Alexius Meinong Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Edizione italiana di Über Annahmen (1910), Zweite, umgearbeitete Auflage, J.A. Barth, Leipzig; rist. in GA IV, 1977, pp. 1-389. La seconda edizione di Sulle assunzioni (1910), di cui si presenta ora la prima traduzione in italiano,... more

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- Phenomenology, Philosophy of the Emotions, Franz Brentano, Intentionality

ABSTRACT: One of the main challenges faced by Russell’s theory of judgment was to provide a satisfactory account of judgment that was not committed to the existence of true, false or inexistent complex entities such as Meinongian objectives. In the study of the Russell-Wittgenstein debate on that theory, scholars never considered the idea that Wittgenstein might not have followed Russell on that issue. In this article, I address that question and hold, first, that problems raised by Russell’s theory of judgment find their solution in the picture theory. Then, I show that Wittgenstein hesitated for a long period of time in the Notebooks between a version of his solution which is committed to the existence of possible (non existing) complex entities and one which is not. Finally, I argue that he did, along with Meinong, go for a committing version in the Tractatus.

- by Jimmy Plourde
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- Bertrand Russell, Alexius Meinong, Theory of Judgment, Early Wittgenstein

How do we come to know metaphysical truths? How does metaphysical inquiry work? Are metaphysical debates substantial? These are the questions which characterize metametaphysics. This book, the first systematic student introduction dedicated to metametaphysics, discusses the nature of metaphysics - its methodology, epistemology, ontology and our access to metaphysical knowledge. It provides students with a firm grounding in the basics of metametaphysics, covering a broad range of topics in metaontology such as existence, quantification, ontological commitment and ontological realism. Contemporary views are discussed along with those of Quine, Carnap and Meinong. Going beyond the metaontological debate, thorough treatment is given to novel topics in metametaphysics, including grounding, ontological dependence, fundamentality, modal epistemology, intuitions, thought experiments and the relationship between metaphysics and science. The book will be an essential resource for those studying advanced metaphysics, philosophical methodology, metametaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of science.

- by Tuomas E Tahko
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- Metaphysics, Ontology, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

Ce papier se présente comme une introduction historique au meinongianisme. J'y aborde la théorie de l'objet et du contenu de la représentation de Twardowski, la théorie de l'objet de Meinong, sa critique par Russell et les réponses... more

- by Thibaut Giraud
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- Kazimierz Twardowski, Bertrand Russell, Alexius Meinong, Meinongianism

Aunque la figura de Meinong se asocia a posiciones realistas acerca delos valores, un análisis más cuidadoso de su obra revela al menos tres concepcionesdiferentes de esta noción. El objetivo de este artículo consiste en examinar sistemáti-camente las tesis acerca de los valores sostenidas en tres de sus obras. Se analizará primero la teoría disposicionalista defendida en Psychologische ethische Untersuc-hungen zur Werttheorie (1894) según la cual los valores son posibles sentimientosde valor. Centraremos después nuestra atención a los cambios realizados en “ÜberWerthaltung und Wert” (1895), obra en la que se explica el concepto de valor rela-cionándolo con los conceptos de emoción y deseo. Finalmente, nos centraremos enlas tesis realistas expuestas en Emotionale Präsentation (1917) y mostraremos la actualidad de las mismas para el debate contemporáneo.

- by Ingrid Vendrell-Ferran
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- Emotion, Values, Phenomenology, Franz Brentano

W artykule niniejszym omawiam kilka klasycznych sposobów podejścia do problemu intencjonalności. Zaczynam od ogólnego naszkicowania problemu. Następnie przechodzę do konkretnych propozycji. Najpierw omówiona zostanie ogólna postać teorii wprowadzającej byty zapośredniczające typu Fregowskiego, następnie teoria przedmiotów intencjonalnych, tak jak występuje ona u Brentana, Ingardena czy Meinonga, a także w wersji operujących ontologią światów możliwych. Kolejnym podejściem będą „przysłówkowe” teorie treści mentalnych, teorie kauzalne, teorie funkcjonalistyczno-reprezentacjonalistyczne oraz teorie behawiorystyczno-funkcjonalistyczne, głoszące pierwszeństwo intencjonalności językowej. Artykuł pomyślany jest jako wprowadzenie do problematyki, i w związku z tym nie znajdą się w nim ani wszystkie istotne zagadki ani też pełne i precyzyjne wersje argumentacji. Starałem się jednak pokazać podstawowe problemy oraz wewnętrzną logikę preferowania tych czy innych podejść.

- by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski
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- Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophical Psychology, Franz Brentano

ABSTRACT This essay reconstructs the history of Gestalt psychology taking as its starting points the early 20th century surge in psychology-of-music research. Leaving behind established tradition, authors such as Stumpf, Ehrenfels, Meinong, Krueger, and Witasek developed a new model of psychic development based on musical experience. The melodic and harmonic combination of sounds – with all its sentimental effects – became the new, fascinating dominant paradigm in theories of perception and cognitive flow in general, with important consequences with regard to musical aesthetics.The Gestalt theory properly speaking, formulated by Wertheimer, Koffka and Köhler, arose in this context, its defining characteristic being the tendency to salvage some of the perspectives of romantic philosophy with regard to nature which stemmed from an innovative use of the concept of ‘sense’. This approach is best exemplified by musical applications such as those of Hornbostel, the famous ethnomusicologist who was also an important Gestalt theorist.

- by Riccardo Martinelli
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- Psychology of Music, Gestalt Psychology, Alexius Meinong, Carl Stumpf

Roman Ingarden’s theory of modes of being belongs to the most interesting and original parts of his ontology. According to Ingarden the word “being” is used with a number of different meanings. Not only have we to distinguish between existential “is” (“There is no Santa Claus”), copulative “is” (“This apple is red”) and “is” as transitive verb (“My dog is in your garden”). Also the philosophically most celebrated existential “is” can be – as another well known thinker used to say – predicated in various ways. According to Ingarden these various ways can be analyzed into several existential moments, which basically correspond to various ways of existential dependence. Possible modes of being are obtained by combining existential moments. Finally we get a highly articulated existential ontology. Modes of being aren’t regarded as primitive and unanalysable. They have a kind of internal structure that helps us to understand ontological dependencies in which entities enjoying a given mode of being are involved. Moreover, the combinatorial idea makes it possible to construct many modes of being out of a relatively small number of existential moments, which makes the resulting dependence network ontologically transparent and cognitively accessible.

- by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski
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- Metaphysics, Ontology, Aristotle, Phenomenology

From Bertrand Russell Society Bulletin Spring 2014

- by Bernard Linsky
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- Bertrand Russell, Alexius Meinong

Desires matter. How are we to understand their intentionality? According to the main dogma, a desire is a disposition to act. In this article, I propose an alternative to this functionalist picture, which is inspired by the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, desire involves a specific manner of representing the world: deontic mode. Desiring a state of affairs, I propose, is representing it as what ought to be or, if one prefers, as what should be. Firstly, I present three principles of the semantics of desires that pertain to their satisfaction conditions, their world-to-mind direction of fit, and the idea that we desire what, we think, is not actual. Secondly, I examine the functionalist view in light of these features. Finally, I argue for the deontic mode conception: desire and ought-to-be fit like hand in glove. Consequently, desire’s intentionality is irreducible to desire’s functional role and calls for a first-person perspective taking modes seriously.

- by Federico Lauria
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- Emotion, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Action, Moral Psychology

Il y a toutes sortes de choses dont nous pouvons parler ; et, parmi ces choses de toutes sortes, il y a des choses qui n’existent pas (comme le monstre du Loch Ness ou le rond carré). L’essentiel de ma thèse consiste à formuler avec rigueur et précision des théories qui expriment une telle intuition, théories que j’appellerai des meinongianismes, puis à les défendre contre deux types d’objection : d’abord des objections qui remettent en cause leur cohérence logique, ensuite des objections qui accusent leur coût ontologique.
Je défendrai donc d'une part qu'il y a des théories meinongiennes logiquement cohérente : différentes approches existent et je montrerai ce qu'elles ont en commun (un domaine d'objets meinongiens présentant une structure méréologique caractéristique) ainsi que les avantages et les inconvénients de chacune (je montrerai notamment pourquoi l'approche reposant sur une distinction entre deux modes de prédication est strictement supérieure à celle qui repose sur une distinction entre deux types de prédicat). D'autre part, dans une seconde partie plus originale, je défendrai que ces théories meinongiennes cohérentes peuvent être formulées de façon à ce que leur engagement ontologique soit acceptable. Autrement dit, je montrerai pourquoi les objets meinongiens ne correspondent pas forcément à des entités meinongiennes.
Ainsi, ce travail s’adresse en fait moins aux philosophes portés à considérer avec bienveillance la jungle des entités meinongiennes qu’à ceux enclin à lui préférer les paysages désertiques. La prise de conscience du fait que les logiques meinongiennes n'engagent pas forcément envers une ontologie meinongienne devrait permettre de renouveler d’une façon beaucoup plus large l’intérêt pour ces logiques : on peut user d'une telle logique sans craindre de s’engager par là envers des entités douteuses (de la même façon que nous n'hésitons pas à recourir à des logiques modales sans considérer par là que nous nous engageons forcément envers une ontologie de possibilia à la Lewis).En conclusion, si la preuve est faite que les théories meinongiennes peuvent être logiquement cohérentes et ontologiquement économes, une telle approche étant de surcroît féconde du point de vue philosophique (de nombreuses applications en témoignent), alors il semble bien que la charge de la preuve ne soit plus du côté des défenseurs de ces théories mais revienne à ses adversaires.

- by Thibaut Giraud
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- Alexius Meinong, Non-Classical Logic, Theory of Objects, Meinongianism
- by Emanuele Coccia
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- Logic, Phenomenology, Intentionality, Alexius Meinong

“On Denoting” marks a fundamental turning point in Russell’s philosophical outlook. With the analysis of denoting phrases, the formulation of the distinction of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, and the implicit use of Ockham’s razor as an eliminative tool, it set the basis for much of Russell’s later philosophical and logical work, including logical atomism, the no-class theory, and the ramified hierarchy of types. Although it has been said that Russell was “a philosopher without a philosophy” (Wood 1959, p. 260), I think that from 1905 on Russell’s philosophy was remarkably faithful to the ideas first presented in “On Denoting”. Not only did these ideas have a lasting effect on Russell’s philosophy, but they also had considerable influence on the development of analytic philosophy. In this paper, I discuss Russell’s treatment of definite descriptions in “On Denoting” and argue that although it is successful in achieving an interesting reduction of contexts involving descriptions to contexts in quantification logic, it contains important ambiguities.

- by Oswaldo Chateaubriand
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- Philosophy Of Language, Truth, Philosophy of Logic, Bertrand Russell

Un primo sguardo sulla relazione tra i problemi di filosofia del linguaggio e i problemi ontologici (in particolare quello sull'esistenza). Si analizzano in questo scritto tre autori della Mitteleuropa e cioè Bolzano, Twardowski e Meinong e si abbozza una teoria dei livelli ontologici con la quale si cerca di classificare più articolatamente oggetti ed eventi e si possa rispondere in maniera più consapevole alla domanda su cosa esista

- by Italo Nobile
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- Metaphysics, Ontology, Semantics, Edmund Husserl
- by Riccardo Martinelli
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- Henri Bergson, Immanuel Kant, Bertrand Russell, Alexius Meinong
- by Michele Paolini Paoletti
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- Alexius Meinong, Theory of Objects, Existence, Non-Existence

This book is both an introduction to and a research work on Meinongianism. “Meinongianism” is taken here, in accordance with the common philosophical jargon, as a general label for a set of theories of existence – probably the most basic notion of ontology. As an introduction, the book provides the first comprehensive survey and guide to Meinongianism and non-standard theories of existence in all their main forms. As a research work, the book exposes and develops the most up-to-date Meinongian theory (called modal Meinongianism), applies it to specific fields, and discusses its open problems. The unifying focus of the work is a single, basic philosophical notion: the notion of existence. Each main theory of the notion available in philosophy is introduced via a detailed, self-contained exposition, and critically evaluated, with the original research emerging in the final Chapters. Part I of the book provides a historical introduction to, and critical discussion of, the dominant philosophical view of existence: the “Kantian-Fregean-Quinean” perspective. Part II is the full-fledged introduction to the Meinongian theories of existence as a real property of individuals: after starting with the so-called naïve Meinongian conception and its problems, it provides a self-contained presentation of the main neo-Meinongian proposals, and a detailed discussion of their strengths and weaknesses. Part III develops a specific neo-Meinongian theory of existence employing a model-theoretic semantic framework. It discusses its application to the ontology and semantics of fictional objects, and its open problems. The methodology of the book follows the most recent trends in analytic ontology. In particular, the meta-ontological point of view is largely privileged

- by Francesco Berto
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- Metaphysics, Ontology, Alexius Meinong, Impossible Worlds

This is a slightly opinionated review of three main factions in metaontology: Quineans, Carnapians, and Meinongians. Emphasis is given to the last camp, as the metaontological aspect of Meinongianism has been underappreciated. The final section then offers some general remarks about the legitimacy of ontology, touching on ideas I have developed in other publications.

- by Ted Parent
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- Metaphysics, Ontology, Pragmatism, Quantification
- by Venanzio Raspa
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- Metaphysics, Ontology, Object Oriented Ontology, Alexius Meinong
- by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski
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- Metaphysics, Ontology, Theories of Meaning, Phenomenology

A che cosa ci stiamo riferendo quando parliamo di entità come ‘Pegaso’ o ‘il cerchio quadrato’? E quale valore di verità possiamo attribuire agli enunciati che li contengono? Fin dall'antichità i filosofi hanno tentato di dare una risposta a queste e altre domande sugli oggetti inesistenti, ma nel corso del ‘900 il dibattito
si è riacceso a partire dalla formulazione della teoria degli oggetti di Meinong. La sua posizione è definita ‘realista’ in quanto sostiene che sia possibile includere oggetti fittizi nella sua tavola delle categorie ontologiche. Questa analisi però non convincerà molti filosofi successivi, che tentano di mostrare come e perché sia sbagliato includere certi oggetti nelle ontologie e di proporre, di contro, delle teorie anti-realiste. In questo testo ci si concentrerà proprio su queste soluzioni elaborate dai maggiori antagonisti di Meinong: Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell e Willard Van Orman Quine.

- by Giulia Pagotto
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- Ontology, Philosophy Of Language, Reference, Meaning
- by Gerhard Preyer
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- Sociology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology

Si è tentato di fare un analisi che si articola in quattro fasi: nell’identificazione della questione esternalista nella grammatica modista, nel rintracciare il medesimo problema in ambito modale nel De interpretatione, nel riportare il problema all’aspetto formale dei modi significandi e, infine, nella “proposta” della soluzione meinonghiana.

- by Cesare Cherchi
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- History of Linguistics, Ontology, Aristotle, Semantics

A century after the death of Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), founder of the «object theory», «Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica» devotes a special issue to the theme: «Meinong and his Contemporaries». During his life, Meinong enjoyed the same notoriety as Husserl, to whom he was commonly compared well in criticism as in appreciation; another figure often associated to him is Russell, with whom Meinong had a controversy that has been extensively studied. However, there are many other figures of contemporary philosophers, who have dealt with Meinong’s ideas and with whom Meinong got in touch. The aim of the issue is to provide a map of the network of the relations that involved Meinong’s philosophy, which still shows vivacity, even when Meinong’s texts are read through various perspectives and with different purposes from those of his contemporaries.

- by Lorenzo Fossati and +1
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- Phenomenology, Austrian Philosophy, Alexius Meinong, Theory of Objects

In this paper I will combine ideas of Meinong's objectology ( my preferred translation of "Gegenstandstheorie") with earlier ideas of ethereal or intelligible gunk. I will try to make that useful for a better understanding of 'emergence'.... more

- by Dan Kurth
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- Category Theory, Baruch Spinoza, Alexius Meinong, Emergence

We outline a neo-Meinongian framework labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM) to account for the ontology and semantics of fictional discourse. Several competing accounts of fictional objects are originated by the fact that our talking of them mirrors incoherent intuitions: mainstream theories of fiction privilege some such intuitions, but are forced to account for others via complicated paraphrases of the relevant sentences. An ideal theory should resort to as few paraphrases as possible. In Sect. 1, we make this explicit via two methodological principles, called the Minimal Revision and the Acceptability Constraint. In Sect. 2, we introduce the standard distinction between internal and external fictional discourse. In Sects. 3–5, we discuss the approaches of (traditional) Meinongianism, Fictionalism, and Realism—and their main troubles. In Sect. 6 we propose our MMM approach. This is based upon (1) a modal semantics including impossible worlds (Subsect. 6.1); (2) a qualified Comprehension Principle for objects (Subsect. 6.2); (3) a notion of existence-entailment for properties (Subsect. 6.3). In Sect. 7 we present a formal semantics for MMM based upon a representation operator. And in Sect. 8 we have a look at how MMM solves the problems of the three aforementioned theories.

- by Francesco Berto
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- Ontology, Fictionality, Metaphysics of Modality, Alexius Meinong

Cu un secol în urmă Alexius Meinong scria cu referire la intenţionalitate că ,,nimeni nu poate să nu recunoască faptul că evenimentele psihice au acest <<caracter distinctiv de a fi îndreptate spre ceva>>, ceea ce ne sugerează extrem de puternic că trebuie să îl considerăm aspectul caracteristic al psihologicului ca opus non-psihologicului" 1. Ne propunem în acest text să vedem care este relaţia dintre intenţionalitate (sau mai precis dintre teza intenţionalităţii, care, după Meinong, s-ar formula în felul următor: ,,evenimentele psihice au drept caracteristică orientarea spre ceva") şi teoria obiectelor nonexistente aşa cum a fost susţinută de Meinong. Înainte însă de a ataca această problemă ne propunem, în prima parte a studiului, să prezentăm două momente premergătoare ale discuţiei despre intenţionalitate, iar apoi, în partea a doua, să schiţăm principalele articulaţii ale teoriei meinongiene a obiectului.

- by Adrian Nita
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- Metaphysics, Franz Brentano, Metaphysics of Mind, Philosophical Logic

Alexius Meinong geliştirmiş olduğu nesne kuramına var olmanın ve varolmamanın ötesinde olan imkânsız ve tamamlanmamış nesneleri dahil etmiştir. Bu nesneler felsefenin hiçbir alanında barınamadıkları için yersiz yurtsuz nesneler olarak adlandırılmıştır. Meinong’un nesne kuramı, Russell tarafından eleştirilmiş ve uzun bir süre bu eleştirinin gölgesi altında kalarak hak ettiği ilgiyi görememiştir. Meinongun nesne kuramının karşılaştığı temel güçlük ise felsefe tarihinde ortodoksiyi oluşturan çelişmezlik ilkesine ters düşmesi olmuştur. Çelişmezlik ilkesinin belirli durumlarda ihmaline dayanan tutarlı ötesi man- tıkların geliştirilmeye başlaması ile yersiz yurtsuz nesnelerin barınabileceği yeni bir mekân ortaya çıkmıştır. Özellikle dialetik mantığın geliştirilmesi ile birlikte Meinongcu nesne kuramı felsefi tartışmaların tekrar gündemine gelmeye başlamıştır. Çalışmamızda çağdaş mantık çalışmaları ile Meinong’un nesne kuramı arasındaki ilişkiyi göstermeye, bu kuramın ontolojik sonuçlarını dikkate alarak değinmeye çalışacağız. Tutarlı-ötesi mantıkların özellikle de dialetik mantığın Meinongcu nesne kuramına nasıl kapı araladığını ortaya koymaya çalışacağız. Bunun için öncelikle Meinong’un nesne teorisinin temel kavramlarını ve argümanlarını ortaya koyacağız. Ardından çağdaş mantık çalışmaları ile Meinongcu nesne teorisi arasındaki ilişkiyi kuracağız. Nihayetinde ise Yeni-Meinongculuğun bazı so- runlarına temas edeceğiz.

- by Ebubekir Muhammed DENİZ
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- Logic, Alexius Meinong, Meinongianism
- by Roger B Clough
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- Alexius Meinong, Theory of Objects

My MA ("Magister") thesis, written in German. Critically evaluates the Quinean "existentialist" apporach to ontology, according to which everything exists, and Meinongian theories, according to which some objects do not exist. Includes a detailed discussion of Alexius Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie, which culminates in the dilemma of being-so, and of Graham Priest's 2005 noneism (nowadays usually referred to as "Modal Meinongianism").

- by Janine Reinert
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- Alexius Meinong, Willard Van Orman Quine, Theory of Objects, Graham Priest
- by Wolfgang Huemer
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- Aesthetics, Continental Philosophy, Austrian Philosophy, Analytic Aesthetics

In this paper I present a sketch of a theory of intentionality introducing special entities called intentional objects. Elaborated theories of this kind can be found in the works of Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden. Nowadays those philosophers who are sympathetic to intentional objects are accused of planting an ontological jungle. All the problems of the theory of intentionality, it is claimed, can be resolved within the framework of a theory assuming a much more parsimonious ontology, like the theory of mental content proposed by the early Husserl or the so-called “adverbial” theory of intentionality. However, I show that the competitors of the theory of intentional objects face serious difficulties, the most important being that within their framework the relation between the representing entity (mental content or “adverbially specified” mental property of the subject) and the external target object has to be construed as primitive, while in the theory of intentional objects it can be easily defined. The consequence is that the partisans of mental contents and adverbialists are forced to require a distinguished kind of epistemic access not only to the representing entity but also to this “representing relation”. This consequence, which is very seldom made explicit, seems indeed to be fatal. Intentional objects appear in this light not as products of an ontological extravagance but instead as entities that are indispensable, if we are to be able to explain the phenomenon of intentionality at all. Moreover, it turns out that we gain nothing if we introduce mental contents in addition to intentional objects. The approach to intentionality that I finally advocate postulates an external relation between a conscious subject and an intentional object, and is thus at bottom Brentanian.

- by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski
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- Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology

Despite their virtual absence in the subsequent phenomenological tradition, Husserl himself held in high esteem the analyzes – often referred to as ‘Husserl’s mereology’ – he undertook in the Third Logical Investigation (Husserl 1913, p. XV). This appreciation was not only due to their quasi-rigorous, quasi-formal aspect. Actually, it relied primarily on their fruitfulness, that is, the multiplicity of their applications. In later works, they will extend from time-consciousness (Huang 2019) to genetic phenomenology (Van Eynde 1999), but they are in fact remarkably diverse as early as the Logical Investigations. The Third LI indeed directly enables Husserl to deal, in the framework of one, unified theory, with a range of problems, whose vastness has not been sufficiently emphasized in the literature. The aim of this paper is thus to identify and synthetize all the problems and debates here at stake, the richness of which testifies to the tremendous power of Husserl's mereology. Five such issues are exhibited: abstraction, moments of unity, formal ontology, pure grammar, and unity of consciousness. Particular emphasis is placed on the last of these issues, which has been rather overlooked in the literature, even though it unveils the essential dependence of phenomenology on mereology. In so doing, the paper also demonstrates that the whole Brentano’s school is involved, in one way or another, in the debates surrounding the Third Investigation. As a conclusion, a comparison between the function of mereology in Brentano and Husserl is offered.

- by Alexis Delamare
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- Franz Brentano, Formal Ontology, School of Brentano, Bernard Bolzano

According to what has long been the dominant school of thought in analytic meta-ontology––defended not only by W. V. O. Quine, but also by Bertrand Russell, Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen, and many others––the meaning of ‘there is’ is identical to the meaning of ‘there exists.’ The most (in)famous aberration from this view is advanced by Alexius Meinong, whose ontological picture has endured extensive criticism (and borderline abuse) from several subscribers to the majority view. Meinong denies the identity of being and existence. That is, he denies that ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ are semantically equivalent, and espouses a theory according to which there are things that do not exist. Here I defend a revised version of this view, which I call “Noncontradictory Neo-Meinongianism.” Focusing primarily on van Inwagen’s arguments in “Meta-Ontology” (1998), I argue that Noncontradictory Neo-Meinongianism is, on commonsensical grounds, preferable to the meta-ontological theories of van Inwagen and Meinong.

- by Sam Hoadley-Brill
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- Metaphysics, Ontology, Meta-Ontology, Bertrand Russell

Il volume analizza il problema del suono nella filosofia tedesca, dalla Critica del Giudizio di Kant alla psicologia della Gestalt. Vengono prese in esame la filosofia della natura del romanticismo e dell’idealismo, la psicologia filosofica della seconda metà del secolo e infine la scuola descrittivo-fenomenologica del primo Novecento. Il quadro che ne risulta è quello di un dibattito molto vivace che tocca fondamentali questioni di fisica acustica, psicologia della percezione ed estetica musicale, mettendo a confronto molti dei massimi autori del secolo. Tra i temi affrontati, il senso dei rapporti numerici insiti nelle relazioni tonali, l’indagine sui processi percettivi e cognitivi legati alle figure armoniche e melodiche, il significato estetico e metafisico del sentimento musicale. Sullo sfondo, le grandi trasformazioni nella prassi musicale del tempo e le notevoli conquiste della scienza acustica, delle quali i filosofi, in diversa misura, furono generalmente consapevoli.

Noneism a is form of Meinongianism, proposed by Richard Routley and developed and improved by Graham Priest in his widely discussed book Towards Non-Being. Priest's noneism is based upon the double move of (a) building a worlds semantics including impossible worlds, besides possible ones, and (b) admitting a new comprehension principle for objects, differerent from the ones proposed in other kinds of neo-Meinongian theories, such as Parsons' and Zalta's. The new principle has no restrictions on the sets of properties that can deliver objects, but parameterizes the having of properties by objects to worlds. Modality is therefore explicitly built in - so the approach can be conveniently labeled as "modal noneism". In this paper, I put modal noneism to work by testing it against classical issues in modal logic and semantics. It turns out that - perhaps surprisingly - the theory (1) performs well in problems of transworld identity, which are frequently considered to be the difficult ones in the literature; (2) faces a limitation, albeit not a severe one, when one comes to transworld individuation, which is often taken (especially after Kripke's notorious 'stipulation' solution) as an easy issue, if not a pseudo-problem; and (3) may stumble upon a real trouble when dealing with what I shall call 'extensionally indiscernible entities' - particular nonexistent objects modal noneism is committed to.

- by Francesco Berto
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- Modal Logic, Alexius Meinong, Impossible Worlds, Graham Priest

The thesis defended, the “guise of the ought”, is that the formal objects of desires are norms (oughts to be or oughts to do) rather than values (as the “guise of the good” thesis has it). It is impossible, in virtue of the nature of desire, to desire something without it being presented as something that ought to be or that one ought to do. This view is defended by pointing to a key distinction between values and norms: positive and negative norms (obligation and interdiction) are interdefinable through negation; positive and negative values aren’t. This contrast between the norms and values, it is argued, is mirrored, within the psychological realm, by the contrast between the desires and emotions. Positive and negative desires are interdefinable through negation, but positive and negative emotions aren’t. The overall, Meinongian picture suggested is that norms are to desires what values are to emotions.

- by Olivier Massin
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- Emotion, Philosophy of Mind, Values, Metaphysics of Mind

"Indice Premessa Avvertenza Il problema 1. Per cominciare, alcuni esempi dal linguaggio ordinario, – 2. Perché uno studio sul principio di contraddizione – 3. Ipotesi di ricerca. I. Incontraddizione Il principio di... more

- by Venanzio Raspa
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- Kant, Logic, Aristotle, History of Logic

Meinongs Untersuchungen über Phantasie, Phantasieerlebnisse und Vorstellungsproduktion sind ein wichtiger Bestandteil seiner Konzeption des Fiktiven. Nach Meinong verweist die Phantasie auf ihr Korrelat, das er in „Phantasie-Vorstellung und Phantasie“ (1889) mit den Phantasievorstellungen identifiziert. Solche Vorstellungen sind, da sie produziert werden, nicht einfach, sondern aus mehreren, miteinander in Beziehung gesetzten Elementen zusammengesetzt. Zur Erklärung, wie Phantasievorstellungen produziert werden, entwickelt Meinong die Theorie der Vorstellungsproduktion. Bei der Entwicklung dieser Theorie stellt der Essay „Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung“ (1899) eine wichtige Etappe dar. Diese Lehre bedeutet einerseits eine Vertiefung der Relationstheorie und andrerseits bietet die Bearbeitung des Begriffs der Fundierung die Erklärung, wie sich Superiora auf Inferiora aufbauen. Das psychologische Gegenstück der Fundierung ist die Vorstellungsproduktion, insofern diese erklärt, wie die Vorstellung eines Gegenstandes höherer Ordnung aus Vorstellungen von Gegenständen niedrigerer Ordnung hervorgeht. Die weitere Entwicklung von Meinongs Denken in Über Annahmen (1902, 1910) führt zur Erweiterung des Tätigkeitsbereichs der Phantasie auf das ganze psychische Leben sowohl durch die Entdeckung einer Art psychischer Erlebnisse in den Annahmen, die im Bereich des Denkens eine ähnliche Rolle spielen wie die Phantasievorstellungen im Bereich des Vorstellens, als auch durch die Entdeckung von Phantasiekorrelaten für Gefühle und Begehrungen, so daß die Phantasie das Unterscheidungskriterium innerhalb der Erlebnisse wird. Eine reichhaltige Forschungsperspektive öffnet die Betrachtung der ernstartigen und schattenhaften Phantasieerlebnisse in Über emotionale Präsentation (1917).

- by Venanzio Raspa
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- Ontology, Aesthetics, Philosophical Psychology, Austrian Philosophy

The present paper is about the epistemology of the theory of color and aims to confront two different approaches. In the first half, I present an overview of some key tenets of Meinong’s Remarks on the Color Solid and the Mixture Law of 1903. In the second half, I discuss Meinong’s approach at length and compare it with another approach which I tend to favor, namely the grammatical and pragmatic approach promoted by Wittgenstein. I highlight some of its difficulties and raise some objections.

- by Denis Seron
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- Color (Philosophy), A Priori Knowledge, Wittgenstein, Alexius Meinong
- by Michele Paolini Paoletti
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- Alexius Meinong, Meinongianism, Nonexistent Objects
- by Wolfgang Huemer
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- Ontology, Aesthetics, Ethics, Phenomenology