Anti-Natalism Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

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- Nationalism, Hate Speech, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Anti-Natalism

This paper examines in detail David Benatar’s asymmetry argument for his thesis that it would have been better for all people not to have begun to exist. Confused attempts to construe the thesis itself are dismissed, including some by Benatar himself (1). A more fitting reading is proposed: in all people self-regret due to one’s own coming into existence would be adequate (2). Benatar’s basic asymmetry of harms and benefits is accepted as a mere truism (3). The lack of any articulate transition from the asymmetry to the thesis on Benatar’s side is exposed. Although the transition is reconstructed from hints provided by
him, it is found wanting (4). Finally, the novelty of the asymmetry argument is highlighted.

- by Vlastimil Vohánka
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- Axiology, Values, Value Theory, Dietrich Von Hildebrand

In his book Better Never to Have Been, David Benatar argues that it is generally all things considered wrong to procreate, such that if everyone acted in a morally ideal way, humanity would elect to extinguish the species. I aim to carefully question the premises and inferences that lead Benatar to draw this anti-natalist conclusion, indicating several places where one could sensibly elect to disembark from the train of argument heading toward such a radical view.

- by Thaddeus Metz
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- Meaning of Life, Anti-Natalism
- by Michael Hauskeller
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- Philosophy, Ethics, Anti-Natalism, Pessimism

This paper directly tackles the question of Benatar’s asymmetry at the heart of his book Better Never to have Been and provides a critique based on some of the logical consequences that result from the proposition that every potential life can only be understood in terms of the pain that person would experience if she or he was born. The decision only to evaluate future pain avoided and not pleasure denied for potential people means that we should view each birth as an unmitigated tragedy. The result is that someone who seeks to maximize utility could easily justify immense suffering for current people in order to prevent the births of potential people. This paper offers an alternative framework for evaluating the creation of people that addresses Benatar’s asymmetry without overvaluing the potential suffering of potential people.

- by Joe Packer
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- Anti-Natalism, David Benatar

David Benatar has argued that the coming into existence of a sentient being is always a harm, and consequently that people who have children always do wrong. The most natural objection maintains that in many lives (at least) while there is some pain, there are also goods (including pleasures) that can outweigh the suffering. From Benatar’s perspective this move, while possibly useful in assessing the lives of those who actually exist, is not an effective defence of procreation. In the case of people who do not yet exist, he maintains that there is a crucial asymmetry arising from the putative fact that the absence of pain is good even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone, whereas absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom that absence is a deprivation. For the potentially existing, he concludes, preventing the pain of existence is justified, but not so facilitating enjoyment of its pleasures. I argue that the asymmetry is insufficiently motivated. I also sketch two additional lines of argument against the asymmetry. First, it may not include all relevant factors. Second, plausible duties to prevent pain require possible sufferers, but do not apply straightforwardly when extended to include preventing the sufferers themselves.

- by David Spurrett
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- Philosophy, Anti-Natalism, Possible People, Procreation

In the mid-1990s, elements of the social justice movement joined growthists and religious conservatives in a veritable Greek chorus of opposition to the problematisation of population growth. This unlikely alliance was highly successful in mainstreaming population denialism as well as turning overpopulation into a taboo subject, especially in the West. In the quarter-century since, natural scientists, environmentalists, demographers, journalists and policy-makers have systematically avoided problematising population growth, with grave consequences to public awareness and debate as well as to interdisciplinary experts' ability to properly diagnose the causes of and most effective remedies for climate change and a plethora of other creeping catastrophes. In this chapter I trace the ideological roots of population denialism and the taboo to age-old growthist ideation in combination with the shaming discourse and idealised expectations of human behaviour from late-18 th-century utopian thought. The problem of overpopulation has become vastly worse over the last 200 years or so, but the rhetorical strategies for dismissing and shutting down discussion on the issue have hardly changed.

- by Karin Kuhlemann
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- History of Thought, Human Rights, Environmental History, Pronatalism

Contemporary anti-natalism (the belief that procreation is immoral) has made a resurgence thanks to the work of South African philosopher David Benatar. In this master's thesis I interact with Benatar's anti-natalism, explaining and critiquing it, before adapting it in order to construct a Christian version of anti-natalism. I then submit anti-natalism to a reasoned interrogation on the basis of biblical revelation, natural law, and philosophical-theological arguments. I conclude that anti-natalism is incompatible with orthodox Christian belief.

- by Ben R Crenshaw
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- Christian Ethics, Anti-Natalism, The Morality of Procreation, David Benatar
- by Franco Palazzi
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- Applied Ethics, Parenting, Anti-Natalism, Obligations to Future Generations

David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a harm, and that – for all of us unfortunate enough to have come into existence – it would be better had we never come to be. We contend that if one accepts Benatar’s arguments for the asymmetry between the presence and absence of pleasure and pain, and the poor quality of life, one must also accept that suicide is preferable to continued existence, and that his view therefore implies both anti-natalism and pro-mortalism. This conclusion has been argued for before by Elizabeth Harman – she takes it that because Benatar claims that our lives are ‘awful’, it follows that ‘we would be better off to kill ourselves’ (Harman 2009: 784). Though we agree with Harman’s conclusion, we think that her argument is too quick, and that Benatar’s arguments for non-pro-mortalism deserve more serious consideration than she gives them. We make our case using a tripartite structure. We start by examining the prima facie case for the claim that pro-mortalism follows from Benatar’s position, presenting his response to the contrary, and furthering the dialectic by showing that Benatar’s position is not just that coming into existence is a harm, but that existence itself is a harm. We then look to Benatar’s treatment of the Epicurean line, which is important for him as it undermines his anti-death argument for non-pro-mortalism. We demonstrate that he fails to address the concern that the Epicurean line raises, and that he cannot therefore use the harm of death as an argument for non-pro-mortalism. Finally, we turn to Benatar’s pro-life argument for non-pro-mortalism, built upon his notion of interests, and argue that while the interest in continued existence may indeed have moral relevance, it is almost always irrational. Given that neither Benatar’s anti-death nor pro-life arguments for non-pro-mortalism work, we conclude that pro-mortalism follows from his anti-natalism, As such, if it is better never to have been, then it is better no longer to be.

- by Ema Sullivan-Bissett
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- Ethics, Anti-Natalism

This one was published online on 17 February 2022 in the Journal of Value Inquiry.

- by Michael Hauskeller
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- Philosophy, Ethics, Schopenhauer, Anti-Natalism

Procreation is a very morally problematic practice, as it is done without the consent of the child. Although it may be true that 'life is a gift', it is an 'unsolicited' gift. Procreation may even be described as a kind of murder,... more

- by Anti Procreation
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- Philosophy, Ethics, Applied Ethics, Bioethics
- by Christopher Belshaw
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- Population Ethics, Anti-Natalism

In this paper, I reconsider David Benatar’s primary argument for anti-natalism—the asymmetry argument—and outline a three-step process for rejecting it. I begin in Part 2 by reconstructing the asymmetry argument into three main premises. I then turn in Parts 3-5 to explain how each of these premises is in fact false. Finally, I conclude in Part 6 by considering the relationship between the asymmetry argument and the quality of life argument in Benatar’s overall case for anti-natalism and argue that it is the latter argument that is actually doing the work. In this sense, the asymmetry argument is not only unsuccessful in generating Benatar’s anti-natalist conclusion, it is also unnecessary as well.

- by Erik Magnusson
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- Bioethics, Reproductive Ethics, Intergenerational justice, Anti-Natalism
- by Stanimir Panayotov
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- Queer Theory, Reproductive Ethics, Georges Bataille, Anti-Natalism

The versions of Nietzschean and Cioranian Antihumanism start from different presuppositions than Foucault’s Antihumanism, adding misanthropy to their nihilistic project. The Cioranian term of the not-man, a darker counterpart to Nietzsche’s Übermensch, can be “tested” through forays into the Romantic and Post- romantic literature, considering for instance Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), Maupassant’s “Horla” (1887), Lorrain’s “The Possessed” (1895) or the poems of Lautréamont. In this paper we compare Cioran’s Antihumanism with the nihilism of Thomas Bernhard’s first novel, Frost (1963).

- by Stefan Bolea
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- Nihilism, 19th Century literature, Existentialism, Anti-Natalism
- by Sayed Taimoor Ali Shah and +1
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- Samuel Beckett, Theatre of the Absurd, Anti-Natalism, The Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer

Anti-natalism is the view that it is (almost) always wrong to bring people (and perhaps all sentient beings) into existence. This view is most famously defended by David Benatar (1997, 2006). There are, however, other routes to an anti-natal conclusion. In this respect, Seana Shiffrin’s paper, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm” (1999), has been rather neglected in the natal debate. Though she appears unwilling to conclude that procreation is always wrong, I believe that she in fact puts forth a case for anti-natalism no less compelling than Benatar’s. My overall aim here is to demonstrate the force of her argument by defending a Shiffrin-esque route to anti-natalism from a powerful objection. This objection appeals to the common belief that because most people endorse their creation, procreation often is all-things-considered permissible. I will show how this objection fails, and why Shiffrin’s rationale for anti-natalism, as I will be representing it, ought to be taken seriously.

- by Asheel Singh
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- Anti-Natalism, Antinatalism, Procreative Ethics, David Benatar
- by Michael Hauskeller and +1
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- Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophical Anthropology, Philosophy of Death

This article is part of a special issue devoted to David Benatar’s anti-natalism. There are places in his oeuvre where he contends that, while our lives might be able to exhibit some terrestrial or human meaning, that is not enough to make them worth creating, which would require a cosmic meaning that is unavailable to us. There are those who maintain, in reply to Benatar, that some of our lives do have a cosmic meaning, but I grant Benatar here that none of our lives does. I instead argue that a lack of cosmic meaning is insufficient to infer that our lives are all bad or, more carefully, bad enough to make procreation impermissible. In particular, I advance a new principle by which to judge the absence of a good to be bad, roughly according to which the more unavailable a good is, the less reason there is to exhibit negative reactive attitudes toward its absence. It follows that there is no reason to regret or be sad about the lack of cosmic meaning, given that it is impossible for us

- by Thaddeus Metz
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- Meaning of Life, Anti-Natalism, Antinatalism

The aim of this paper is to raise two questions. The first question is: How is pessimism related to Buddhism (and vice versa)? The second question is: What relation does an immanent philosophy have to pessimism and Buddhism, if any? Using True Detective, an American television crime drama, as my point of departure, first I will outline some of the likenesses between Buddhism and pessimism. At the same time, I will show how the conduct of one of the main characters in True Detective resembles the paths of Buddhism and pessimism, even though he is ethical in a strictly non-pessimistic and non-Buddhist fashion. Last, I will try to place these findings in perspective through the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze’s thoughts. Hereby, I hope to illustrate that joy, not suffering, is basic to human existence, and how human beings may overcome a spiritual pessimism.

- by Finn Janning
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- Gilles Deleuze, Schopenhauer, Tibetan Buddhism, Anti-Natalism

Contemporary philosopher David Benatar has advanced the self-evidently controversial claim that “coming into existence is always a harm.” Benatar’s argument turns on the basic asymmetry between pleasure and pain, an asymmetry he seeks to explain by the principle that those who never exist cannot be deprived. Benatar’s import is almost incredible: humans should cease to procreate immediately, thereby engendering the extinction of the species—a view known as “anti-natalism.” According to many of his readers, the ancient Hebrew sage Qoheleth expresses a pessimistic nihilism that runs as thick as Benatar’s. Prima facie grounding for this assertion is that Qoheleth, like Benatar, raises the issue of whether coming into existence may be a harm—and gives an affirmative answer. In two passages, Ecclesiastes 6:1-6 and 4:1-3, Qoheleth declares that an unborn hypothetical person is “better off” than their existent counterpart. Yet the meaning and implication of these words is far from obvious. Does Qoheleth imply that the non-exister’s state, and non-existence in general, is universally superior to existence? Or is he instead speaking exceptionally, of particular persons in rare circumstances? By examining the two “better”-statements in their literary context, I will argue that Qoheleth intends these examples as exceptions. He does not go so far as to make the supremely nihilistic claim that coming into existence is always, or even generally, a net harm; yet, he does concede that in certain cases, it can be. Beyond this, I will explore how the two thinkers’ divergent conclusions can be traced to a deeper difference of philosophical method. This question concerning non-existence opens a window to Qoheleth’s broader scheme of values and therefore serves as a surprisingly useful entry point by which to engage his philosophy. The paper utilizes the methodology Jaco Gericke has recently termed “philosophical criticism,” but specifically applied to Qoheleth.

- by Jesse Peterson
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- Religion, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Hebrew Bible
- by Ben Woodard
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- Nihilism, Anti-Natalism, Extinction, Pessimism

The option of being 'spiritual but not religious' deserves much more philosophical attention. That is the aim here, taking the work of Robert Solomon as a cue, with focus on the particular issues that emerge with viewing life as gift. This requires analysis of 'existential gratitude' to show that there can be gratitude for things without gratitude to someone for providing things, and also closer attention to the role that metaphor plays in cognition. I consider two main concerns with gift and gratitude thinking, that the nonreligious justification is too 'instrumentalist' in its approach and that viewing life as gift, whether in a religious or nonreligious way, is simply too optimistic.

- by Drew Chastain
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- Spirituality, Metaphor, Anti-Natalism, Robert Solomon

The so-called asymmetrical argument demonstrates a significant disproportion between a value of goodness and evil for existing people, compared to the absence of these phenomena in case of those, who have never existed. The philosopher, who first fully formulated this argument to justify his antinatalistic position, was David Benatar. In this paper I examine the extent to which the Benatar´s asymmetrical argument has been confirmed by its historically older versions. Primarily I examine the dependence of agreement between Benatar´s and Hans Jonas argumentation on the interpretation of Jonas´philosophy. Finally I investigate whether the asymmetry between good and evil is actually reflected in human thinking.

- by Kateřina Lochmanová
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- Ethics, Applied Ethics, Hermeneutics, John Rawls

According to David Benatar's asymmetry argument, the transition from nonexistence to existence is always a harm, and procreation always a pro tanto wrong. This argument fails to reach its anti-natalist conclusion if we maintain the view that there is no temporal relationship between our worldly lives and our afterlives. On this view, since anyone who will be freely procreated has an existence in the afterlife that is atemporal with respect to worldly time, procreators do not move those they procreate from nonexistence to existence and so do not harm them. This view provides a reason to reject Benatar's stringent "life worth starting" criterion for procreation.

- by Marcus Hunt
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- Ethics, Anti-Natalism, The Morality of Procreation

A very common but untested assumption is that potential children would consent to be exposed to the harms of existence in order to experience its benefits (if it were possible for us to ask and for them to respond). And so, would-be parents might appeal to the following view: Procreation is all-things-considered permissible, as it is morally acceptable for one to knowingly harm an unconsenting patient if one has good reasons for assuming her hypothetical consent—and procreators can indeed reasonably rely on some notion of hypothetical consent. I argue that this view is in error. My argument appeals to a consent-based version of anti-natalism advanced by Seana Valentine Shiffrin. Anti-natalism is the view that it is (almost) always wrong to bring people (and perhaps all sentient beings) into existence. While, like Shiffrin, I stop short of advocating a thoroughgoing anti-natalism, I nevertheless argue that procreators cannot appeal to hypothetical consent to justify exposing children to the harms of existence. I end by suggesting a more promising route by which this justification might be achieved.

- by Asheel Singh
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- Anti-Natalism, Human Dignity, Paternalism, Antinatalism
- by Axel Gosseries
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- Environmental Economics, Global Justice, Anti-Natalism, Population Control
- by Michael Hauskeller
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- Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, Environmental Sustainability, Fiction
- by Lorraine Yeung
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- Philosophy, Anti-Natalism, David Benatar, The Philosophical Quarterly
- by axel gosseries
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- Environmental Economics, Economic Theory, Global Justice, Applied Economics