Indra Overland | Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (original) (raw)

Papers by Indra Overland

Sustainability

Research on the adoption of the bicycle as a means of transport has been booming in high-income c... more Research on the adoption of the bicycle as a means of transport has been booming in high-income countries. However, little is known about bicycle adoption in lower-income countries where air pollution is high and cycling infrastructure is poor. Understanding the drivers of cycling adoption in developing economies can increase the efficiency of transport policies while reducing local air pollution, improving health, and cutting greenhouse gas emissions. The objective of this study is to identify the factors affecting cycling uptake in a low-income country using the city of Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan as a case study. The analysis is based on the Theory of Planned Behavior, a questionnaire-based survey of 900 respondents, factor analysis, and a logit model. In contrast to studies carried out in developed countries, this study finds that students are less likely to adopt cycling than other population groups. Other findings suggest that support for public transport, a desire for regular exerc...

Algorithms, 2019

This paper develops an automated algorithm to process input data for segmented string relative ra... more This paper develops an automated algorithm to process input data for segmented string relative rankings (SSRRs). The purpose of the SSRR methodology is to create rankings of countries, companies, or any other units based on surveys of expert opinion. This is done without the use of grading systems, which can distort the results due to varying degrees of strictness among experts. However, the original SSRR approach relies on manual application, which is highly laborious and also carries a risk of human error. This paper seeks to solve this problem by further developing the SSRR approach by employing link analysis, which is based on network theory and is similar to the PageRank algorithm used by the Google search engine. The ranking data are treated as part of a linear, hierarchical network and each unit receives a score according to how many units are positioned below it in the network. This approach makes it possible to efficiently resolve contradictions among experts providing inpu...

Handbook of OPEC and the Global Energy Order, 2020

Regional Connection under the Belt and Road Initiative, 2018

Central Asian Survey, 2022

This article assesses the extent to which the academic community engaged with climate change in C... more This article assesses the extent to which the academic community engaged with climate change in Central Asia between 1991 and 2021. The article finds that climate change has been neglected in the field of Central Asia area studies. Out of a total 13,488 journal articles in eight key journals for Central Asia research, only 33 articles (0.24%) were on climate change or a related topic. Climate change has been similarly neglected at the events of 17 Central Asia area studies associations. Out of 1305 conference panels, none was focused on climate change. Out of 10,249 individual presentations, only two (0.02%) were focused on climate change. The very same scholars who have been most active in the securitization of Central Asia have ignored the severe security threats that climate change poses to the region. The article contributes to the field of Central Asian studies by drawing attention to severe knowledge gaps that hinder the Central Asian countries from adapting to climate change. It concludes with six recommendations.

Environmental Research Communications, 2021

This paper studies socioeconomic and environmental changes in the neighboring areas Bangladesh-My... more This paper studies socioeconomic and environmental changes in the neighboring areas Bangladesh-Myanmar border from 2012 to 2019, thus covering the period before and after the 2017 Rakhine conflict in Myanmar and outflux of refugees across the border to Bangladesh. Given the scarcity and costliness of traditional data collection methods in such conflict areas, the paper uses a novel methodological model based on very-high-resolution satellite imagery, nighttime satellite imagery, and machine-learning algorithms to generate reliable and reusable data for comparative assessment of the impacts of the Rakhine conflict. Assessments of welfare and environmental risks using this approach can be accurate and scalable across different regions and times when other data are unavailable. Key findings are: the general livelihood situation has worsened and income sources shrunk in Rakhine; forced migration damaged the ecologically fragile regions in the two countries; the destruction of aquacultur...

One Earth, 2021

The energy transition is causing a surge in demand for minerals for clean energy technologies, gi... more The energy transition is causing a surge in demand for minerals for clean energy technologies, giving rise to concerns about the sources and security of supplies of critical materials. Although Central Asia was one of the Soviet Union's main sources of metals and industrial minerals, it has been forgotten in contemporary global critical materials analyses. Here we review the Central Asian mineral resource base and assess its current and potential contributions to global supply chains. We find that the importance of Central Asia lies mainly in the diversity of its mineral base, which includes mineable reserves of most critical materials for clean energy applications. This renders the region important in mineral economics, security of supply, and geopolitical perspectives alike. In sum, Central Asia is likely to become a new hotspot for mineral extraction and a major global supplier of selected critical materials for clean energy technologies.

Oxford Energy Forum, 2021

The burgeoning literature on the geopolitics of the energy transition now numbers more than 200 p... more The burgeoning literature on the geopolitics of the energy transition now numbers more than 200 publications (Vakulchuk et al, 2020). Many of these works conjecture boldly about how the replacement of fossil fuels by renewable energy will affect international affairs. However, many of these conjectures rest on unstated assumptions about the global energy system of the past, which is more contested than it is made out to be. Figure 1 presents six areas where one’s interpretation of past and current issues are decisive for how one thinks about the changes that will be wrought by the energy transition. The rest of this article reviews each of them.

Oxford Energy Forum, 2021

Is Russia failing to see the accelerating changes in the global energy system brought on by clima... more Is Russia failing to see the accelerating changes in the global energy system brought on by climate policy and energy technology learning curves? Is it prepared for the impact of these changes on demand for Russian fossil fuel exports? As the world’s largest fossil fuel exporter, Russia will be affected by the energy transition more than any other country. Unlike Saudi Arabia—with which it vies for preeminence as the world’s largest oil exporter—Russia is also the world’s largest gas exporter and third-largest coal exporter. Fossil fuels play a pivotal role in Russia’s income, employment, power on the international stage, and identity. Russia also has the world’s second-largest nuclear arsenal and the world’s largest territory, giving it a major presence in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East alike. There is, therefore, also no other country whose fate in the global energy transition will matter as much to the rest of the world.

Journal of Cleaner Production, 2021

Little is known about how the environmental approaches of foreign investors in developing countri... more Little is known about how the environmental approaches of foreign investors in developing countries are formed. The objective of this study is to conceptualize and investigate the drivers of the environmental performance of foreign firms. This is done through a comparative analysis of the environmental profiles of Chinese and Japanese firms in Myanmar. Applying institutional and resource-based theories, the study investigates the complex and multifaceted roles that domestic regulations and internal resources of firms play in their environmental performance. The study contributes to the literature on corporate environmental behaviour by constructing a novel set of environmental variables connected with FDI. The research is based on survey data covering 296 Chinese and 125 Japanese companies operating in Myanmar. The data are analysed using a hierarchical multiple linear regression. It is found that Japanese companies tend to adopt all-inclusive and comprehensive strategies driven by both regulatory pressure and firm capacity when addressing environmental issues, while the environmental choices of Chinese companies tend to be driven by intra-firm resources. For Chinese companies, neither ownership type nor operating in a polluting industrial sector necessarily influence the environmental profile, whereas both of these variables had significant effects on the environmental performance of Japanese firms. The findings indicate that both resource-based and institutional theories are useful when assessing the influence of environmental regulations on FDI in developing countries.

Energy and Climate Change, 2021

This article carries out a multisectoral qualitative analysis (MSQA) and policy integration analy... more This article carries out a multisectoral qualitative analysis (MSQA) and policy integration analysis of six sectors important for climate mitigation in Southeast Asia in order to assess the status of the climate-energy nexus in the region. It concludes that Southeast Asia will be heavily affected by climate change but the mitigation efforts of the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are incommensurate with the threat they face. Their nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement are modest, they have a low proportion of renewable energy in their energy mixes, a modest target for raising the share of renewable energy and they are not likely to reach this target. The ASEAN countries have also been slow to adopt electric vehicles and to accede to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), while continuing to burn their forests, channel subsidies to fossil fuels and invest in new coal power plants. If ASEAN accelerated decarbonization, it could seize business opportunities, secure its standing in the international political system and climate justice discussions, and increase its chances of reaching the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

AEO6 explores four scenarios – three of which were modelled in AEO5 as well, plus a new scenario ... more AEO6 explores four scenarios – three of which were modelled in AEO5 as well, plus a new scenario focused on attaining Sustainable Development Goal 7, “Affordable and Clean Energy”. Starting with roughly the same suite of technologies for the same population and GDP extrapolations, the four scenarios explore different strategies and escalating levels of ambition, and their implications:

Baseline Scenario: This scenario assumes ASEAN Member States’ energy systems continue to develop along historical trends, with little effort to meet their national or regional targets. Labelled as “Business as Usual” in AEO5, it has been renamed to emphasise that it does not reflect the expected future, but rather historical patterns, as a point of reference for the other scenarios. AMS Targets Scenario (ATS): This scenario projects the future development of ASEAN energy systems if Member States do what is needed to fully achieve their own national energy efficiency and renewable energy targets, as well as their climate commitments – but do not make adjustments to reflect ASEAN regional targets.

APAEC Targets Scenario (APS): This scenario explores what it would take to achieve the regional targets for energy intensity and renewable energy outlined in APAEC 2016–2025, and how this might transform ASEAN’s energy systems even beyond 2025; achieve 23% of total primary energy supply (TPES) from renewable energy and reduce the energy intensity by 30% from 2005 levels, both in 2025.

Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Scenario: This scenario builds on the ATS to explore what ASEAN Member States would have to do to achieve the three targets of SDG 7 by 2030: to ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services; increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix; and double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency (from 2015 levels).

Climate and Development, 2021

Africa has only contributed a small fraction of global greenhouse gas emissions yet faces disprop... more Africa has only contributed a small fraction of global greenhouse gas emissions yet faces disproportionate risks from climate change. This imbalance is one of many inequities associated with climate change and raises questions concerning the origin, distribution and thematic prioritization of funding for climate-change research on Africa. This article analyses a database comprising USD 1.51 trillion of research grants from 521 organizations around the world and covering all fields of research from 1990 to 2020. At most 3.8% of global funding for climate-change research is spent on African topics – a figure incommensurate with Africa’s share of the world population and vulnerability to climate change. Moreover, institutions based in Europe and North America received 78% of funding for climate research on Africa, while African institutions received only 14.5%. Research on climate mitigation received only 17% of the funding while climate impacts and adaptation each received around 40%. Except for Egypt and Nigeria, funding supported research on former British colonies more than other African countries. The findings highlight the need to prioritise research on a broader set of climate-change issues in Africa and to increase funding for Africa-based researchers in order to strengthen African ownership of research informing African responses to climate change.

Environmental Research Communications, 2021

International Journal of Environmental Studies, Jun 1, 2010

This paper argues that the most obvious measure to combat greenhouse gas emissions is to remove t... more This paper argues that the most obvious measure to combat greenhouse gas emissions is to remove the vast subsidies that promote higher energy consumption in more than half of the countries in the world, and that this measure should take precedence over many others. The article discusses also why removing energy subsidies is so difficult, and which type of state may succeed. This question is examined with reference to China, India and Russia, all major contributors to global warming. Non‐democratic governments and energy importers might ...

Business Strategy and the Environment, 2021

The Arctic Environmental Responsibility Index (AERI) covers 120 oil, gas, and mining companies in... more The Arctic Environmental Responsibility Index (AERI) covers 120 oil, gas, and mining companies involved in resource extraction north of the Arctic Circle in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Finland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden. It is based on an international expert perception survey among 173 members of the International Panel on Arctic Environmental Responsibility (IPAER), whose input is processed using segmented string relative ranking (SSRR) methodology. Equinor, Total, Aker BP, Con-ocoPhillips, and BP are seen as the most environmentally responsible companies, whereas Dalmorneftegeophysica, Zarubejneft, ERIELL, First Ore-Mining Company, and Stroygaz Consulting are seen as the least environmentally responsible. Companies operating in Alaska have the highest average rank, whereas those operating in Russia have the lowest average rank. Larger companies tend to rank higher than smaller companies, state-controlled companies rank higher than privately controlled companies, and oil and gas companies higher than mining companies. The creation of AERI demonstrates that SSRR is a low-cost way to overcome the challenge of indexing environmental performance and contributing to environmental governance across disparate industrial sectors and states with divergent environmental standards and legal and political systems.

What is Russia&amp;amp;amp;#x27;s potential as a partner in the global race towards a low... more What is Russia&amp;amp;amp;#x27;s potential as a partner in the global race towards a low-carbon economy? This book provides a balanced analysis of Russia&amp;amp;amp;#x27;s impressive, understudied and sometimes surprising strengths in the renewable energy sector. The work is a first of its kind, exploring the significant political and economic obstacles to developing renewable energy in Russia. The volume explores whether effective partnerships may be achieved by combining Russia&amp;amp;amp;#x27;s excellence in basic research and its diverse natural resources with ...

ASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE). Policy Brief No. 13, 2020

Vietnam is one of the most attractive destinations for renewable energy investment in ASEAN. In 2... more Vietnam is one of the most attractive destinations for renewable energy investment in ASEAN. In 2018, the country attracted USD 5.2 billion. In 2019, the share of renewable energy in the energy mix was 9%, thus already exceeding the 7% target set for 2020. If Vietnam is to continue its success and compete globally for investment in renewable energy, it will need to further develop its investment climate. The competition is heating up in this area, and an increasing number of countries have similar conditions and frameworks for renewable energy investment. Therefore, every improvement may help boost a market’s relative attractiveness. We propose six actions that can further enhance the attractiveness of Vietnam’s renewable energy sector for investment from both domestic and international investors: prioritise renewable energy in the governance system; streamline the regulatory framework; facilitate market entry for investors; improve transparency and communication about the investment regime; improve grid expansion planning; join IRENA to further build the capacity for renewable energy governance.

Energy Union, 2016

This chapter addresses two questions. Firstly, judging from the growing regulatory pressure on Ga... more This chapter addresses two questions. Firstly, judging from the growing regulatory pressure on Gazprom, has the EU really become liberal mercantilist, or is it still just liberal? Secondly, how can Gazprom respond to the pressure? The chapter finds that the EU has become far more systematic and salient in its measures to handle Gazprom, but that it is methodologically difficult to say, on the basis of this case alone, whether the regulatory tightening amounts to a new liberal mercantilist stance or not. The chapter lays out several avenues that Gazprom has followed or could follow in response to the EU and concludes that the best approach for Gazprom would be to adapt to EU market liberalization rather than fighting it—which it is increasingly doing.

Sustainability

Algorithms, 2019

Handbook of OPEC and the Global Energy Order, 2020

Regional Connection under the Belt and Road Initiative, 2018

Central Asian Survey, 2022

Environmental Research Communications, 2021

One Earth, 2021

Oxford Energy Forum, 2021

Journal of Cleaner Production, 2021

Energy and Climate Change, 2021

Climate and Development, 2021

Environmental Research Communications, 2021

International Journal of Environmental Studies, Jun 1, 2010

Business Strategy and the Environment, 2021

ASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE). Policy Brief No. 13, 2020

Energy Union, 2016

Conway Bulletin, 2019

What is a BRI project? Most Chinese projects in Central Asia are bilateral but many of them are a... more What is a BRI project? Most Chinese projects in Central Asia are bilateral but many of them are announced as part of BRI initiatives. This op-ed summarizes data on 261 Chines projects in Central Asia gathered by the Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT), operated by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the OSCE Academy.

This study examines the implications of climate change for international affairs in Southeast Asi... more This study examines the implications of climate change for international affairs in Southeast Asia and for ASEAN as a multilateral organization. Climate change and efforts to mitigate climate change give rise to major risks as well as opportunities in international affairs. It is therefore in the interest of all countries to be aware of the risks and prepare for them, and the overarching purpose of this study is to support ASEAN and its member states in this area. Given Southeast Asia’s complex geography—with numerous archipelagoes, long coastlines, intricate borders, and great-power neighbors—climate change is especially likely to affect interstate relations in the region.Climate change may impact on international affairs among the ASEAN countries at several levels. Firstly, changing climatic conditions may affect interstate relations through humanitarian crises, migration, and/or the need for greater imports of vital goods. Secondly, reducing greenhouse gas emissions requires international coordination and cooperation. Thirdly, the global energy transition driven by climate policy may lead to an altered geopolitical situation in the world, including ASEAN.

The aim of this study is to help a group of actors from the Stavanger region to map international... more The aim of this study is to help a group of actors from the Stavanger region to map international expertise in the field of energy security with focus on the energy-security and climate-change nexus. This is the first step towards setting up an international think tank to conduct joint studies on EU energy security and climate policy, on the links between European climate policy and future energy supplies, on the patterns of interaction between the EU importers and their main suppliers of oil and gas and the role of technology in enhancing the resource base for oil and gas supplies and in creating new opportunities for renewables and energy efficiency.

The study was commissioned by the University of Stavanger (UiS), International Research Institute of Stavanger (IRIS), Stavanger Chamber of Industry and Commerce, and Greater Stavanger Economic Development, and carried out jointly by the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). The study was conducted in the period between February and June 2009 and is based on both quantitative and qualitative analysis of information on energy related research.

In the preparatory phase of the project it was agreed that the study’s geographical scope should be limited to the areas of greatest importance to Norwegian energy interests – Europe (including Russia) and North America. It was also decided that the mapping should focus on research institutions that potentially could be invited to partner with the planned think tank.

The report is divided into six parts and has three appendices. The first and introductory part outlines the goals of the project and presents the structure of the report. In the second part, an assessment of the current state of the European debate on energy security is presented. The focus is on how the policy area ‘European security of energy supply’, has been understood and treated by politicians, both at the EU and national levels. This background chapter informs our conclusion that different problems and approaches to solutions taken by different research actors reflect different political understandings of the problem, and vice versa. The focus is on key policy-makers in Europe, the EU Commission and central member states, as well as Russia as the major gas exporter to the EU (and one major cause of the security of supply concerns in Europe) and the United States, as the EU’s main interlocutor on traditional security issues. This chapter starts by discussing the historical background of the European debate – and action – on energy security, and then goes on to a detailed account of the current state of the debate and the contemporary processes that shape the European debate and policies. Part of the chapter is dedicated to the inherent tensions in the formulation of EU energy policy, pointing out the lack of coherence due to the national vs supranational approaches.

In the third part of the report we explain our methodological approach to identifying the most important research institutions in international research on energy policy. A three-step approach was adopted combining both quantitative and qualitative elements. In the first step, we put together a preliminary gross list of 57 institutions that may play a role setting the international research agenda in this area. In the next step, we ranked the web sites of theses institutions quantitatively, according to their visibility on the internet. Subsequently we carried out a reputational expert survey of the importance of these institutions in the international research and policy community. In the fourth part of the report the results of the expert survey are presented.

This paper is intended as a preliminary guide to the energy elites of the three main oil and gas ... more This paper is intended as a preliminary guide to the energy elites of the three main oil and gas exporting countries in Central Asia, and as a practical tool for foreign actors seeking to understand who is who, who makes decisions and who their interlocutors are in those countries.

Appendix 1 provides extensive tables listing identified members of the elites in the three countries and some of their main attributes. These listings are meant to be used as a reference work.

In addition to functioning as a reference work, the paper attempts to extract some comparative points about the energy elites of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. First of all, it is clear that they share some important features. They are largely technocratic, in the sense that a majority in all three countries have higher technical education that is directly relevant for the petroleum sector. Most have studied in their own home country, Russia or other post-Soviet countries, and are more than 45 years of age.

There are however also important differences among the countries. For instance, Kazakhstan’s energy elite is younger than that of the other two, and more of them have studied in Western Europe or the USA.

Business and politics are closely linked in all three countries, but this is expressed in different ways. In Turkmenistan, it is difficult to identify a domestic business elite distinct from politics, because of the rigid state control over business development. The Turkmen energy elite is also closely associated with the ruling party, the Democratic Party. Similarly close links between the ruling party and the energy elite are evident in Kazakhstan, where most members of the energy elite are affiliated with the Nur Otan party. The energy elite in Kazakhstan was previously more independent, but this has changed with the establishment of a dominant political party. The Kazakh business elite, however, is not affiliated with the ruling party to the same degree as in Turkmenistan. This can be explained by the dominant role of the energy sector in the national economy, which provides impetus for political control over energy resources. In both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the state still controls the energy resources and related companies, directly and in detail. The importance of family connections within and between the different elites is evident in all three countries, with several cases of close relatives of political figures controlling key businesses or energy positions.

This brief comment outlines the changes underway in the production of unconventional gas in North... more This brief comment outlines the changes underway in the production of unconventional gas in North America and sketches the possible chain of consequences for Russia’s role as a gas exporter. If the current trend in the production of unconventional gas continues, it may have a considerable impact on Russia’s export strategies and economic prospects. In an extreme scenario it might even undermine the viability of the Nord Stream, Shtokman and Yamal projects. Although much uncertainty remains, such hypothetical, non-research based scenarios provide a possible agenda for future research, which is the main purpose of this note. Hopefully it can also generate some discussion.

This paper provides a short but comprehensive survey of different aspects of doing business in Uz... more This paper provides a short but comprehensive survey of different aspects of doing business in Uzbekistan. It includes an overview of the Uzbekistani economy, political regime and international relations, focusing on the main worries and risks for foreign investors. At the end of the paper a detailed overview of practicalities and formalities related to investing in Uzbekistan is included.

The death of former president Saparmurat Niyazov opened the possibility of positive change and ne... more The death of former president Saparmurat Niyazov opened the possibility of positive change and new opportunities in Turkmenistan, which so far had been off-limits for all but a few Western oil companies. The power consolidation under the new president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow has however resulted in a confusing combination of continuity and change. The main unanswered question is whether the continuity is interpreted simply as caution and slowness on Berimuhamedow’s part, or whether it represents more fundamental aspects of the Turkmen regime over time. Berdimuhamedow was a key person in Niazov’s government, and would be peculiar if a full-blown democrat were hiding at the top of such a regime for so many years. Another important contradiction within the new regime is between a certain opening on the one hand, combined with increased competence and dynamism which simultaneously makes the regime better equipped to exert repression on the other hand. Our overall judgement is that it will remain staunchly non-democratic but stable, and will play hardball in the petroleum sector.

In March 2012 Dmitry Medvedev will step down as president of the Russian Federation. For five yea... more In March 2012 Dmitry Medvedev will step down as president of the Russian Federation. For five years he has been the main champion of modernization in Russia, and his change of status therefore raises a question: what will become of the modernization effort? Although the modernization project has encountered significant barriers and Medvedev himself is increasingly cast as ineffectual, the fact that some components of the modernization agenda are linked to strong interest groups ensures its continuation with or without Medvedev as Prime Minister. In particular, several of the country’s main businesspeople may wish to promote modernization in the form of a new round of privatization.

Taking the first Forum for Development Cooperation with Indigenous Peoples in 2000 as a point of ... more Taking the first Forum for Development Cooperation with Indigenous Peoples in 2000 as a point of departure, Indra Øverland focused on indigenous to indigenous development assistance. In many of the debates in 2000, Sámi representatives had maintained that a bigger part of the state-financed assistance to Indigenous peoples should be channelled through Sámi organisations. NORAD was open to this proposition, and since the first forum the cooperation between NORAD and the Sámi Council has increased considerably.

Øverland focused on the relations between indigenous organisations and other organisations engaging in development assistance to indigenous peoples on an international level. Along with Sweden, Finland, Denmark, New Zealand, Australia, USA, Canada, France and Japan, Norway is a significant player in the global development assistance arena. At the same time they have indigenous populations with potential roles to play within development cooperation.

The new report published by NUPI, jointly contributed by its partner institutes in all ten ASEAN ... more The new report published by NUPI, jointly contributed by its partner institutes in all ten ASEAN countries, analyses the consequences of climate change and climate policy toward international affairs in ASEAN. Both climate change and climate mitigation are likely to affect international affairs in ASEAN—in ways that are both good and bad—for example through forced migration, strains on food production, accelerated dam construction on the region’s international rivers on reduced dependency on fossil fuel imports. Major analysis and assessment in term of global energy transition, international climate-policy commitments of ASEAN countries, ASEAN's role on climate and energy policy as well as recommendations were put forward.

My contribution was more in part of how Cambodia has responded to the latter (including the country's perspective toward COP21; commitment, progress, and achievement; INDCs; major challenges and constraints).

Northern Europe has assumed greater strategic importance during the new millennium. In particular... more Northern Europe has assumed greater strategic importance during the new millennium. In particular, the importance of the Barents Sea, the Baltic Sea and northwestern Russia has increased. Several reasons underlie this strategic shift. They include Russia’s re-emerging strength as a great power. This is highlighted in the north due to Russia’s long land border with the EU and Norway. Various energy projects are another reason for the growing importance of the region, and here for example bilateral Russian—Norwegian cooperation is already underway alongside multilateral regional coordination. The potential opening of the Arctic sea route as a result of global warming, and the unexploited energy resources in the Arctic Sea shelf represent further policy drivers for a wider interest in the north. The policy and institutional network in northern Europe is rich. After its official unveiling in 1998, the Northern Dimension (ND) programme of the EU became an attempt to coordinate the various activities and introduce some strategic priorities. However, the EU’s action plans for the ND for the years 1999—2006 received criticism from various angles, but perhaps most notably from the Russian government for not taking its views properly into consideration. The political declarations and lists of projects in the EU’s action plans did not pay enough attention to the practical implementation and financing of tangible projects. However, the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) which was launched in 2001 remains today a workable model for concrete project cooperation in the field of environmental protection and nuclear safety. Another partnership, the Northern Dimension Health and Social Well-being partnership (NDHSP), is also in operation. However, so far it has not been able to produce as good project outcomes as the NDEP, especially when it comes to concrete multilateral projects.

The new ND starting in 2007 has a more flexible framework where Russia, Norway, Iceland and the EU are equal partners. The NDEP and NDHSP partnerships still remain at the core. The logistics and transport sector is mentioned as the next new area for setting up a formal partnership, and the possibility of an energy partnership is explored. It is in this context that this policy paper seeks to assess the prospects for the new ND whilst also suggesting ways for ‘energising’ it, both literally and in the sense of analysing how energy policy could fit in.

The Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 2011

Abstract The article analyses the overall framework of Russian electricity reforms, which needs t... more Abstract The article analyses the overall framework of Russian electricity reforms, which needs to be considered within general energy targets (ie sustainability and security of supply). The analysis demonstrates that although Russia achieved quite good results in electricity market liberalization, gas market remains opaque and environmental markets are only embryonic. Therefore, the market design for the power sector itself remains limited. Regulatory practices are also characterized by the quasi-regulation practices, which do ...

Revue de l'Energie, Jan 1, 2010

This paper deals with a special case of an ethnic minority in the Russian Army – the Javakheti Ar... more This paper deals with a special case of an ethnic minority in the Russian Army – the Javakheti Armenians – and the Russian military base at Akhalkalaki , Georgia. The case is special because it represents a rare circumstance in which the Russian Army maintained a military base composed largely of ethnic minority Javakheti Armenians, within a different country, in this case Georgia. The base was closed in 2007 raising questions about the future of the Javakheti Armenian community after the loss of what was, in practice, its greatest employer. This paper relates the closure of the base to the legacy of Russia’s military presence in local informal economies and power structures among the Javakheti Armenians, in order to explain why the closure of the base has not resulted in major unrest among the local Javakheti Armenian population, which seemingly had depended on it for economic survival.

CROP, the Comparative Research Programme on …, Jan 1, 2005

Conflict, Security & Development, Jan 1, 2002

This report offers an in-dept analysis of the role of international election observation missions... more This report offers an in-dept analysis of the role of international election observation missions in during the political upheavals in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. It presents the work of three leading, young academics from Kyrgyzstan. The report forms part of the ‘NUPI Network for Election Observation and Exchange’. This is project that is supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The starting point for the assessments presented here is the realisation that international election observer missions played a central part in the events that eventually lead to the toppling of President Askar Akaev’s administration in march 2005. Kyrgyzstan is also a case that highlights the immense challenges that face election observation missions in non consolidated democracies of the former Soviet Union. Many of these countries, Kyrgyzstan included, have developed traditions of deep-seated and sophisticated manipulation of election procedures. Given these preconditions, the three articles aim to assess from differing perspectives how election observation was conducted in the country in 2005.

Journal of Refugee Studies, Jan 1, 2005

International cooperation and Arctic …, Jan 1, 2007

This chapter examines the impact of Arctic regimes on indigenous is-sues. The focus is on the Arc... more This chapter examines the impact of Arctic regimes on indigenous is-sues. The focus is on the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR).

The Shtokman Project's Blind Zone: Franco-Russian Relations This article points out that Norwegia... more The Shtokman Project's Blind Zone: Franco-Russian Relations This article points out that Norwegian actors tend to overlook the involvement and importance of the French oil company Total in the Shtokman gas project, mistakenly thinking of this project as an essentially Norwegian-Russian bilateral affair. In order to fill this lacuna, the article provides an overview of the political and economic cooperation between France and Russia, Total's global operations and the company's ties to the Russian and French states. The article concludes that Total and France are uniquely well positioned to develop their cooperation with Russian energy partners, and that this is both a potential benefit and a challenge for Norway's involvement in the Shtok-man project. Keywords: Russia | energy | Shtokman | Total | France Sammendrag Mange norske aktører har en tendens til å tenke på Sjtokman-prosjektet som en norsk-russisk bilateral affaere, og overser dermed det franske oljeselskapet Totals deltakelse i dette samarbeidet. For bedre å forstå bakgrunnen for Totals rolle i Sjtokman-samarbei-det, gir artikkelen derfor et overblikk over det politiske og økonomiske samarbeidet mellom Frankrike og Russland, Totals globale operasjoner samt selskapets bånd til den franske og den russiske staten. Artikkelen konkluderer med at Total og Frankrike er unikt posisjonert for å videreutvikle sitt samarbeid med russiske energipartnere, og at dette både kan vaere et potensielt gode og en utfordring for Norges involvering i Sjtok-man-prosjektet. Nøkkelord: Russland | energi |Sjtokman |Total | Frankrike

NUPI har blitt bedt om å tegne et øyeblikksbilde av verden slik den vil kunne fortone seg etter v... more NUPI har blitt bedt om å tegne et øyeblikksbilde av verden slik den vil kunne fortone seg etter vinteren 2018, da Tromsø kanskje skal stå som vertskap for de 23. olympiske vinterleker. Et globalt utsyn mot verden sett fra nord, men med en prioritering av regionale konsekvenser – hvordan skal man gå frem for å tegne et slikt bilde?

Et fremtidsbilde må selvsagt bygge på gjetninger – som i sin tur vil kunne være mer eller mindre kvalifiserte i forhold til den kunnskapen vi allerede sitter på i dag. Ti år er både et kort og et langt tidsperspektiv. Hvis vi snakker om globale klimaendringer, er ti år svært kort tid. Selv om vi i løpet av det neste tiåret får på plass et internasjonalt klimaregime som legger sterke begrensninger på utslipp av klimagasser, vil vi først kunne se de konkrete resultatene av dette for klodens klima lenge etter 2018. På den annen side er ti år også et langt perspektiv. Går vi ti år tilbake i tid, sto for eksempel Russland på konkursens rand. I august 1998 måtte den russiske staten erklære seg midlertidig betalingsudyktig. Ved inngangen til 2008 har Russland
avansert til å bli verdens syvende største økonomi (målt i kjøpekraftjustert BNP) og sitter på verdens tredje største gull- og valutareserver. Og på politikkens område kan endringene skje enda raskere.

Bare i løpet av det neste året vil nye presidenter være på plass i Russland og USA, maktskifter som begge vil kunne føre til politiske kursjusteringer etter åtte år med Vladimir Putin og George W. Bush i førersetet. Vi har valgt å løse oppgaven ved å se nærmere på enkelte tunge trender som vi allerede ser gjøre seg gjeldende i dag, og som vi tror vil kunne ha stor betydning for den videre utviklingen frem mot 2018. Disse blir supplert med mer konjunkturavhengige utviklingstrekk, og til sammen danner disse grunnlaget for tre delrapporter innenfor feltene klima og miljø, økonomi og sikkerhetsog utenrikspolitikk. På bakgrunn av de tre delrapportene har vi så satt sammen et øyeblikksbilde – en fremstilling av hvordan et utsyn fra nord kan komme til å ta seg ut i 2018.

I hver av delrapportene har vi samtidig inkludert noen mulige wildcards. Et wildcard er i denne sammenheng en hendelse som er lite sannsynlig, men mulig, og som dersom den inntreffer, vil kunne endre eksisterende trender på en fundamental måte. Oppløsningen av Sovjetunionen i 1991 eller angrepet på USA 11. september er eksempler på hendelser som bare få år før de inntraff ville kunne vært beskrevet som mulige wildcards, men som når de fant sted, bidro til å endre historiens gang. Grunnen til at vi har trukket inn slike wildcards er for å understreke bredden i mulige utfall.

22. november 2003 stormet den unge, karismatiske lederen Mikheil Saakasjvili gjennom dørene til d... more 22. november 2003 stormet den unge, karismatiske lederen Mikheil Saakasjvili gjennom dørene til det georgiske parlamentet og inn på verdens tv-skjermer. Bak seg hadde han titusener av georgiske borgere, som demonstrerte på Frihetsplassen og området rundt parlamentet. Ved sin side hadde han sine nærmeste medarbeidere og venner, som banet vei og beskyttet ham. Foran ham stod landets aldrende president, Eduard Sjevardnadse, forfjamset og omgitt av sine nervøse livvakter. I sin fremstrakte hånd holdt Saakasjvili en rose. Denne artikkelen tar for seg bakgrunnen for den politiske utviklingen i Georgia høsten 2003 og våren 2004, og ser deretter på veien fremover for landets nye ledelse.

Hvilke konsekvenser har 70 dr med sovjetiske reformer hatt for de russiske samenes etnopolitiske ... more Hvilke konsekvenser har 70 dr med sovjetiske reformer hatt for de russiske samenes etnopolitiske organisering etter 1989? F0rste del av denne artikkelen tar for seg utviklingen av de russiske samenes etnopolitiske organisasjoner og lederskap pa 1990-tallet. I andre del belyses sammenhengen mellom dennepostsovjetiske utviklingen og politikken i sovjettiden.

I kjølvannet av Sovjetunionens sammenbrudd kunne det virke som om man fikk en styrking av multila... more I kjølvannet av Sovjetunionens sammenbrudd kunne det virke som om man fikk en styrking av multilateralismen og en svekkelse av nasjonalstaten. I stedet for at stormakter gikk inn og forholdt seg bilateralt til land og etniske grupper i det postsovjetiske området, handlet verdenssamfunnet ofte i fellesskap gjennom multilaterale organisasjoner for å løse konflikter og styrke regionens generelle utvikling.1 Dette er imidlertid bare en del av historien. I denne artikkelen vil jeg forsøke å vise hvilke føringer som ligger innbakt i det multilaterale systemet. Argumentet går ikke på hvordan mektige enkeltstater dominerer multilaterale institusjoner – slik som Russland har gjort innen SUS og USA av og til har gjort innen FN – men heller om konsekvensene av måten selve det multilaterale systemet er strukturert på. Nærmere bestemt vil jeg se på hvordan multilaterale institusjoner som er bygget opp av anerkjente nasjonalstater, forholder seg til kvasistater.

Denne rapporten ser nærmere på norsk bistand til urfolk. Rapporten tar utgangspunkt i Norads stat... more Denne rapporten ser nærmere på norsk bistand til urfolk. Rapporten tar utgangspunkt i Norads statistiske database over de prosjekter som har rapportert urfolk som hovedmålgruppe i perioden 1999–2005.

Databasen viser omfanget av det som rapporteres som urfolksbistand, samt fordeling på kanaler (organisasjonstyper) og geografiske områder. For å vurdere om statistikken gjenspeiler reell støtte til urfolk, har vi sett nærmere på arkivdokumentasjonen for et utvalg av disse prosjektene.
Arkivutvalget er på 228 prosjekter og representerer nesten 50 % av de utbetalte midlene i hele perioden, og utgjør altså rundt 935 millioner kroner. I denne arkivgjennomgangen har vi bare funnet dokumentasjon på at 19 % av midlene i utvalget kan sies å være støtte til urfolk. Dette utvalget representerer 174 millioner kroner, mens de resterende 761 millioner kronene enten er feilkategorisert, uklart definert eller dreier seg om prosjekter der det ikke ble funnet dokumentasjon.

Hvis man ser bort fra de midlene som har gått til prosjekter hvor det ikke ble funnet dokumentasjon i arkivene (tilsvarende 363 millioner), utgjør dokumentert urfolksbistand 30,5 prosent av totalen på 571 millioner kroner.

Det er altså antakelig et stort misforhold mellom de tallene som oppgis for urfolksstøtte og realiteten. I kartleggingen har vi ikke benyttet strenge kriterier for hva som regnes som urfolksbistand. Det betyr at tallene som presenteres i denne rapporten, i seg selv urovekkende nok, kan sees på som et «best case scenario». I verste fall kan den virkelige tilstanden i norsk urfolksbistand være verre. På denne bakgrunnen anbefales en større gjennomgang av urfolksstøtten slik at den kan kvalitetssikres og gjenspeile politiske prioriteringer og målsetninger.
Tilgang til arkivdokumentasjon er en svært omfattende og tidkrevende prosess, og dokumentasjonen er mangelfull og spredt. Det er dermed en stor utfordring å etterprøve de statistiske tallene for utviklingsstøtten. Med bakgrunn i dette anbefales det at rapporteringssystemet for urfolksbistand kvalitetssikres bedre.

Rapporten peker også på at bistandsapparatet opererer med kategoriseringer av urfolk og urfolksbistand som ikke er klare nok, dette gjelder særlig begrepet «integrert urfolksstøtte».

En overordnet gjennomgang av norsk utenrikspolitikk, dens konsistens og spenninger, sett i lys av... more En overordnet gjennomgang av norsk utenrikspolitikk, dens konsistens og spenninger, sett i lys av selvbilder og utenrikspolitisk praksis.

Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT) / Central Asia Regional Data Review no. 20, 2019

This data article summarises the analysis of 261 Chinese projects in Central Asia. The findings i... more This data article summarises the analysis of 261 Chinese projects in Central Asia. The findings indicate that trade promotion and industrial development are the sectors where there is most BRI-related activity in Central Asia. The total number of projects in these areas approximates the number of projects in all other areas combined. These sectors also receive most investment. In terms of the number of implemented projects, roads is the second key sector, followed by energy. However, due to larger project sizes, energy receives more funds than roads. The majority of Chinese projects in Central Asia are bilateral.

Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT) / Central Asia Regional Data Review no 21, 2019

This data article shows that most of the rail and road projects in which the Chinese are involved... more This data article shows that most of the rail and road projects in which the Chinese are involved in Central Asia are implemented within the territories of individual countries and thus are still poorly linked with each other. However, these internal transport routes are expected to eventually form the basis of a new cross-regional network within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Smaller scale road construction and rehabilitation projects create linkages connecting China across Central Asia to South Asia, Turkey, Europe, and the Middle East.

Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT) / Central Asia Regional Data Review no 23, 2019

Mineral resources is the sector that receives most Chinese investment in Central Asia. China and ... more Mineral resources is the sector that receives most Chinese investment in Central Asia. China and its Central Asian partners pursue both strategic and commercial goals by promoting projects in the minerals sector. Kazakhstan hosts the largest number of projects and receives the largest amount of Chinese investment. The second largest recipient of financing is Turkmenistan, where several big projects are implemented.

Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT) / Central Asia Regional Data Review no 22, 2019

One of the strategic objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia is to provi... more One of the strategic objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia is to provide China with alternative import/export and energy supply routes. This data article shows that the presentation and coverage of BRI projects varies considerably from country to country. The largest number of BRI projects in Central Asia are implemented in Kazakhstan and are in the oil and gas sector. By contrast, Turkmenistan is implementing only a few Chinese energy projects, though they are large-scale and its sum of investment is the second-largest of the Central Asian states.

Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT) / Central Asia Regional Data Review no 24, 2019

China’s investment in the industrial sectors of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has been on the rise si... more China’s investment in the industrial sectors of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has been on the rise since the 1990s. However, this data article shows the recent expansion of Chinese investment also in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Thus, China has expanded its engagement in the development of local industries in larger countries as well. The projects in Kazakhstan are the largest in terms of the number and size of investments. China has substantially increased the number of industrial projects in Uzbekistan, yet the evidence shows that the costs of the projects are small in scale.

Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT) / Central Asia Regional Data Review no 25, 2019

China and its Central Asian counterparts pursue finance and IT projects for both commercial and s... more China and its Central Asian counterparts pursue finance and IT projects for both commercial and strategic reasons. As this data article shows, transparency is limited and exact information on the size of their investments is only partly available. In the financial sector, China cooperates most closely with Kazakhstan among the Central Asian countries.

Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT) / Central Asia Regional Data Review no 26, 2019

This data article looks at Chinese investment in agriculture and food production in Central Asia.... more This data article looks at Chinese investment in agriculture and food production in Central Asia. It shows that the agricultural sector projects have low priority within the Belt and Road Initiative. Kazakhstan is the biggest recipient of Chinese investment in agriculture and food projects in Central Asia.

Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT) / Central Asia Regional Data Review no 27, 2019

Along with financing hard infrastructure projects, Beijing also promotes soft power projects in t... more Along with financing hard infrastructure projects, Beijing also promotes soft power projects in the form of people-to-people initiatives. However, such projects are low priority within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia. The Confucius Institutes, which appear to be an important vehicle for Chinese soft power in the region, are not directly linked to BRI and were launched before and independently of BRI.

Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT) / Central Asia Regional Data Review no 16, 2019

This data article surveys the government policies in support of renewable energy in the five Cent... more This data article surveys the government policies in support of renewable energy in the five Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. It begins by providing general information and key energy statistics for these countries. It then presents comparative data on their regulatory policies, fiscal incentives, and public financing policies. The data were collected from government institutions of the Central Asian states, official national statistics, media reports, and international organizations.

Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT) / Central Asia Regional Data Review no 18, 2019

This data compilation surveys the solar energy potential of the five Central Asian countries: Kaz... more This data compilation surveys the solar energy potential of the five Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. It also provides data on installed and planned solar power capacity in these countries.

Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT) / Central Asia Regional Data Review no 17, 2019

This data article surveys the wind energy potential of the five Central Asian countries; Kazakhst... more This data article surveys the wind energy potential of the five Central Asian countries; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The dataset presents the theoretical wind power supply capacity in the region as well as existing wind power installations.

Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team (CADGAT) / Central Asia Regional Data Review no 19, 2019

This data article surveys the hydropower potential of the five Central Asian countries: Kazakhsta... more This data article surveys the hydropower potential of the five Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The dataset presents the theoretical hydropower supply capacity of all the river basins of Central Asia. It was prepared using data from national and international sources, and it provides information on installed small and medium hydropower capacities and planned projects in the above-mentioned countries.

Central Asia Regional Data Review, 2016

Data collection and outline of report Data collection for the CADGAT media reports was carried ou... more Data collection and outline of report Data collection for the CADGAT media reports was carried out in August–December 2013, so the figures presented here reflect the situation at that point in time. This report is intended as an overview that can be updated later. Sources of information are listed in footnotes, with access dates.

Background of report
The development of mass media in the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan since independence differs considerably. All five countries have non-state media; and international organizations conduct workshops, trainings and various events. The media have high influence on local society. This data review presents some aspects of media and related topics in the Central Asian region.

Key findings
- The top radio stations are privately financed, except in Turkmenistan, where all radio stations are state-owned.
- Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have the highest amount of broadcasting in Russian. In Kyrgyzstan, there is a near equal amount that is broadcasted in Kyrgyz and Russian; this has remained stable since independence.
- In Turkmenistan, all national radio channels broadcast in Turkmen. In Tajikistan, a clear majority broadcast in Tajik. This has also remained stable since independence. Overall, there seems to be few changes as regards radio broadcasting language for all five countries over the years compared here.

Central Asia Regional Data Review, 2016

Data collection and outline of report Data collection for the CADGAT media reports was carried ou... more Data collection and outline of report
Data collection for the CADGAT media reports was carried out in August–December 2013, so the figures presented here reflect the situation at that point in time. This report is intended as an overview that can be updated later. Sources of information are listed in footnotes, with access dates.

Key findings
- Kazakhstan has more private TV channels than the other countries, in nominal and relative terms.
- All TV channels in Turkmenistan are state-owned.
- The top programme in all five countries is news.
- In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, there are no national Russian-language channels, but both have a few multi-language channels. In Tajikistan, all channels are to some degree multi-language, but Tajik dominates. In contrast, Kazakhstan has a strict policy on language representation. In Kyrgyzstan, there is an even balance, although all state channels broadcast in the Kyrgyz language.

Central Asia Regional Data Review, 2016

Data collection and outline of report Data collection for the CADGAT media reports was carried o... more Data collection and outline of report
Data collection for the CADGAT media reports was carried out in August–December 2013, so the figures presented here reflect the situation at that point in time. This report is intended as an overview that can be updated later. Sources of information are listed in footnotes, with access dates.

Background of report
The development of the media in the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan since independence varies significantly. CADGAT reports 13, 14 and 15 examine developments in the media within three spheres: print media, TV and radio. The data show significant across-time variation within and among the countries, with greatest differences in the ratio between broadcasting/publication in the national languages, and in Russian and other languages. CADGAT researchers collected data in the fall of 2013, of which some was updated as of June 2015 with regard to certain processes (TV digitalization). The data were collected by individual researchers in each of the five countries. Variation in terms of data availability and quality across the countries should be noted. We have presented the sources and methods used in footnotes. However, much information is not publicly available, so personal assessments of the researchers and their network have occasionally been used. This is specifically noted in each case.

Key findings
- There are considerable differences in how much print media is available in each country; in Turkmenistan, there is roughly only one print media outlet per 116 000 citizens; in Uzbekistan, one per 30 000; Kyrgyzstan, one per 33 000; Tajikistan, one per 22 500; and at the far end of the range, Kazakhstan, with one print media outlet per 9 000 citizens.
- However, the amount of print media available does not correspond with rankings on the World Press Freedom Index, where both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have consistently fared better than Kazakhstan over the past decade. Turkmenistan has ranked lowest, follow by Uzbekistan.
- There is also great variation as to the language of publication: at the one end of the spectrum is Turkmenistan, with 95% of the print media published in the national language, in contrast to Kazakhstan, with only 25%. The figures for Kyrgyzstan are 60%; Tajikistan, 79%; and Uzbekistan, 86%. This echoes the proportion of print media published in Russian: Turkmenistan lowest, with 4.5%; Kazakhstan highest, with 40%.
- In Turkmenistan, the top three print media are state-owned; in Kyrgyzstan, they are private. In the other three countries there is a mixture as regard ownership.

Central Asia Regional Data Review , 2015

Recent academic literature on Central Asia has shown an increasing interest in holidays and the c... more Recent academic literature on Central Asia has shown an increasing interest in holidays and the celebrations that mark such days as a way of understanding nation- and state-building policies in the region. This CADGAT dataset provides a good starting point for a comparative approach. It presents an overview of national holidays in the five Central Asian countries: what the holidays are and when they are celebrated; and traces the development of national holidays (some are no longer celebrated, whereas new ones have arrived) back to independence in 1991.

The data were collected between March and September 2014 by individual researchers in each of the five countries. Variation in terms of data availability and quality across the countries must be noted. The sources and methods used are listed in footnotes.

Central Asia Regional Data Review, 2015

This report is the first about various aspects of holidays in Central Asia. In this report, we present public holidays and the laws and regulations on holidays in the five countries. The second report in this series concerns the phenomenon of ‘professional holidays’ in the five countries.

These reports present an important aspect of regional cooperation in Central Asia – trade. Many f... more These reports present an important aspect of regional cooperation in Central Asia – trade. Many factors speak in favour of regional trade and cooperation, including (a) the communication, transport and energy infrastructure created by the former Soviet Union as an integrated national system; (b) environmental issues which require regional approaches; (c) the potential attraction of a region free of trade and transit barriers for foreign and local investors, compared with the limitations of small national economies; (d) utilization of regional cooperation to overcome geographical obstacles and to improve access to global markets. However, statistics on intraregional trade indicate that the level of trade in the region still falls short of its potential.

These reports (three in total) are based on data collected from various sources, with the results of this laborious effort presented in tables and graphs. As the data come from different sources they may not be free of methodological flaws. However, where possible the data have been verified and compared with various alternative sources.

Key findings
- The leaders of the Central Asian countries have adopted diverse economic strategies which have led to divergence in trade policies, ranging from quite liberal (Kyrgyzstan) to relatively restrictive (Uzbekistan). This can be seen as one obstacle to harmonization of regional trade and cooperation.
- All five Central Asian states have natural resources as their main export items, and are largely dependent on these exports. In 2011, the most important export commodity in Kazakhstan (crude oil and gas condensate) and Tajikistan (aluminium) accounted for 62.4% and 63.4%, respectively, of total exports.
- The Central Asian states have a low degree of trade complementarity: they produce and export many of the same items and therefore need to look for trade partners beyond their immediate neighbours.

Central Asia Regional Data Review, 2013

These reports present an important aspect of regional cooperation in Central Asia – trade. Many ... more These reports present an important aspect of regional cooperation in Central Asia – trade.

Many factors speak in favour of regional trade and cooperation, including (a) the communication, transport and energy infrastructure created by the former Soviet Union as an integrated national system; (b) environmental issues which require regional approaches; (c) the potential attraction of a region free of trade and transit barriers for foreign and local investors, compared with the limitations of small national economies; (d) utilization of regional cooperation to overcome geographical obstacles and to improve access to global markets. However, statistics on intraregional trade indicate that the level of trade in the region still falls short of its potential.

Key findings
- The leaders of the Central Asian countries adopted diverse economic strategies which have led to divergence in trade policies, ranging from quite liberal (Kyrgyzstan) to relatively restrictive (Uzbekistan). This can be seen as one obstacle to harmonization of regional trade and cooperation.
- All five Central Asian states have natural resources as their main export items, and are largely dependent on these exports. In 2011, the most important export commodity in Kazakhstan (crude oil and gas condensate) and Tajikistan (aluminium) accounted for 62.4% and 63.4%, respectively, of total exports.
- The Central Asian states have a low degree of trade complementarity: they produce and export many of the same items and therefore need to look for trade partners beyond their immediate neighbours.

Central Asia Regional Data Review, 2013

These reports present an important aspect of regional cooperation in Central Asia – trade. Many f... more These reports present an important aspect of regional cooperation in Central Asia – trade. Many factors speak in favour of regional trade and cooperation, including (a) the communication, transport and energy infrastructure created by the former Soviet Union as an integrated national system; (b) environmental issues which require regional approaches; (c) the potential attraction of a region free of trade and transit barriers for foreign and local investors, compared with the limitations of small national economies; (d) utilization of regional cooperation to overcome geographical deficiencies and to improve access to global markets. However, statistics on intraregional trade indicate that the level of trade in the region has not lived up to its potential.

The reports (three in total) are based on data collected from various sources, with the results of this laborious work depicted in tables and graphs. As the data come from different sources they may not be free of methodological flaws. However, where possible the data have been verified and compared with various alternative sources.

This first report deals with trade policies and major export items of each of the five countries. It includes a review of trade policies and trade complementarity in the region, and tables showing the evolution of export profiles of each country after independence.

Key findings
- The leaders of the Central Asian countries adopted diverse economic strategies which led to divergence in their trade policies, ranging from quite liberal (Kyrgyzstan) to relatively restrictive (Uzbekistan). This can be seen as one obstacle to harmonization of regional trade and cooperation.
- All five Central Asian states have natural resources as their main export items, and are largely dependent on these exports. In 2011, the most important export commodity in Kazakhstan (crude oil and gas condensate) and Tajikistan (aluminium) accounted for respectively 62.4% and 63.4% of total exports.
- The Central Asian states have a low degree of trade complementarity: they produce and export many of the same items and therefore need to look for trade partners beyond their immediate neighbours.

The PRIX index value for Q4 2016 is 44.09, based on input from 268 country analysts. This is the ... more The PRIX index value for Q4 2016 is 44.09, based on input from 268 country analysts. This is the lowest PRIX index value ever registered, indicating a significant reduction in the flow of oil onto international markets and promoting an oil price rebound. The drop of 3.57 index points from Q3 to Q4 is the largest quarterly drop ever registered by the index, strengthening the prospects for a fall in global oil exports. It is the third quarter in a row that the index is significantly below a neutral value of 50, indicating a clear trend over time towards a weakening global supply side in oil markets. However, the impact on the oil price also depends on other factors, and in particular how much of the gap is filled by a rebound of US shale oil production. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are among the biggest exporters that have seen major drop s in their index values, pulling the global index downwards. At 93.75, Libya has the highest index value of all of the countries, pointing towards a possible end to its export problems. Iran has bounced back to a high index value of 85.00, meaning that the Iran Country Analysts continue to expect rapidly rising exports from Iran.

The PRIX index for Q1 2015 is 52.63, indicating that oil exports may rise moderately and contribu... more The PRIX index for Q1 2015 is 52.63, indicating that oil exports may rise moderately and contribute to the oil price moving downwards. Angola, Oman, and the UAE are expected to be the biggest contributors to the rise in oil supply. This forecast is valid for the period from January 1st to March 31st 2015.

The PRIX index for Q2 2015 is 55.87, indicating that oil exports may rise and put downward pressu... more The PRIX index for Q2 2015 is 55.87, indicating that oil exports may rise and put downward pressure on the oil price. Iran, Iraq, and Oman are expected to be the biggest contributors to the rise in oil supply. This forecast is valid for the period from May 1st to June 30th 2015.

The PRIX index for Q3 2015 is 54.92, indicating that oil exports may rise and put downward pressu... more The PRIX index for Q3 2015 is 54.92, indicating that oil exports may rise and put downward pressure on the oil price. Iran, Iraq, and Oman are expected to be the biggest contributors to the rise in oil supply. This forecast is valid for the period from June 1st to September 30th 2015. There was a rise in convergence among the views of PRIX index country analysts compared to the second quarter, indicating that the trend towards rising oil supply is becoming more clear-cut.

The PRIX index value for Q4 2015 is 52.92, indicating that global oil exports may rise only sligh... more The PRIX index value for Q4 2015 is 52.92, indicating that global oil exports may rise only slightly during the coming months, helping keep the oil price weak but stable. Iran, Iraq, and Oman are expected to contribute most to rising supplies. Iran's index value is highest of all, and the PRIX country analysts are confident that Iran will rapidly raise exports by the end of the year. Kuwait's index value has made an abrupt shift towards falling exports, after three consecutive quarters of neutral values. Kuwait may thus be the first Arab Gulf state to throw in the towel in the price war. Taking into account the index values from the past three quarters, the longer-term trend is towards stabilization of oil exports and a new oil market equilibrium for the time being. There was increased divergence among the views of PRIX index country analysts compared to the previous quarter, possibly indicating that more countries are nearing a change of export strategy.

The PRIX index value for the first three months of 2016 is 50.06, based on input from 290 country... more The PRIX index value for the first three months of 2016 is 50.06, based on input from 290 country analysts. This indicates that global oil exports will remain unchanged, contributing to the oil price s staying weak. Saudi Arabia's index value has dipped below 50 for the first time in 12 months , a possible sign that the kingdom is getting closer to ending its strategy of high oil supply. Iran's index value is highest of all, implying that the PRIX country analysts are confident that I ran will rapidly raise exports by the end of the first quarter as sanctions are reduced. Also Russia's index value is high, indicating that neither the oil price nor sanctions over the conflict in Ukraine are expected to stop Russian output from continuing to rise. I f one aspect of the current situation is a supply war between the world's two biggest oil exporters—Russia and Saudi Arabia—Russia is not blinking yet. Russian oil companies are cushioned by the dramatic fall in the value of the ruble, in which many of their costs are denominated. US shal e producers (with their costs in dollars) and the Saudis (with their currency pegged to the dollar) do not enj oy this automatic ventilation. Sooner or later, the low oil price is likely to trigger political unrest in on e or more major oil exporting countries, possibly leading to a fall in exports. The new low PRIX index values for Venezuela and Nigeria may signal that the risk is high in these countries. In Libya, a moderate rise in oil exports is expected. Libya's roller coaster PRIX index values over the past year have reflected the unstable situation in the country, but at least for the coming quarter the situation for exports seems to be improving.

The PRIX index value for the third quarter of 2016 is 47.66, based on input from 289 country anal... more The PRIX index value for the third quarter of 2016 is 47.66, based on input from 289 country analysts. This is the second quarter in a row that the index is significantly below a neutral value of 50 , meaning that global oil exports are expected to fall, promoting an oil price rebound. Nigeria, Iran, and Libya are among the biggest exporters that have seen major drops in their index values, pulling the global index downwards. Although Iran has fallen significantly since the last quarter, it still has a very high index value, meaning that the Iran Country Analysts continue to expect rapidly rising exports from Iran. Although Norway's index value is below 50, possible oil worker strikes are not expected to affect Norwegian oil exports beyond the very short term. The low oil price has triggered political unrest in several major oil exporting countries. The new low PRIX index values for Venezuela and Nigeria signal that their exports are in trouble. The question now is whether prices will rise fast enough for such countries to stabilize, or whether i t is too late and they will experience further socioeconomic and political collapse.

The PRIX index value for the second quarter of 2016 is 46.60, based on input from 265 country ana... more The PRIX index value for the second quarter of 2016 is 46.60, based on input from 265 country analysts. This is the lowest PRIX index value ever registered. The fall below 50 means that, for the first time in 18 months, global oil exports are predicted to fall. This could help push the oil price towards a rebound. Major exporters such as Iraq, Qatar, Russia, the UAE and Venezuela are among the countries that have seen the biggest drop in their index values, pulling down the global index value. Iran is the outlier, with an index value that is much higher than that of other countries, leaving Iran as the only country that is expected to raise its exports significantly. If it were not for Iran, global exports would be dropping even more dramatically. While many other countries are expected to cut back their exports, Saudi Arabia is forecast to steady its course, staying close to its current high levels. This could be interpreted as Saudi Arabia winning the supply war. Sooner or later, the low oil price is likely to trigger political unrest in one or more major oil exporting countries, possibly leading to a fall in exports. The new extremely low PRIX index value for Venezuela may signal that the risk is high there. The question now is whether prices will rise fast enough for such countries to stabilize, or whether it is too late.

This book examines Russia’s capacity to respond to a changing world, and it does so through the l... more This book examines Russia’s capacity to respond to a changing world, and it does so through the lens of the country’s oil industry. The reasons for this choice of topic are the place of the petroleum sector in Russian society, the place of Russian oil and gas in the world’s energy supply and the rapid pace of change in the global energy industry. Against a backdrop of dramatic social and political change, this book presents a systematic analysis of how modern energy developments in the form of shale oil and renewable energy, for example, are being handled by Russia’s five largest oil companies: Rosneft, LUKOIL, Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegas and Tatneft. With a combined value of over USD 180 billion and wide-ranging political connections, not only are these companies vital channels for much of Russia’s income, but they also constitute the backbone of the Russian economy.

Routledge, 2019

Has the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by China in 2013, changed the perception of Chin... more Has the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by China in 2013, changed the perception of China among local actors in Central Asia? There are numerous internal problems and contradictions among the Central Asian countries and the region remains one of the least integrated in the world. This poses serious challenges to BRI but also offers opportunities for enhancing regional connectivity and integration. Although there has been some research and even more media coverage of BRI, little is known about how Central Asians perceive BRI. This chapter fills some of these gaps and analyzes the present state of relations between the Central Asian countries and China and collects and systematizes perceptions of Beijing and BRI among Central Asian stakeholders. The analysis focuses on economic cooperation, infrastructure and educational initiatives, as they as they are among BRI's main pillars. The main conclusion is that current attitudes towards China have been formed within the framework of bilateral relations that started in 1991, and there has so far been no major shift in the perception of China in Central Asia since BRI was launched. Whereas the broader public expects more economic opportunities from BRI and there has been more discussion of China's role in Central Asia after 2013, local communities remain uninformed and weakly connected to the high-level interaction between the Chinese and Central Asian governments.

The Sámi are an indigenous Northern European people whose homeland, Sápmi, extends across the ter... more The Sámi are an indigenous Northern European people whose homeland, Sápmi, extends across the territories of four states: Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden. For the Sámi of the Nordic countries, a long period of cultural repression gave way to a renaissance of sorts during the last half of the twentieth century. During the last decades of the century, their indigenous rights were recognized, they experienced a cultural and linguistic revival, and popularly elected Sámi parliaments were established in each of the three Nordic states. In contrast, the Soviet Sámi had little opportunity to develop independent ethno-political organizations and were largely isolated from their ethnic kin across the Norwegian border. The Soviet–Norwegian frontier was one of only two short stretches where the USSR and NATO shared a direct land border (the other being between Turkey and the USSR), and it remained tightly sealed until 1989. After the Soviet Union collapsed, its borders opened. In the decades that followed, the Russian Sámi attempted a linguistic revival; they began mending the Cold War scars across Sápmi and established their own independent ethno-political organizations. This period saw numerous struggles over the right to define the interests of the Russian Sámi and represent them, laying the foundations for current Russian Sámi politics. This book tells the story of what happened once the Soviet borders opened up. In this volume, we follow the development of an ethno-political movement on the periphery of the Russian Federation: the tensions that arise when a small people attempts to organize itself, reconstitute its culture and identity and reach out across the old Iron Curtain to ethnic kin in the West. As this border has been one of the most important dividing lines in modern history, the tale of the Sámi people and their efforts to mend their divisions is a case study of not only an indigenous movement, but indeed a microcosm of Russian–Western relations, replete with idealism, opportunism, misunderstandings, cultural exchange and intended and unintended consequences.

Central Asia Regional Data Review, 2022

This data article provides an overview of fossil fuel trends in Central Asia from 2010 to 2019. D... more This data article provides an overview of fossil fuel trends in Central Asia from 2010 to 2019. Data on the production, consumption, export and import of coal, natural gas and oil are summarised for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. While promoting renewable energy, Central Asia continues to rely on and expand the use of coal, natural gas and oil with no major phase-out plans yet on the horizon.

Stokke, K., Vakulchuk, R. and Øverland, I. (2017). Myanmar: A Political Economy Analysis. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Foreign Affairs, NUPI. Report commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (98 pp.).

International Journal of Environmental Studies, Jun 1, 2010

Page 1. No. 708 2006 Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt Norwegian Institute of International Affa... more Page 1. No. 708 2006 Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Anita Haslie Indra Øverland [708] Notat Norges bistand til urfolk En realitetsorientering Page 2. Utgiver: Copyright: ISSN: ISBN: Besøksadresse: Addresse: Internett: E-post: Fax: Tel: ...

NUPI Report , 2021

Europa er Norges viktigste marked, og europeiske land er – sammen med USA – Norges viktigste alli... more Europa er Norges viktigste marked, og europeiske land er – sammen med USA – Norges viktigste allierte i utenrikspolitikken. Gitt Norges tilkobling til EU via EØS-avtalen, Schengen, og Klimaavtalen, så vil enhver endring i EUs mål og virkemåte påvirke Norge. EUs grønne giv (European Green Deal - EGD) er en av de mest omfattende endringene av EU på lang tid. EGD er på en og samme tid en klimastrategi og en vekststrategi, med et klart mål om at energi-basen for økonomien skal gjøres fornybar og sirkulær. Selv om en overordnet strategi og plan er etablert, er det betydelig usikkerhet knyttet til hvor-dan EGD vil se ut. Norge har dialog med EU om EGD, men som ikke-medlem har Norge be-grenset informasjonstilgang og ikke minst svært begrenset mulighet til å påvirke utformingen av EGD. Samtidig fokuserer EGD på saker som ikke bare er viktige for Norge, men som også er potensielt vanskelige, gitt Norges avhengighet av olje og gass. At EU lykkes med å nå egne klimamål vil være viktig for å nå globale klimamål, og EU vil kunne være en pådriver for global klimapolitikk. For Norge definerer EGD en ramme og et sett av tiltak som kan bidra positivt til en krevende omstilling, og som kan ventes å ha en rekke konsekvenser: • EGD vil innebære økt pris på utslipp og samtidig gi insentiver og støtteordninger for utvikling av ny teknologi, herunder på karbonfangst og lagring, på hydrogen og på havvind. For norsk næringsliv denerer således EGD nye rammevilkår, men hvor det er usikkerhet knyttet til utformingen av konkrete regler og tiltak, som kan påvirke investeringsbeslutninger. • Norges økonomiske interesser er fortsatt i stor grad knyttet til fortsatt olje- og gassproduk-sjon, og EGD vil sannsynligvis fremskynde når «knekkpunktet», politisk og økonomisk, inntreer der risiko vil være høyere enn potensiell nytte/verdi ved fortsatt olje- og gassproduksjon. • Norge behandler ofte energipolitikken, som blant annet innebærer planer om fortsatt olje- og gassproduksjon, adskilt fra klimapolitikken. EGD innebærer at EU i større grad inte-grerer energi- og klimapolitikken, noe som både politisk og forvaltningsmessig vil kunne være utfordrende. • EGD innebærer til dels en kvalitativt ny metode for politisk styring gjennom såkalt «main-streaming», hvor alt av regler revideres for å sikre en grønn prol. En slik sektorovergripende tilnærming bryter med sektorprinsippet i norsk politikk, som kan skape utfordringer knyttet til EØS, hvor hvert fagdepartement har ansvar for sine respektive politikkfelt. • Volumet og tempoet i nye tiltak under EGD er svært høyt, noe som utfordrer det forvalt-ningsmessige oppsettet for håndtering av EGD i Norge. Samtidig bringer EGD med seg regulatorisk usikkerhet for Norge fordi det er uklart hvordan ulike regler vil bli utformet, og om det kan gis unntak og tilpasninger dersom det anses ønskelig for Norge. • Interessene og oppmerksomheten hos EUs medlemsland vil sannsynligvis endre seg i tråd med EGD. Norge kan ikke utelukke at de landene som historisk har vært nære allierte – EU-medlemmer i nordvestlige deler av Europa – i noe mindre grad kan ha sammenfallen-de interesser med Norge i energipolitikken. Det er for eksempel interessant å merke seg at Norge i mindre grad enn før får gehør fra tradisjonelle allierte for argumenter om gass som overgangsløsning på veien mot karbonnøytralitet, mens EU-land i sør og øst i større grad er åpne for slik argumentasjon. • Norges mulighet til å påvirke EUs beslutninger er begrenset, og knytter seg først og fremst til deltakelse i arbeids- og ekspertgrupper i en tidlig, forberedende fase som drives av ulike departementer og underliggende etater. Med EGD blir dette arbeidet vesentlig mer omfattende og krever større grad av koordinering, også på politisk nivå. • Regelverket er komplekst, fordrer stor teknisk kompetanse på ulike saksfelt, og stiller også store krav til breddekunnskap om EUs beslutningsprosesser. • EGD betyr at EUs langsiktige strategi og prioriteringer dyttes mot en fornybar og sirkulær fremtid. Indirekte vil dette sannsynligvis også påvirke vurderinger i EU av hva slags kom-petanse som anses viktig. For å bli invitert inn i viktige diskusjoner i Brussel og i andre europeiske hovedsteder må Norge anses å ha relevante bidrag. Dette vil stille nye krav til utviklingen av næringer, spisskompetanse og politiske initiativ.