Reid's Inheritance From Locke, and How He Overcomes It (original) (raw)

Some remarks on Reid on Primary and Secondary Qualities

Steffen Borge

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Primary and Secondary Qualities: A Proposed Modification of the Lockean Account

Georges Dicker

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1977

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Secondary Qualities as Dispositions

Nathan Rockwood

Locke Studies, 2020

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Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities

Samuel Rickless

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1997

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Review Essay: Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate, edited by Laurence Nolan (OUP)

Keith Allen

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Reid, Aristotle, and Color

Christopher A Shrock

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Reid's foundation for the primary/secondary quality distinction

Jennifer McKitrick

Philosophical Quarterly, 2002

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Primary and Secondary Qualities

Peter Ross

Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception

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Dispositional Theories of Color and the Claims of Common Sense

Janet Levin

2000

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Seeing White and Wrong: Reid on the Role of Sensations in Perception, with a Focus on Color Perception

Lucas Thorpe

in Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value (Mind Association Occasional Series) , Edited by Rebecca Copenhaver and Todd Buras, Ozford University Press, 2015

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Locke's Life-World: The Teleological Role of Secondary Qualities

Martin Lenz

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Review of Thomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities by Andrew Shrock

Alastair Crosby

Locke Studies, 2018

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Thomas Reid on Aesthetic Perception

Becko Copenhaver

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Secondary Qualities - Subjective and Intrinsic

Peter Sandøe

Theoria, 2008

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Locke’s Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities as Partly Correlated with Kant’s Account of The Thing in Itself

Puttipong Oungkanungveth

MANUSYA: Journal of Humanities

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Review of Thomas Reid’s Theory of Perception by Ryan Nichols

Jennifer McKitrick

2008

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Locke’s Distinctions Between Primary and Secondary Qualities

Michael Jacovides

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Qualities and Consciousness

David Rosenthal

Revue Roumaine de Philosophie

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Reflections on Reid and the Two-Component Model of Experience

Paul Coates

Academia Letters, 2021

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Learning and Conceptual Content in Reid’s Theory of Perception

Ryan Nichols

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Fred's Red: On the Objectivity and Physicality of Mental Qualities

Sam Coleman

Synthese - text available at: https://rdcu.be/cRzZO, 2022

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Thomas Reid on Acquired Perception

Becko Copenhaver

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Appearance and Reality: A Philosophical Investigation into Perception and Perceptual Qualities

Janet Levin

Philosophical Books, 1989

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Thomas Reid's Only Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction

Christopher A Shrock

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Thomas Reid on Language and Mind Thomas Reid on Language and Mind

Alastair Crosby

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The Dilemmas of the Dual Channel: Reid on Consciousness and Reflection

Dr. Daniel Mishori

Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 2003

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Primary Qualities, Secondary Qualities and The Truth About Intention

Alex Miller

Synthese 171, 2009

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Belief in Reid's Theory of Perception

Adam Pelser

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A Non-modal Conception of Secondary Properties

Pedro Tabensky

2010

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Colour as a Secondary Quality1

J. David Velleman

Mind, 1989

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Reid on Consciousness: HOP, HOT, or FOR?

Becko Copenhaver

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Thomas Reid's Theory of Perception

Ryan Nichols

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Reid on the Moral Sense

Becko Copenhaver

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Locke's Primary Qualities

Robert A Wilson

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Reid’s Rejection of Intentionalism

Todd Ganson

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