International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 26 (original) (raw)

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Volume 26, Number 1, March 1997

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    Javier Arin, Vincent Feltkamp:
    The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games. 61-73
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    Daniel Granot, Michael Maschler:
    The reactive bargaining set: Structure, dynamics and extension to NTU games. 75-95
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    Harry Aarts, Kees Hoede, Yukihiko Funaki:
    A marginalistic value for monotonic set games. 97-111
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    Amnon Rapoport:
    Order of play in strategically equivalent games in extensive form. 113-136
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    Andrzej S. Nowak:
    On an axiomatization of the banzhaf value without the additivity axiom. 137-141

Volume 26, Number 2, June 1997

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    Peter Sudhölter:
    The modified nucleolus: Properties and axiomatizations. 147-182
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    Bert Fristedt:
    The deceptive number changing game, in the absence of symmetry. 183-191
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    Jean Derks, Jeroen Kuipers:
    On the core of routing games. 193-205
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    Daniel Granot, Frieda Granot, Weiping R. Zhu:
    The reactive bargaining set of some flow games and of superadditive simple games. 207-214
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    Andrey Garnaev, G. Garnaeva, P. Goutal:
    On the infiltration game. 215-221
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    Abraham Neyman:
    Correlated equilibrium and potential games. 223-227
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    Leeat Yariv:
    A note on repeated games with non-monotonie value. 229-234
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    Ton Storcken:
    Effectivity functions and simple games. 235-248
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    Jingang Zhao:
    A cooperative analysis of covert collusion in oligopolistic industries. 249-266
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    Paolo Cubiotti:
    Existence of nash equilibria for generalized games without upper semicontinuity. 267-273
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    John Hillas, Dries Vermeulen, Mathijs Jansen:
    On the finiteness of stable sets. 275-278

Volume 26, Number 3, October 1997

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    Ken-Ichi Shimomura:
    Quasi-Cores in Bargaining sets. 283-302
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    János Flesch, Frank Thuijsman, Koos Vrieze:
    Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games. 303-314
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    Massimo Marinacci:
    Finitely additive and epsilon Nash equilibria. 315-333
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    Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover:
    Ternary voting games. 335-351
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    Thomas Quint, Martin Shubik:
    A theorem on the number of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game. 353-359
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    Ulrich Faigle, Walter Kern, Sándor P. Fekete, Winfried Hochstättler:
    On the complexity of testing membership in the core of min-cost spanning tree games. 361-366
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    Jeroen Kuipers:
    Minimum cost forest games. 367-377
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    Parkash Chander, Henry Tulkens:
    The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities. 379-401
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    Frank Thuijsman, Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan:
    Perfect information stochastic games and related classes. 403-408
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    Ulrich Kamecke:
    Rotations: Matching schemes that efficiently preserve the best reply structure of a one shot game. 409-417

Volume 26, Number 4, December 1997

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    Elaine Bennett, Michael Maschler, William R. Zame:
    A demand adjustment process. 423-438
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    Amit Pazgal:
    Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games. 439-453
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    Yves Sprumont:
    On the game-theoretic structure of public-good economies. 455-472
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    Stephen Ching:
    Strategy-proofness and "median voters". 473-490
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    Carles Rafels, Stef Tijs:
    On the Cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set. 491-499
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    Clara Ponsati, Joel Watson:
    Multiple-issue bargaining and axiomatic solutions. 501-524
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    Ross Cressman:
    Dynamic stability in symmetric extensive form games. 525-547
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    Maria Saez-Marti:
    On the asymptotic convergence to mixed equilibria in 2×2 asymmetric games. 549-559
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    John M. Rulnick, Lloyd S. Shapley:
    Convex covers of symmetric games. 561-577
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    Mark B. Cronshaw, Levon S. Kazarian:
    Some bounds for Markov chains. 579-582

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