Pittsburgh School Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Dieser Artikel untersucht den meta-philosophischen Graben, der sich durch die P i t t s b u r g h e r S c h u l e der zeitgenössischen Philosophie zieht. Es handelt sich dabei um eine Meinungsverschiedenheit über die Angemessenheit und... more

Dieser Artikel untersucht den meta-philosophischen Graben, der sich durch die P i t t s b u r g h e r S c h u l e der zeitgenössischen Philosophie zieht. Es handelt sich dabei um eine Meinungsverschiedenheit über die Angemessenheit und Erfolgsaussichten philosophischer Erläuterungsversuche, in denen begriffliche Praktiken, welche wir nur implizit beherrschen, durch die Kombination einfacher und einfach zu überblickender praktischer Regeln nachkonstruiert werden. Während solche philosophischen Rekonstruktionen für Robert Brandom zu einem besseren Verständnis der relevanten Begriffe bzw. Vokabulare führen und damit ein taugliches Mittel für die analytische Philosophie sein können, hält John McDowell sie für Symptome eines fehlerhaften Verständnisses diskursiver Praxis und ihr Scheitern für unvermeidbar. Nach McDowell liegt die Aussichtslosigkeit („linearer“) philosophischer Rekonstruktionen im Holismus der Sprachkompetenz und der Intentionalität begründet: Zwischen konkreten begrif...

In this article, I discuss the primacy that, following Sellars, Robert Brandom ascribes to the intersubjective and discursive space of reasons over all other processes in which the human mind is involved. I will compare Brandom’s... more

In this article, I discuss the primacy that, following Sellars, Robert Brandom ascribes to the intersubjective and discursive space of reasons over all other processes in which the human mind is involved. I will compare Brandom’s perspective with that of the situated approach to the study of mind. At first, my aim is to show that the origin of intentionality has to be found in the sphere of sentience and the living body. Second, by comparing the enactivist account of language that derives from the naturalization of Husserl’s phenomenology with the neo-pragmatist approach to the linguistic turn, I argue for a heuristic primacy owing to the linguistic practice of giving and asking for reasons. This allows me to reflect with a meta-philosophical approach on to what extent two families of views such as pragmatism and phenomenology, with their different variants, interact in the attempt to blend things together, i.e., nature and culture; mind and world; and what happens inside the human body and what happens outside it.

It is common to criticize the idea of objectivity by claiming that we cannot make sense of any cognitive contact with the world that is not constituted by the very materials of our thinking, and to conclude that the idea must be abandoned... more

It is common to criticize the idea of objectivity by claiming that we cannot make sense of any cognitive contact with the world that is not constituted by the very materials of our thinking, and to conclude that the idea must be abandoned and that the world is 'well lost'. We resist this conclusion and argue for a notion of objectivity that places its source within the domain of thoughts by proposing a conception of facts, akin to McDowell's, as thinkable while independent of any act of thinking. However, we do so without any empiricist commitment.

InMind and World,John McDowell claims that we need to steer our way between bald naturalism and rampant platonism as two ways to explain our capacity to use concepts. Performing this task requires an explanation of how concepts can be... more

InMind and World,John McDowell claims that we need to steer our way between bald naturalism and rampant platonism as two ways to explain our capacity to use concepts. Performing this task requires an explanation of how concepts can be both socially charged and, at the same time, genuinely involving the world as it really is. I suggest that McDowell’s explanation is insufficient and that Wilfrid Sellars’s idea of sense impressions might be used to clarify the relationship between social practices and conceptual knowledge without incurring too much damage to the overall architectonics of McDowell’s theory.

McDowell (1994, 2013) argues that in order for our thought and judgments to be about the world, our sensory experience itself must be concept-laden. In Kantian terms, McDowell’s claim is that intuitions are conceptual, demonstrative... more

McDowell (1994, 2013) argues that in order for our thought and judgments to be about the world, our sensory experience itself must be concept-laden. In Kantian terms, McDowell’s claim is that intuitions are conceptual, demonstrative ‘this-suches’ and ipso facto provide constraint on our conceptual judgments. The purpose of this paper is twofold: it is a critique of McDowell’s position followed by a positive account of how sensory experience constrains not only our conceptual judgments but also our perceptual interactions with objects. First, I argue that McDowell’s strategy of finding normative constraint on knowledge by conceptualizing intuitions is problematic because it rests on an exegetically questionable reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, namely on three crucial points: the import of the ‘togetherness’ and ‘sameness of function’ principles, the content of an intuition, and the singularity and immediacy of intuition. I further argue that McDowell’s approach undermines its own aim of finding in intuition a source of ‘friction’ for our conceptual judgments. Secondly, I take recourse to Todes’s phenomenological account of the ‘Perceptual Categories’ in order to develop the notion of a normative framework which hinges on the role of perceptual satisfactions. I speculate that this framework, which I term ‘somatic normativity’, is not exhausted at the level of preconceptual perceptual interactions but is continuous with and functions at the level of conceptual judgments. I suggest that this might be a more fruitful approach in sourcing experience’s normative constraint on thought and knowledge without purporting an isomorphism of intuition and concept. I conclude after considering potential objections to this proposal.

McDowell famously relies on his interpretation of Kant to clarify the intentionality of sensory consciousness. In this article, I argue that the selective use of Kantian notions troubles McDowell account. The first section shows how... more

McDowell famously relies on his interpretation of Kant to clarify the intentionality of sensory consciousness. In this article, I argue that the selective use of Kantian notions troubles McDowell account. The first section shows how McDowell’s view on intentionality rests on the transcendental role assigned to (revised) Kantian intuitions (§1). The following sections argue that the introduction of “corrected” Kantian claims activates a dialectical tension that runs through McDowell’s thinking. This
contradictory logic is visible in the progression from Mind and World to later essays. On the one hand, the broad Kantian framework of Mind and World illuminates the shortcomings of its presentation of intuitional content as propositional. To offer a coherent account of intuitions, McDowell would need to engage more closely with central claims of Kant’s philosophy (§2). On the other hand, McDowell’s attempt to redefine his view of intuitional content in light of Kantian categories does not solve the problem but generates additional frictions. In particular, McDowell’s presentation of the directedness of thought to objects discloses the necessity of a closer
engagement with the substantive claims of Kant’s critical metaphysics (§3).

John McDowell’s conceptualism has suffered some modifications since its initial formulation. Our objective in this paper is to show that as a result of these adjustments, John MacDowell’s so-called new conceptualism displays the... more

John McDowell’s conceptualism has suffered some modifications since its initial formulation. Our objective in this paper is to show that as a result of these adjustments, John MacDowell’s so-called new conceptualism displays the conceptual content of its justifying nature.

In a recent article in this journal, Marc Champagne leveled an argument against what Wilfrid Sellars dubbed 'the Myth of the Given.' Champagne contends that what is given in observation in the form of a sensation must be able to both... more

In a recent article in this journal, Marc Champagne leveled an argument against what Wilfrid Sellars dubbed 'the Myth of the Given.' Champagne contends that what is given in observation in the form of a sensation must be able to both cause and justify propositionally structured beliefs. He argues for this claim by attempting to show that one cannot decide which of two equally valid chains of inference is sound without appeal to what is given in experience. In this note, I show that while this argument is sound, the conclusion he draws is far too strong. Champagne's argument shows only that our empirical beliefs are determined through experience. It does not license the stronger claim that, in order for us to have empirical knowledge, bare sensations must be able to justify beliefs.

In Mind and World McDowell aims to answer the question of how both our experience of the world and the world our experience is about can be conceptually framed through and through, and yet the world can be understood as independent from... more

In Mind and World McDowell aims to answer the question of how both our experience of the world and the world our experience is about can be conceptually framed through and through, and yet the world can be understood as independent from our empirical judgements. McDowell suggests that, to answer this question, we need to steer our way between " bald naturalism " and " rampant platonism " as two extreme ways to explain our capacity to use concepts and respond to reasons. In this paper, I claim that the idea of conceptual content, which McDowell uses to reconcile the two opposing extremes, lends itself to two conflicting interpretations. I suggest that, in order to accommodate both of these interpretations, McDowell needs to offer an account of the evolution of the normative which would explain the relationship between the idea of language as a set of social practices and the idea of objective conceptual contents.

Brandom's idea of objectivity, as presented within the framework of his normative pragmatism, accommodates two claims. According to Brandom, discursive norms are instituted by practical attitudes of the members of a social group; and, at... more

Brandom's idea of objectivity, as presented within the framework of his normative pragmatism, accommodates two claims. According to Brandom, discursive norms are instituted by practical attitudes of the members of a social group; and, at the same time, the objectivity of these norms is not reducible to social consensus. The central challenge for Brandom is to explain how the norms that all members of a group take to be correct differ from those that are correct objectively. I show that Brandom's distinction between correct and incorrect moves in what he calls the " scorekeeping game " doesn't yield objectivity unless supported by the Peircean idea of the end of inquiry. It is this idea that is capable of successfully reconciling the social character of the game and the objectivity of meanings shared by scorekeepers. I further suggest that, in the absence of this idea, Brandom's approach results in a discrepancy between inferential roles played by linguistic expressions and institutional roles played by scorekeepers.

Most inferentialists hope to bypass givenness by tracking the conditionals claimants are implicitly committed to. I argue that this approach is underdetermined because one can always construct parallel trees of conditionals. I illustrate... more

Most inferentialists hope to bypass givenness by tracking the conditionals claimants are implicitly committed to. I argue that this approach is underdetermined because one can always construct parallel trees of conditionals. I illustrate this using the Müller-Lyer illusion and touching a table. In the former case, the lines are either even or uneven; in the latter case, a moving hand will either sweep through or be halted. For each possibility, we can rationally foresee consequents. However, I argue that, until and unless we benefit from what is given in experience, we cannot know whether to affirm the antecedents of those conditionals.

Robert Brandom holds that what we mean is best understood in terms of what inferences we are prepared to defend, and that such a defence is best understood in terms of rule-governed social interactions. This manages to explain quite a... more

Robert Brandom holds that what we mean is best understood in terms of what inferences we are prepared to defend, and that such a defence is best understood in terms of rule-governed social interactions. This manages to explain quite a lot. However, for those who think that there is more to making correct/incorrect inferences than obeying/breaking accepted rules, Brandom’s account fails to adequately capture what it means to reason properly. Thus, in an effort to sketch an alternative that does not rely primarily on peer pressure, I draw on the work of C. S. Peirce. Peirce argued that, when we reason, we manipulate abstract diagrams in order to observe what results. Since some manipulations are barred by the self-same nature of the diagrams, I try to show that this qualitative incompatibility, which I dub “contrapiction,” is a good (non-social) reason to regard some reasoning as bad.

This essay argues that acknowledging the existence of mind-independent facts is a matter of vital importance, in that acquiescence before the layout of the world is something demanded of knowing agents from the most elementary empirical... more

This essay argues that acknowledging the existence of mind-independent facts is a matter of vital importance, in that acquiescence before the layout of the world is something demanded of knowing agents from the most elementary empirical deliverance to the most abstract construct. Building on the idea that normativity requires the presence of more than one option to choose from, the essay shows how the cessation of one's life is the disjunctive alternative of any experiential episode. This much has been missed, it argues, because of a generalized failure to appreciate how even the simplest atomic contents embroil their subjects in acts of assent. Its account thus casts a new light on relativism and skepticism, revealing them to be provisional luxuries supported only by the cognitive labor of others.

This paper argues that there is a conflict between two theses held by John McDowell, namely i) the claim that we are under a standing obligation to revise our beliefs if reflection demands it; and ii) the view that veridical experience is... more

This paper argues that there is a conflict between two theses held by John McDowell, namely i) the claim that we are under a standing obligation to revise our beliefs if reflection demands it; and ii) the view that veridical experience is a mode of direct access to the world. Since (i) puts no bounds on what would constitute reasonable doubt, it invites skeptical concerns which overthrow (ii). Conversely, since (ii) says that there are some experiences which we are entitled to trust, it undermines the prescriptive scope of (i). Drawing on C. S. Peirce’s distinction between genuine and contrived doubt, I maintain that critical revisions of beliefs should be triggered only by unwanted disruptions of habits, thereby restoring unity between McDowell’s two theses.