Hamid Taieb | Humboldt Universität zu Berlin (original) (raw)

Papers by Hamid Taieb

This paper aims to present and evaluate the (unduly neglected) account of the essence of colours ... more This paper aims to present and evaluate the (unduly neglected) account of the essence of colours developed by the early phenomenologist Adolf Reinach. Reinach claims that colours, as regards their nature or essence, are physical entities. He is opposed to the idea that colours are “subjective” or “psychic”. It might be the case that the colours we see in the world do not exist but are mere appearances. However, their non-existence would not entail any change in their essence: that is, they would not be psychic, but would just be non-existent physical entities. In Reinach’s view, we can be “ontic-neutral essentialists” about colours: we can remain neutral as to the existence of colours but still make claims about their essence. In the first part of the paper, I present Reinach’s take on the essence of colours. In the second part, I address his existential neutrality about colours; in particular, I argue that Reinach’s ontic-neutral essentialism brings to the fore a seldom noted but crucial distinction to be made in the discussion of colours, that between empirical and metaphysical non-realism about colours.

This paper focuses on a crucial question of social ontology addressed by Gerda Walther, namely, w... more This paper focuses on a crucial question of social ontology addressed by Gerda Walther, namely, whether a social community has its own reality over and above that of its members and its cultural “products”, such as language, religion, infrastructure, and works of art. Walther has a nuanced answer which combines elements of phenomenology and Marxism. She praises Marxists for drawing our attention to the “community as such”, taken as an object distinct from its members and their relations. She maintains the thesis, defended according to her by “certain socialists and Hegelians” (which presumably includes Marxists), that communities have their own reality. However, she develops it one step further, arguing that these social structures are “higher-order” unitary realities that exist over and above their members and cultural products. In addition, she enriches this realist position from a phenomenological point of view by identifying with precision the kinds of mental act on which communities are founded, namely, “unifications” and “we-experiences”. As such, Walther’s theory is an early encounter between phenomenology and Marxism, prior to Trần Đức Thảo and Jean-Paul Sartre, and thus deserves much more attention than it has received in the history of philosophy.

In this paper, I address the issue of how to best account from a philosophical point of view for ... more In this paper, I address the issue of how to best account from a philosophical point of view for the diversity of our (synchronic) mental activities. The discussion starts with Mark Textor's mental monism, defended in his book Brentano's Mind. According to mental monism, our mental life is constituted by just one simple mental act, in which different sub-acts – e.g. seeing, hearing, and self-consciousness – can be conceptually distinguished. Textor grounds this view in the work of the early Brentano and contrasts it with the theory of the later Brentano, who introduces a mental substance into his philosophy of mind. According to Textor, Brentano needs a substance because he is unable to explain how mental monism can account for the separability of our mental activities, for example, the fact that I can stop hearing F while still seeing blue. Textor argues, however, that mental monism can solve this problem. I address two issues regarding Textor's view. First, I challenge his interpretation of the early Brentano by arguing that Brentano imports not conceptual, but ontological complexity into our mental life; I defend Brentano's view against possible criticisms, and I address some objections to mental monism. Second, I oppose Textor's narrative about Brentano's adoption of mental substance. I argue that Brentano needs a substance not to explain separability, but rather to individuate our mental acts. I still argue, however, that Brentano's earlier view (understood in my sense) is better than the substance account for dividing the mind.

This paper aims to present and evaluate Brentano's account of the individuation of mental acts. I... more This paper aims to present and evaluate Brentano's account of the individuation of mental acts. In his early works, Brentano assimilated mental acts to tropes; however, he encountered difficulties in explaining their individuation, since the usual solutions for the individuation of tropes were not readily applicable to his theory of mental acts. In a later period, Brentano introduced into his psychology what he called the "soul", and this allowed him to explain the individuation of mental acts. Finally, after his "reistic" turn, he excluded mental acts from his ontology, for he rejected abstracta of any kind, including abstract particulars, and admitted only things, or res (in Latin), that is, concrete particulars; in his late philosophy, there are no "thinkings", but only "thinkers". However, he still needed to explain what individuates different thinkers, and this was again the soul. In the conclusion, the paper critically compares the different theoretical options considered by Brentano.

The aim of my paper is to present the critique by Brentanians – more precisely, by Brentano himse... more The aim of my paper is to present the critique by Brentanians – more precisely, by Brentano himself and his students Stumpf and Marty – of the thesis that colours are properties that are relational to a perceiver. For Brentanians, colours are monadic physical properties. Brentanians, I will show, think that colours do not exhibit a relationality to perception when we experience them, and that the concepts of them do not contain any mark representing a relation to perception; this phenomenological and logical non-relationality, they think, allows them to hold that colours are not relational by nature. Despite arguing that colours are monadic and physical, Brentanians also hold that colours do not exist in reality, and in their opinion these two theses are perfectly compatible. I will further show that although Brentanians (especially Marty) claim that colours are monadic, they nonetheless allow for a loose relationality of colours to perception which is, however, identical to that of any other physical property. I will conclude by discussing some interesting consequences of the Brentanian theory for contemporary debates about colours.

This paper aims to address a problem faced by any philosopher who treats universals as intentiona... more This paper aims to address a problem faced by any philosopher who treats universals as intentional objects: in defending this thesis, aren’t they committed to the view that each of us thinks an individuated universal, since each of us, when thinking of a universal, must have our own intentional object? This problem, which is mentioned by Brentano at the turn of the twentieth century, originated in the Middle Ages in debates initiated by Averroes about the nature of the intellect. It shows up in the later Aquinas, due to his theory of the verbum, which might be interpreted as a sort of intentional object, but it is solved without too much difficulty. It is later found in Hervaeus Natalis, who does accept intentional objects; in contrast to Aquinas, it is not clear that Hervaeus has a good solution to the problem. After first presenting the problem, this paper then turns to its medieval origins by analysing its occurrence in Aquinas’s criticism of Averroes. It then explains why Hervaeus has more difficulties than Aquinas in solving the problem. It concludes with a systematic reflection on the various possible solutions to the problem.

This paper presents the defense by the medieval philosopher Peter Auriol of the thesis that sound... more This paper presents the defense by the medieval philosopher Peter Auriol of the thesis that sounds and odors have no real, mind-independent being, but exist only as mental correlates of acts of hearing and smelling. Auriol does not see this as an idiosyncratic position, as he claims to be following not only Aristotle, but also Averroes on the issue. Since it is often thought that non-realism about sensible qualities was “inconceivable” for medieval authors and was made possible only by the early modern scientific revolution led by Galileo, it is crucial to bring Auriol’s position to the fore. Auriol’s view, and its alleged roots in Arabic philosophy, invites us to reassess our standard narrative in the history of philosophy and science.

This paper aims to reassess a notion in the works of the later Husserl that is both historically ... more This paper aims to reassess a notion in the works of the later Husserl that is both historically important and philosophically insightful, but remains understudied, namely, that of type. In opposition to a standard reading which treats Husserl's type presentations as pre-conceptual habits, this paper argues that these representations are a specific kind of concept. More precisely, it shows that Husserl's account of type presentations is akin to the contemporary prototype theory of concepts. This is historically important, since the predecessor of the prototype theory is usually said to be Wittgenstein. From a philosophical standpoint, the paper shows that Husserl has an innovative account of the connection between type concepts and their extension. Contrary to the standard view of extensions as sets and thus sharp entities, Husserl develops a correlationalist theory of concepts, according to which, for the specific characteristics in the structure of a concept, there are corresponding characteristics in the arrangement of its members, and vice versa. According to this theory, while sharp concepts lead to sharp extensions, vague concepts such as (proto)type concepts lead to vague extensions. The paper presents this understanding of Husserl in detail and explains its philosophical significance.

Brentano’s account of intentionality has often been traced back to its scholastic sources. This i... more Brentano’s account of intentionality has often been traced back to its scholastic sources. This is justified by his claim that objects of thought have a specific mode of being – namely, “intentional inexistence” (intentionale Inexistenz) – and that mental acts have an “intentional relation” (intentionale Beziehung) to these objects. These technical terms in Brentano do indeed recall the medieval notions of esse intentionale, which is a mode of being, and of intentio, which is a “tending towards” (tendere in) of mental acts. However, within the lexical family of intentio there is another distinction that plays an important role in medieval philosophy – namely, the distinction between first and second intentions (intentio prima and intentio secunda), which are, roughly speaking, concepts of things and concepts of concepts respectively. What is less well-known is that Brentano explicitly borrowed this distinction as well, and used it in his account of intentionality. This paper explores this little-known chapter in the scholastic-Austrian history of intentionality by evaluating both the historical accuracy and the philosophical significance of Brentano’s borrowing of the scholastic distinction between first and second intentions.

Brentanians defend the view that there are distinct types of object, but that this does not entai... more Brentanians defend the view that there are distinct types of object, but that this does not entail the admission of different modes of being. The most general distinction among objects is the one between realia, which are causally efficacious, and irrealia, which are causally inert. As for being, which is equated with existence, it is understood in terms of “correct acknowledgeability.” This view was defended for some time by Brentano himself and then by his student Anton Marty. Their position is opposed to Bolzanian, Husserlian, and Meinongian ontologies, in which a distinction in the (higher) types of object implies a distinction in their mode of being. These Austro-German discussions anticipate much of the contemporary debate between Quineans, who accept only differences in objects, and neo-Meinongians or other ontological pluralists, who accept different modes of being. My paper first presents the Brentanian view in detail and then evaluates its philosophical significance.

In this paper, I present Brentano’s account of sensation. In the first part, I focus on Brentano’... more In this paper, I present Brentano’s account of sensation. In the first part, I focus on Brentano’s positive views on sensation, according to which it is an intuitive fundamental presentation of a real physical phenomenon. In the second part, I discuss the way Brentano distinguishes sensation from other mental acts, namely, outer perception, inner perception, acts of interest, proteraesthesis, memory, conceptual presentations, and imagination.

This paper presents and evaluates the early Husserl’s account of typicality. In the Logical Inves... more This paper presents and evaluates the early Husserl’s account of typicality. In the Logical Investigations, Husserl holds that the meaning of ordinary language (common) names is sensitive to typicality: this meaning depends on typical examples which vary in different contexts and are more or less similar to one another. This seems to entail that meanings, which according to Husserl are concepts, are “fluctuating” (schwankend) and vague. Prima facie, such a claim contravenes his theory of ideal meanings, or concepts, which are “fixed” (fest) and sharp. However, Husserl wants to save this theory. He claims that the fluctuation and vagueness in question are not to be found in the meaning itself, or the concept, but rather derive from the act of meaning. Thus, he apparently manages to make room for typicality in ordinary language while accepting only fixed and sharp meanings. After presenting Husserl’s theory, I evaluate it and ask whether he will still be committed, despite his own claims, to accepting prototype concepts to account for typicality in ordinary language.

Husserl often pays tribute to his teacher Brentano for having opened the path towards phenomenolo... more Husserl often pays tribute to his teacher Brentano for having opened the path towards phenomenology. However, the praise is systematically followed by a criticism: Brentano failed to draw all the consequences from his ground-breaking rediscovery of intentionality, and remained stuck in inadequate psychological research. For Husserl, there are three ways to study mental acts: empirical, eidetic, and transcendental. What is objected to Brentano is his adherence to empirical psychology. Husserl himself focuses on the second and third levels. It is clear that Brentano never entered into transcendental considerations. However, it seems also clear that he was doing eidetic-like research in psychology in a way similar to Husserl. In the paper, I first present Husserl’s criticism of empirical and, thus, Brentanian psychology. I then turn to Brentano’s and the psychology of his heirs and try to show that Husserl’s criticism is not quite correct. In the course of the discussion, I treat the crucial epistemological question of eidetic vs empirical knowledge, both in Husserl and in Brentano.

This paper discusses the thesis defended by Edith Stein that certain acts can be attributed to th... more This paper discusses the thesis defended by Edith Stein that certain acts can be attributed to the State. According to Stein, the State is a social structure characterized by sovereignty. As such, it is responsible for the production, interpretation, and application of law. These tasks require the performance of acts, most of which are what Stein calls “social acts” like enactments and orders. For Stein, the acts in question are made by the organs of the State, but in the name of the State, and are thus attributed to the State via a relation of representation. In the first section, the paper presents Stein’s thesis that the sovereignty of the State entails a series of legal prerogatives, which in turn result in various social acts being ascribed to the State through its representatives. In the second section, the paper critically discusses Stein’s views, notably her theory of representation, and the underdetermination of her account of the nature of the State, while emphasizing its most interesting aspects, namely, its fine-grained analyses of the various acts that are attributed to the State.

This paper examines the account of ordinary language semantics developed by Franz Brentano and hi... more This paper examines the account of ordinary language semantics developed by Franz Brentano and his pupil Anton Marty. Long before the interest in ordinary language in the analytic tradition, Brentanian philosophers were exploring our everyday use of words, as opposed to the scientific use of language. Brentano and Marty were especially interested in the semantics of (common) names in ordinary language. They claimed that these names are vague, and that this is due to the structure of the concepts that constitute their meaning: concepts expressed by such names are themselves vague, based on typicality, and have more or less similar items within their extension. After presenting the views of Brentano and Marty, this paper compares them to later accounts of meaning and concepts, notably Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblances and the prototype theory of concepts, and emphasizes the originality of the Brentanian position.

This paper presents and evaluates the Brentanian theory of association of ideas. The topic of ass... more This paper presents and evaluates the Brentanian theory of association of ideas. The topic of association usually brings to mind British Empiricism, which is often thought to have a monopoly on the matter. Brentano, however, adopts an original, alternative account of association. He argues that all cases of association can be placed under a single general law, that of “habit”. His explicit account of the topic is rather brief; however, his most faithful pupil, Anton Marty, thoroughly developed his master’s views. Marty presents Brentano’s account of association in detail, and endeavours to defend it against rival theories, notably those which hold that the laws of “similarity”, or of what is called “redintegration”, are able to explain all cases of association. First, the paper presents the information found in Brentano himself on association of ideas. Then, it turns to Marty to analyze his developments of the Brentanian view. Finally, the paper evaluates Brentano and Marty’s account by tackling some objections that it may face.

Carl Stumpf, in his Spinozastudien, presents the Aristotelico-Scholastic thesis of the “paralleli... more Carl Stumpf, in his Spinozastudien, presents the Aristotelico-Scholastic thesis of the “parallelism” between mental acts and contents, i.e., the thesis that “the essential differences and divisions of the acts run in parallel to those of the contents, since they are determined in their specificity by the latter.” In his paper, Stumpf also distinguishes between passive and active accounts of intellection in the history of philosophy. Now, Stumpf, in his own theory of intentionality, has rather an active account of intellection: he holds that the contents of abstract presentations and judgments are “products” of these acts. Stumpf does not explicitly give a historical precedent for his position. In this note, I would like to discuss Stumpf’s historical narrative concerning the active accounts of intellection, as well as to complete this narrative with information about some prior philosophical positions resembling Stumpf’s own views on psychic products.

Reinach est connu pour défendre une théorie a priori du droit civil. Cette position, qui se dit i... more Reinach est connu pour défendre une théorie a priori du droit civil. Cette position, qui se dit inspirée de Husserl, est usuellement qualifiée de « platonisme » dans la littérature secondaire. Elle se comprend comme intuition des essences, projet de phénoménologie eidétique que Reinach fait remonter à Platon. Une position qui est rejetée par Reinach en philosophie du droit est le « psychologisme », thèse tendant à expliquer le droit par référence à la psyché. L’hostilité de Reinach à l’égard du psychologisme semble être une hostilité à l’égard de lui-même : en tant qu’élève de Lipps, Reinach avait écrit une thèse sur la notion de causalité en droit pénal, dans laquelle il faisait jouer à la psychologie un rôle fondateur pour le droit. Dans mon exposé, je retracerai l’évolution de Reinach sur ces questions, en repartant de sa thèse et des travaux de Lipps sur lesquelles elle se base pour la comparer aux écrits reinachiens plus tardifs et leur rapport tant à Platon qu’à Husserl.

Cet article cherche à savoir dans quelle mesure l’outillage conceptuel de Brentano peut rendre co... more Cet article cherche à savoir dans quelle mesure l’outillage conceptuel de Brentano peut rendre compte des processus psychiques dont la découverte est usuellement attribuée à Freud. L’article commence par rappeler qu’il y a, entre le maître Brentano et l’élève Freud, une opposition fondamentale : le premier rejette l’existence de phénomènes psychiques inconscients, tandis que le second non seulement les admet, mais les érige en principe majeur d’explication de la vie psychique. Après avoir présenté les arguments de Freud en faveur de l’inconscient, l’article se penche sur deux concepts brentaniens sous-étudiés, soit ceux d’association et de disposition, et entreprend de montrer qu’ils permettent d’expliquer certains phénomènes dont l’étude est traditionnellement réservée à la psychanalyse.

Since the first discussion of Brentano’s relation to (and account of) medieval philosophy by Spie... more Since the first discussion of Brentano’s relation to (and account of) medieval philosophy by Spiegelberg in 1936, a fair amount of studies have been dedicated to the topic. And if those studies focused on some systematic issue at all, the beloved topic of intentionality clearly occupied a hegemonic position in the scholarly landscape . The following pages consider the question from the point of view of ontology, and in a twofold perspective: What did Brentano know about medieval ontology and what kind of access did he have to that material (section 1)? What kind of use did Brentano make of medieval material in his own philosophy, and with what kind of results (section 2)?

Anton Marty (Schwyz, 1847–Prague, 1914) contributed significantly to some of the central themes o... more Anton Marty (Schwyz, 1847–Prague, 1914) contributed significantly to some of the central themes of Austrian philosophy. This collection contributes to assessing the specificity of his theses in relation with other Austrian philosophers. Although strongly inspired by his master, Franz Brentano, Marty developed his own theory of intentionality, understood as a sui generis relation of similarity. Moreover, he established a comprehensive philosophy of language, or "semasiology", based on descriptive psychology, and in which the utterer’s meaning plays a central role, anticipating Grice’s pragmatic semantics. The present volume, including sixteen articles by scholars in the field of the history of Austrian philosophy and in contemporary philosophy, aims at exposing some of Marty’s most important contributions in philosophy of mind and language, but also in other fields of research such as ontology and metaphysics. As archive material, the volume contains the edition of a correspondence between Marty and Hans Cornelius on similarity. This book will interest scholars in the fields of the history of philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries, historians of phenomenology, and, more broadly, contemporary theoretical philosophers.

Die Vorlesung will einen Einblick in verschiedene philosophische Traditionen vermitteln. In der s... more Die Vorlesung will einen Einblick in verschiedene philosophische Traditionen vermitteln. In der seit Jahren geführten Debatte um die Erweiterung des Kanons ist häufig davon die Rede, dass neben „westlichen“ (oder „europäischen“) Traditionen auch „nicht-westliche“ (oder „nicht-europäische“) philosophische Traditionen einbezogen werden sollen. Dennoch findet eine Auseinandersetzung mit sogenannten „nicht-westlichen“ Traditionen bislang selten statt. Daran möchte die Vorlesung etwas ändern. Gleichzeitig ist es so, dass diese Bezeichnungen („westlich“/„nicht-westlich“, „europäisch“/„nicht-europäisch“) selbst aus verschiedenen Gründen problematisch sind; unter anderem sorgen sie dafür, dass die zahlreichen Verbindungen zwischen verschiedenen philosophischen Traditionen nicht in den Blick kommen. Das Hauptziel dieser Vorlesung, die in den kommenden Jahren immer im Sommersemester angeboten werden soll, ist es, möglichst umfassend zu sein, nach und nach mehr philosophische Traditionen unter einem Dach zu vereinen und die Verbindungen zwischen ihnen zu betonen und zu diskutieren.

Im kommenden Sommersemester finden eine Reihe von Vorträgen zur antiken und mittelalterlichen Philosophie statt. Diese Vorträge zielen darauf ab, unser Verständnis dieser Epochen zu erweitern, sei es durch den Fokus auf nicht-europäische geografische Räume wie China und die islamische Welt oder durch die Untersuchung und Diskussion von „europäischen“ und „nicht-europäischen“ Traditionen, insbesondere der altgriechischen, chinesischen und indischen Logik. Ein weiteres allgemeines Interessengebiet wird die Rolle von Frauen in der „europäischen“ Philosophie sein. Darüber hinaus sind Vorträge zu spezifischen Traditionen wie der afrikanisch-amerikanischen Philosophie oder der kritischen Theorie geplant.

Die Vorlesungen werden jeweils von Expert:innen zu diesen Traditionen – teils von unserem Institut, teils von Instituten anderer Universitäten – gehalten; die Sprachen sind Deutsch und Englisch. Es wird zudem Reflexionssitzungen geben, in denen wir gemeinsam auf Querverbindungen und Einflüsse, aber auch auf Fragen der Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung reflektieren, so etwa bei einer Podiumsdiskussion am 10. Juni 2024 mit den Gesamtherausgebern des Grundrisses der Geschichte der Philosophie („Ueberweg“).

Die Vorlesung wird von Dr. Hamid Taieb koordiniert und mit Prof. Dr. Mike Beaney und Prof. Dr. Jonathan Beere gemeinsam organisiert und durchgeführt.

Die Vorlesung will einen Einblick in verschiedene philosophische Traditionen vermitteln. In d... more Die Vorlesung will einen Einblick in verschiedene philosophische Traditionen vermitteln. In der seit Jahren geführten Debatte um die Erweiterung des Kanons ist häufig davon die Rede, dass neben „westlichen“ (oder „europäischen“) Traditionen auch „nicht-westliche“ (oder „nicht-europäische“) philosophische Traditionen einbezogen werden sollen. Dennoch findet eine Auseinandersetzung mit sogenannten „nicht-westlichen“ Traditionen bislang selten statt. Daran möchte die Vorlesung etwas ändern. Gleichzeitig ist es so, dass diese Bezeichnungen („westlich“/„nicht-westlich“, „europäisch“/„nicht-europäisch“) selbst aus verschiedenen Gründen problematisch sind; unter anderem sorgen sie dafür, dass die zahlreichen Verbindungen zwischen verschiedenen philosophischen Traditionen nicht in den Blick kommen. Das Hauptziel dieser Vorlesung, die in den kommenden Jahren immer im Sommersemester angeboten werden soll, ist es, möglichst umfassend zu sein, nach und nach mehr philosophische Traditionen unter einem Dach zu vereinen und die Verbindungen zwischen ihnen zu betonen und zu diskutieren.

In diesem Sommersemester wird es zunächst vier allgemeine Vorlesungen zu antiker chinesischer Philosophie, antiker griechischer Philosophie, indischer Philosophie und arabischer Philosophie geben, bevor wir uns spezifischeren philosophischen Traditionen zuwenden: dem klassischen deutschen Idealismus, der feministischen Philosophie, der Adab-Tradition sowie der frühen analytischen Philosophie und Phänomenologie. Die Vorlesungen werden jeweils von Expert:innen zu diesen Traditionen – teils von unserem Institut, teils von Instituten anderer Universitäten – gehalten; die Sprachen sind Deutsch und Englisch. Es wird zudem Reflexionssitzungen geben, in denen wir gemeinsam auf Querverbindungen und Einflüsse, aber auch auf Fragen der Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung reflektieren, so unter anderem bei einer Podiumsdiskussion am 26. Juni 2023 mit Mitgliedern des Koselleck-Projekts „Geschichte der Philosophie in globaler Perspektive“ von der Universität Hildesheim.

Die Vorlesung wird von Prof. Dr. Kristina Lepold koordiniert und von Prof. Dr. Mike Beaney, Prof. Dr. Jonathan Beere, Prof. Dr. Kristina Lepold und Dr. Hamid Taieb gemeinsam organisiert und durchgeführt.

Our perception shows us a world containing sensory qualities such as colours, sounds, etc.: a sen... more Our perception shows us a world containing sensory qualities such as colours, sounds, etc.: a sensible world. However, physics teaches us that the world is just a dark and silent heap of particles; colours, sounds, etc., are only derived “secondary” qualities, mere appearances arising from the action of the physical “primary” qualities on our senses. Hence the problem: Do colours, sounds, etc., exist independently of us, and if not, to what extent do their appearances provide us with an adequate knowledge of reality?
The problem of secondary qualities, which has occupied philosophers since the early modern era, found one of its most systematic treatments in the Austro-German tradition, more precisely in and around the School of Brentano (though it has gone largely unnoticed). Brentano and his followers, among them Husserl, Meinong, and their many students, made novel analyses of all aspects of the problem: they furnished detailed phenomenological descriptions of the content and object of sensation, which they took to be required for sound discussion of the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the problem; they proposed various original metaphysical solutions to the question of whether sensory qualities exist; and they explored the different epistemological consequences of the metaphysical options at stake, in particular for the reliability of our perception.
This conference gathers both specialists in the Austro-German tradition and contemporary philosophers working on colours and other sensory qualities, with the aim of reconstructing the Austro-German debates on secondary qualities and undertaking an evaluation of the theoretical value of this material.

The aim of this workshop is to enrich our narrative of how the notion of intentionality appeared ... more The aim of this workshop is to enrich our narrative of how the notion of intentionality appeared and evolved in the history of philosophy. In order to do so, it will bring together scholars specializing in each of the main periods in the history of (Western) philosophy, and invite them to explore the topic of intentionality in their areas of specialization, either by reinterpreting already well-known historical episodes, or by bringing new ones to the fore. Such broad diachronic (longue durée) work on intentionality promises to be mutually enriching for the participants, as studies in one period are likely to shed light on aspects that have gone unnoticed or neglected in the scholarship in another period and perhaps even improve our understanding of already well-known discussions.

by Caroline Montebello, Laure Piguet, Mathilde Sigalas, Daniela Solfaroli Camillocci, Sarah Scholl, Pamela Ohene-Nyako, PhD, Jade Sercomanens, Anne-Lydie Dubois, Hamid Taieb, and Myriam Piguet

À travers cent biographies illustrées de femmes* ayant marqué l’histoire de Genève, le recueil 10... more À travers cent biographies illustrées de femmes* ayant marqué l’histoire de Genève, le recueil 100Elles* ancre dans la mémoire collective autant de figures féminines, du VIe au XXe siècle, et participe ainsi à sa féminisation. Cet ouvrage d'art et de vulgarisation scientifique lutte contre un ensemble de phénomènes sociaux et culturels, tels que le patriarcat et le sexisme, qui ont contribué et contribuent encore à l'invisibilisation des femmes* dans l'histoire et dans l'espace public. Il est le fruit d'un travail collaboratif, local et inclusif, prolongeant l’installation provisoire de cent plaques portant le nom de femmes* dans les rues de Genève. Rédigé par des historiennes de l’Université de Genève, coédité par Caroline Montebello et Laure Piguet et réalisé sous la direction de l’association féministe l’Escouade, ce livre est illustré par dix artistes genevoises, alumnae de la HEAD – Genève, partenaire du projet.