Perfectly natural properties Research Papers (original) (raw)
It is often said that the best system account of laws (BSA) needs supplementing with a theory of perfectly natural properties. The 'strength' and 'simplicity' of a system is language-relative and without a fixed vocabulary it is... more
It is often said that the best system account of laws (BSA) needs supplementing with a theory of perfectly natural properties. The 'strength' and 'simplicity' of a system is language-relative and without a fixed vocabulary it is impossible to compare rival systems. Recently a number of philosophers have attempted to reformulate the BSA in an effort to avoid commitment to natural properties. I assess these proposals and argue that they are problematic as they stand. Nonetheless, I agree with their aim, and show that if simplicity is interpreted as 'compression', algorithmic information theory provides a framework for system comparison without the need for natural properties. Keywords: laws of nature; best system account; natural properties; algorithmic information theory; invariance theorem. RESUMEN: A menudo se dice que la explicación de las leyes del mejor sistema (BSA) requiere ser completada con una teoría de las propiedades perfectamente naturales. La 'fuerza' y la 'simplicidad' de un sistema son relativas a un lenguaje y sin un vocabulario fijo es imposible comparar sistemas rivales. Recientemente, varios filósofos han in-tentado reformular la BSA en un esfuerzo por evitar el compromiso con las propiedades naturales. Aquí valoro estas propuestas y argumento que son problemáticas en su forma actual. Sin embargo, comparto su objetivo y muestro que si la simplicidad es interpretada como 'compresión', la teoría algorítmica de la información pro-porciona un marco para la comparación sin necesidad de apelar a propiedades naturales. Palabras clave: Leyes de la naturaleza, explicación del mejor sistema, propiedades naturales, teoría algorítmica de la infor-mación, teorema de invariancia.
Should we posit sparse properties? This paper aims to explore the issue of postulating sparse properties in one’s ontology. Sparse properties (particularly, the Lewisian variant of sparse properties) being the important differentiator... more
Should we posit sparse properties? This paper aims to explore the issue of postulating sparse properties in one’s ontology. Sparse properties (particularly, the Lewisian variant of sparse properties) being the
important differentiator that distinguishes pluralist theories of properties from their competitors, through a structural division between an elite subset of properties and the vast hordes of properties whose sole function is to act as the value of predicates. The importance of this distinction being that sparse properties are taken as fulfilling an assortment of roles, more than enough to satisfy the price of entry (what I shall call ‘The Work-Load Principle’). This paper will argue that there is a cumulative case to be made against reifying the Lewisian variant of sparse properties, in the hopes that this will dissuade metaphysicians from positing Lewisian sparseness.
Key Words: Properties, David Lewis, Sparseness, Naturalism, Pluralism.
This paper presents an account of what it is for a property or relation (or ‘attribute’ for short) to be logically simple. Based on this account, it is shown, among other things, that the logically simple attributes are in at least one... more
This paper presents an account of what it is for a property or relation (or ‘attribute’ for short) to be logically simple. Based on this account, it is shown, among other things, that the logically simple attributes are in at least one important way sparse. This in turn lends support to the view that the concept of a logically simple attribute can be regarded as a promising substitute for Lewis’s concept of a perfectly natural attribute. At least in part, the advantage of using the former concept lies in the fact that it is amenable to analysis, where that analysis—i.e., the account put forward in this paper—requires the adoption neither of an Armstrongian theory of universals nor of a primitive notion of naturalness, fundamentality, or grounding.
In this paper I argue that the analysis of natural properties as convex subsets of a metric space in which the distances are degrees of dissimilarity is incompatible with both the definition of degree of dissimilarity as number of natural... more
In this paper I argue that the analysis of natural properties as convex subsets of a metric space in which the distances are degrees of dissimilarity is incompatible with both the definition of degree of dissimilarity as number of natural properties not in common and the definition of degree of dissimilarity as proportion of natural properties not in common, since in combination with either of these definitions it entails that every property is a natural property, which is absurd. I suggest it follows that we should think of the convex class analysis of natural properties as a variety of resemblance nominalism.