Empiricism Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Descartes’s belief in innate ideas still looms, in one form or another, over the history of philosophy today. In typical Early-Modern, Rationalist fashion, Descartes presents readers with main arguments for his belief in these... more

Descartes’s belief in innate ideas still looms, in one form or another, over the history of philosophy today. In typical Early-Modern, Rationalist fashion, Descartes presents readers with main arguments for his belief in these pre-packaged ideas, via appeals to God and the application of logical thinking techniques. That is, Descartes asserts that the so-called inherent idea of God derives from God and that the mind can establish this notion as well as the surety of its supposed innate ideas of immortality and identity. However, such ideas may appear alien to some, and even unfounded upon critique. First, this essay will present Descartes’s philosophy of innate ideas by using his Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. Next, this piece will then describe the philosopher Hume’s Empiricist understanding of ideas and the problems of abstraction, and then challenge the Cartesian view that innate notions like God, immortality of the soul, and identity may not be so innate, or as precise as Descartes leads us to believe.

Homework for Philosophy class.

Translation evaluation is undoubtedly one of the most difficult tasks facing a translator trainer. It is unlikely that there will ever be a ready-made formula that will transform this task into a simple one; however, this article suggests... more

Translation evaluation is undoubtedly one of the most difficult tasks facing a translator trainer. It is unlikely that there will ever be a ready-made formula that will transform this task into a simple one; however, this article suggests that the task can be made somewhat easier by using a specially designed Evaluation Corpus that can act as a benchmark against which translator trainers can compare student translations.

Chapter 6 in Voltaire's science fiction satire, Micromegas, is an illustration of the French Enlightenment's movement toward empirical scientific methods and intellectual skepticism, away from speculative metaphysics, organic systems... more

Chapter 6 in Voltaire's science fiction satire, Micromegas, is an illustration of the French Enlightenment's movement toward empirical scientific methods and intellectual skepticism, away from speculative metaphysics, organic systems known as the Summae, and recognition of the absolute.

This essay talks about the origins of mathematics. Is mathematics an innate skill people have always had? Did man create this discipline with the help of his senses? This passage targets the folllowing debate. It offers a general... more

This essay talks about the origins of mathematics. Is mathematics an innate skill people have always had? Did man create this discipline with the help of his senses?
This passage targets the folllowing debate. It offers a general overview about the topic.

"Understanding Scientific Progress constitutes a potentially enormous and revolutionary advancement in philosophy of science. It deserves to be read and studied by everyone with any interest in or connection with physics or the theory of... more

"Understanding Scientific Progress constitutes a potentially enormous and revolutionary advancement in philosophy of science. It deserves to be read and studied by everyone with any interest in or connection with physics or the theory of science. Maxwell cites the work of Hume, Kant, J.S. Mill, Ludwig Bolzmann, Pierre Duhem, Einstein, Henri Poincaré, C.S. Peirce, Whitehead, Russell, Carnap, A.J. Ayer, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Nelson Goodman, Bas van Fraassen, and numerous others. He lauds Popper for advancing beyond verificationism and Hume’s problem of induction, but faults both Kuhn and Popper for being unable to show that and how their work could lead nearer to the truth." —Dr. Lloyd Eby teaches philosophy at The George Washington University and The Catholic University of America, in Washington, DC

The aim of this study is to introduce in detail the model of descriptive definition of Stephen C. Pepper. After an outline of his analysis of nominal definitions, Pepper’s own conception of descriptive definition is presented. Further on,... more

The aim of this study is to introduce in detail the model of descriptive definition of Stephen C. Pepper. After an outline of his analysis of nominal definitions, Pepper’s own conception of descriptive definition is presented. Further on, the study seeks to reveal deeper connections of this model to Pepper’s account of cognitive situation based on the dynamic and reciprocal relation between uncritical knowledge (common sense) and critical knowledge. Finally, the potentially dangerous consequences of ignoring the proper nature and status of definition are discussed.

Nuova edizione italiana a cura di Filippo Domenicali. Postfazione di Ubaldo Fadini. "Empirismo e soggettività. Saggio sulla natura umana secondo Hume", è apparso in Francia nel 1953 e rappresenta l'esordio filosofico del giovane Deleuze.... more

Nuova edizione italiana a cura di Filippo Domenicali. Postfazione di Ubaldo Fadini.
"Empirismo e soggettività. Saggio sulla natura umana secondo Hume", è apparso in Francia nel 1953 e rappresenta l'esordio filosofico del giovane Deleuze. Si tratta di un testo di sfolgorante bellezza e attualità, in cui l'autore riesce a tracciare un'inedito ritratto di David Hume facendone un intercessore di primo piano, imprescindibile per la definizione di un empirismo superiore adeguato alla logica delle molteplicità. Hume, riletto e interpretato al di là dei consueti canoni storiografici, risuona nuovamente in tutta la sua freschezza, e aiuta Deleuze a delineare le coordinate per una nuova immagine del pensiero introducendoci in un mondo artefatto, dominato dall'artificiale, che si situa al di là dei dualismi tradizionali, a un pluralismo aperto alla contingenza degli incontri e delle relazioni. Hume, insomma, ha saputo porre in modo nuovo il problema della soggettività, ma di una soggettività finalmente concreta, incarnata, affettiva e passionale, «pratica». A diretto contatto con la vita.

The missing shade of blue is an alleged counter-example to Hume’s theory of “perceptions” raised by Hume himself (Hume, [1748] 2011: §2.16). This essay proceeds as follows; firstly, a brief summary of Hume’s ([1748] 2011) conceptual... more

The missing shade of blue is an alleged counter-example to Hume’s theory of “perceptions”
raised by Hume himself (Hume, [1748] 2011: §2.16). This essay proceeds as follows; firstly, a
brief summary of Hume’s ([1748] 2011) conceptual distinctions regarding perceptions and the
empiricist principle; secondly, the problem of the missing shade of blue counter-example;
responses to the missing shade of blue; assessing these responses and addressing other issues
with Humean empiricism; finally, assessing the viability of a Humean empiricism. As a result,
this essay will argue that Hume is correct in his assessment of the missing shade of blue and
that, furthermore, the correct solution to this issue (and the correct account of the empiricist
principle) is as a purely empirical claim that does not require any significant revision to Hume’s
core position.

This article evaluates the efficacy, effectiveness, and clinical significance of empirically supported couple and family interventions for treating marital distress and individual adult disorders, including anxiety disorders, depression,... more

This article evaluates the efficacy, effectiveness, and clinical significance of empirically supported couple and family interventions for treating marital distress and individual adult disorders, including anxiety disorders, depression, sexual dysfunctions, alcoholism and problem drinking, and schizophrenia. In addition to consideration of different theoretical approaches to treating these disorders, different ways of including a partner or family in treatment are highlighted: (a) partner-family-assisted interventions, (b) disorder-specific partner-family interventions, and (c) more general couple-family therapy. Findings across diagnostic groups and issues involved in applying efficacy criteria to these populations are discussed.

The trilogy Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition investigates how Aristotle and his ancient and medieval successors understood the relation between the external world and the human mind. It gives an equal footing to the... more

The trilogy Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition investigates how Aristotle and his ancient and medieval successors understood the relation between the external world and the human mind. It gives an equal footing to the three most influential linguistic traditions – Greek, Latin, and Arabic – and offers insightful interpretations of historical theories of perception, dreaming, and thinking. This final volume focuses on intellectual operations and analyses some of the most exciting issues pertaining to the conceptual representation of the external world. The contributions cover the historical traditions and their impact on contemporary philosophy of mind.

This paper explores two related issues concerning Locke's account of epistemic justification for empirical knowledge. One issue concerns the degree of justification needed for empirical knowledge. Commentators almost universally take... more

This paper explores two related issues concerning Locke's account of epistemic justification for empirical knowledge. One issue concerns the degree of justification needed for empirical knowledge. Commentators almost universally take Locke to hold a fallibilist account of justification, whereas I argue that Locke accepts infallibilism. A second issue concerns the nature of justification. Many (though not all) commentators take Locke to have a thoroughly internalist conception of justification for empirical knowledge, whereas I argue that he has an externalist conception of justification: it is the fact that sensation is caused by an external object that justifies our belief in the corresponding object. So, while most commentators take Locke to be a fallibilist with an internalist conception of justification for empirical knowledge, I argue he is actually an infallibilist with an externalist conception of justification.

How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness? If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with... more

How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness? If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity? How do people react to being accused to talking nonsense themselves? Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life? In dream-reports perhaps? Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs? Or in certain jokes and hoaxes? Are contradictions felt to be meaningless? I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties. First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others. Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.

Programme of the Conference (Berlin, 26-27 June 2019)

Pp.14-41 in Feminist Research Practice: A Primer, ed. Sharlene Hesse-Biber, 2013.

As the result of 7 years of teaching seminars of Modern European Philosophy at the Philosophy Department of Athens University, the author publishes her notes together with extracts of original texts by Locke, Berkeley & Voltaire. The... more

As the result of 7 years of teaching seminars of Modern European Philosophy at the Philosophy Department of Athens University, the author publishes her notes together with extracts of original texts by Locke, Berkeley & Voltaire. The purpose of the publication is to assist students and researchers with bibliography and basic access to the issues of Lockean philosophy of human understanding in a historical perspective. Volume II will be dedicated to further parts of Locke's Essay translated to Greek by the author and an introduction to the contemporary impact of the philosopher's views on perception, self and personal identity. Index of terms in Greek and English, bibliography, links and a series of questions for the students are also included.

Mi objetivo en esta investigación es revisar si el planteamiento de Jesse Prinz corresponde efectivamente a una forma de empirismo -considerando como piedra angular del mismo la premisa de que los conceptos no son innatos: todo lo que... more

Mi objetivo en esta investigación es revisar si el planteamiento de Jesse Prinz corresponde efectivamente a una forma de empirismo -considerando como piedra angular del mismo la premisa de que los conceptos no son innatos: todo lo que está en la mente, estuvo primero en los sentidos-, dadas las concesiones que hace a algunas formas de nativismo, en su intento de solucionar las problemáticas identificadas por la ciencia cognitiva contemporánea en las teorías clásicas del empirismo. Para ello, me baso en un modelo estándar de empirismo que extraigo de la filosofía de David Hume. Mi tarea aquí consiste en revisar si los elementos esenciales del empirismo clásico están presentes, sin haber sido socavados por los nuevos elementos integrados desde a la ciencia cognitiva contemporánea, en la propuesta de Prinz. Primero reviso la teoría clásica de la mente y las ideas de Hume, para luego mostrar el análisis del cientista cognitivo Jerry Fodor de ésta y abordar las problemáticas que él indica, lo cual nos lleva al debate nativismo-antinativismo de conceptos. En el capítulo dedicado a este debate, se incorpora, además, la teoría nativista de Susan Carey. Finalmente, me centro en la teoría de conceptos de Jessy Prinz, que supone una alternativa empirista viable, contra las formas de nativismo de conceptos antes expuestas, para luego examinar qué elementos del empirismo clásico perviven y si acaso son compatibles con los elementos que Prinz rescata de las propuestas de Fodor y Carey.

Criticisms of Karl Popper’s critical rationalist epistemology are often confused and misleading. In part that is due to Popper’s somewhat lax use of language, in which technical terms are used in more than one sense. I attempt to clarify... more

Criticisms of Karl Popper’s critical rationalist epistemology are often confused and misleading. In part that is due to Popper’s somewhat lax use of language, in which technical terms are used in more than one sense. I attempt to clarify Popper’s views by regimenting his terminology. The result is offered as a clear and concise exposition of the main points of Popper’s epistemology.

Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’). To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet... more

Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’). To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet others: nonsensical, i.e. meaningless. And often one is left guessing.

John Henry Newman’s Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent seeks to explain why it is that when the mind’s eye strains to pick out one among the world’s furnishings, its gaze passes only per speculum in aenigmate. Within the Grammar, this... more

John Henry Newman’s Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent seeks to explain why it is that when the mind’s eye strains to pick out one among the world’s furnishings, its gaze passes only per speculum in aenigmate. Within the Grammar, this explanation unfolds as a diptych, first addressing how assent can outpace understanding (Part One), and then, how merely probable grounds can yield absolute assent (Part Two). Central to the argument of both “panels,” however, is the opposition between “notions” and “things,” which is woven throughout Newman’s successive accounts of apprehension, assent, and inference. At a glance, Newman’s distinction between notion and thing can seem to imply a parsimonious or even “nominalist” ontology, committed to the unreality of abstract objects such as kinds, classes, or propositions. By contrast, this paper argues that such a reading of Newman’s distinction fundamentally mistakes the aim for and register in which he writes; Newman principally distinguishes notions from things, not in order to attach appropriate metaphysical qualifiers to items in the world’s inventory, but rather to pick out distinct modes of the mind’s relation to the world. In other words, the opposition of notion to thing is not adjectival, but adverbial, or even, “grammatical.”

Victor Frankenstein fails in his profession because he consistently contravenes three basic tenets of scientific community: observation, repetition, and transparency. Critics of Frankenstein have generally failed to recognize the socially... more

Victor Frankenstein fails in his profession because he consistently contravenes three basic tenets of scientific community: observation, repetition, and transparency. Critics of Frankenstein have generally failed to recognize the socially responsible scientific values that Shelley attempts to define through the character of the creature. This article argues that Shelley's novel puts forward the idea of socially responsible science: cooperative forms of experimentation that reimagine the scientist's materials and instruments as agents, involve multiple points of view, and pursue mutually beneficial discoveries. Shelley depicts the creature's trial-and-error tests as the natural and instinctual antithesis of Victor's unnatural and artificial laboratory work; the creature's empiricism satisfies needs and solves specific human problems. Shelley's farsighted fiction promotes this vision in an age when the scientific revolution had made science truly popular. Her fictional experiments with the idea of socially responsible science enable us to read Frankenstein as a work of science fiction that offers both a utopian ethic of intellectual partnership and a critique of singular science. If Shelley's vision of a more open and reflective scientific community aspired to a potentially impossible ideal, it is one toward which she thought her age should aspire.