Perfectly natural properties Research Papers (original) (raw)

Purity is the principle that fundamental facts only have fundamental constituents. In recent years, it has played a signiﬁcant role in metaphysical theorizing—but its logical foundations are underdeveloped. I argue that recent advances in higher-order logic reveal a subtle ambiguity regarding Purity’s interpretation; there are stronger and weaker versions of that principle. The arguments for Purity only support the weaker interpretation, but arguments that employ it only succeed if the stronger interpretation is true. As a result, nearly every metaphysician who has appealed to Purity has made a mistake—in that the inferences that they make are not justiﬁed by the arguments that they provide.

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- Metaphysics, Higher-order logics, Metaphysical grounding, Fundamentality

Metaphysicians generally agree that not all predicates are created equal. In the Parmenides, young Socrates affirms that there are Forms of the beautiful, the just, and the good, but denies that there is a Form of hair or of mud. In classical Indian metaphysics, Udayana’s followers distinguished ‘real’ universals (jāti) from those that are merely ‘constructed’ (upādhi).1 And in recent Western philosophy, Goodman (1955) has distinguished projectible from non-projectible predicates, Armstrong (1978) predicates that correspond to universals from those that don’t, Shoemaker (1980) genuine from ‘mere Cambridge’ properties, and David Lewis (1983; 1986) perfectly natural attributes from those that are less than perfectly natural.2 It is easy to notice that in each of these distinctions, one of the two respective classes of predicates (or universals, etc.) is in some way privileged. The distinction that this paper is concerned with also fits into this roster. I shall try to give an account ...

- by Jan Plate
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- Philosophy, Fundamentality, Perfectly natural properties

Should we posit sparse properties? This paper aims to explore the issue of postulating sparse properties in one’s ontology. Sparse properties (particularly, the Lewisian variant of sparse properties) being the
important differentiator that distinguishes pluralist theories of properties from their competitors, through a structural division between an elite subset of properties and the vast hordes of properties whose sole function is to act as the value of predicates. The importance of this distinction being that sparse properties are taken as fulfilling an assortment of roles, more than enough to satisfy the price of entry (what I shall call ‘The Work-Load Principle’). This paper will argue that there is a cumulative case to be made against reifying the Lewisian variant of sparse properties, in the hopes that this will dissuade metaphysicians from positing Lewisian sparseness.
Key Words: Properties, David Lewis, Sparseness, Naturalism, Pluralism.

- by Keagan Kruger
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- Ontology, Metaphysics of properties, David K Lewis, Willard Van Orman Quine

The algorithmic theory of laws claims that the laws of nature are the algorithms in the best possible compression of all empirical data. This position assumes that the universe is compressible and that data received from observing it is easily reproducible using a simple set of rules. However, there are three sources of evidence that suggest that the universe as a whole is incompressible. The first comes from the practice of science. The other two come from the nature of the universe itself: the presence of chaotic behavior and the nature of quantum systems also suggests that the universe is incompressible. This paper evaluates these sources and argues that none provides a convincing case to reject the algorithmic theory of laws.

- by Billy Wheeler
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- Metaphysics, Laws of Nature (Philosophy)

An alternative to the Best System theory of Laws based upon Algorithmic Information Theory.

- by Terrance Tomkow
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- Computational Physics, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Physics

In this paper I argue that the analysis of natural properties as convex subsets of a metric space in which the distances are degrees of dissimilarity is incompatible with both the definition of degree of dissimilarity as number of natural properties not in common and the definition of degree of dissimilarity as proportion of natural properties not in common, since in combination with either of these definitions it entails that every property is a natural property, which is absurd. I suggest it follows that we should think of the convex class analysis of natural properties as a variety of resemblance nominalism.

- by Ben Blumson
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- Metaphysics, Metaphysics of properties, Conceptual Spaces, Properties

It is often said that the best system account of laws (BSA) needs supplementing with a theory of perfectly natural properties. The 'strength' and 'simplicity' of a system is language-relative and without a fixed vocabulary it is impossible to compare rival systems. Recently a number of philosophers have attempted to reformulate the BSA in an effort to avoid commitment to natural properties. I assess these proposals and argue that they are problematic as they stand. Nonetheless, I agree with their aim, and show that if simplicity is interpreted as 'compression', algorithmic information theory provides a framework for system comparison without the need for natural properties. Keywords: laws of nature; best system account; natural properties; algorithmic information theory; invariance theorem. RESUMEN: A menudo se dice que la explicación de las leyes del mejor sistema (BSA) requiere ser completada con una teoría de las propiedades perfectamente naturales. La 'fuerza' y la 'simplicidad' de un sistema son relativas a un lenguaje y sin un vocabulario fijo es imposible comparar sistemas rivales. Recientemente, varios filósofos han in-tentado reformular la BSA en un esfuerzo por evitar el compromiso con las propiedades naturales. Aquí valoro estas propuestas y argumento que son problemáticas en su forma actual. Sin embargo, comparto su objetivo y muestro que si la simplicidad es interpretada como 'compresión', la teoría algorítmica de la información pro-porciona un marco para la comparación sin necesidad de apelar a propiedades naturales. Palabras clave: Leyes de la naturaleza, explicación del mejor sistema, propiedades naturales, teoría algorítmica de la infor-mación, teorema de invariancia.

This paper presents an account of what it is for a property or relation (or ‘attribute’ for short) to be logically simple. Based on this account, it is shown, among other things, that the logically simple attributes are in at least one important way sparse. This in turn lends support to the view that the concept of a logically simple attribute can be regarded as a promising substitute for Lewis’s concept of a perfectly natural attribute. At least in part, the advantage of using the former concept lies in the fact that it is amenable to analysis, where that analysis—i.e., the account put forward in this paper—requires the adoption neither of an Armstrongian theory of universals nor of a primitive notion of naturalness, fundamentality, or grounding.

- by Jan Plate
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- Fundamentality, Perfectly natural properties

The number of writings on truth-making which have been published since Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith's seminal, rich and deep article "Truth-Makers" in 1984 is considerable. Some deal with the theory of the notion, some with its applications, some with both. This paper adds up to the pile of writings which focus on the theory. I focus on one account of truth-making I find plausible, the view that for a truth-bearer to be made true by an entity is for it to be the case that the truth-bearer is true because the entity exists, where 'because' is understood as expressing a form of objective, metaphysical explanation which is now often subsumed under the label 'grounding'. Taking this account for granted, we may distinguish, amongst the general principles governing truth-making, those which derive from more basic principles governing the notions in terms of which it is defined, from those which do not. Which principles compose the first class, which are the more basic principles from which they derive, and how do the former derive from the latter? I try to make some steps towards an answer to this difficult question.

- by Fabrice Correia
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Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties in terms of the facts about naturalness. This article discusses the three most inﬂuential of these attempts, each of which involve David Lewis. These are Lewis’s 1983 analysis, his 1986 analysis, and his joint 1998 analysis with Rae Langton.

- by Dan Marshall
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- Metaphysics of properties, David K Lewis, Intrinsicality