Matias Guirado | Universidad de Buenos Aires (original) (raw)

Papers by Matias Guirado

The inconceivability of Descartes' skeptical arguments against common sense

Against mathematical nominalism, 2024

No abstract needed

Meaning and necessity, 2024

No abstract, dude

Resumen de la filosofía de Heidegger, 2024

What this philosopher has told in a bunch of words

proof of an External World, 2024

Why I think we don't need a proof of the existence of the world

Apuntes sobre la aritmética relevantista y el programa de Meyer Resumen. Algunas aritméticas de t... more Apuntes sobre la aritmética relevantista y el programa de Meyer Resumen. Algunas aritméticas de tipo Peano formuladas en lógica de la relevancia formalizan una demostración finita de consistencia absoluta. Esto revelaría-a juicio de Robert K. Meyers y otros-que los teoremas de Gödel son producto de una mala elección de lógica. Aquí se examinan algunos de los argumentos que sustentan esta conclusión y se sostiene que dichos argumentos fallan en proporcionar motivaciones filosóficas o aritméticas para aceptar un cambio de lógica.

En: M. Albizu et al. (eds.), Actas del Vº Simposio de Filosofía Moderna, p. 224-231, 2021, Rosari... more En: M. Albizu et al. (eds.), Actas del Vº Simposio de Filosofía Moderna, p. 224-231, 2021, Rosario, Santa Fe: UNR Editora. ISBN: ISBN 978-987-702-485-2

www.unioviedo.es/Teorema ABSTRACT Machery et al.'s (2004) cross-cultural study on the Gödel case... more www.unioviedo.es/Teorema
ABSTRACT Machery et al.'s (2004) cross-cultural study on the Gödel case has been criticized as the probe question the authors asked to respondents fails to distinguish between speak-er's and semantic reference. I argue that the replies of Machery and others to the ambiguity problem fail. Based on current literature on experimental psychology and comparative survey methodology, I suggest that the problem derives from a cross-cultural variation in the operationalization of contextual information contained in the vignette, plus culture-induced cognitive differences. This calls for adjustment in Machery et al.'s study.

Reseña de la compilación Realismo, verdad y significado.

In this paper I defend a meta-scientific view which combines scientific realism and mathematical ... more In this paper I defend a meta-scientific view which combines scientific realism and mathematical anti-platonism. In other words, I maintain that what current scientific theories imply about spatio-temporal entities is true (or approximately true) and what they imply about the mathematical realm is false (or lack a knowable true value). In the first part of the paper the so called ‘Quine-Putnam indispensability argument’ for mathematical platonism is exposed. In the second part I argue that the claim to naturalize mathematical Platonism by restricting the extension of Platonic realm under the ontological requirements of empirical science returns a distorted picture of both scientific practice and mathematical practice. In the third part I argue that scientific realists can account for the empirical applicability of mathematical theories without a serious commitment to the existence of mathematical objects and defend this proposal from some worthy objections.

Volúmen 1 del primero número de Revista Zétesis. ISSN: 0719-5214, INDEXACIÓN: Latindex. Índice *ARTÍCULOS: - 'Realismo científico y anti-platonismo' por Matías Alejandro Guirado.

In Realistic Rationalism(1998), Jerrold Katz extended his stance on philosophy of languag... more In Realistic Rationalism(1998), Jerrold Katz extended his stance on philosophy of language and linguistics into the field of traditional formal sciences. The purpose of the book is to show that logics and mathematics provide synthetic a priori knowledge of necessary truths. The development of this epistemological project appears closely related to the promotion of a metaphysical-modal component, which states that formal sciences study immutable properties and relationships instantiated by necessarily existing abstract (non-spatial and atemporal) objects. Indeed, this component plays an important role in the understanding of the conditions of a priori synthesis and, moreover, in explaining the objective certainty of logical and mathematical truths. In this paper, I shall argue that Katz's epistemological project is untenable for three reasons: first, the postulation of modally necessary entities is not a sine qua non to explain the particular type of certainty that characterises the formal sciences; second, it is perfectly feasible to give an anti- realistic explanation of the a priori character of the knowledge of necessary truths; third, Katz's arguments in favour of the necessary existence of abstract objects are fallacious

En este trabajo rechazo los alegatos de Psillos (2012) contra el nominalismo moderado (NM). El NM... more En este trabajo rechazo los alegatos de Psillos (2012) contra el nominalismo moderado (NM). El NM es una variante del realismo que recomienda restringir la creencia racional a los contenidos puramente nominalistas de las teorías científicas. Psillos cuestiona esta pretensión, aduciendo que los contenidos platónicos desempeñan un papel insoslayable en la explicación del éxito de la ciencia. Para refutar esta postura, hago tres cosas: sostengo que las teorías científicas tienen contenidos puramente nominalistas, defiendo la plausibilidad metacientífica del concepto de adecuación nominalista y descarto la existencia de hechos físico-matemáticos básicos.

Mark Balaguer ha elaborado una peculiar variante del platonismo matemático -denominada ‘full-blo... more Mark Balaguer ha elaborado una peculiar variante del platonismo matemático -denominada ‘full-blooded platonism’ o ‘FBP’- para solucionar el problema de Benacerraf sobre la inaccesibilidad de las entidades abstractas. Según FBP, todos los objetos matemáticos consistentemente caracterizables existen, aunque de modo contingente. En este trabajo quisiera mostrar que la plenitud ontológica y la contingencia modal no pueden converger en una teoría de objetos matemáticos filosóficamente respetable. Para esto argumento que FBP no cubre algunos factores elementales de confiabilidad epistémica y que envuelve un criterio de plenitud tanto matemática como metafísicamente implausibl

The main objection against Cartesian dualism in Philosophy of Mind is that it is incompati... more The main objection against Cartesian
dualism in Philosophy of Mind is that it
is incompatible with science. It has been
argued, in particular, that the principle
of causal closure of the physical world
and the theorem of preservation of
energy –as well as the concept of dynamic
interaction of fundamental physics–
overrule the postulation of causal
interactions between thinking substances
and extended ones. In this paper I argue
that this conclusion is at least hasty
and that it is not a trivial issue to refute
Cartesian dualism by using empirical
considerations. My theses are: (i) that the
antidualistic criticisms based on scientific
premises collapse into a metaphysically
implausible reductionism; and (ii) that
physical theory does not preclude the
existence of a relation of causation or
recurrent dynamic interaction as the one
required in order to explain the conscious
experience by postulating a pertinent link
between immaterial minds and nervous
systems

In Realism in Mathematics (1990), Penelope Maddy developed a quirky response to Benacerraf's dile... more In Realism in Mathematics (1990), Penelope Maddy developed a quirky response to Benacerraf's dilemma. This dilemma requires us to choose between a good semantics and a good epistemology for mathematics: if we endorse platonism, then we won't be able to explain mathematical knowledge; but, if we reject platonism, then we won't be able to provide a tarskian semantics for mathematese. Maddy
proposes a synthesis between platonism and physicalism in order to sidestep the dilemma. She endorses an ontology of spatiotemporal sets to refute the epistemological horn of the dilemma and defends the irreducibility of those sets in order to deal with the semantic horn. In this paper I argue that, far from overcoming the dilemma, Maddy's proposal succumbs to it. Strictly speaking: the irreducibility of spatiotemporal sets prevents us to develop a reasonable epistemology, while the intervention of material elements in their constitution prevents us to appropriately reconstruct the concept of mathematical truth.

According to Mark Colyvan, some mature scientific developments (specifically, Newtonian cosmology... more According to Mark Colyvan, some mature scientific developments (specifically, Newtonian cosmology, descriptive oceanography, early calculus and Dirac's quantum theory) contain contradictory assumptions, and this enables the prima facie adoption of certain naturalized realism of inconsistent entities. An exotic aspect of Colyvan's proposal is the claim that the resulting variety of realism emerges from the mere application of the parameters of theory evaluation involved in Quine's epistemology. While this is a highly controversial claim in itself, my intention in this paper is simply to show that the theories put forward by Colyvan do not exhibit the properties required so that the implementation of the Quinean guidelines gives place to a philosophically respectable metaphysics of contradictory entities. The thesis I defend here are: (i) neither Newtonian cosmology nor descriptive oceanography exhibits any genuine contradiction; (ii) the inconsistencies apparent in the early calculus and Dirac's quantum theory respectively exhibit a methodological effectivity weak enough so that their use does not rationally demand a realistic recovery.

Nominalistic scientific realism restricts to the field of spatio-temporal entities the belief in ... more Nominalistic scientific realism restricts to the field of spatio-temporal entities the belief in the unobservable underpinned by the success of science. This claim requires giving criteria to decouple from the realistic attitude the Platonic entities committed in scientific ontology; entities such as numbers or vector spaces. Hartry Field has been the first to try to settle this requirement from a systematic point of view. His strategy seeks to show that scientific theories can be completely nominalized, namely, reformulated in a language expunged from commitments to mathematical objects. Joseph Melia (1998) has (somewhat harshly) questioned the soundness of this project. In his view, fieldian nominalism: (i) commits us to arbitrary, causally irrelevant objects, (ii) violates the requirement of ontological parsimony and (iii) lacks sufficient resources to remove the reference to fundamental constants such as e and π. This paper provides a response to Melia's objections. First, I reaffirm the nominalistic adequacy of Field's metaphysics. Then I argue that the charge of ontological waste misses an important technical detail involved in the development of this metaphysics. Finally, I outline a technique to recover the reference to irrational magnitudes from a nominalistic point of view.

The philosophical debate about dispositions acquired an increasingly metaphysical tone in recent ... more The philosophical debate about dispositions acquired an increasingly metaphysical tone in recent times. This shift was driven by the methodological failure of the reductionist project. Paradoxes of material implication and the inability to assign necessary and sufficient conditions for the manifestation of powers in things undermined the claim of achieving purely conditional definitions of dispositional ascriptions. Stephen Mumford was one of the first philosophers to promote a realistic approach to dispositional properties as a means of understanding their predication conditions. In his book Dispositions (1998), Mumford promotes a functionalist monism according to which the instance or token of a dispositional property does not differ ontologically from the categorical basis underlying its manifestation: the conceptual distinction between them is based on purely epistemic issues. In this paper I offer a brief overview of the current state of the debate about dispositions and display some shortcomings of Mumford's proposal. It is argued that the monistic thesis preclude the possibility of a realistic recovery of Quantum Mechanics' dispositional phenomena; also, that the functionalist criterion of identity between instantiated dispositions and their categorical basis is unacceptable.

En “Una teoría realista moderada sobre las disposiciones”, Nilda Robles sostiene que la concepció... more En “Una teoría realista moderada sobre las disposiciones”, Nilda Robles sostiene que la concepción funcionalista de las disposiciones de Stephen Mumford es insatisfactoria. Afirma que las explicaciones disposicionales realistas son triviales, que la identidad presunta entre disposiciones y propiedades categóricas es inaceptable y que, de sostenerse, las disposiciones proliferan innecesariamente. En este trabajo argumento que la propuesta funcionalista es defendible si se flexibiliza la tesis del monismo neutral. Sostengo que las explicaciones disposicionales realistas son informativas, que muchas de las manifestaciones disposicionales científicamente elucidadas carecen de bases categóricas y que la proliferación de propiedades disposicionales responde al avance científico.

Thesis by Matias Guirado

En este trabajo se sostiene que el platonismo matemático es refutado por el cuerno epistemológico... more En este trabajo se sostiene que el platonismo matemático es refutado por el cuerno epistemológico del dilema planteado por Paul Benacerraf en su artículo “Mathematical Truth” (1973). Para esto se recorta y recorre el espacio lógico de las respuestas plausibles a la objeción epistemológica de Benacerraf y se argumenta que ninguna de ellas es satisfactoria. Específicamente, se distingue, clasifica y rechaza seis estrategias: (i) tratar de cuestionar la premisa epistemológica del argumento de Benacerraf; (ii) postular una facultad de intuición suprasensible de entidades abstractas; (iii) atribuir poderes causales a los objetos matemáticos; (iv) restringir la actitud a las teorías de la matemática aplicada y cifrar su confiabilidad en el éxito de sus aplicaciones empíricas; (v) aducir la confiabilidad de nuestros métodos de adquisición de creencias matemáticas; (vi) expandir la ontología matemática hasta el límite de sus posibilidades lógicas. Pero, luego de refutar el platonismo matemático en el plano epistemológico, se procede a reivindicarlo en un plano semántico y metodológico. La principal motivación para este cambio de actitud hacia el platonismo radica en que es la única postura capaz de propiciar una reconstrucción responsable del concepto de verdad matemática. Consecuentemente, se repara en la necesidad de preservar intacta la pintura platonista de la metodología matemática, a la vez que se recomienda renunciar a indagar en el estatus de los objetos de conocimiento matemático.