Criminal Insurgency Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Mexico's cartels are significant social, political, and economic actors. The extent of their socioeconomic and political influence is the subject of great debate yet, as their recent response to natural disaster demonstrates, they are influencing the populace in new and diverse ways. In the aftermath of recent hurricanes (i.e., Hurricanes Manuel and Ingrid) in Mexico cartels provided " humanitarian " aid to the victims of the storms. As a result they positioned themselves in a positive light in the communities they assisted. This strategic note documents and assesses this cartel foray into the provision of social goods—specifically " humanitarian aid. " Cartel Disaster Relief On 22 September 2013, Proceso reported that the Gulf Cartel (Cártel del Golfo/CDG) dispensed tons of supplies to persons impacted by Hurricane Ingrid in Tamaulipas. In this report, it was noted that the CDG posted a video on YouTube claiming that " they help because they have a heart " (" Si ayuden es por que tienen corazon ").[1] The video—punctuated by a " rap style corrido " voice over—shows pickup trucks loaded with supplies: food, water, rice, masa, milk, that are then dispensed to the affected community.[2] The ability for the cartel to mobilize and distribute groceries and aid without government interdiction raises questions about state capacity in the contested disaster zone. Questions about state capacity and cartel intentions were raised on social media in the immediate aftermath of the storm. Tweets became the common method of sharing disaster situation reports. Social media also became a way for the CDG to publicize its relief efforts. As one report noted: The most interesting twist came Sunday when an Internet video claiming to be from the Gulf Cartel began circulating through social media. The video shows several pickup trucks filled with food items being driven across the state and through dirt roads where the food was delivered to the communities. In the video, a written message claiming to be from the Gulf Cartel says that the organization is from Tamaulipas and cares for the people of the state.[3] The aid to the town of Aldama provided by the CDG was publicized on social media and widely reported

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- Social Banditry, Cartels, Criminal Insurgency, Mexican Drug Cartels

A narcomanta (narco-banner) threatening Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) if Federal security forces are not removed from Guantajuato state was posted in Salamanca, Guanajuato (Gto), Mexico on the morning of 31 January 2019. Shortly after the narcomanta was found, a pickup truck containing explosives was discovered parked in front of a nearby oil refinery. Initial reports discounted the presence
of an explosive device, claiming the incident was a hoax, but later reports confirmed the presence of actual explosives. The region has been the site of violent competition between the Cártel de Santa Rosa Lima (CSRL) and Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG).

- by John P. Sullivan and +1
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- Violent Non-State Actors, Criminal Insurgency, Mexican Drug Cartels, Crime wars

In its recent Armed Conflict Survey 2017, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London said Mexico’s criminal insecurity has reached the level of armed conflict. The Mexican government rejected that characterization. This... more

- by John P. Sullivan and +1
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- Organized Crime, Transnational Organized Crime, Violent Non-State Actors, Nonstate Actors

The nature of crime and conflict is rapidly evolving. Postmodern war is increasingly influenced by non-traditional and irregular combatants: non-state soldiers. These actors are exploiting technology and networked doctrine to spread their influence across traditional geographic boundaries. This emphasis on non-traditional actors accompanies a shift in political and social organization. This shift may well be a shift in state form: from nation-state to market- state. This transition is fueled by rapid developments in technology and the adoption of network organizational forms. Conflict during this transition blurs the distinctions between and among crime, terrorism and warfare. This essay explores the dynamics of terrorism, crime and private armies during this epochal shift.

- by John P. Sullivan
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- Organized Crime, Insurgency, Criminal Insurgency

The US Consulate in Guadalajara, Jalisco was attacked with two grenades in the hours before Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (ALMO) was sworn in as Mexico’s new president. The attack, which occurred around 2300 hours on Friday, 30 November 2018, involved two grenades thrown at the consulate. While the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)—has been mentioned as a possible suspect group in the attack—which yielded no injuries the CJNG denies involvement.

- by John P. Sullivan
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- Violent Non-State Actors, Narcotrafficking, Drug Wars, Criminal Insurgency

In an apparently significant acceleration of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), Mexican cartel violence embraced the car bomb in an attack on Federal police in embattled Ciudad Juárez last Thursday, 15 July 2010. Not only did the attack employ a car bomb (apparently a primitive improvised explosive secreted inside a car not the fully-integrated variant found in Iraq, and the AfPak theatres known as a VBIED), but it also was an ambush that directly targeted police. This TTP is a classic insurgent attack method that promises to be part of Mexico's future engagements in its on-going criminal insurgencies.

Al conmemorarse una década desde que el ex presidente Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) declaró la Guerra contra el narcotráfico en México, este trabajo analiza la pertinencia de clasificar aquel enfrentamiento como un conflicto armado interno bajo los estándares de la legislación internacional. Se plantea como hipótesis que la confrontación desarrollada en territorio mexicano no cubre los parámetros establecidos para la existencia de un conflicto armado no internacional conforme al Derecho Internacional Humanitario, calificando más bien como ‘Otra Situación de Violencia’ conforme a la terminología propuesta por el Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja, escenario que no se encuentra contemplado en la jurisdicción internacional.

While the strategic and operational levels of the
Mexican cartel war have gained much prominence in
analytical assessments, the tactical level has received
less attention. This article is an attempt at tactical assessment of
the drug war. It will provide a brief sketch of evolving tactical
missions in the cartel war and the challenges faced by Mexican
police and military forces. Cartel tactics have undergone a
disturbing evolution over the past few years. The resulting trend
includes greater proficiency, lethality, and barbarism as the conflict matures.

- by John P. Sullivan
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- Transnational Organized Crime, Cartels, Gangs, Criminal Insurgency

This article reviews the Barrio Aztecas/Los Aztecas transnational gang network.

- by John P. Sullivan
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- Transnational Organized Crime, Cartels, Gangs, Gangs, Crime and Violence

The first-phase cartel form originated in Colombia during the 1980's in response to the increasing demand for cocaine in the United States. This type of cartel, characterized by the Medellin model, realized economies of scale not known to the individual cocaine entrepreneurs of the mid-1970's. This early cartel was an aggressive competitor to the Westphalian state because of its propensity for extreme violence, uncompromising nature, and willingness to directly challenge the authority of the state. The Medellin model was hierarchical and revolved around its kingpin, Pablo Escobar. The second phase of the cartel form also originally developed in Colombia in the city of Cali. Unlike its Medellin counterpart, the Cali group, which emerged in the early 1980's, was a shadowy organization devoid of an actual kingpin. Its organization was more distributed and network-like, rather than traditionally hierarchical. Many of its characteristics and activities were stealth-masked and dispersed, thereby providing many operational capabilities not possessed by the first-phase cartel form. Third-phase cartels, if and when they emerge, have the potential to pose an even more significant challenge to the modern nation-state and its institutions. A third-phase cartel would result from unremitting corruption and co-option of state institutions. Although this "criminal state successor" has yet to emerge, warning signs of its eventual arrival are present in many States worldwide. Such an entity would challenge our current institutions and, at least during a transitional period, could be expected to exploit corruption, co-option, terrorism, crime, and violence toward its ends.

- by John P. Sullivan
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- Governance, Transnational Organized Crime, Organised Crime, Corruption

This article reviews the current situation involving the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) in Mexico's crime wars. The evolution of the threat is illustrated through... more

- by John P. Sullivan and +2
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- Criminal Insurgency, Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), Mexican Drug Cartels, Criminal Cartels

Crime wars and criminal Insurgencies challenge states as they emerge at the intersection of crime and war. In many nations these conflicts involve protracted gang and drug wars. These situations of insecurity range in the level of intensity and complexity. At times the lower levels of violence result in local consequences: violence and insecurity. In others the criminal organizations challenge the state and establish alternative of parallel power structures. This short paper will discuss these issues by briefly summarizing the situation in Mexico and Colombia. This summary will then identify the need for further research and development of legal and policy approaches in these states, as well as others facing similar challenges such as Brazil and Central America.

Mexico is engaged in a complex drug war. This war is actually an interlocking series of networked “narco-“or "criminal insurgencies" waged by criminal syndicates and gangs, popularly known as cartels. This situation challenges state institutions and the rule of law as Mexican drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) seek to penetrate Mexico’s political institutions to further their lucrative drug black market. The situation has profound human and national security implications throughout the Western Hemisphere and beyond. This article looks at the current situation in Mexico. It will briefly examine the cartels and related criminal enterprises (i.e., gangs and enforcer organizations), the nature of their assault on Mexico’s institutions, and the impact on Mexican police and Mexico’s military. Finally, it will suggest potential bi-lateral and multilateral approaches for building police and military capacity to counter the threat.

- by John P. Sullivan
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- Military and Politics, Police and Policing, Criminal Insurgency

Los cárteles de la droga y bandas latinas suponen un desafío a la autoridad estatal en México y América Central. Esta lucha de poder-contrapoder resta legitimidad y solvencia al estado a la vez que otorgan poder económico y político a los carteles y las bandas criminales. En esta lucha, los cárteles suministran bienes utilitarios y sociales, escriben narrativas de poder y rebelión y actúan como “bandidos sociales post-modernos” para obtener apoyo y legitimidad dentro de sus propias organizaciones y las áreas geográficos que controlan. Su mensaje se difunde a través de la violencia instrumental y simbólica, operaciones de información (incluyendo la influencia de la prensa y una narrativa social – narcocultura- donde los gánsteres se retratan como contrincantes poderosos al estado corrupto). Narcocorridos (canciones populares), narcomantas (lonas, banderas, pancartas), narcobloqueos (cortes de tráfico), narcomensajes (mensajes en muchas formas incluyendo “cadáver-mensajes”), y narco santos (sistemas alternativos de veneración incluyendo Jesús Malverde y la Santa Muerte) son empleados para construir estas narrativas de contrapoder. El siguiente artículo examina estas dinámicas desarrollándose actualmente en América Latina y las describe colocandolas en una perspectiva teorética.

- by John P. Sullivan
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- Information operations (IO), Narcocultura, Insurgency, Criminal Insurgency

On Monday, 31 January 2022 at approximately 1030 hours (10:30 am) a Mexican Army (SEDENA) convoy travelling on a dirt road in a remote area near Apatzingán drove over a landmine. The vehicle was reportedly a ‘SandCat’ light armored vehicle (LAV). At least one, and up to four or more soldiers were said to be injured. The area where the incident occurred is reportedly in territory contested by the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) and the Cárteles Unidos (CU).

- by John P. Sullivan and +1
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- Criminal Insurgency, Mexican Drug Wars, Mexican Drug Cartels, Anti-vehicle Landmines

Transnational gangs challenge states in a variety of way. First, they transcend geographical and jurisdictional boundaries. Second, when left unchecked, they can erode the legitimacy of state institutions, co-opt state officials, and exceed state capacity to control their actions. A combination of crime, corruption, and impunity can empower criminal enterprises—gangs and criminal cartels—at the expense of the state. Finally, transnational crime blurs the distinctions between crime and war, local and global, and state and non-state violence. This essay examines these challenges and the evolution of gangs and criminal cartel conflict.

- by John P. Sullivan
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- Violent Non-State Actors, Militias, Non State Armed Actors, Street gangs

Contemporary Mexican cartel use of car bombs began in mid-July 2010 and has since escalated. Given the proximity to the United States, some literally within miles of the border, the car bombings, with about 20 incidents identified over the last 2 1/2 years, should be of interest to local, state, and federal U.S. law enforcement, the U.S. Army, and other governmental institutions which are providing increasing support to Mexican federal agencies. An historical overview and analysis of cartel car bomb use in Mexico provides context, insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns. In order to generate insights into future cartel car bombings in Mexico, the identification of such potentials offers a glimpse into cartel “enemy intent,” a possible form of actionable strategic intelligence. For Mexico, steady and both slowly and quickly increasing car bomb use trajectories may exist. The prognosis for decreasing car bomb deployment appears unlikely. If cartel car bombs were to be deployed on U.S. soil or against U.S. personnel and facilities in Mexico, such as our consulates, we could expect that a pattern of indications and warnings (I&W) would be evident prior to such an attack(s). In that case, I&W would be drawn from precursor events such as grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks (or attempted attacks) on our personnel and facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb deployment patterns in Mexico. The authors conclude with initial recommendations for U.S. Army and defense community support to the military and the federal, state, and local police agencies of the Mexican state, and the various U.S. federal, state, and local police agencies operating near the U.S.-Mexican border. The extent of support in intelligence, organization, training, and equipment is highlighted, as well as the extent that these forms of support should be implemented to counter cartel vehicle-borne IEDs and overall cartel threats.

- by John P. Sullivan
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- Transnational Organized Crime, Mexico, Cartels, Gangs

Three nations in Central America’s Northern Triangle have implemented an integrated, multinational task force to combat the threat from gangs (maras and pandillas) in the region. The task force or la Fuerza Trinacional contra las Maras y... more

- by John P. Sullivan and +1
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- Violent Non-State Actors, Maras Gangs, Maras, 3 Gen gangs

Competition in Order and Progress examines the competition in statemaking between criminal enterprises (gangs, militias, and criminal armed groups) and the state. The title builds from Brazil's motto Ordem e Progresso to capture the... more

- by John P. Sullivan and +1
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- Brazil, Non-international armed conflicts, Militias, Gangs

Urban conflict and transnational crime are pressing concerns in many regions. This is especially true in Latin America. This chapter explores the relationship between crime and conflict in Latin American cities. The concepts of "global cities" and "global gangs" are reviewed to illuminate the interactions between illicit and licit activities-that is, underworld and upper-world economic flows and political economy-corruption, and linkages to global and transnational economics. The Rise of Urban Conflict Urban conflict comes in many guises. These can include full-blown urban warfare involving international armed conflicts, noninternational armed conflicts, or a complex combination of both; endemic crime; and urban terrorism and civil strife (Konaev and Spencer 2018; Sullivan 2018a). Obviously, conflict in urban settings poses many challenges to the populace and the state. While protecting the public is foremost among these challenges, a range of tactical, operational, and strategic considerations arise for police, state security services, and urban political organs-mayors, city councils, and the public services they provide, ranging from physical infrastructure through healthcare, education, and policing. The most

A series of car bombings by criminal gangs in Ecuador demonstrates the challenge of criminal enterprises directly confronting the state. In a recent (29 May 2022) car bombing in front of a police station (Unidad de Vigilancia Comunitaria/Community Surveillance Unit-UVC) in La Florida, Guayaquil, a taxi exploded. The day before, police conducted a controlled removal of an explosive device left in front of a local business. Officials claim the attack was a response to the removal of gang graffiti associated with Los Tiguerones prison gang.

- by John P. Sullivan and +1
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- Criminal Insurgency, Criminal Cartels, third generation gangs, Crime wars

Transnational organized crime is a pressing global security issue. Mexico is currently embroiled in a protracted drug war. Mexican drug cartels and allied gangs (actually poly-crime organizations) are currently challenging states and sub-state polities (in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and beyond) to capitalize on lucrative illicit global economic markets. As a consequence of the exploitation of these global economic flows, the cartels are waging war on each other and state institutions to gain control of the illicit economy. Essentially, they are waging a 'criminal insurgency' against the current configuration of states. As such, they are becoming political, as well as economic actors. This presentation examines the dynamics of this controversial proposition. The control of territorial space -- ranging from 'failed communities' to 'failed regions' -- will be examined. The presentation will examine the exploitation of weak governance and areas (known as 'lawless zones,' 'ungoverned spaces,' 'other governed spaces,' or 'zones of impunity') where state challengers have created parallel or dual sovereignty, or 'criminal enclaves' in a neo-feudal political arrangement. The use of instrumental violence, corruption, information operations (including attacks on journalists), street taxation, and provision of social goods in a utilitarian fashion will be discussed. Finally, the dynamics of the transition of cartels and gangs into 'accidental guerrillas' and 'social bandits' will be explored through the lens of 'third generation gang' theory and 'power-counter power' relationships. This presentation will serve as a starting point for assessing the threat to security from transnational organized crime through lessons from the Mexican cartels.

- by John P. Sullivan
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- Narco violence, Transnational Organized Crime, Cartels, Gangs

Police in Rio de Janeiro (RJ) began a major operation—Operação Cidade Integrada (Operation Integrated City)—on Wednesday 19 January 2022 to retake control of RJ's Jacarezinho favela. Approximately 1,200 police (Polícia Militar or Military Police) took part in the coordinated action. The operation is reminiscent of the UPP (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora or Pacifying Police Units) approach initially implemented ahead of the 2016 Olympics. This new initiative apparently seeks to expand that approach by integrating comprehensive social programs to restore state authority and governance. The action seeks to displace criminal governance by the Comando Vermelho (CV or Red Command) and milícia (militia) groups.

- by John P. Sullivan and +1
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- Militias, 3 Gen gangs, Criminal Insurgency, Crime wars

Conflict and crime are converging in interesting ways worldwide. Gangsters, revolutionaries, and terrorists interact in a variety of ways complicating state response, policing, military, and intelligence operations. This article looks at the Bacrim—an emerging adaptive adversary—in this ‘convergence’ of war and crime in Colombia, the epicenter of contemporary drug wars.

- by John P. Sullivan
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- Latin American Studies, Colombia, Organized Crime, Cartels

This chapter covers the early history of bandits including the role of bandits in revolution (e.g., Pancho Villa), the rise of urban guerrillas (e.g., Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution, Carlos Marighella (the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla)) in Brazil and the Tupamaros in Uruguay, and the transition from ideological revolt to criminal insurgency. The later transition will focus on the transition to crime by the FARC and ELN in Colombia succeeded by Bacrim in Colombia, mega-gangs in Venezuela, and by Brazilian gangs (i.e., The Commando Vermelho and Primeiro Comando da Capital), followed by the rise of criminal insurgency waged by territorial (third-generation) gangs (including maras such as MS-13 and Barrio 18 in Central America) and criminal cartels. The nexus between prison gangs and criminal gangs and the emergence of criminal enclaves (such as the Triple Frontier and Ciudad del Este) will be explored. A common thread will be a discussion of crime and social banditry (Hobsbawm) as mechanisms of revolt. Urban crime and instability and the emergence of crime wars and criminal insurgency will be discussed in context of state transition, globalization, and the rise of transnational organized crime.

- by John P. Sullivan and +1
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- 3 Gen gangs, Criminal Insurgency, Bandits, 3rd Generation Street gangs

Select Mexican military and federal police units have been utilizing body cams for some years now for after action review, prosecutorial, and public informational (i.e., state narrative) purposes. Such use has taken place at least since January 2016 (the ‘El Chapo’ takedown) per YouTube posted footage, if not earlier—in their raids on cartel kingpins and operatives.[1] In what may represent an Indications and Warning (I&W) incident, the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel (Cártel Santa Rosa de Lima or CSRL, Cártel de Santa Rosa or CSR, SRL; aka Cártel de Guanajuato) has now utilized a GoPro body cam in a recent tactical action against the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) and posted the video imagery (and accompanying audio) to its online social media. In essence, the CSRL GoPro video posting elevated this tactical action into First Person Shooter (FPS) type immersive activity—a form of social media tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) usage believed to have not previously been employed by a Mexican cartel. Thus, this appears to be the first documented use of this immersive FPS TTP.

- by John P. Sullivan and +1
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- Violent Non-State Actors, Drug Wars, Criminal Insurgency, Mexican Drug Wars

Investigators from the Jalisco State Prosecutor’s office (Fiscalía del Estado de Jalisco) seized two heavy vehicles with artisanal armor (blindaje artesanal) in a workshop located on a farm in Tuxpan, Jalisco on Thursday, 19 December 2019. The two improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs) are believed to belong to the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). This incident is not unique and represents an ongoing, yet sporadic, pattern of IAFV deployment in Mexico by the cartels over the last decade.

- by John P. Sullivan and +1
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- Drug Wars, Criminal Insurgency, Mexican Drug Wars, Mexican Drug Cartels

Driven by globalization, Internet communications technology (ICT), and new economic forms the nature of states may be changing. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) – including what are commonly known as cartels – are early adopters to the new political/economic landscape. In addition to seeking to rule the illicit economy, criminal actors (networked cartels and gangs) are challenging states through high-order violence and leveraging nascent social/spiritual movements (narcocultura) to potentially usher in a new political dynamic. These violent non-state actors (criminal soldiers) are insurgent actors. They are waging new forms of insurgency – criminal and possibly spiritual – that have the potential to reconfigure states.

- by John P. Sullivan
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- Political Economy, Governmentality, State crime, Organized Crime

This paper examines the impact of attacks on journalists on media reportage within Mexico's drug wars, known as "la Inseguridad" in Mexico. It examines two concepts in communication theory (agenda-setting theory and "mind framing" for power and counter-power) to frame the impact of drug cartel information operations (info ops). Specifically, It examines cartel attacks on media outlets, and kidnappings and assassinations of journalists by narco-cartels to gauge the potential impact of the attacks in terms of censorship, cartel co-option of reportage, and the use of new media (horizontal means of mass self-communication).

- by Robert J Bunker
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- Political Economy, Governmentality, State crime, Organized Crime
- by Moses Shalangwa
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- Criminal Insurgency

Two intelligence specialists from SEIDO (Subprocuraduría Especializada en Investigación de Delincuencia Organizada) within Mexico’s Attorney General’s office, the Procuraduría General de la República (PGR), were apparently captured by a criminal cartel. The federal agents appear in a video being guarded by armed men in black who are suspected to be members of the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG). The agents were believed to have been kidnapped while off duty near the borders of the states of Jalisco and Nayarit on 5 February 2018. Human remains found in Xalisco, Nayarit on 15 February 2018 were suspected to belong to the agents. After forensic identification the PGR confirmed
the remains belonged to the agents on 18 February 2018.

- by John P. Sullivan and +1
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- Organized Crime, Transnational Organized Crime, Criminal Insurgency, Mexican Drug Wars

The 4th Small Wars Journal-El Centro anthology comes at a pivotal time, roughly a third of the way through the term, for the Enrique Peña Nieto administration in Mexico. The mass kidnapping and execution of 43 rural student teachers in Iguala, Guerrero in late September 2014 has only served to further highlight the corruptive effects of organized crime on the public institutions in that country. In addition, many other states in Latin America are now suffering at the hands of criminal insurgents who are threatening their citizens and challenging their sovereign rights.

- by John P. Sullivan
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- Organized Crime, Criminal Insurgency, Mexican Drug Wars, Latin American Security

India is perhaps one of the most experienced counterinsurgents in the world, having fought a huge array of insurgencies since Independence. To date, the dominant guiding principles and benchmarks established to evaluate India’s performance can be likened to a ‘classical’ model of COIN, forming a consensus across scholars, practitioners and policymakers alike of at least the rhetorical importance of adherence to democracy-friendly practices such as minimum force, the pursuit of political resolutions and hearts and minds. Charting the evolution of and analysing tensions within the model, this paper tests the extent of India’s actual adherence to the model in COIN campaigns in the Punjab and the Northeast, before proposing an alternative model, combining aspects of Kautilyan philosophy with some contextual indicators to better pin down how India responds to insurgencies.

An improvised explosive drone ('dron bomba') was interdicted by Mexican Federal Police/Policía Federal (PF) in Guanajunto in Central Mexico at daybreak of Friday, 20 October 2017. Four men were arrested following a 'high-risk' vehicle stop on the Salamanca-Morelia highway. The discovery of an improvised Unmanned Aerial System (UAS)—also known as an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)—is the latest example of cartel weapons evolution. The IED is consistent with recent papas bombas (potato bombs) employment by the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Guanajunto is currently contested by several cartels including the CJNG, Los Zetas, and the Sinaloa cartel.

- by John P. Sullivan and +1
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- Violent Non-State Actors, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Criminal Insurgency, Drones

"Sustained penetration by transnational criminal networks (cartels and gangs) of state institutions is challenging Mexico and states throughout Latin America. This paper discusses ‘criminal insurgencies’ as a power-counterpower dynamic where criminal combatants use violence, corruption, and information operations (including new media) to challenge state capacity and legitimacy, and exert territorial control for supporting their illicit economic domains. Social/environmental modification, including information operations (e.g., narcocorridos,
narcomantas, and narcopintas), alternative belief systems (i.e.,
narcocults), targeted symbolic violence (including attacks on journalists and government officials), direct attacks on the police and military by criminal bands (sometimes wearing uniforms), and the provision of social goods while adopting the mantle of social bandit or primitive rebel are stimulating a new narcocultura. This paper examines these irregular conflicts through a comparative ethnographic lens to inform intelligence analysis and practice supporting an understanding of strategic shifts in sovereignty and governance."

- by John P. Sullivan
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- New Media, State Formation, Information operations (IO), Narcocultura

This edited collection from 'Small Wars Journal - El Centro' examines Mexico's drug war/criminal insurgencies. Primary authors are John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker. Includes contributions from Hal Brands, Pamela Bunker, Dave... more

- by John P. Sullivan
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- Transnational Organized Crime, Mexico, Cartels, Gangs

For a couple of decades now, the security environment of Latin America has seen the emergence of new violent non-state actors (VNSA) whose activities pose a serious threat to national security. There are some geographical areas within Brazil, especially in the town of Rio de Janeiro, in which these actors violate the sovereignty of the State by preventing it from becoming the only source of authority to legislate, enforce laws and regulate business within a given territory. Some of these VNSA are what we call “criminal insurgencies”. This type of insurgency is driven by economic gains and therefore it seeks to obtain autonomy and economic control of parts of the territory within a State in order to carry out its criminal activities. These VNSA threaten the viability of the state by generating instability and violence, thus reducing the state's ability to control parts of its territory. In respect to this article, the author describes the “criminal insurgency” as a threat to the viability of Rio de Janeiro city. However, Rio de Janeiro is not an isolated case. Even worse, this type of VNSA is emulated in other Latin American countries, especially in highly populated urban areas devoid of State presence.

- by Christian Azevedo
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- Terrorism, Sovereignty, Brazilian Studies, Organized Crime