne leveled an argument against what Wilfrid Sellars dubbed 'the Myth of the Given.' Champagne contends that what is given in observation in the form of a sensation must be able to both... more
In a recent article in this journal, Marc Champagne leveled an argument against what Wilfrid Sellars dubbed 'the Myth of the Given.' Champagne contends that what is given in observation in the form of a sensation must be able to both cause and justify propositionally structured beliefs. He argues for this claim by attempting to show that one cannot decide which of two equally valid chains of inference is sound without appeal to what is given in experience. In this note, I show that while this argument is sound, the conclusion he draws is far too strong. Champagne's argument shows only that our empirical beliefs are determined through experience. It does not license the stronger claim that, in order for us to have empirical knowledge, bare sensations must be able to justify beliefs.
Most inferentialists hope to bypass givenness by tracking the conditionals claimants are implicitly committed to. I argue that this approach is underdetermined because one can always construct parallel trees of conditionals. I illustrate... more
Most inferentialists hope to bypass givenness by tracking the conditionals claimants are implicitly committed to. I argue that this approach is underdetermined because one can always construct parallel trees of conditionals. I illustrate this using the Müller-Lyer illusion and touching a table. In the former case, the lines are either even or uneven; in the latter case, a moving hand will either sweep through or be halted. For each possibility, we can rationally foresee consequents. However, I argue that, until and unless we benefit from what is given in experience, we cannot know whether to affirm the antecedents of those conditionals.
Robert Brandom holds that what we mean is best understood in terms of what inferences we are prepared to defend, and that such a defence is best understood in terms of rule-governed social interactions. This manages to explain quite a... more
Robert Brandom holds that what we mean is best understood in terms of what inferences we are prepared to defend, and that such a defence is best understood in terms of rule-governed social interactions. This manages to explain quite a lot. However, for those who think that there is more to making correct/incorrect inferences than obeying/breaking accepted rules, Brandom’s account fails to adequately capture what it means to reason properly. Thus, in an effort to sketch an alternative that does not rely primarily on peer pressure, I draw on the work of C. S. Peirce. Peirce argued that, when we reason, we manipulate abstract diagrams in order to observe what results. Since some manipulations are barred by the self-same nature of the diagrams, I try to show that this qualitative incompatibility, which I dub “contrapiction,” is a good (non-social) reason to regard some reasoning as bad.