Nāgārjuna Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Nagarjuna, philosophe bouddhiste fondateur de l'école du Madhyamaka du Milieu au II° siècle, est reconnu comme un Patriarche autant par les écoles tibétaines que par le zen japonais. Il influencera notament l'Hanna Shingyo, le célèbre Sutra du coeur qui est en résonnance avec sa pensée. Ses thèses hardies proposent une déconstruction des vérités bouddhistes sclérosées qui versent dans l'idéalisme ou le matérialisme, en invitant à emprunter une voie radicale de l'entre-deux, entre vérité relative et vérité au sens ultime, avec une approche radicale et décapante de la vacuité et de l'éveil, en phase avec les dernières découvertes de la physique quantique. Ce nouvel article propose une approche globale de sa philosophie, en insistant sur les conséquences pratiques de sa pensée sur la méditation et les enseignements bouddhistes.

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- Buddhist Studies, Zen Buddhism, Madhyamaka School, Buddhist Sanskrit Manuscripts

《六十如理颂》是公元2、3世纪时印度佛教论师龙树的代表作之一，主要阐述“缘起无生”的中观义理，在印度撰述中有着很高的引用率，曾对后世产生巨大影响。
该论梵本久佚，其宋代汉译本质量较差，藏译本一直是学界的主要参考。西方学界的梵本辑佚历经一个世纪，从各文献引用中共辑出12颂，占全论五分之一。
基于近年来新发现的梵文写本，笔者又新辑出20馀颂，使得本书共刊出梵本37颂（其中5颂仅存一半），已逾全论半数。此外，本书还刊出藏汉文精校本，并附汉语新译和义理导读。
In this book, 37 Sanskrit verses (including five half-verses) of the YṢK are recovered on the basis of quotations found in newly identified Sanskrit manuscripts from Tibet, which include two folios of the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā-vṛtti, the Munimatālaṃkāra, the Madhyamakāvatāra and an unknown commentary of the
Madhyamakāloka. A concordance of the verses collected in Lindtner 1982 and in this book can be found on page (39); a detailed concordance of all verses quoted in the Sanskrit works currently available to us is on page (40). For works that quote the YṢK but are (as far as we can determine) only extant in Tibetan translations, references are given in the footnotes to the Sanskrit of each verse.

- by Shaoyong Ye
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- Buddhist Philosophy, Madhyamaka School, Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna

Does it make sense to employ modern logical tools for ancient philosophy? This well-known debate2 has been re-launched by the indologist Piotr Balcerowicz, questioning those who want to look at the Eastern school of Jainism with Western glasses. While plainly acknowledging the legitimacy of Balcerowicz’s mistrust, the present paper wants to propose a formal reconstruction of one of the well-known parts of the Jaina philosophy, namely: the saptabhaṅgī, i.e. the theory of sevenfold predication. Before arguing for this formalist approach to philosophy, let us return to the reasons to be reluctant at it. For one thing, Balcerowicz (2008) made a clear-cut distinction between a constructivist and a reductionist method of interpretation. The former is defined by Balcerowicz (2008: 4), where the so-called “constructivist” method is not to be confused with the philosophy of mathematics and merely amounts to the exercise of formal reconstruction:

- by Fabien Schang
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- Jainism, Philosophy, Madhyamaka School, Question Answering (Information Retrieval)
- by Giuseppe Ferraro
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- Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna

Review of Carlo Rovelli, Helgoland, Adelphi, Milano 2020

- by Joseph Walser
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- Madhyamaka School, Early Mahayana Doctrines, Abhidhamma, Nāgārjuna

Classical Indian and Chinese Madhyamaka are NOT "world-negating" in any sense that precludes the positive fullness of mundane life. My argumentation is intended as a response to Kuang-ming Wu's depreciation of Buddhism in general and the Madhyamaka in particular, in his otherwise impressive book, _On Metaphoring_ . To make my case, passages from Nagarjuna's _Mulamadhyamakakarikas_ are examined carefully, as are passages from Chi-Tsang's _Fa-hua Hsuan-lun_ and _Ehr-ti I_ . It is shown that Chi-tsang rejects the progressive "discarding" of the "Three Levels of the Two Truths." Rather, they are all retained simultaneously, which is a key to my argument in terms of Chi-Tsang's appreciation of the mundane world. I also take the occasion to defend Jacques Derrida, whom Kuang-ming Wu accuses, in _On Metaphoring_, of an "anything goes" attitude towards hermeneutics. Rather, Derrida treasures the "remainders" that survive "objectivity as deconstructed," and supply clues to how the world goes on. Regarding my work in dialogue between Buddhists and Christians, Wu accuses me very falsely of syncretism, whereas I argue that dialogue is most fertile when it examines the samenesses and differences that are appointed by the founding "irreducible differences" between Buddhism and Christianity.

- by Robert Magliola
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- Buddhism, Buddhist Studies, Catholic Theology, Jacques Derrida

The logical analysis of Nāgārjuna's (c. 200 CE) catuṣkoṭi (tetralemma or four-corners) has remained a heated topic for logicians in Western academia for nearly a century. At the heart of the catuṣkoṭi, the four corners' formalization typically appears as: A, Not A (¬A), Both (A &¬A), and Neither (¬[A∨¬A]). The pulse of the controversy is the repetition of negations (¬) in the catuṣkoṭi. Westerhoff argues that Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā uses two different negations: paryudāsa (nominal or implicative negation) and prasajya-pratiṣedha (verbal or non-implicative negation). This paper builds off Westerhoff's account and presents some subtleties of Nāgārjuna's use of these negations regarding their scope. This is achieved through an analysis of the Sanskrit and Tibetan Madhyamaka commentarial tradition and through a grammatical analysis of Nāgārjuna's use of na (not) and a(n)-(non-) within a diverse variety of the catuṣkoṭi within the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.

- by Chris Rahlwes
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- Buddhism, Negation (Logic), Negation, Nāgārjuna

Corrects the notion that there existed a "Rasaratnākara" by Nāgārjuna. Rather, there was a "Rasendramaṅgala" by Nāgārjuna Siddha, and a "Rasaratnākara" by Nityanātha Siddha. The latter work has a section that is a version of the... more

- by Dominik Wujastyk
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- Alchemy, Sanskrit, India, Nāgārjuna
- by John Clark
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- Buddhism, Social Theory, Asian Studies, Philosophy

A short introducion to Nagarjuna's vacuity theory

- by Luca Pasini
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- Buddhism, Madhyamaka School, Nāgārjuna
- by Paulo Borges
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- Buddhism, Metaphysics, Philosophy Of Religion, Mysticism

“Neither from itself nor from another, nor from both, nor without cause, does anything whatever, anywhere arise.” This is the springboard to Nagarjuna’s examination of the notion of essencelessness which is one of the main precepts of Madhyamaka Buddhism. It is the core of the Middle Way between nihilism and eternalism and is deeply rooted in the traditional Buddhist philosophies of causation and dependant arising. I seek to explore this difficult set of concepts through the works of other great Buddhist writers and philosophers. My hope is to bring some measure of understanding and light into the clinging shadows of a complex notion whereby nothing has inherent nature (essenselessness) yet exists through the interdependence arising from causes and effects. I will draw upon several supporting verses throughout Nagarjuna’s examinations, as well as various explanations from scholarly works and commentators.

- by Scarlet Jory
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- Buddhism, Mahayana, Nāgārjuna, Mahayana Buddhism
- by Giuseppe Ferraro
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- Madhyamaka School, Nagarjuna, Madhyamaka, Mahayana

The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the key points of
Nāgārjuna’s discussion of problems relating to the philosophy of language. We willfocus on two works from Nāgārjuna’s yukti-corpus that address these matters most explicitly, the Vigrahavyāvartanī (VV) and the Vaidalyaprakaraṇa (VP). The discussion will concentrate on four topics: Nāgārjuna’s views on semantics, the problem of empty names, the relation between language and momentariness, and the implications of Madhyamaka views on parts and wholes for the existence of
language.

- by Jan Westerhoff
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- Philosophy Of Language, Buddhist Philosophy, Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna

從印度佛學兩個主流的大乘學派來看，無論是中觀學派(Madhyamaka)或是唯識學派(Vijñānavāda)，都將思考的重點放在外於主體的對象。也就是，儘管中觀學派以是以無自性(na... more

從印度佛學兩個主流的大乘學派來看，無論是中觀學派(Madhyamaka)或是唯識學派(Vijñānavāda)，都將思考的重點放在外於主體的對象。也就是，儘管中觀學派以是以無自性(na svabhva)、緣起(prattyasamutpda)、性空(śūnyatā)的哲學來分析一切存在物處於緣起性空的存在狀態。而唯識學派以阿賴耶識(ālaya-vijñāna)、種子、現行識等概念體系之來解釋外在對象之現象性格。這兩個學派前者是以存有學的進路，對經驗世界存在物形上實體的解構。而後者則將被視為獨立於主體的認識對象、客體轉成純粹的現象性格之認識論進路。依據吳汝鈞的看法，無論是中觀或唯識學派，其所關心的焦點都是先解構外於主體的對象，再進行主觀執取的消解並覺悟。也就是先透過否定客體的實在性或是將客體的存在狀態轉為心識現象，並在此基礎上將主體對客體的妄執、顛倒消解。
事實上，吳汝鈞認為上述提到以客體性為關注焦點的佛學思想，缺乏了對主體性或是自我的關注。而佛性(Buddha-dhātu)或如來藏思想(Tathāgatagarbha)的提出，正是將著力點關注在解脫、覺悟的主體性，提供了成佛的潛能、基礎、可能性，或是借用康德的用語「先驗的根據」(transcendental ground)，即是使佛性這種潛能現實化(realization of Buddha Nature)。在他的判釋中這種從客體性走向主體性的佛學思想，可分為佛性圓覺和佛性偏覺兩種。相較於佛性圓覺的體證、工夫論性格，佛性偏覺雖然也注重如來藏、清淨佛性、真如心之主體性。但其是以一種分離性的方式來進行實踐，也就是透過「超越的分解」 (transzendentale analyse)的方式來建立佛性，作為成佛覺悟的依據。而本研究的目的則在於討論強調「超越的分解」的華嚴宗思想家法藏，在其《華嚴一乘教義分齊章》中如何透過傳統印度的論證模式「四句」(catuṣkoṭi)來開展其關於三性(偏計所執、依他起性、圓成實性)的思想。而這種透過「四句」對三性的詮釋方式，與龍樹(Nāgārjuna)的主要論典《中論》(Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā)所提到的「四句偈」是否存在著存有學、認識論、語言哲學甚至是方法論的差異性?

- by 延霖周
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- Sociology, Kant, Buddhist Philosophy, Aristotle
- by Joseph Walser
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- Indian Philosophy, Madhyamaka School, Nagarjuna, Madhyamaka

Madhyamaka philosophy has been frequently characterized as nihilism, not just by its Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents, but also by some contemporary Buddhologists. This characterization might well strike us as surprising. First, nihilism appears to be straightforwardly inconsistent ("if there is nothing, there is still the fact that there is nothing, so there is something"). It would be curious if a philosophical school holding such an obviously deficient view would have acquired the kind of importance Madhyamaka has acquired in the Asian intellectual land- scape over the last two millenia. Second, Madhyamaka by its very name proclaims to tread the "middle way", and what if anything would count as an extreme position but the view that there is nothing? This essay addresses both the systematic status of nihilist theories as well as the historical contexts in which Madhyamaka has been characterized as nihilistic, aiming to throw some light on plausible and implausible ways of understanding the Madhyamaka intellectual enterprise.

- by Jan Westerhoff
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- Madhyamaka School, Nāgārjuna, Jan Westerhoff

The purpose of this paper is to show that the transcendental approach, first formulated by Kant, and then elaborated by generations of neo-Kantian thinkers and phenomenologists, provides Buddhism in its highest intellectual achievement... more

- by Michel Bitbol
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- Buddhism, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Physics, Buddhist Philosophy
- by Anne MacDonald
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- Buddhism, Comparative Philosophy, Indian Philosophy, Tibetan Philosophy

Nota de 2012: El texto que sigue fue escrito entre febrero y octubre del 2006, y constituyó el centro a partir del cual fui urdiendo mi concepción histórico-filosófica del budismo expuesta en un libro de reciente publicación, terminado en el 2010, titulado originalmente Budismo, Ciencia e Intersubjetividad aunque de hecho publicado como El budismo: un examen histórico-filosófico (Ed. Kairós). Esta última revisión me ha forzado a muchas enmiendas, tanto en estilo como en contenido.

- by Miguel Rodríguez de Peñaranda
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- Buddhism, Buddhist Studies, Nagarjuna, Nāgārjuna

Aśvaghoṣa's two epic poems are ostensibly biographies of the Buddha himself and of his half-brother, the handsome Nanda. The poems have hitherto been read in the world of Buddhist studies as religious texts -- albeit splashed with colourful sexual content. These annotated translations, with introductions to each chapter, aim to bring out the irreligious irony which runs through Aśvaghoṣa's poetry. This irony is most evident in a 'reverse innuendo' whereby sexually suggestive behaviour (especially in BC Cantos 3 - 5) has hidden meaning that would tend to be called, in Buddhist studies departments, "soteriological." The translator is independent in the sense of holding no academic position nor any status in a religious organization. As a long-time Zen practitioner and qualified teacher of the FM Alexander Technique, however, he has been well trained to appreciate the ever-present irony of "soteriological" endeavour -- namely that trying to be right puts us wrong.

- by Mike Cross
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- Buddhism, Sanskrit language and literature, Zen, Zen Buddhism

Article tiré de la conférence éponyme, donnée le 17 novembre 2016 à Lille, 27 p.

- by Vincent BERNE
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- Dewey, John Dewey, Richard Rorty, Madhyamaka School

In the two texts that undoubtedly belong to Nagarjuna (2nd century CE)—Middle Stanzas (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā) and Dispeller of Disputes (Vigrahavyāvartani)—the Buddhist philosopher develops the doctrine of emptiness (sunyata). This doctrine offers a vantage point for a radical critique of metaphysics. In the paper, I propose that the challenge of metaphysics suggested by Nagarjuna, which I term a critical procedure, offers a critique somewhat similar to Nietzschean critique of metaphysics. I propose that the critical procedure deployed by Nagarjuna undermines metaphysics both grammatically by rejecting existential predicate, and pragmatically by rejecting truth as an objective of inquiry.

- by Gleb Biserov
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- Metaphysics, Buddhist Philosophy, Friedrich Nietzsche, Nāgārjuna

This is an offprint of my, "Nagarjuna and the Ratnavali: New Ways to Date An Old Philosopher."

- by Joseph Walser
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- Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, Indian ancient history, Madhyamaka School

Перевод нитишастры Нагарджуны (двуязычное издание)

- by Dmitry Wackunin
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- Didactics, Nagarjuna, Tibetan Buddhism, Indo-Tibetan Buddhism

Born in a land where the feeling of nothingness was unavoidable, Cioran has
long been tempted by the demon of the nihilistic spirit. At first he was morbidly
seduced by the desire of extinction, later, in the wake of Pyrrho wandering
through the streets of Eastern wisdom, he has pursued the extinction of desire.
The drama of his existence stems from the impossibility of combining “the
conscience of nothingness and love of life”, not being able, due to his inner
constitution, to surrender completely to one or to the other. However, this latest
setback, seems to open the doors to an unprecedented liberation, beyond all the
predetermined salvations.

- by Massimo Carloni
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- Buddhism, Nihilism, Skepticism, Pyrrhonism
- by Shaoyong Ye
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- Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna, Madhyamika Buddhism

Mahāyāna streams of Buddhism have had a profound impact on the shape of Buddhist formations in India, throughout Asia, and beyond. This course examines, in a selected survey format, the classification, cultural formations, literature, and systematic thought of Mahāyāna doctrines and practices utilizing a range of interdisciplinary methods and approaches. The course focuses on the problems of classification and definition; the "new metaphysics" of emptiness; controversies in the conception of Buddhahood; the centrality of compassion; visualization and other meditation techniques; the role of faith and the practices of lay people; and the development of the bodhisattva ideal.

- by James Apple
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- Buddhism, Buddhist Studies, Madhyamaka School, Tibetan Buddhism

This article examines philosophical differences between Atiśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (982-1054 CE) and Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 970-1030 CE) based on evidence from newly published Tibetan manuscripts. Traditional Tibetan historians describe Atiśa as Ratnākaraśānti's student in the study of Mahāyāna works at Vikramaśīla. Ratnākaraśānti is also recorded in these sources as being a tantric master in a number of lineages upheld by Atiśa. Yet, as this paper demonstrates, these two important Indian Buddhist scholars had significant differences in their philosophical views. The paper compares doctrines found in the works of Ratnākaraśānti and Atiśa to clearly demonstrate how they differed on a number of points of thought and exegesis. Although both Atiśa and Ratnākaraśānti claimed to follow the Middle Way (madhyamā pratipat) of Nāgārjuna, Atiśa's thought was influenced by Candrakīrti, while Ratnākaraśānti expounded his system based on Yogācāra sources. As a specific example to illustrate the differences between these two scholars, the article draws attention to Nāgārjuna's Yuktiṣaṣṭikā (verse 34), where Atiśa interprets the verse in terms of mere appearances that dependently arise while Ratnākaraśānti framed his interpretation on mental qualities whose ultimate nature consists of the " mere luminosity of non-duality " (advayaprakāśamātra). The paper concludes that these differences between Atiśa and Ratnākaraśānti impacted their relationship at Vikramaśīla monastery in eleventh century India.

- by James Apple
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- Religion, Buddhism, Indian Philosophy, Buddhist Philosophy

The teachings of Madhyamaka (" middle way philosophy ") have been the basis of Tibetan Buddhist thought and practice since the eighth century. After the twelfth century, Tibetan scholars distinguished two branches of Madhyamaka: Autonomist (rang rgyud pa) and Consequentialist (thal 'gyur ba, *prāsaṅgika). What distinctions in Madhyamaka thought and practice did twelfth century Tibetan scholars make to differentiate these two branches? This article focuses upon a newly identified twelfth century Tibetan manuscript on Madhyamaka from the Collected Works of the Kadampas: Khu lo tsā ba's Treatise. Khu lo tsā ba, also known as Khu ston Mdo sde 'bar, was a contemporary of Jayānanda and Pa tshab Lo tsā ba Nyi ma grags and instrumental for the revitalized reception of Madhyamaka in twelfth century Tibet. Khu lo tsā ba's Treatise outlines a multifaceted understanding of Madhyamaka (" middle way philosophy ") as the work solely focuses upon the distinctions between Autonomist and Consequentialist Mādhyamikas. The paper outlines the structure and content of the Treatise and identifies six topics that the author emphasizes to distinguish Autonomist and Consequentialist branches of Madhyamaka. Based on an overview of these topics, the paper concludes that the Autonomist/Consequentialist distinction of Madhyamaka was already well developed in twelfth century Tibet and involved a differential of systems that encompassed much more than distinct styles of logical proof.

- by James Apple
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- Buddhism, Philosophy, Indian Philosophy, Buddhist Philosophy

The two truths theory is usually considered as an indispensable framework for Madhyamaka exponents to maintain a middle position. Based on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MK) and its Indic commentaries, this paper challenges this view and argues that there is a discernible turning point in the exegetic history of the MK concerning the two truths theory and that the practice of establishing the middle position on two truths was not present in the Madhyamaka tradition until Bhāviveka of the sixth century.

- by Shaoyong Ye
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- Buddhist Philosophy, Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna, Madhyamika Philosophy

The catuṣkoṭi or tetralemma is an argumentative figure familiar to any reader of Buddhist philosophical literature. Roughly speaking it consists of the enumeration of four alternatives: that some propositions holds, that it fails to hold, that it both holds and fails to hold, that it neither holds nor fails to hold. The tetralemma also constitutes one of the more puzzling features of Buddhist philosophy as the use to which it is put in arguments is not immediately obvious and certainly not uniform: sometimes one of the four possibilities is selected as 'the right one,' sometimes all four are rejected, sometimes all four are affirmed.

- by Jan Westerhoff
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- Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna, Catuskoti, Tetralemma

"This is a strikingly original and innovative work on Nagarjuna's dialectics as it provides a clear formulation of the modality of Nagarjuna's method of prasangāpādana reasonings and demonstrates the systematic uses of its specific form... more

- by Shahin Khan
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- Buddhist Philosophy, Nagarjuna, Nāgārjuna, Catuskoti

This paper considers the philosophical interpretation of the concept of svabhāva, sometimes translated as 'inherent existence' or 'own-being', in the Madyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy. It is argued that svabhāva must be understood as having two different conceptual dimensions, an ontological and a cognitive one. The ontological dimension of svabhāva shows it to play a particular part in theories investigating the most fundamental constituents of the world. Three different understandings of svabhāva are discussed under this heading: svabhāva understood as essence, as substance, and as the true nature of phenomena (absolute svabhāva). The cognitive dimension shows svabhāva as playing an important rôle in our everyday conceptualization of phenomena. Svabhāva is here seen as a superimposition (samāropa) which the mind projects onto the world. Although it is never used in the sutras and is rare in the Pali canon the term svabhāva, often translated as 'inherent existence' or 'own-being' denotes one of the central concepts of Madyamaka philosophy. Despite its centrality, its rô le is fundamentally negative: one, if not indeed the central concern of Madyamaka argumentation is to demonstrate that, despite our intuitions to the contrary, svabhāva does not exist. The notion of emptiness (śūnyatā) denotes precisely the absence of svabhāva.

- by Jan Westerhoff
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- Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna, Svabhāva, Jan Westerhoff
- by David E Cooper
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- Buddhism, Philosophy Of Religion, Metaphor, Quietism

It has become popular to portray the Buddhist Nāgārjuna as an ontological nihilist, i.e., that he denies the reality of entities and does not postulate any further reality. A reading of his works does show that he rejects the self-existent reality of entities, but it also shows that he accepts a "that-ness" (tattva) to phenomenal reality that survives the denial of any distinct, self-contained entities. Thus, he is not a nihilist concerning what is real in the final analysis of things. How Nāgārjuna's positions impact contemporary discussions of ontological nihilism and deflationism in Western philosophy is also discussed.

- by Richard Jones
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- Metaphysics, Ontology, Nihilism, Madhyamaka Buddhism

Over the past century Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) has been translated, in part and in its entirety, into an array of languages. Although a number of English translations have appeared, a philologically reliable yet readable English rendering of the MMK has remained a desideratum. A new translation by Mark Siderits and Shōryū Katsura now supersedes Jay Garfield’s previously popular MMK translation, which, made in reliance on only the Tibetan version of the MMK, is often problematic (The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, Oxford, 1995). Siderits’ and Katsura’s attempt to improve upon previous translations of the MMK was recently acknowledged by the Khyentse Foundation, which at the 17th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies awarded them its 2014 “Prize for Outstanding Translation.”

- by Anne MacDonald
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- Buddhism, Indian Philosophy, Tibetan Philosophy, Tibetan Studies

Beyond being and non-being: Buddhist philosophy against the charge of nihilism

- by Krzysztof Jakubczak
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- Scepticism, Buddhist Philosophy, Nihilism, Skepticism