Greek hoplite Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
This short article attempts to show that there was not sword particular to the Spartans and that short swords were used by various Greek Armies from the Bronze Age. Origany published in Greek in the Naftiki Hellas (Naval Greece) magazine... more
This short article attempts to show that there was not sword particular to the Spartans and that short swords were used by various Greek Armies from the Bronze Age. Origany published in Greek in the Naftiki Hellas (Naval Greece) magazine of the Hellenic Navy.
Scholarship on the archaic Greek military has been frequently reduced to a discussion on the rise of the hoplite and the introduction of the phalanx. The methodological approach to the issue has often consisted of an attempt to “discover... more
Scholarship on the archaic Greek military has been frequently reduced to a discussion on the rise of the hoplite and the introduction of the phalanx. The methodological approach to the issue has often consisted of an attempt to “discover the phalanx” in the sources: to identify a closed formation or a specific kind of heavy-armed warrior in the scattered pieces of literary, iconographic and archaeological evidence. As a result, research on the archaic Greek military has at times been carried out with the hoplite and the phalanx already in mind. This paper offers a reconsideration of both concepts in their literary and cultural context in order to improve our understanding of their use by the ancient Greeks.
The primary structural characteristics of the phalanx formation are its width, its depth and its density, while there are many other secondary ones-structural, functional, psychological- and of extreme importance nonetheless: weaponry,... more
The primary structural characteristics of the phalanx formation are its
width, its depth and its density, while there are many other secondary ones-structural, functional, psychological- and of extreme importance nonetheless: weaponry, shock/striking weight, flexibility, mobility, coherence, durability, collective protection and cost. The interaction among all these features produced the winner in symmetric confrontations (phalanx against phalanx, of similar or different type
and tactics) and the verdict in asymmetric ones (like hoplites against tribal warriors). This paper, based on primary sources so as to avoid the haze of later interpretation, aims to review the identity of the phalanx formation focusing on various aspects: the creation, function and comparative weight of the mechanics/dynamics, the importance of the initiative, the phases of struggle, the individual combat skills and the G-factor (generalship).
Despite the vast research undertaken on hoplite warfare, surprisingly little is known about how hoplite shields were made, the very technology underpinning the transformative military reforms of hoplite warfare. The few forays that have... more
Despite the vast research undertaken on hoplite warfare, surprisingly little is known about how hoplite shields were made, the very technology underpinning the transformative military reforms of hoplite warfare. The few forays that have explored the manufacturing process have been isolated and unintegrated studies leading to an often simplistic and superficial uniformity of production model which does not reflect the evidence. This article analyses the physical remains of extant hoplite shields and finds a plurality of different designs in concurrent use with core compositional differences that likely impacted combat performance and economic value with some designs performing better than others. Moreover, the use and availability of different shield designs of variable quality and economic value suggests a wider range of socioeconomic diversity in hoplite armies and among hoplites than is generally assumed.
First published in Greek and here is the translation in English.
Influential and widespread approaches to archaic and classical Greek warfare maintain that pitched battles were simple and straightforward clashes of heavy infantry, fought according to a set of highly ritualized protocols that ultimately... more
Influential and widespread approaches to archaic and classical Greek warfare maintain that pitched battles were simple and straightforward clashes of heavy infantry, fought according to a set of highly ritualized protocols that ultimately entailed the rejection of any kind of tactical refinement. This denial of tactics is supposed to be the result of the agricultural and agonistic nature of Greek warfare. Literary evidence, however, shows that Greek commanders had a constant concern about tactical issues and multiple tactical choices at hand. What will be suggested here is a revision of the concept of ‘tactics’ applied to archaic and classical Greece. The idea of ‘cultural tactics’, the set of pragmatic decisions taken on the battlefield according to the ideological and cultural framework of the polis, will be put forward. This concept entails that all tactical decisions were guided by the cultural principle of favoring and protecting the citizen body.
The tactics of Epaminondas in surprise, timing, and combined arms are still a subject of study. The direction of the Battle of Mantinea is considered his crowning achievement. Though, it is not universally accepted which exact formation... more
The tactics of Epaminondas in surprise, timing, and combined arms are still a subject of study. The direction of the Battle of Mantinea is considered his crowning achievement. Though, it is not universally accepted which exact formation he used, and few reside on how the whole maneuver was carried out
from the point of drill and issuing battle orders. In this paper, a detailed account is proposed as to the
exact drill applied by Epaminondas’ Theban hoplites in the second battle of Mantinea, 362 BC. Taking account of the available drill level of the time, the detailed description of Xenophon and of similar allied and enemy tactics and intentions, we suggest that the Theban infantry line reformed from phalanx
battle order almost to marching order under cover of dust and successful friendly screening action by light troops and cavalry. In this way, both directional fl exibility and speed of movement was achieved so as to crash onto the enemy right, were the troops of value (by virtue or nativity) were always stationed
by decree of tradition. After succeeding in their charge, Thebans lost cohesion and in the confusion, their general as well. Being irreplaceable, the victors stayed aghast allowing the enemy a counterattack which snatched a draw from the jaws of defeat. This string of events is indicative of an elaborate
and extra privy plan, demanding the presence of the mastermind proper to fulfi ll it. The only possible
intent, which was risky, sensitive and decisive, is for Epaminondas to intend to reform his phalanx line
perpendicularly to the enemy’s already smashed one. This plan imitates standard Spartan fl anking intentions without the need of the extreme Spartan maneuvering ability and indicates that the most suitable attack formation had been at this case to revert to marching order. Thus redeployment was
easy, contrary to the generally assumed addition of fully deployed units in successive lines to achieve
the desired depth with less eff ort. Such theories and conclusions may be bolstered only by experimental
archeology and living history approaches, as dynamic concepts may be proved or disproved only by experiment, this study does not constitute proof. But entails a defi nitive positive value; if a concept is workable today, it has always been so, although the actuality is far from defi nitive.
One model of the hoplite phalanx has gained traction in recent years, a model I shall call the orthodox view (propounded most notably by Victor Davis Hanson). I shall argue that this orthodox model is not tenable on two accounts. Firstly,... more
One model of the hoplite phalanx has gained traction in recent years, a model I shall call the orthodox view (propounded most notably by Victor Davis Hanson). I shall argue that this orthodox model is not tenable on two accounts. Firstly, that our evidence about the corpses that covered the battlefield does not accord with the demands of the orthodox model; and secondly, that our knowledge of the retrieval of wounded soldiers does not accord with the orthodox model. I shall also briefly suggest alternative features of the phalanx that account for such objections, although I by no means am attempting to create a complete and detailed model.
The heavily armoured infantryman, known as the hoplite, began to emerge on the battlefields of Greece in the mid-seventh century BC. 1 The seventh century was also witness to a wave of changes in the governments of some Greek cities,... more
The heavily armoured infantryman, known as the hoplite, began to emerge on the battlefields of Greece in the mid-seventh century BC. 1 The seventh century was also witness to a wave of changes in the governments of some Greek cities, which resulted in the established oligarchies and monarchies being replaced by tyrannies. The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which the emergence of the hoplite class impacted upon the political developments in Greece, and specifically with regards to the tyrannies that were established across the Greek world between c.650-500 BC. 2 During the seventh century, tyrants took control of Corinth (Cypselus), Katane (Euarchus), Megara (Theagenes), Miletus (Thrasybulus), Mytilene (Melandrus), Samos (Demoteles), Sicyon (Orthagoras), and a failed attempt to seize power in Athens (Cylon). In order to understand the extent to which hoplites may have affected these political developments in Greece, it is important to examine their influence on the battlefields. Warfare in the eighth century BC was essentially a long range skirmish oriented affair, fought by individual aristocratic warrior specialists. 3 This method of warfare was generally inconclusive, and it did not always descend into a decisive melee phase. 4 The introduction of the hoplite as a solider, and the gradual development of the phalanx as a tactical unit, was specifically implemented to " supersede long-range fighting " with decisive melee encounters decided by an increasingly uniformly armed force. 5 This emergence then eventually led to the implementation of massed phalanx based battlefield tactics, which in turn required a number of similarly armoured men in order to be effective. In order to maximise the military potential of the hoplite, and additionally to protect themselves as best they could from attacks on their flanks and rear, Greek aristocrats were obliged to recruit a sufficient number of these heavily-armoured warriors from outside of the ranks of the traditional aristocracy. To achieve this, the aristocrats were forced into widening the qualification requirements to include wealthy non-aristocratic farmers. As a consequence, for the first time warfare, which had hitherto been the domain of specialist aristocratic warriors, was opened up to include the wealthier farmer-soldiers who could afford to arm themselves with the hoplite panoply of arms and armour.
The paper deals with the question about the degree to which the perioikoi were integrated into the structure of the Spartan army. The author draws attention to a number of inconsistencies and contradictions of sources containing some... more
The paper deals with the question about the degree to which the perioikoi were integrated into the structure
of the Spartan army. The author draws attention to a number of inconsistencies and contradictions of sources
containing some information on the Lacedaemonian army’s tactical organization at its different stages. The author
mainly focuses on the textual analysis of the passage of De Republica Lacaedemoniorum in which Xenophon
speaks about regular tactical units of Spartan troops (Rep. Lac. XI.4). The author overturns the arguments
for the hypothesis that the integration of periokoi and spartiatai in the form of common fighting units took
place only after the defeat in the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC.
In this study we have focused on the time-honoured theory that a census classes, the zeugitai, were synonymous with the hoplites by reviewing the precedent arguments and the principal sources cited to support this theory. Our main... more
In this study we have focused on the time-honoured theory that a census classes, the zeugitai, were synonymous with the hoplites by reviewing the precedent arguments and the principal sources cited to support this theory. Our main conclusion is as follows: First, the etymological interpretation of the zeugitai as ‘soldiers in the same rank’, which has been often cited to argue that the zeugitai were a military category predating the reforms of Solon, is too dubious to make any persuasive argument. Secondly, the well-known accounts of Thucydides (6.43; 8.24.2) support neither the argument that the hoplites ek katalogou were not thetes but rather the zeugitai and the higher census classes nor that the thetes performed military service only on a voluntary basis. These accounts only attest that the Athenian epibatai in the Classical period might have normally been volunteers, but not necessarily thetes. Thirdly, the widely accepted view that the thetes were neither enrolled in the hoplite register (katalogos) nor under any obligation to serve as hoplites, unlike the higher census classes, is not based on any clear evidence and is therefore not tenable. Evidence which directly attest that the thetes did serve is scarce, but at least there are no good grounds for denying this belief. Finally, if the property qualification of the zeugitai is correct and each of them held 8.7 to 13 ha of land, they would have been too numerous to be hoplites. Even if their property averaged 4 to 5 ha, the equivalent of a so-called ‘hoplite farm’, they would have still been too numerous. It would be inevitable to suppose that the hoplites would have been a much broader group.
In our view, the zeugitai and the hoplites in Archaic and Classical Athens would have never been identical. Although their population and wealth cannot be clearly determined, the zeugitai were a socio-economic entity, while the hoplites, which consisted of a broad-based population, were a branch of the Athenian army.
In this article, I will focus on the social and cultural dynamics that challenge criticisms of the idea of a developing broad class of middling and small farmers in 6th century BC Attica, of whom those with sufficient land to plough with... more
In this article, I will focus on the social and cultural dynamics that challenge criticisms of the idea of a developing broad class of middling and small farmers in 6th century BC Attica, of whom those with sufficient land to plough with a yoke of oxen (zeugitai) could begin to be characterised as hoplites. The subject of debt provides crucial support for the notion of a large social group of peasant landowners, as in the case of Hesiod in neighbouring Boeotia. These military developments involving not only the elite but also the demos of Attica were reflected in the collective imaginary of Athens of time, especially in the myth of the giants and the figure of Heracles
In the military culture of Ancient Greeks Mercenary is in a very important position. Many citizens served as mercenaries in the polis and in the military expeditions. These soldiers have often served in the neighboring states or even in... more
In the military culture of Ancient Greeks Mercenary is in a very important position. Many citizens served as mercenaries in the polis and in the military expeditions. These soldiers have often served in the neighboring states or even in the armies of enemy States rather than their own country. Since the archaic period these soldiers were found even in the service of the Babylonian, Egyptian, and Persian kings. The trained soldiers have even risen to become the personal guards of the kings of Persia and Egypt, and even some have become the governors of the region. It has pushed many kingdoms to take advantage of the mercenaries because of the warrior features of the Greeks and the strong influence of the phalanx system of the heavy infantry hoplites in the battlefield. Apart from these military situations, economic and sociological problems also caused mercenary to spread to all social strata and became a source of livelihood for every public sector.
This article tries to clarify and analyze the ethical and war connections that model the ethical tradition in ancient Greece up to the V century B.C. as well as expose and examine such ethical and war contents that prefigure the ethics... more
This article tries to clarify and analyze the ethical and war connections that model the ethical tradition in ancient Greece up to the V century B.C. as well as expose and examine such ethical and war contents that prefigure the ethics tradition in the Greek culture under the critical vision offered in the Euripides Theater. In order to do so, there is an approach of the following issues: the war roots of the heroic ethics, the ethical transition from the heroic to the civic perspective, and finally, the ethical political criticism of the Euripides Theater to the war fundaments of the heroic ethics. Regarding the methodological comprehension framework, the analyses of this article are oriented form a socio-historical perspective that allows the analysis of the cultural practices of the Greek culture regarding their literary and intellectual constructions. In order to offer an anthropological and political vision of the ethical and war models of the Greek tradition.
The usage of monograms on the Greek Shields and the Lambda that was..not!
An autobiographical poem with Homeric and phyletic themes.
Englush and Greek, facing pages.
Dal settembre 2014, l’area archeologica dello Stadio di Domiziano in Roma ha integrato nel proprio spazio espositivo l’interessante collezione dell’Associazione Archeos, inaugurando così l’esposizione permanente “Gladiatores e Agone... more
Dal settembre 2014, l’area archeologica dello Stadio di Domiziano in Roma ha integrato nel proprio spazio espositivo l’interessante collezione dell’Associazione Archeos, inaugurando così l’esposizione permanente “Gladiatores e Agone Sportivo. Armi e Armature dell’Impero Romano”.
The Army of Alexander was an army made for campaigns, conquests and dedicated to the purpose of continuous expansion. But the Successors armies like the Seleucid army had a different mission. The army became ”institutional” and geared... more
The Army of Alexander was an army made for campaigns, conquests and dedicated to the purpose of continuous expansion. But the Successors armies like the Seleucid army had a different mission. The army became ”institutional” and geared towards defense, aiming to the protection of the crown and the vast lands of the Empire. The Seleucid’s “Royal Guard” is considered to have 10.000 men in various units, core of which were the “Argyraspides” (lit. Silvershields). The unit was continuing the tradition of Alexander’s “Hypaspists”, having a lot of functional similarities with the Persian “Immortals”. The “Royal Guard” was the permanent unit of the Seleucid army. The backbone of the “Silvershields” came from the Syro-Macedonian elite, or even original Macedonians called “klIrouchoi” (military colonists) who were settled in the Empire receiving land and privileges in exchange for military service.