Mimamsa Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

pre-print draft of an article published in the 2015.2 Supplement of the Rivista di Studi Orientali, edited by G. Milanetti and R. Torella, and presented at the conference "The Human Person and Nature in Classical and Modern India, Rome,... more

pre-print draft of an article published in the 2015.2 Supplement of the Rivista di Studi Orientali, edited by G. Milanetti and R. Torella, and presented at the conference "The Human Person and Nature in Classical and Modern India, Rome, 14th--15th March 2013", pp. 45--54. Please email me if you want a pdf of the printed article.

The purpose of the panel is to explore a specific aspect of the concept of originality in Indian knowledge systems, literature and the arts. We would like to discuss the relation of innovation and perpetuation of earlier forms and... more

The purpose of the panel is to explore a specific aspect of the concept of originality in Indian knowledge systems, literature and the arts. We would like to discuss the relation of innovation and perpetuation of earlier forms and contents of knowledge and aesthetic expressions. Although within the South Asian intellectual traditions this relationship is rarely the topic of explicit reflections, it can be investigated by taking a closer look at the treatment of older materials by later authors. With a view to this, we would like to discuss, for example, the following questions.

It is well-known to a scholar of Hindu Law that the Hindus regard the need for a father to have a son is as important as a man to get married. According to the theory of three debts, to have a son is considered a ‘must’ for every Hindu.... more

“Adaptive reuse,” an influential theoretical concept in the field of architecture, describes the reuse of partly reconstructed buildings for purposes different from those for which they were originally erected. In the present volume, this... more

“Adaptive reuse,” an influential theoretical concept in the field of architecture, describes the reuse of partly reconstructed buildings for purposes different from those for which they were originally erected. In the present volume, this concept is for the first time transferred from its edificial application to a wider specter of cultural activities, namely to the composition of texts and to the creation of concepts and rituals. The volume opens with an introduction in which the editors explain their understanding of of adaptive reuse and its innovative application to cultural studies. They differentiate between simple re-use and adaptive reuse as two ideal types of re(-)use. Simple re-use is the resumption of a previous use without a strong change of purpose. An item is simply used again, because it is readily available. Adaptive reuse implies more. The reuser aims at well-definable purposes, e.g., adding prestige, credibility or authority to the newly created work. The reused elements have therefore to be recognizable. Adaptive reuse ideally involves a strong change of usage, and it is not primarily motivated economically. The twelve main chapters of the volume are divided into four thematic sections. Section 1, “Adaptive Reuse of Indian Philosophy and Other Systems of Knowledge,” consists of five case studies by Philipp Maas, Himal Trikha, Ivan Andrijanic, Yasutaka Muroya and Malhar Kulkarni dealing with the adaptive reuse of Sanskrit philosophical and grammatical texts in Sanskrit works of philosophy, grammar and poetry. In all these cases, adaptive reuse serves the creation of new forms and contents within a traditionally established framework in which the prestige of the sources of adaptive reuse reflects upon its target. In the second section, entitled “Adaptive Reuse of Tropes,” Elena Mucciarelli and Cristina Bignami analyze the motif of the chariot in Vedic, medieval and contemporary works and rituals and fruitfully employ the concept of adaptive reuse in various religious contexts. The chapters of the third section “Adaptive Reuse of Untraced and Virtual Texts” by Daniele Cuneo, Kiyokazu Okita, Elisa Freschi and Cezary Galewicz deal again with philosophical and religious texts, this time focusing on the adaptive reuse of sources that are no longer available or did never exist. It emerges from these studies that reuse of virtual texts was frequently intended to support the introduction of innovations into established traditions. In some cases, the prestige of the reusing works even reflected back on the allegedly reused source. Finally, the chapter by Sven Sellmer in the fourth section “Reuse from the Perspective of the Digital Humanities” deals with the computer-based identification of possibly reused text-passages in epic literature that otherwise would remain undetectable.

An overview of the "six systems" of Hindu philosophy

T his paper looks at how the celebrated Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka Pārthasārathi Miśra drew on the Bhagavad-gītā (BhG) in his works Śāstra-dīpikā (ŚD) and Nyāya-ratnākara (NRĀ) to advance several arguments concerning the Sāṅkhya ontology of the BhG... more

T his paper looks at how the celebrated Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka Pārthasārathi Miśra drew on the Bhagavad-gītā (BhG) in his works Śāstra-dīpikā (ŚD) and Nyāya-ratnākara (NRĀ) to advance several arguments concerning the Sāṅkhya ontology of the BhG and the Mīmāṁsā understanding of the true nature of the soul and the attainment of liberation. These arguments are treated here in the following order: that the theistic philosophy of Sāṅkhya vocalized in the BhG cannot be true at face value; that the individual souls are plural in number, omnipresent in dimension, and have as their common characteristic qualitative sameness but not numeric identity; that knowledge of the soul as distinct from matter is not directly efficacious in the pursuit of liberation, but meditation on the soul is; and that the sense of self is not an illusory feature of personhood but the mark through which one knows the soul as the substance behind it.

T his paper seeks to advance the understanding of the idea of non-violence or ahirhsa in Hindu systematic thought-philosophy and theology-by focusing on the justification of animal sacrifice in the Srfbhii$ya commentary on the... more

T his paper seeks to advance the understanding of the idea of non-violence or ahirhsa in Hindu systematic thought-philosophy and theology-by focusing on the justification of animal sacrifice in the Srfbhii$ya commentary on the Brahma-Siitra (BS) written by the great Vaisnava Vedantin Ramanuja (ca. .1While the issue of condemnation and vindicationof animal sacrifice in Hindu systematic thought has received valuable scholarly consideration in the last decade of the 20 th century, particularlyin the work of Wilhelm Halbfass (1991),Jayashree Gune(1993), andjan Houben(1999), Rarnanuja receivedcomparativelylessattention than the earlier Mimarnsakas and Vedantins.There is,therefore, enough space to say something more on the topic,' Byreading Ramanuja in his context and with the help of his commentator Sudarsana Siiri, I propose to show here that Ramanuja rejected two classical justificationsof ritual killing that were associated with the Mimarnsakas Kumarila (ca. and Prabhakara (ca. and had dominated the Vedantic discourse. I claim that Ramanuja's justification of animal sacrifice stands alone in the commentarial tradition of the BS, and that while his argument was by no means novel, it was significant for the context insofar as it turned the glance from the wellbeingof the perpetrator of violenceto that ofthe victim.

This article aims to follow the process of adoption of Navya-Nyāya techniques of cognitive analysis in the school of Vedic hermeneutics, Mīmāṃsā, in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, in the larger context of the spread of these... more

This article aims to follow the process of adoption of Navya-Nyāya techniques of cognitive analysis in the school of Vedic hermeneutics, Mīmāṃsā, in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, in the larger context of the spread of these techniques in India. I shall argue that this process arises in Mīmāṃsā on the sidelines of the Advaita-Dvaita Vedānta controversy in South India, then subsequently flourishes in Varanasi. These techniques are adopted gradually and selectively, for not all the Mīmāṃsā thinkers choose to use them.

The 16 th-century South Indian scholar Appaya Dīkṣita is well-known for his harsh criticism of the Dvaita Vedānta school. This article sheds light on his relationship to the other great luminary of 16 th-century South India―the Mādhva... more

The 16 th-century South Indian scholar Appaya Dīkṣita is well-known for his harsh criticism of the Dvaita Vedānta school. This article sheds light on his relationship to the other great luminary of 16 th-century South India―the Mādhva Vyāsatīrtha. Appaya's engagement with the Tarkatāṇḍava, Vyāsatīrtha's celebrated treatise of epistemology and logic, is here discussed in relation to two works of Appaya: the Upakramaparākrama and the Śivārkamaṇidīpikā, with the aim to reflect further on the close relationship between both Sanskrit intellectuals and clarify certain aspects of Appaya's scholarly practice.

This article examines the commonplace use of the word " eternal " to translate nitya in Mīmāṃsā contexts, whereby it shows that this translation is not acceptable. This is based on the word's etymology, the parallel use of siddha in... more

This article examines the commonplace use of the word " eternal " to translate nitya in Mīmāṃsā contexts, whereby it shows that this translation is not acceptable. This is based on the word's etymology, the parallel use of siddha in comparable Vyākaraṇa contexts (a school that shared a common history with Mīmāṃsā) and, most importantly, the Mīmāṃsā use of nitya in ritual contexts. This latter use was so frequent that for a Mīmāṃsā audience, such a context was certainly immediately called to mind whenever the term nitya was used to define language. To conclude, the article discusses some broader methodological points regarding the need to avoid translations that evoke an altogether different cultural milieu. This is possible if, on one hand, one is aware of one's starting point, that is, one's own cultural background. At the end of the hermeneutic circle, this is the target language of a translation, or the language that is being used to analyse a text. On the other hand, one must be aware of the point of departure, that is, the cultural background of the text that is being translated or analysed.

In this article, I focus on the idea of mahā-vākya in the theology of Jīva Gosvāmin. I show how Jīva drew on two distinct understandings of mahā-vākya, those of Mīmāṁsā and Advaita Vedānta, to claim that: (1) the whole Veda, including the... more

In this article, I focus on the idea of mahā-vākya in the theology of Jīva Gosvāmin. I show how Jīva drew on two distinct understandings of mahā-vākya, those of Mīmāṁsā and Advaita Vedānta, to claim that: (1) the whole Veda, including the Itihāsa-Purāṇa corpus, was one large mahā-vākya; (2) a quarter verse from the Bhāgavata was a mahā-vākya; (3) the praṇava Oṁ was a mahā-vākya. I argue that Jīva used the notion of mahā-vākya to show that all the Vedas, epics, and Purāṇas denote Kṛṣṇa through the fact that the single most important scriptural statement, ‘Kṛṣṇa is the Supreme Lord’ of Bhāgavata Purāṇa 1.3.28, has Kṛṣṇa as its reference. I conclude that mahā-vākya for Jīva was just a tool that he used for the purpose of canon formation in which the central role would belong to the Bhāgavata.

One of the tasks undertaken by Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660 C.E.), exponent of the logico-epistemological school, is the proof of the Buddha’s reliability as a spiritual guide. In this connection, the nature of the Buddha’s compassion and... more

One of the tasks undertaken by Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660 C.E.), exponent of the logico-epistemological school, is the proof of the Buddha’s reliability as a spiritual guide. In this connection, the nature of the Buddha’s compassion and omniscience plays a fundamental role and is a recurrent topic. Scholarly attention has recently focused on the issue; Pramāṇavārttika (PV) I.12 and Dharmakīrti’s commentary thereon, in particular, have been analyzed more than once, together with related texts of the brahmanical tradition as well as of other Buddhist schools. No investigations have been made, however, with regard to the context of the passage in Dharmakīrti’s work itself.
A number of thematically connected passages in Dharmakīrti’s works on the distinct issues of the Buddha’s compassion and omniscience, form a network that presents compassion and omniscience as complementary mental qualities. These linked discussions concern, on the one hand, the nature of the Buddha’s mental qualities and, on the other hand, the function and utilization of specific logical tools. They also contribute to the understanding of an essential epistemological issue in Dharmakīrti’s system: the import of non-observation in an inferential process of knowledge. Whether the doctrinal matter of the nature of the Buddha’s mental qualities revealed the epistemological issue or an epistemological issue was used for doctrinal purposes remains to be seen.

This paper deals with the development of two philosophical tradi- tions (i.e. successions of thinkers), namely Nyāya and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. Our attempt is to juxtapose the two schools on a specific philosophical problem, to highlight points... more

This paper deals with the development of two philosophical tradi- tions (i.e. successions of thinkers), namely Nyāya and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. Our attempt is to juxtapose the two schools on a specific philosophical problem, to highlight points of contact and departure, and possibly to get a better picture of the evolution of their thought by underlining inherited concepts and mutual influences. In doing so we will show how the representatives of the two streams further explained the orig- inal arguments of the sūtras, added new perspectives, and replied to issues raised by opponent schools.
Particularly, our focus is on the defense of the validity (prāmāṇya) of Veda. The reason for this choice is that Veda is held as an autonomous source of information about religious matters by the two schools under exam1 and is widely accepted in their social context as a source of knowledge. In this sense it constitutes the tradition (i.e. the cultural horizon) of both.

The Mīmāṃsā school of Indian philosophy elaborated complex ways of interpreting the prescriptive portions of the Vedic Sacred Texts. The present article is the result of the collaboration of a group of scholars of logic, computer science,... more

The Mīmāṃsā school of Indian philosophy elaborated complex ways of interpreting the prescriptive portions of the Vedic Sacred Texts. The present article is the result of the collaboration of a group of scholars of logic, computer science, Western philosophy and Indian philosophy and aims at the individuation and analysis of the deontic system which is applied, but never explicitly discussed in Mīmāṃsā texts. The article outlines the basic distinction among three sorts of principles ---hermeneutic, linguistic and deontic--- proposes a first formalisation of the deontic ones and uses it to reason about a well-known example of seemingly conflicting statements, namely the prescription to undertake the malefic Śyena sacrifice and the prohibition to perform any harm.

A sample chapter from my recently published book, The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita: Selected Metaphysical Chapters (OUP, 2022.) This is a translation (from Sanskrit and Tibetan) of the Mīmāṃsaka-parikalpita-ātma-parīkṣā, including the... more

A sample chapter from my recently published book, The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita: Selected Metaphysical Chapters (OUP, 2022.) This is a translation (from Sanskrit and Tibetan) of the Mīmāṃsaka-parikalpita-ātma-parīkṣā, including the verses by Śāntarakṣita and the Pañjikā commentary by Kamalaśīla. One of the last major works of Indian Buddhist philosophy, this text offers a highly sophisticated rational defense of Buddhist teachings and serves as an important source for debates between South Asian Buddhists and their Hindu and Jain critics.

This assertion seems to have become a standard view in the Mīmāṁsā school of Kumārila's time because the opponents in the Vākyādhikaraṇa of his Ślokavārttika (ŚV) and in the Bhāvārtha-adhikaraṇa (MmS 2.1.1-4) of the TV equally attack this... more

This assertion seems to have become a standard view in the Mīmāṁsā school of Kumārila's time because the opponents in the Vākyādhikaraṇa of his Ślokavārttika (ŚV) and in the Bhāvārtha-adhikaraṇa (MmS 2.1.1-4) of the TV equally attack this view when beginning to criticise the theory of bhāvanā. 4 In the Vākyādhikaraṇa, however, Kumārila avoids determining which part of a finite verb is expressive of bhāvanā. 5 In the Bhāvārtha-adhikaraṇa, Kumārila presents a complicated discourse in which he first attempts to refute the standard view, standing by an alternative one that bhāvanā is denoted by a whole finite verb. 6 vidyate). The ākhyātatva denotes the intentional bhāvanā (ārthī bhāvanā) activated by human beings, whereas the liṅtva particular to the optative mood of injunctions denotes the verbal bhāvanā (śābdī bhāvanā) issued by injunctions. Although Kumārila calls a finite verb "ākhyāta" without assuming "ākhyātatva" as a part of it, the idea of the denotation of bhāvanā by ākhyātatva may have been, as Kuroda Why on earth, however, is the meaning called bhāvanā, which is expressed as 'One should bring something into being,' proved to be denoted only by the suffix made separate from [verbal roots] such as √yaj?" (kathaṁ punar yajyādīn pṛthakkṛtya kevalapratyayavācya eva bhāvanārtho labhyate bhāvayed iti.) 5 After having presented three alternatives whereby bhāvanā is denoted either by a verbal suffix (pratyaya), a verbal root or a whole finite verb, Kumārila does not decide which is the most appropriate, noting that it is rewarded only with meager results (ŚV, Vākyādhikaraṇa, vv. 248-250; Kuroda 1980: 440).

In recent years there have been debates surrounding various aspects of the early Confucian philosopher Xunzi’s view on ritual (li 禮) as a specific core element of his ethical thought. One of the main questions concerns the source of... more

In recent years there have been debates surrounding various aspects of the early Confucian philosopher Xunzi’s view on ritual (li 禮) as a specific core element of his ethical thought. One of the main questions concerns the source of ritual. Is ritual something that humans (in particular, the sages) discover in the world, or is it instead something they create? That is—does Xunzi offer a realist or a conventionalist view of ritual? The answer to this question is of great import for understanding the thought of Xunzi in general, as it will suggest certain readings of his views on language, human nature, and moral self-cultivation. Part of the problem, however, is that although Xunzi says quite a bit about the function of ritual and why we should be concerned with it (the pragmatic application of ritual), he says relatively little about the metaphysics of ritual. Arguments either for a realist or conventionalist position have thus far tended to focus mainly on textual interpretation. The problem is that on the issue of the metaphysics of ritual there is a very limited amount to work with in the text of the Xunzi itself. Fortunately, however, there are other available methods that have been neglected which can help us to make headway on this issue. In this paper I outline one such method, which I call the "analogical method", and apply it to the case of Xunzi’s metaphysics of ritual.

In this encyclopaedia entry I give a summary of the stage that atheistic argumentation had reached in India by the end of the 9th century. Atheistic arguments involved (1) pointing to logical fallacies in the inference(s) that Naiyayikas... more

In this encyclopaedia entry I give a summary of the stage that atheistic argumentation had reached in India by the end of the 9th century. Atheistic arguments involved (1) pointing to logical fallacies in the inference(s) that Naiyayikas used to establish the existence of God, and (2) highlighting certain unresolvable difficulties concerning God’s nature.

[Excerpt from preface (Vorwort):] If by “organism” one means the systematic interconnection of the parts of the body that work together for the sake of sustaining life, one could figuratively say that Prabhākara, in his theory of... more

[Excerpt from preface (Vorwort):] If by “organism” one means the systematic interconnection of the parts of the body that work together for the sake of sustaining life, one could figuratively say that Prabhākara, in his theory of enjoinment (niyoga), is examining the “organism” of the authorless (apauruṣeya) Veda. In his view, the Veda is not simply an eternally static scripture but an active commandment-giver. The decree (codanā) of the Veda, that is, the fundamental injunction (vidhi) of a Vedic sacrifice (yajña), issues an enjoinment, which is transmitted into individual injunctions of the sacrifice, leading the hearer from one ritual act to another systematically. As a result of the regular performance of the sacrifice, the Veda is further preserved. Within the exercise of its ‘organism,’ the Veda uses the hearer’s activity.
In the first part of this work, I present an outline of the ‘organism’ of the authorless Veda presented in Prabhākara’s Bṛhatī. The second part consists of the translations of the selected parts of the Bṛhatī in which Prabhākara, following his commentary on Śabara’s Bhāṣya, expresses his ideas examined in the first part. Because Prabhākara does not usually present his thoughts in a systematic form, I have first systematically summarized the content of individual small sections in the content analysis. In the footnotes, I translated relevant commentaries of Śālikanātha. The topics of the relevant Sūtras can be indicated as follows; Mīmāṃsāsūtra 2.1.1: the verb in an injunction and the force of actualization (bhāva); 2.1.5: decree (codanā) of the Veda; 2.1.6-8: principal and secondary ritual action; 2.2. 13 and 16: sacrificial action and its subsidiary (guṇa); 3.1.1-10: hierarchy of ritual elements; 4.1.1-3: benefiting a human being (puruṣārtha); 4.1.11-16 and 21-24: benefiting the sacrifice (kratvartha); 6.1.1-3: eligibility (adhikāra) to perform the sacrifice.