Greek Warfare Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

- by Michael J . Taylor
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- Military History, History and Memory, Memory Studies, Sparta
- by Fernando Echeverría
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- Greek Warfare, Ancient Greek Warfare, First Peloponnesian War

Life and Civilisation of the Greeks.

Scholarship on the archaic Greek military has been frequently reduced to a discussion on the rise of the hoplite and the introduction of the phalanx. The methodological approach to the issue has often consisted of an attempt to “discover the phalanx” in the sources: to identify a closed formation or a specific kind of heavy-armed warrior in the scattered pieces of literary, iconographic and archaeological evidence. As a result, research on the archaic Greek military has at times been carried out with the hoplite and the phalanx already in mind. This paper offers a reconsideration of both concepts in their literary and cultural context in order to improve our understanding of their use by the ancient Greeks.

- by Fernando Echeverría
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- Greek Warfare, Ancient Greek Warfare, Greek hoplite, Greek phalanx

Abstract. The military strategy chosen by Pericles in 431 b.C., which refuses land battle, was due not only to military and economic factors but also to the general principle of avoiding as much as possible risks and unnecessary casualties, even if this choice required to spend more money, goods, time (as Pericles says in Thuc. I 143, 5). This principle – which is opposite to the traditional values of hoplitism – is shown in several statements attributed to Pericles (in the works by Plutarch), sometimes relating to actual military campaigns conducted by Pericles (the siege of Samos). Finally, the strategic behaviour of Pericles is tied to the Periclean democratic ideology, to the idea of soma autarkes and to the value given to citizen’s body, which are given expression to in the Pericles’ Funeral Oration in Thuc. II 37 ff.
Key-words: Pericles; Plutarch; strategy; asphaleia; money

- by Gianfranco Mosconi
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- Ancient History, Greek History, Athenian Democracy, Plutarch
- by Joseph Bryant
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- Democratization, Greek Warfare, Military Technology, Greek Polis
- by Spyros Bakas
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- Greek History, Anatolian Studies, Anatolian Archaeology, Greek Archaeology

The Ancient Greek Warfare - as been presented to the public by the modern scholars -is a multi-dimentional kind of war with various kind of troops , tactics and applications.
Recent researches have emerged the importance of archery to the Ancient Greeks as a platform of "flexible - war" absolutely necessary to most of the famous Battles of the era.
Greek Archery from the end of the Middle Greek Bronze Age (1400 BC) to the end of the Classical Period (400 BC) presented a wealth of important elements. The various shooting methods of the archers - as been depicted in archaeological findings (pottery ,statues, fragments, depictions) - present us a culture that has been very familiar to this weapon and has developed several ways of using it, depended on the needs of war.
In this study we will not focus only on ethnically Greek archers but generally the archers of the Greek world, comprising all of them who fought along with the Greeks in their armies. Taking into account that the surviving literal sources of the drawing techniques areextremely limited, we will try to emerge our conclusions through artistic representations of the era under research. Shooting techniques, as the "Greek Draw" the "Mediterranean Draw", the "Reverse Draw", the "Thumb technique" and all the variations of those, we
will be presented in a detailed way, based on various depictions.

- by Spyros Bakas and +1
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- Greek Archaeology, Ancient Greek History, Scythian archaeology, Archeologia

This article combines historical analysis with international-relations theory to contend that geopolitical developments around the Eastern Mediterranean in the middle third century BCE were indirectly responsible for the emergence of the Parthian state and a new international system of states in the ancient East. Since the death of Alexander the Great, the Seleucid Empire had ruled over much of the East; however, disastrous military conflicts at home and abroad in the West caused a sudden decline of Seleucid power in the 240s-230s BCE. The troubles of the Seleucid state caused what political scientists call a power-transition crisis that damaged Seleucid hegemony over the East when the Seleucid satraps of Parthia and Bactria declared their independence. Moreover, the deleterious civil wars between Seleucid dynasts in the West and the rebellions of eastern satraps encouraged the nomadic Parni tribe from the Central Asian steppe (later known as the Parthians), who had been seeking a new homeland for decades, to invade northeastern Iran and establish a new kingdom. With the Parni’s successful conquest of Parthia and its immediate consequences, a new interstate system of tripolarity between the Seleucid Empire, Bactrian Kingdom, and the newly formed Parthian state emerged in the ancient East.

- by Nikolaus L Overtoom
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- Critical Theory, History, Ancient History, Military History

Influential and widespread approaches to archaic and classical Greek warfare maintain that pitched battles were simple and straightforward clashes of heavy infantry, fought according to a set of highly ritualized protocols that ultimately entailed the rejection of any kind of tactical refinement. This denial of tactics is supposed to be the result of the agricultural and agonistic nature of Greek warfare. Literary evidence, however, shows that Greek commanders had a constant concern about tactical issues and multiple tactical choices at hand. What will be suggested here is a revision of the concept of ‘tactics’ applied to archaic and classical Greece. The idea of ‘cultural tactics’, the set of pragmatic decisions taken on the battlefield according to the ideological and cultural framework of the polis, will be put forward. This concept entails that all tactical decisions were guided by the cultural principle of favoring and protecting the citizen body.

- by Fernando Echeverría
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- Greek Warfare, Ancient Greek Warfare, Greek hoplite, Greek phalanx
- by Sławomir Sprawski
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- Alexander the Great, Greek Warfare, Thessaly, Polyaenus

"Companion To" chapter summarizing the impact of (Greek) warfare on agriculture, as well as agriculture's impact on and importance to warfare.

- by Jeanne Reames and +1
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- Greek Warfare

The tactics of Epaminondas in surprise, timing, and combined arms are still a subject of study. The direction of the Battle of Mantinea is considered his crowning achievement. Though, it is not universally accepted which exact formation he used, and few reside on how the whole maneuver was carried out
from the point of drill and issuing battle orders. In this paper, a detailed account is proposed as to the
exact drill applied by Epaminondas’ Theban hoplites in the second battle of Mantinea, 362 BC. Taking account of the available drill level of the time, the detailed description of Xenophon and of similar allied and enemy tactics and intentions, we suggest that the Theban infantry line reformed from phalanx
battle order almost to marching order under cover of dust and successful friendly screening action by light troops and cavalry. In this way, both directional fl exibility and speed of movement was achieved so as to crash onto the enemy right, were the troops of value (by virtue or nativity) were always stationed
by decree of tradition. After succeeding in their charge, Thebans lost cohesion and in the confusion, their general as well. Being irreplaceable, the victors stayed aghast allowing the enemy a counterattack which snatched a draw from the jaws of defeat. This string of events is indicative of an elaborate
and extra privy plan, demanding the presence of the mastermind proper to fulfi ll it. The only possible
intent, which was risky, sensitive and decisive, is for Epaminondas to intend to reform his phalanx line
perpendicularly to the enemy’s already smashed one. This plan imitates standard Spartan fl anking intentions without the need of the extreme Spartan maneuvering ability and indicates that the most suitable attack formation had been at this case to revert to marching order. Thus redeployment was
easy, contrary to the generally assumed addition of fully deployed units in successive lines to achieve
the desired depth with less eff ort. Such theories and conclusions may be bolstered only by experimental
archeology and living history approaches, as dynamic concepts may be proved or disproved only by experiment, this study does not constitute proof. But entails a defi nitive positive value; if a concept is workable today, it has always been so, although the actuality is far from defi nitive.

- by Spyros Bakas and +2
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- Greek History, Greek Archaeology, Ancient Greek History, Ancient Warfare
- by Fernando Quesada-Sanz
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- Greek military history, Greek Warfare, Falcata, Machaira

Conflict in Greece and Rome: The Definitive Political, Social, and Military Encyclopedia, ed. Sara Phang, Douglas Kelly, Peter Londey, and Iain Spence, ABC-CLIO. 2016.

- by Nikolaus L Overtoom
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- History, Ancient History, European History, Military History
- by Luca Asmonti
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- Greek History, Cyprus Studies, Achaemenid Persia, Cyprus

Combat scenes depicted on vases are a critical source for the reconstruction of Greek warfare in the archaic period. They are the subject of a lively debate over their accuracy and reliability as historical sources, and the degree to which they represent historical ways of fighting among archaic Greeks has been questioned. A particularly common argument used to question, or even in some cases, to reject some scenes as potential sources is to identify them as depicting ‘archaizing’ and/or ‘heroizing’ topics, that is, images drawn from a legendary past or from the myths. This scepticism has often been based on the identification of a few elements in the pictures which have traditionally been regarded as belonging to myth or to a period prior to the introduction of the phalanx. It is shown here that an examination of both these specific elements and the larger combat scenes in the light of new theories about the phalanx and the hoplite in the archaic period offer fresh grounds for analysis.

Success in war over rival kings or barbarian invaders was one of the marks of legitimation for the Hellenistic rulers. Depictions of, or allusions to, war are quite rare in the surviving Hellenistic court poetry; however, we can have a glance of military life (and death) through the lens of verse epitaphs for men who served in the army –in every rank, from royal philoi to humble privates–, and from the occasional dedicatory epigrams they commissioned for temple offerings. Poetic portrayal of members of an army involves display (or concealment) of many layers of their individual and public “identity”: social status, ethnicity, cultural background, religious belief, etc. Building a corpus of such epigrams produced in the 4th-1st cent. BC, from every area of the Hellenistic world (mainland Greece, Macedonia, the Ptolemaic, Attalid and Seleucid kingdoms, the independent poleis of Asia Minor) I shall try to assess similarities and differences in self-presentation of men who –often gone unremarked by ancient historians or court poets– helped building the power of their basileis or keeping the freedom of their own polis.

- by Silvia Barbantani
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- Military History, Military Science, Classics, Greek Literature
- by Spyros Bakas
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- Scythian archaeology, Greek Warfare, Bow and Arrow Technology, Archery
- by Fernando Echeverría
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- Greek Warfare, Hoplites, Ancient Greek Warfare
- by Nikolaus L Overtoom
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- History, Ancient History, Military History, Cultural Studies

Scholarship has recently started to question a longstanding tradition that interpreted Greek poliorcetics as subordinated operatively and strategically to the phalanx. The centrality of the hoplite, conceived as a heavy-armed infantryman exclusively suited for combat in closed formations, concurred for decades with a general discredit of Greek military technology to produce a negative view of the besieging capacities of the Greeks: highly specialised for frontal collisions on level ground, Greek armies were allegedly not particularly apt for, or keen of, poliorcetic actions. Visions emphasizing the “ritualistic” nature of Greek warfare have also been instrumental in this approach.
This paper will incorporate sieges, and broader military operations against urban centres, to the general Greek land strategy during the Archaic and Classical periods. Poliorcetics will be presented as a fundamental part of Greek military strategy, involving both naval and land operations, considerable human and material resources, and a calculated but permanent exposition to risk and failure. The aim will be to find an answer to a fundamental question: why and how did a Greek army approach an enemy town?
Accordingly, several ideas will be put forward. First, that settlements were a consistent ¬¬¬–sometimes even the main– military targets for Greek armies, and therefore a fundamental part of Greek land strategy. Second, that campaigns around and against settlements consumed most of the material and human resources of Greek armies, often involving amphibious operations on expensive fleets. Third, that Greek armies were flexible and multifunctional entities coordinating different kinds of troops in diverse tasks. And fourth, that the relevance of poliorcetics can be explained on strategic, economic, and political grounds, affecting the conditions not only of the attackers, but also of the defending community.

- by Michael Cosmopoulos
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- Military Veterans, Combat Veterans, War Studies, Second World War
- by Luca Asmonti
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- Ancient Greek History, Greek Warfare, Mercenaries, Ancient Greek Warfare

The consideration of combat scenes on archaic Greek vases as a reliable source for the reconstruction of ancient Greek warfare depends on several aspects. Despite playing a considerable role in the selection of characters, in their location and postures in the scene, and in the actions they perform, composition has been commonly ignored. The identification of the patterns ruling the composition of combat scenes can potentially shed some new light on the historicity and reliability of the military practices depicted on them.

- by Fernando Echeverría
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- Greek Pottery, Greek Warfare, combat scenes on Greek vases
- by Marco Merlo
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- Military History, Arms and Armor Studies, Ancient Greek History, Ancient Warfare
- by Alessandro Pace
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- War Studies, Greek Sicily, Greek Warfare, Sicily

The modern needs on observing and examine the past and the history, demand new and not conventional presentational methods. This article presents with the use of several examples, the ways that Association Koryvantes uses experiential learning for the promotion and the popularization of Archaeology. Innovative ways of communication, which enable archaeology outcomes to be acceptedby the general public with a maximum effectiveness.

- by Spyros Bakas and +1
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- Experimental Archaeology, Education, Historical Archaeology, Teacher Education

Gaugamela was the last major battle fought by Alexander the Great against the Persian empire. Ancient sources provide conflicting tales of key events, but no clear account of the course of the battle. To understand what ‘really’ happened you also have to take account of what has not been said and what happened afterwards. This analysis is the product of those investigations.
In Chapter 9, the first of two chapters on the actual fighting, I examine the initial Persian attacks and the related source problems.

- by Kathleen Toohey
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- Ancient History, Alexander the Great, Ancient Persia, Ancient Greek History

Fear is commonly regarded as a natural emotion in war, present as well in ancient Greek warfare. Greek literary sources occasionally emphasize the emotions connected to the contemporary experience of combat from a primarily narrative perspective. This paper will offer an introduction to the Greek notion and conceptualization of fear in the classical period and its relationship with war, intending to achieve a better understanding of its role in the literary sources and, ultimately, its relevance in Greek culture and warfare.

- by Fernando Echeverría
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- Fear, Ancient Greek History, Emotions, Greek Warfare

La conversion massive par Alexandre le Grand des trésors accumulés par les Achéménides en monnaies d’or et d’argent est un phénomène majeur de l’histoire monétaire mondiale. Par son ampleur, cette augmentation soudaine de la masse monnayée en circulation ne se compare avec aucun autre épisode antique ou médiéval. Ce n’est pas tant l’accroissement du nombre d’études de coins ou de trésors recensés qui nous autorise aujourd’hui à proposer une vision plus nourrie de ce grand dossier historique. Nos idées se sont à ce propos précisées, mais pas profondément modifiées. Sauf que, pour l’étude de la circulation par les trésors, on n’avait pas proposé jusqu’ici de vision globale tant géographique que chronologique, et que – ce faisant – il est permis de mettre en évidence un schéma très clair quant à la question de savoir dans quelle direction est parti l’or monnayé après 250 av. J.-C. Mais il est surtout possible d’agréger au dossier quatre types d’arguments, qui tous paraissent renforcer le même schéma directeur : 1) les analyses métallographiques, en particulier celles portant sur les éléments traces (platine et palladium), 2) une attention renforcée aux rapports entre monnaies et orfèvrerie (pour lesquels Yanis Touratsoglou avait déjà tracé la voie), 3) le traitement du dossier épigraphique, maigre mais fortement instructif, et – last but not least – 4) la prise en compte du prisme plus grossissant que déformant de la Nouvelle Comédie, Plaute en tête, dont – s’agissant des monnaies – les archétypes fonctionnent toujours dans le même sens. L’enquête permet de montrer que, pour l’essentiel, l’or monnayé d’Alexandre a emprunté des circuits courts, à la fois 1) temporellement puisqu’il disparaît pour l’essentiel en une grosse génération, 2) géographiquement puisqu’il semble avoir surtout concerné la Macédoine et les Balkans, et 3) socialement puisqu’il paraît confiner à des archétypes qui ne s’éloignent pas beaucoup de la sphère militaire. Dès lors, et au contraire de ce que les historiens ont généralement soutenu à la suite de Gustav Droysen, il ne semble pas que l’or monnayé d’Alexandre, essentiellement transformé en dépenses de prestige non productives, a beaucoup contribué à créer de la richesse durable par l’augmentation des capacités de production.

- by Francois de Callatay
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- History, Ancient History, Hellenistic History, Greek Epigraphy
- by Gianfranco Mosconi
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- Greek Warfare, Classical Tradition, Akinakes, Classical Scholarship

In this paper, I examine the semantic range of trauma as a phenomenon, focused upon late Archaic and Classical Greece. I set understandings of trauma in the context of material culture studies and attempt to read the significance of armor... more

- by Sebastian de Vivo
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- Trauma Studies, Ancient Greek History, Greek Warfare, Combat PTSD
- by Sebastian de Vivo
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- Trauma Studies, Greek Warfare, Combat PTSD, Ancient Greek Warfare
- by Michał N Faszcza
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- Alexander the Great, Roman military history, Roman Army, Ancient Warfare

ACCESS USING THE SCRIBD.COM URL ABOVE....
Warfare is a martial art. It has, for millennia, been learned through intense practice, usually overseen by an older exemplar or master. The skills of Greek warriors, wrestling; using the sword, spear, bow and sling; horsemanship; attention to orders amongst chaos; and, the care and feeding of men and equipment were no exception. By the time Epaminondas of Thebes invaded Laconia, a change in the military art was underway that included increasingly sophisticated tactics, fluid modes of combat, and sophisticated new equipment whose mastery demanded full-time soldiers and intelligent, trained leaders. There is valid evidence supporting the assertions of modern historians—such as Victor Davis Hanson, Paul Cartledge, and Peter Green—that developments in military science made in the waning years of the Peloponnesian War and immediately after were learned by Philip of Macedon from his exposure to older practitioners of war. Philip, who embellished military science with his own innovations, redesigning his armies in the process; then passed a legacy of knowledge to Alexander the Great. The evidence is based upon personal associations and the use of similar tactics.

- by David G Terrell
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- Alexander the Great, Ancient Greece (History), Greek Warfare
- by Matthew Maher
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- Greek History, Ancient Persia, Ancient Greek History, Greek Warfare
- by Uroš Matić
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- Ancient History, Performance Studies, War Studies, Ptolemaic Egyptian History
- by Lennart Gilhaus
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- Violence, History of Violence, Greek Warfare, Revenge
- by Reyhan Körpe
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- Ancient History, Greek History, Anatolian Studies, Anatolian Archaeology

Les spécialistes de monnaies antiques ont d’abord cru que le phénomène monétaire était avant tout d’essence religieuse ; puis, ils ont imaginé, sans trop en détailler le mécanisme, que la monnaie avait été émise à des fins commerciales. La tendance lourde depuis plusieurs décennies à présent en numismatique est de renforcer toujours plus la proposition transitive suivante : 1) la monnaie a été émise pour payer des dépenses publiques ; 2) l’essentiel des dépenses publiques est allé à la chose militaire ; donc 3) l’essentiel des monnaies a servi à financer les efforts de guerre. A bien y regarder, cela vaut pour les rois et les empereurs mais également – certes de façon moins spectaculaire – pour les cités. Un autre discours, à l’opposé de celui-là, s’est aussi construit récemment. Il est le fait d’historiens culturels qui, partant d’Aristote et de Platon, et du bouleversement social qu’implique l’usage de la monnaie frappée comme instrument standardisé de l’échange, pensent détecter un lien fort entre développement de la monnaie et développement de la démocratie. Ce lien à la démocratie est en panne de démonstration : c’est bien à entretenir les armées qu’auront d’abord servi les monnayages émis dans l’antiquité.

- by Francois de Callatay
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- Hellenistic History, War Studies, Numismatics, Athenian Democracy