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Papers by Alessio Bucci

Despite the advancements in the study of sleep, many doubts still remain with regard to the pheno... more Despite the advancements in the study of sleep, many doubts still remain with regard to the phenomenal aspects of dreaming. Sleep mentation seems to lack a solid evolutionary explanation and we have no precise mapping of the phenomenal aspects of dreaming onto the neural activity of the sleeping brain. In order to address these issues, we propose to adopt Predictive Processing (PP), an emerging theoretical framework for cognitive science that aims to unify perception, action and cognition under a single mechanism (Clark 2013, in press; Hohwy 2013). The core idea is that brains are predictive machines with a hierarchical structure, continuously in the business of predicting their own sensory inputs. Applied to the study of dreaming (Hobson & Friston 2012, Hobson, Hong & Friston 2014), PP highlights the continuity and the differences of dreaming with other waking mental states, grounding them on the very same cognitive architecture. However, PP doesn't precisely account for the phenomenological aspects and how we come to experience anything in the first place (the “hard problem” of consciousness). We argue that if a second theory proves to be efficient in explaining the phenomenal aspect of dreaming, then PP could be integrated with it for a more comprehensive explanation of cognition. Our theory of choice is Integrated Information Theory (IIT) (Tononi 2012, Oizumi, Albantakis & Tononi 2014). According to IIT the quantity of consciousness of a system is equal to the amount of integrated information generated by its elements, while the quality of experience is defined in relation to maximally irreducible conceptual structures (MICS), i.e. constellation of concepts in the “qualia space”. Phenomenal consciousness is hence defined on the basis of the informational relationships generated by the system's repertoire of internal states, which characterizes conscious experience in both the waking and dreaming state. After the introduction on PP, IIT and the specific issues surrounding dreaming, we procede to explain how PP and IIT can be merged in order to explain the cognitive mechanism behind the emergence of dream phenomenology, focusing on the conceptual similarity between the two theories' vocabularies. Finally, we illustrate a few critical points and some implications of a more general merging of the theories.

Comparative Philosophy, 2020

Chief amongst the issues Toshihiko Izutsu broached is the philosophisation of Zen Buddhism in his... more Chief amongst the issues Toshihiko Izutsu broached is the philosophisation of Zen Buddhism in his book Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism. This article aims to critically compare Izutsu’s reconstruction of Zen metaphysics with another metaphysical tradition rooted in Descartes’ cogito ergo sum. Putting Izutsu’s terminological choices into the context of Zen Buddhism, we review his argument based on the subject-object distinction and establish a comparison with the Cartesian cogito. A critical analysis is conducted on the functional relationship between subject and object in Izutsu’s metaphysics of Zen (meditation). This is examined step by step from the perspective of Descartes’ Meditations. On the one hand, we focus on prima facie similarities in meditative and reflective methodologies used by the Zen and Cartesian approaches. On the other, we highlight some unequivocal differences in the metaphysical role of the subject: an indubitable foundation for the epistemological access to...

Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2018

ITA: In questo breve commento all'articolo di Sara Palermo mi propongo di rilevare alcune critici... more ITA: In questo breve commento all'articolo di Sara Palermo mi propongo di rilevare alcune critici-tà relative al metodo di indagine e alla solidità dell'ipotesi suggerita dall'autrice. In seguito mi concentrerò sulla rilevanza dello studio del nocebo/placebo nell'ambito del dibattito sul rapporto mente/corpo e su come questi fenomeni mettano in discussione approcci dualisti e neurocentrici ancora pervasivi soprattutto in campo filosofico. In conclusione, mi soffermerò sul ruolo delle aspettative nella costruzione del mo-dello del nocebo/placebo, riprendendo un contesto particolarmente promettente per l'inquadramento teorico del fenomeno: il cervello predittivo.

ENG: In this brief commentary on Sara Palermo’s article, I highlight several methodological criticisms of the data analysis and hypotheses proposed by the author. I then focus on the relevance of nocebo/placebo studies for the contemporary debate on the mind/body problem. In particular, I show how these phenomena raise questions for dualistic and neurocentric approaches that are still prevalent in philosophy. Finally, I stress the role of expectations in nocebo/placebo models, with reference to a promising theoretical framework: the predictive brain.

Sleep and dreaming are important daily phenomena that are receiving growing attention from both t... more Sleep and dreaming are important daily phenomena that are receiving growing attention from both the scientific and the philosophical communities. The increasingly popular predictive brain framework within cognitive science aims to give a full account of all aspects of cognition. The aim of this paper is to critically assess the theoretical advantages of Predictive Processing (PP, as proposed by Clark 2013, Clark 2016; and Hohwy 2013) in defining sleep and dreaming. After a brief introduction, we overview the state of the art at the intersection between dream research and PP (with particular reference to Hobson and Friston 2012; Hobson et al. 2014). In the following sections we focus on two theoretically promising aspects of the research program. First, we consider the explanations of phenomenal consciousness during sleep (i.e. dreaming) and how it arises from the neural work of the brain. PP provides a good picture of the peculiarity of dreaming but it can't fully address the problem of how consciousness comes to be in the first place. We propose that Integrated Information Theory (IIT) (Oizumi et al. 2014; Tononi et al. 2016) is a good candidate for this role and we will show its advantages and points of contact with PP. After introducing IIT, we deal with the evolutionary function of sleeping and dreaming. We illustrate that PP fits with contemporary researches on the important adaptive function of sleep and we discuss why IIT can account for sleep mentation (i.e. dreaming) in evolutionary terms (Albantakis et al. 2014). In the final section, we discuss two future avenues for dream research that can fruitfully adopt the perspective offered by PP: (a) the role of bodily predictions in the constitution of the sleeping brain activity and the dreaming experience, and (b) the precise role of the difference stages of sleep (REM (Rapid eye movement), NREM (Non-rapid eye movement)) in the constitution and refinement of the predictive machinery.

Interviews by Alessio Bucci

ALIUS Bulletin, 2019

The field of the scientific study of consciousness has seen a flourishing of methodologies and th... more The field of the scientific study of consciousness has seen a flourishing of methodologies and theories. The debate over what defines consciousness and how we should study it is, however, yet to be settled. Philosopher Tim Bayne has proposed the “natural kind” approach, suggesting that consciousness properties should be empirically informed rather than defined a priori. Relying on the cross-talk between philosophy and empirical science, he proposes a cautious and integrative outlook that takes into account the diversity of the conscious phenomenon, defending a multidimensional model of conscious states.

Talks by Alessio Bucci

Breaking down consciousness: hints for a conceptual clarification of the notion of "altered state... more Breaking down consciousness: hints for a conceptual clarification of the notion of "altered states" from psychedelics studies.

Sleep and dreaming are fundamental aspects of our mental life and biological upkeep. The introduc... more Sleep and dreaming are fundamental aspects of our mental life and biological upkeep. The introduction of the wake-sleep algorithm (Hinton et al., 1995) in the field of machine learning is a landmark recognition of the efficiency of sleep in building a functional, fit and stable cognitive architecture. The increasingly popular predictive brain framework within cognitive science inherited this view. The aim of this paper is to assess the theoretical advantages of Predictive Processing (PP, as proposed by Clark 2013, 2015; and Hohwy, 2013) in defining sleep and dreaming while incorporating them in a wider understanding of the labour of the brain and its architecture. In order to do so, in the first section we will overview the state of the art at the intersection between dream research and PP (with particular reference to Hobson & Friston, 2012; Hobson, Hong & Friston 2014). In the second section, we will focus on two aspects of the research program: 1. the " neurophenomenology " of dreaming, to be understood as the correlation between phenomenal (subjective) aspects of dreaming and the underlying brain activity during sleep; 2. the evolutionary function of sleeping and dreaming. In regards to 1, we will argue that an ancillary theory of consciousness is required in order to fully flesh out the constitution of phenomenal experience from the predictive architecture. We will propose that the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) (Tononi 2012, 2015; Oizumi, Albantakis, & Tononi, 2014) is a good candidate for this role and we will show its advantages and points of contact with PP. In regards to 2, we will illustrate why according to both PP and IIT sleep has an important adaptive function (through " synaptic pruning " and the conservation of synaptic homoeostasis) and we will discuss why IIT can account for sleep mentation (i.e. dreaming) in evolutionary terms (Albantakis et al., 2014). In the final section we will discuss other two aspects of dream research that are strictly connected to PP: (a) the role of bodily predictions in the constitution of the sleeping brain activity and the dreaming experience; (b) the precise role of the difference stages of sleep (REM, NREM) in the constitution and refinement of the predictive machinery. For (a), we will argue that there are good indications that bodily predictions play an important role in the constitution of dreams (Windt, Harkness & Lenggenhager, 2014; Windt, 2015), criticising the idea that dreaming is just a skull-bound, totally offline form of virtual reality. For (b), we will show that there is contrasting evidence on the function of the difference stages

Chief amongst the issues Toshihiko Izutsu broached is the philosophisation of Zen Buddhism (Izuts... more Chief amongst the issues Toshihiko Izutsu broached is the philosophisation of Zen Buddhism (Izutsu, 1977). This paper aims to critically compare Izutsu's reconstruction of Zen metaphysics with the tradition of Western contemporary metaphysics rooted in Descartes' 'Cogito Ergo Sum’ (Descartes, 1985: 127, 195). After an introduction to Zen Buddhism and a discussion putting Izutsu's terminological choices in context, we reconstruct his argument with the linguistic formula 'I see this' and establish a comparison with the Cartesian Cogito. A critical analysis is conducted on Izutsu's Zen metaphysics from the perspective of Descartes and then vice versa, paying particular attention to the interplay between the two traditions. On the one hand, we focus on a prima facie similarity in meditative and introspective methodologies used by the Zen and Cartesian approaches. On the other, we highlight unequivocal differences in the metaphysical role of the Subject: a mental foundation for the epistemological access to reality (in Descartes), and the point of actualisation of the Universal Mind (in Zen Buddhism). Consequently, in view of the current reception of Descartes in Western analytic metaphysics, we discuss how the Zen ‘I-consciousness' could be newly fleshed out by developing Izutsu's intended philosophy from our critical comparison.

Predictive Processing (PP) is an emerging theoretical framework in cognitive science which aims t... more Predictive Processing (PP) is an emerging theoretical framework in cognitive science which aims to unify perception, action and cognition under a single mechanism (Clark 2013, in press; Hohwy 2013). The core idea is that brains are predictive machines with a hierarchical structure, continuously in the business of predicting their own sensory inputs. This is achieved through Bayesian statistical inferences based on a generative model of the causal structure of the world. One form of PP has been recently applied to the study of dreaming (Hobson & Friston 2012, Hobson, Hong & Friston 2014). This application highlights the continuity and the differences of dreaming with other waking mental states, grounding them on the very same cognitive architecture. However, many doubts still remain with regard to the phenomenal aspects of dreaming and how we come to experience anything in the first place (the “hard problem” of consciousness). It is critical to explain dream consciousness in particular because (1) we have no precise mapping of the phenomenal aspects of dreaming onto the neural activity of the sleeping brain and (2) sleep mentation seems to lack a solid evolutionary explanation.
In order to address these problems we propose to integrate PP with a leading theory of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory (IIT), as proposed by Tononi (2012) and Oizumi, Albantakis & Tononi (2014). IIT proposes an explicit account of phenomenal consciousness, defined as integrated information. According to IIT the quantity of consciousness of a system is equal to the amount of integrated information (ΦMAX) generated by its elements, while the quality of experience is defined in relation to maximally irreducible conceptual structures (MICS), i.e. constellation of concepts in the “qualia space”. Phenomenal consciousness is hence defined on the basis of the informational relationships generated by the system's repertoire of internal states, which characterizes conscious experience in both the waking and dreaming state.
After the introduction of PP, IIT and the specific issues surrounding dreaming, we procede to explain how PP and IIT can be merged in order to explain the cognitive mechanism behind the emergence of dream phenomenology. We highlight the conceptual similarity in the two theories' vocabularies and argue that, if IIT proves to be efficient in explaining the phenomenal aspect of dreaming, then PP could be integrated with it for a more comprehensive explanation of cognition. We then move on to illustrate a few critical points in this merging operation. In conclusion, we speculate that if dreaming consciousness is a positive case study for the integration of PP and IIT, it can also be a springboard for a more general merging of the theories, in which IIT is complementary to PP in explaining consciousness as well as cognition.

Dreaming is a prominent feature of our mental life and has recently found a space in cognitive sc... more Dreaming is a prominent feature of our mental life and has recently found a space in cognitive science as a dedicated field of study. However, as it was recently argued in an extensive review of the contemporary debates (Windt & Noreika, 2011) we still face the problem of how to integrate theories about dreaming within a broader theory of cognition and consciousness (the Integration Problem). In response to the Integration Problem, I present Action Oriented Predictive Processing (AOPP) as recently proposed by Clark (2013). According to AOPP, the brain's cognitive architecture is hierarchical and operates through Bayesian inferences and predictive coding: it actively creates hypotheses on the state of the world according to Bayesian inference rules, and it checks those hypotheses against the sensory data. In this perspective, dreaming is strongly linked to both perception and imagination; however, dreamers are almost entirely isolated from the external world and their brain can’t check the hypotheses against the sensory data. According to AOPP then, dreams are the results of predictions about the world done by a brain running free from the world itself. After the introduction on AOPP, I focus on some empirical studies on dreaming which are compatible with the AOPP explanation, with particular reference to Hobson & Friston (2012). I subsequently address specific issues within this framework, such as:
- is there something that we can call "dream consciousness" and what are its specific features?
- what's the role of action (i.e. interaction with the environment) in the constitution of dreams?
In response to the first, I argue that consciousness is better understood as a continuum of different mental states and dreaming is an altered state of consciousness compared to wake, characterized by a lack of constraints for the predictive mechanism usually active during wake. Regarding the role of action, I argue that the bizarre and impoverished simulated environment in which the dreamer is immersed triggers automatic responses and associations rather than constituting actions as performed during wake. I conclude that AOPP is an innovative but also integrative framework from which to shed light on the differences and similarities between dreaming and waking consciousness.

Poster Presentations by Alessio Bucci

The notion of “altered” states has been employed in the scientific study of consciousness for dec... more The notion of “altered” states has been employed in the scientific study of consciousness for decades (Ludwig, 1966; Tart, 1990). However, the incredible diversity of identifiable conscious states and the lack of a clear-cut definition of a baseline of consciousness make the notion unclear. Here I aim to provide some conceptual clarifications on what it means to be in an altered state of consciousness, focusing specifically on examples of disturbances of the self, a feature that has received some attention in the literature recently. I present some discussions of empirical cases, drawing on the literature about psychedelic substances (Carhart-Harris et al., 2016; Letheby & Gerrans, 2017; Millière, 2017; Tagliazucchi et al., 2016), trance (Hove et al., 2016; Flor-Henry et al., 2017; Mainieri et al., 2017) and hypnagogic states (Goupil & Bekinschtein, 2012; Thompson, 2014; Windt, 2015). I highlight similarities and differences among these cases and, in line with a recent theoretical analysis (Bayne, Hohwy & Owen, 2016), I propose the adoption of a multidimensional mapping of conscious states. Finally, I explore the implications of this approach for our understanding of consciousness as a unitary concept. I argue that we should consider the notion of “altered” states to be misleading in its normative characterisation and that we should treat this notion as purely descriptive in relation to a somewhat arbitrary baseline.

Predictive Processing (PP) (Clark, 2013, 2016; Hohwy, 2013) claims that brains are predictive mac... more Predictive Processing (PP) (Clark, 2013, 2016; Hohwy, 2013) claims that brains are predictive machines with a hierarchical structure, continuously in the business of predicting their own internal states and external input. This result is achieved through a combination of top-down flows of predictions and bottom-up flows of error signals. Predictions are based on hypotheses construed on a generative model of the world based on statistical Bayesian inferences that the brain learns, refines and deploys over time. This inferential process creates expectations (or priors) which guide prediction at each level of the cognitive hierarchy. Priors are organised from bottom levels (fast timescale perceptual details) to top levels (slow timescale abstract regularities). At each level the brain makes a hypothesis (or prediction) about the state of the level below. At the bottom levels, hypotheses are matched with the stream of sensory inputs, generating an amount of prediction error, that is then streamed upward (forward) in the architecture, repeating the matching process at each level.

Despite the advancements in the study of sleep, many doubts still remain with regard to the pheno... more Despite the advancements in the study of sleep, many doubts still remain with regard to the phenomenal aspects of dreaming. Sleep mentation seems to lack a solid evolutionary explanation and we have no precise mapping of the phenomenal aspects of dreaming onto the neural activity of the sleeping brain.
In order to address these issues, we propose to adopt Predictive Processing (PP), an emerging theoretical framework for cognitive science that aims to unify perception, action and cognition under a single mechanism (Clark 2013, in press; Hohwy 2013). The core idea is that brains are predictive machines with a hierarchical structure, continuously in the business of predicting their own sensory inputs. Applied to the study of dreaming (Hobson & Friston 2012, Hobson, Hong & Friston 2014), PP highlights the continuity and the differences of dreaming with other waking mental states, grounding them on the very same cognitive architecture. However, PP doesn't precisely account for the phenomenological aspects and how we come to experience anything in the first place (the “hard problem” of consciousness).
We argue that if a second theory proves to be efficient in explaining the phenomenal aspect of dreaming, then PP could be integrated with it for a more comprehensive explanation of cognition. Our theory of choice is Integrated Information Theory (IIT) (Tononi 2012, Oizumi, Albantakis & Tononi 2014). According to IIT the quantity of consciousness of a system is equal to the amount of integrated information generated by its elements, while the quality of experience is defined in relation to maximally irreducible conceptual structures (MICS), i.e. constellation of concepts in the “qualia space”. Phenomenal consciousness is hence defined on the basis of the informational relationships generated by the system's repertoire of internal states, which characterizes conscious experience in both the waking and dreaming state.
After the introduction on PP, IIT and the specific issues surrounding dreaming, we procede to explain how PP and IIT can be merged in order to explain the cognitive mechanism behind the emergence of dream phenomenology, focusing on the conceptual similarity between the two theories' vocabularies. Finally, we illustrate a few critical points and some implications of a more general merging of the theories.

Thesis Chapters by Alessio Bucci

Cosa accade quando ci addormentiamo? Cosa sono quei ricordi di immagini, suoni, colori, movimenti... more Cosa accade quando ci addormentiamo? Cosa sono quei ricordi di immagini, suoni, colori, movimenti che abbiamo al risveglio e che chiamiamo sogni? Questi interrogativi permeano la storia del pensiero e si può affermare a buon titolo che siano quesiti fondamentali: non solo trascorriamo quasi un terzo della nostra vita nel sonno, ma i sogni che ne derivano influenzano anche la nostra vita di veglia e si presentano a tutti gli effetti come episodi di attività psichica. Il corpo non si limita a spegnersi durante il sonno, anzi è possibile tracciare una continuità con la veglia sia riguardo le sue disposizioni biologiche sia riguardo l'attività mentale. Il sogno è dunque un fenomeno fondamentale per lo studio della mente e la filosofia non può esimersi dal tenerlo in considerazione e tentare di dare una risposta ai quesiti che pone. Lo scopo di questo scritto è illustrare come l'approccio naturalistico avanzi ipotesi fruttuose per la risoluzione di alcuni problemi filosofici di lunga data; l'obiettivo che mi prefiggo è quello di sottolineare l'attualità del sogno come problema filosofico fondamentale. Al fine del mio lavoro, nel primo capitolo traccerò un breve excursus storico-filosofico sulle teorie del sogno dall'antichità greca fino alla prima metà del Novecento, soffermandomi maggiormente sulla continuità dell'approccio naturalistico nel corso del tempo e individuando in Freud e Malcolm due grandi ostacoli contemporanei a questa visione, rispettivamente per l'ambito scientifico e filosofico. Nel secondo capitolo fornirò le basi scientifiche della discussione analizzando lo stato dell'arte nel campo neuropsicologico e fisiologico; mi soffermerò in particolare sulla teoria dei sogni di Allan Hobson, su alcune critiche mosse ad essa in ambito scientifico e sul recente studio sistematico del sogno lucido, un fenomeno già noto ma che sfida apertamente il senso comune. Nel terzo capitolo, infine, tratterò le posizioni filosofiche contemporanee più rilevanti dopo Malcolm riguardo al tema del sogno, concentrandomi su autori che si appoggiano dichiaratamente ai risultati delle scienze cognitive. Tratterò della natura del fenomeno onirico, suggerendo una sua possibile definizione in termini di simulazione. Illustrerò inoltre i vantaggi dell'approccio naturalistico allo studio del sogno.

Comparative Philosophy, 2020

Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2018

ALIUS Bulletin, 2019

Despite the advancements in the study of sleep, many doubts still remain with regard to the pheno... more Despite the advancements in the study of sleep, many doubts still remain with regard to the phenomenal aspects of dreaming. Sleep mentation seems to lack a solid evolutionary explanation and we have no precise mapping of the phenomenal aspects of dreaming onto the neural activity of the sleeping brain.
In order to address these issues, we propose to adopt Predictive Processing (PP), an emerging theoretical framework for cognitive science that aims to unify perception, action and cognition under a single mechanism (Clark 2013, in press; Hohwy 2013). The core idea is that brains are predictive machines with a hierarchical structure, continuously in the business of predicting their own sensory inputs. Applied to the study of dreaming (Hobson & Friston 2012, Hobson, Hong & Friston 2014), PP highlights the continuity and the differences of dreaming with other waking mental states, grounding them on the very same cognitive architecture. However, PP doesn't precisely account for the phenomenological aspects and how we come to experience anything in the first place (the “hard problem” of consciousness).
We argue that if a second theory proves to be efficient in explaining the phenomenal aspect of dreaming, then PP could be integrated with it for a more comprehensive explanation of cognition. Our theory of choice is Integrated Information Theory (IIT) (Tononi 2012, Oizumi, Albantakis & Tononi 2014). According to IIT the quantity of consciousness of a system is equal to the amount of integrated information generated by its elements, while the quality of experience is defined in relation to maximally irreducible conceptual structures (MICS), i.e. constellation of concepts in the “qualia space”. Phenomenal consciousness is hence defined on the basis of the informational relationships generated by the system's repertoire of internal states, which characterizes conscious experience in both the waking and dreaming state.
After the introduction on PP, IIT and the specific issues surrounding dreaming, we procede to explain how PP and IIT can be merged in order to explain the cognitive mechanism behind the emergence of dream phenomenology, focusing on the conceptual similarity between the two theories' vocabularies. Finally, we illustrate a few critical points and some implications of a more general merging of the theories.