Philosophy of Archaeology Research Papers (original) (raw)

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- Archaeology, Philosophy of Archaeology, Protohistory, Istanbul

‘The Çatalhöyük evidence as a whole’, write Hodder and Pels, ‘gives many indications that, indeed, people began to link themselves to specific pasts, by burying pots, tools, humans and hunting trophies in ways that indicate particular memories rather than a generic reference to a group’. Such striking claims about Neolithic cognitive change seem to chime neatly with the other ambitious hypotheses explored in this volume, intended to link measurable changes in the archaeological record to historical changes in consciousness, creativity, and self. In this essay I return to memory as a test case for evaluating claims about cognitive change in the Neolithic, trying to flesh out and generalise Hodder’s suggestive remarks about memory at Çatalhöyük by setting them in the context of a broad theoretical approach to personal memory which might both make sense of and in turn be buttressed and developed by the archaeological case study. I proceed by first explaining and defending the possibility of historical changes in autobiographical memory, anchoring this exercise in speculative cognitive archaeology and cognitive history in the picture of the ‘scaffolded mind’ suggested by the ‘distributed cognition’ framework. In section 3, I discuss features of autobiographical memory and its components which are highlighted in various domains of recent science and theory, and which taken together reveal personal remembering as a rich and complex set of learned and enculturated skills. Section 4 lays out the background conditions for the putative historical changes, in or before the Neolithic, before I go on in section 5 to sketch a picture of the nature, causes, and implications of the hypothesised changes in memory capacities and practices.

"In archaeology, biotic phenomena (e.g. human behaviour) must be inferred from a-biotic traces, requiring the process model to be conceptually unified. This unification has been prevented by dualistic ontologies that conceive humans and their purported unique traits as epi-phenomena, ontologically separated from their environment. The resulting encapsulation of phenomena within separate theoretical fields is proposed to be the source of our inability to apply evolutionary theory in archaeology.
The symptoms manifest as ontological deletion, isolation or “freezing“ of the organism within explanatory models, consequently, processes that span the divide for example those that include both biotic and a-biotic components such as technology or culture, have been impossible to integrate with evolutionary theory. "

- by Dylan G Foley
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- Archaeology, Philosophy, Ontology, Philosophy of Science

Interactions between archaeology and philosophy are traced, from the ‘New Archaeology’s’ use of ideas from logical empiricism, the subsequent loss of confidence in such ideas, the falsificationist alternative, the rise of ‘scientific realism’, and the influence of the ‘new’ philosophies of science of the 1960s on post-processual archaeology. Some recent ideas from philosophy of science are introduced, and that discipline’s recent trajectory, featuring debate between realists and anti-realists, as well as a return to ‘classic’ concerns about explanation, causation, and laws of nature, is described. Many interactions between philosophy of science and archaeology have been based on a misplaced quest for a single ‘off-the-peg’ methodology or other philosophical framework for archaeology. Historical conditions have fostered the damaging idea that archaeologists have to choose between ‘positivism’ and subjectivism. I conclude by suggesting what kinds of contemporary philosophical work might interest archaeologists, and argue that philosophers should recognize the distinctive heterogeneity of archaeology.

- by Rob Gargett
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- Archaeological Method & Theory, Philosophy of Archaeology

Archaeology is nothing if not a modeling discipline, despite longstanding ambivalence about models. Archaeologists model the data they recover from the archaeological record, the sources on which they draw to interpret these data, the specific events and activities that produced the surviving traces, and the encompassing social, cultural, ecological contexts and processes in which these events and activities took place. I argue that it is most productive to think about archaeological practice as a genre of empirically grounded, investigative reasoning with and through models – a perspective elaborated by recent advocates of a “model-based archaeology” (Kohler and van der Leeuw 2007). In this chapter I address the question: What are archaeological models? I propose a taxonomy of the kinds of models archaeologists build and use, distinguished by specificity and representational function. In the process I address two further questions: What do archaeologists use models to do? And, how do they learn from models?

- by Alison Wylie
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- Archaeology, Modeling and Simulation, Philosophy of Archaeology

Archaeology and philosophy share a long history of engagement. This engagement was most pronounced in the 1960s and 1970s with the so-called New Archaeology that drew upon philosophy of science to build an epistemological and methodological framework. The ensuing debates concerning how to adequately do this resulted in archaeologists being largely disaffected with philosophy of science. In the 1980s and 1990s, while philosophy of science shifted toward a more practice-based post-positivist philosophy, increasingly merging with the interdisciplinary field of science studies, archaeology began to engage with a wider suite of philosophies, including continental and pragmatist sources. Currently, rather than epistemic issues, archaeology and science studies share a growing interest in ontology and the role of materiality in human life.

Just about any object, event or process we detect in nature or culture is something we might interpret. Not only are the things we interpret heterogeneous, so are the activities, processes, procedures, methods, or practices to which we apply the word ‘interpretation’. This double heterogeneity sinks any chance of finding a unified topic worthy of serious intellectual investigation: only in a very superficial sense is there anything for a general theory or philosophical account of interpretation to be about. Attempts to provide a general theory of interpretation tend to culminate in restatements of the familiar idea that to interpret something is to determine its meaning (or to assign it a meaning). But in the absence of substantive ideas about meaning and determining this is unhelpful. Little is achieved by taking “scientific” interpretation to be the assignment of natural meaning to natural phenomena and “cultural” interpretation to be the assignment of nonnatural meaning to cultural phenomena, and theories of nonnatural meaning and utterance interpretation in the Gricean tradition can no more provide the foundation of a general theory of cultural interpretation than semiotic theory can. The producers and users of cultural entities—tools, pots, weapons, jewellery, clothing, shelter, cave paintings, laws, and ceremonies, for example—doubtless had all sorts of intentions when producing or using them. Around a dozen types of intentions that are worth separating fit into several complex hierarchies (most notably ontogenetic, phylogenetic, and epistemic). But (i) only those at the apex have anything like the structure of Gricean meaning intentions; (ii) if current thinking on utterance interpretation in pragmatics and cognitive archaeology is correct, in the ordinary course of things an evolved, dedicated, efficient, automatic, largely nonconscious cognitive mechanism is responsible for serving up conclusions about the contents of those intentions; and (iii) there is no reason to think interpreting cultural entities always involves forming conclusions about the intentions with which they were produced or used. Nonetheless, work in the Gricean tradition provides three things that are useful in examining not only hierarchies of intentions but also constitutive questions about the determination of meaning and the extent to which semantic theory must ultimately be hostage to a theory of pragmatic interpretation: (i) a back-catalogue of attempts to separate and analyse various kinds of intentions (including those that have come to be called informative intentions, communicative intentions, and meaning intentions), (ii) a tight nexus of distinct notions of meaning, and (iii) a collection of sharp tools that, when properly deployed, provide clear ways of forestalling certain kinds of practical and intellectual mistakes that are made not only in the fields just mentioned but also in the philosophy of language and semantic theory, particularly in separable debates about the “determination” of meaning.

- by Stephen Neale
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- Philosophy Of Language, Pragmatics, Lexical Semantics, Legal interpretation
- by Uroš Matić and +1
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- History, Ancient History, Archaeology, Classical Archaeology
- by Bruce Routledge
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- Epistemology, Philosophy of Archaeology

If the Earth has not occupied a distinguished place in the universe in both physical and biochemical senses of the term, then why did half of a century of search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI) result in no detection of incoming signals from our extraterrestrial analogues, let alone those from an alien colonization of the galaxy? When Italian physicist Enrico Fermi raised, in an informal discussion, one of the earliest versions of this question, the response was a general laughter; yet the question soon made its way into the academic discussions as an interesting puzzle and continued to challenge our conjectures over the possibilities involved with the rather weird concept of extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI). In this essay, after presenting a brief history of the main hypotheses proposed thus far in order to explain the nature of ETI in both historical and the modern senses of the term, the author has made a thorough survey of the main presumptions giving rise to Fermi's question, and shows, by drawing on the logical extension of the so-called mediocrity principle to some certain cases of epistemological importance, that Fermi's question would actually lead to a misarticulated tautology rather than a paradox; yet a tautology with significant implications for our understanding of intelligence in general. Our discussion is thus drawn on such various forms of reasoning as those involved in archeology, ethology, and economics, but with the same aim of outlining what a radically other being is supposed to behave if it was to convey an intelligible, mediocre form of consciousness.

- by Ehsan Sanaei
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- Ethology, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Intelligence Studies

Nicolas Zorzin’s degrowth archaeology—and LouAnn Wurst’s radical response to it—are discussed in light of disenchantment and sustainable archaeology. Disenchantment is not just integral to degrowth archaeology, it is its reason for being. Disenchantment is also what makes degrowth archaeology untenable. Reflecting the larger effort to remake and ‘re-enchant’ archaeology, and like sustainable archaeology, degrowth archaeology underestimates the scope and scale of disenchantment. In doing so, archaeologists risk perpetuating and exacerbating disenchantment.

- by Richard M Hutchings
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- Archaeology, Anthropology, Philosophy of Archaeology, Archaeological Theory

Work on meaning and utterance interpretation in the Gricean, intentional-inferential tradition cannot support a general or integrated theory of interpretation. Indeed, the quest for such a theory is a fool's errand. The things we are said to interpret are massively heterogeneous; so are the activities, methods, or practices involved. This double heterogeneity sinks any chance of a unified subject matter. Only in a superficial sense is there anything for a general theory or philosophical account of interpretation to be about. Even where interpretive activities involve forming hypotheses about intent-as is often claimed for legal, literary, artistic, and archaeological interpretation-work in the Gricean, intentional-inferential tradition fails to illuminate either the nature or the principal goals of those activities. However, it does provide what is necessary to refine postulated hierarchies of intentions much needed in those domains and to address questions about the determination of meaning and the extent to which semantic theory must ultimately be hostage to a theory of pragmatic interpretation.

- by Stephen Neale
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- Philosophy Of Language, Pragmatics, Meaning, H.P. Grice

In this contribution I will first briefly consider the collegial ideal of disciplinary co- operation which frames the premise of this section of the volume. I then move to the points of contact between STS and archaeology, exploring whether there is friction or slippage between the two disciplines. Here symmetry, not just as metaphor of parity but in the specific analytic form of generalized or ‘radical symmetry’ is unpacked as one point of contact between the fields. After the currents of thought in the fields are followed, I conclude by suggesting waypoints for orienting around what I feel to be eddies in the disciplines’ respective radical currents, to offer a knot in the future of object-centred inquiries.

In this chapter we consider the theories of embodied cognition and extended mind with respect to the human ability to engage in numerical cognition. Such an enquiry requires first distinguishing between our innate number sense and the sort of numerical reasoning that is unique to humans. We provide anthropological and linguistic research to defend the thesis that places the body at the center of our development of numerical reasoning. We then draw on archaeological research to suggest a rough date for when ancient humans first were able to represent numerical information beyond the body and in enduring material artifacts. We conclude by briefly describing how these capacities for embodied and extended numerical cognition shaped our world.

This paper discusses the principle of symmetry for archaeology in light of the discipline’s theoretical legacy. At the core, this principle involves a reconfiguration of how the relationship between humans and things is characterized. Advocating the recognition of mixtures of what are routinely parsed into categories of nature and society, a symmetrical archaeology centres itself upon the equitable study of the discipline’s defining ingredients. It is argued that such symmetry of humans and things undercuts many pesky dualisms exhibited throughout the recent history of archaeological theory and practice. The article summarizes the salient formulations of this relationship in archaeological thinking and suggests that a symmetrical focus on ontological mixtures removes the reliance upon multiplying epistemological settlements that fragment the discipline. An example is given of how heritage might be rethought.

I’m often asked why, as a philosopher of science, I study archaeology. Philosophy is so abstract and intellectual, and archaeology is such an earth-bound, data-driven enterprise, what could the connection possibly be? This being a Dewey lecture I construe this question in autobiographical terms: how did I come to work at this odd intersection between fields? I also take this as an opportunity to reflect on a major sea change that has taken place in philosophy of science in the forty years since I began thinking about how philosophy and archaeology bear on one another. I see this as an eminently Deweyan shift toward grounding philosophical analysis in a robust, richly contextualized understanding of scientific inquiry. Philosophers of science have long argued for such grounding in historical terms but what is distinctive, and distinctively Deweyan, at this juncture is a commitment to take up questions arising in and from practice, questions that matter to researchers and also policy-makers, funders, and, indeed, all those affected by the practice and results of scientific inquiry.

- by Alison Wylie
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- Philosophy of Science, John Dewey, Philosophy of Archaeology, Scientific Practice

What work does the adjective ‘social’ in social archaeology do? What is the character of human/things relations under the rubric of social archaeology? We raise these questions in relation to the recent Companion to Social Archaeology by Meskell and Preucel. While the corrective of the ‘social’ has been extremely productive, in broaching these questions we enter very murky waters. Our task in this article is to show where meanings of the ‘social’ have broken down; our charge is to demonstrate how frames of reference in understanding people/things relations have become muddled. By building on the strength of archaeology with regard to things, we seek to revisit the question: what is it to be human?

- by Timothy Webmoor and +1
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- Posthumanism, Social Archaeology, Thing Theory, Philosophy of Archaeology

The past, as a concept, delineates a ‘virtual territory’ whose degree of ‘accessibility’ over the centuries has been pertinent to the various intersections between capitalist socio-economic structures and the epistemological agenda(s) of western history/archaeology. Although this relation has been highlighted repeatedly with regards to modernity, postmodernity is taken to signal the 'democratization' of the past. The present paper argues instead that postmodernism builds a thoroughly symbiotic relationship with late capitalism and that free access and circulation within the 'territory' of the past, goes hand-in-hand with the inevitable loss of foundational ontological values, such as the ability for critical navigation and historical positioning.

- by despina catapoti
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- Archaeology, Public Archaeology, Digital Archaeology, History of Capitalism

Epistemic peer disagreement raises interesting questions, both in epistemology and in philosophy of science. When is it reasonable to defer to the opinion of others, and when should we hold fast to our original beliefs? What can we learn from the fact that an epistemic peer disagrees with us? A question that has received relatively little attention in these debates is the value of epistemic peer disagreement—can it help us to further epistemic goals, and, if so, how? We investigate this through a recent case in paleoanthropology: the debate on the taxonomic status of Homo floresiensis remains unresolved, with some authors arguing the fossils represent a novel hominin species, and others claiming that they are Homo sapiens with congenital growth disorders. Our examination of this case in the recent history of science provides insights into the value of peer disagreement, indicating that it is especially valuable if one does not straightaway defer to a peer’s conclusions, but nevertheless remains open to a peer’s evidence and arguments.

- by Johan De Smedt
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- Sociology of Culture, Paleoanthropology, Human Evolution, Epistemology

- by Helen De Cruz and +1
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- Paleoanthropology, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Biology
- by John Sutton
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- Material Culture Studies, Distributed Cognition, Embodiment, Memory Studies

I distinguish, by specificity and representational function, several different types of archaeological models: phenomenological, scaffolding, and explanatory models. These take the form of concrete, mathematical, and computational models (following Weisberg’s taxonomy), and they exemplify what Morgan describes as the double life of models; they vary significantly in the degree to which they are intended to accurately represent a particular target, or are media for experimental manipulation of idealized cultural processes. At the phenomenological end of the spectrum, representational models of data include typological constructs that selectively represent variability in archaeological data on several dimensions: formal (material), spatial, and temporal. Archaeologists also build phenomenological models of data drawn from nonarchaeological sources – cultural and natural – that are relevant for interpreting archaeological data as evidence. Assemblages of these target and source models ...

- by Alison Wylie
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- Archaeology, Modeling and Simulation, Philosophy of Archaeology

As a modern academic Ulysses, the historical scientist is enticed by numerous plausible scientific theories that can explain the historical data in search of the truth. However, the predicament of her work is to inevitably crash onto the rocks and cliffs of uncertainty. The problem discussed in this paper is that several scientific models can be suitable to account for the same empirical observations. The risk of falling into speculation is looming, and exceedingly dangerous in science. This is also the case in archaeological sciences, such as bioarchaeology. A bioarchaeologist frequently encounters traces of disease in ancient skeletons, and pertinent patterns may often result from equally probable different causes. This is a methodological issue commonly encountered in the interpretation of pathological patterns in human remains, and constitutes part of the problem known in bioarchaeology as the osteological paradox. During an informal trilogue, three characters discuss the osteological paradox, and attempt to define it in philosophical terms. The aim of this work is to present the problems of scientists with the philosophical approach to the debate between scientific realism and antirealism, focusing in particular on the so-called problem of underdetermination. Our original approach is to apply the distinction between ‘how-possibly’ models and ‘how-actually’ models by Alisa Bokulich to archaeological issues, integrating various fields of science with a multidisciplinary and omnivorous approach. The trilogue ends providing the historical scientist with reasons and means to believe in her ability to conceive of true and reliable scientific models to interpret the historical past.

- by Alessandra Morrone and +1
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- Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Archaeology, Human Osteology, Bioarchaeology, Osteology, Paleopathology

"Bilimkuram bilimlerden kaynaklanan sorunların 20. yy. başlarında sistematikleştirilmesinin sonucu olarak günümüzde bilim ve bilimsel araştırının neticesi olan bilgiyi konu alan bir felsefe dalı olmuştur. Bilimkuramda bilim tam genişliğinde ele alınır ve unsur olarak bilimsel araştırının yöntemi, nedenleri, değeri ve sanat, din, mitoloji gibi başka alanlara karşı sınırlandırılması ile ilgili sorunlar işlenir. Bilimkuram «bilim felsefesi» ya da «genel bilimkuram» ve «özel bilimkuram» olarak bölümlenir. Birincisi genel olarak bilim ile ikincisi ise belirli/özel bir bilim dalı ile ilgilidir. Özel bilimkuram dolayısıyla araştırılan belirli bilim dalında uzmanlık gerektirir ve böylece sadece felsefenin araştırdığı bir alan olarak sınırlandırılamayacağını gösterir. Her bilim dalında olduğu gibi arkeoloji içinde kendi bilimkuramı üzerinde çalışma zorunluluğu söz konusudur. Bu sunumda arkeoloji bilimkuramının dizgeleştirilmesinde işlenmesi gereken öğe/unsurlar takdim edilecektir."

Innovative modes of collaborative practice are transforming archaeology; descent communities and archaeologists jointly define the research agenda and pursue programs of historical, archaeological inquiry together, sometimes bringing strikingly different conceptual schemes and methodologies to bear on questions of common concern. The tolerance of epistemic pluralism necessary for such practice has attracted sharp critiques from skeptics – philosophers (e.g., Boghossian in Fear of Knowledge, 2006) as well as archaeologists – who decry the compromises they believe it entails for properly scientific inquiry conceived in terms of the traditional ideal that science, proper, should be value free. By contrast, I contend that these collaborations can and often do significantly improve archaeological practice empirically, conceptually, and methodologically. I argue that when these projects succeed they illustrate the virtues of extending the cognitive-social norms of Longino’s proceduralist account of objectivity – specifically, her “tempered equality of intellectual authority” – beyond the confines of the scientific community (2002, 128-135). In the process, I identify the diversity of pluralisms that are a source of creative insight in these projects and I make the case that critics who fear this pluralism misrecognize the complexity of and contingency of the epistemic norms they defend.

The object of the present article is to study the relations between the forms of knowledge production in archaeology and the existing systems of publication in academic journals. We explore the predominant criteria in peer-review processes and the relative importance of their epistemological dimension. The results are discussed in terms of the social, political and institutional implications of contemporary academic archaeology, suggesting a need to strengthen epistemological criteria in the peer-review processes, thus improving the justification of the assertions that archaeology makes about the past. This is important for archaeology as a discipline that claims to generate a contribution to present-day society, but it requires changes in institutional policies at local and regional levels in order to be effective.

Digital data integration, manipulation and knowledge creation in archaeology continue to fail due to an inadequate and fragmented philosophical infrastructure. Progress will require a broad program of research under the Philosophy of Archaeology to investigate and control ontology and category issues in archaeological data models. Success in such research will enable archaeology to generate data compatible with physical and evolutionary theory.

- by Dylan G Foley
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- Archaeology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Environmental Philosophy

VanPool, Christine S., and Todd L. VanPool (2003) Introduction: Method, Theory, and the Essential Tension. In _Essential Tensions in Archaeological Method and Theory_, edited by Todd L. VanPool and Christine S. VanPool, pp. 1-4.... more

- by Ivan Marinov
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- Archaeology, Theoretical Archaeology, Philosophy of Archaeology
- by Timothy Webmoor
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- Archaeology, Ontology, Design, Art
- by Alison Wylie
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- Philosophy, Political Science, Philosophy of Archaeology, Pluralism

In commenting on the state of affairs in contemporary archaeology, Wylie outlines an agenda for archaeology as an interdisciplinary science rooted in ethical practices of stewardship. In so doing she lays the foundations for an informed... more

- by Alison Wylie
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- Interdisciplinarity, Philosophy of Archaeology, Stewardship
- by Alison Wylie
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- Archaeology, Art, Philosophy of Archaeology, History of Archaeology

This paper examines the inferential framework employed by Palaeolithic cognitive archaeologists, using the work of Wynn and Coolidge as a case study. I begin by distinguishing minimal-capacity inferences from cognitive-transition inferences. Minimal-capacity inferences attempt to infer the cognitive prerequisites required for the production of a technology. Cognitive-transition inferences use transitions in technological complexity to infer transitions in cognitive evolution. I argue that cognitive archaeology has typically used cognitive-transition inferences informed by minimal-capacity inferences, and that this reflects a tendency to favour cognitive explanations for transitions in technological complexity. Next I look at two alternative explanations for transitions in technological complexity: the demographic hypothesis and the environmental hypothesis. This presents us with a dilemma: either reject these alternative explanations or reject traditional cognitive-transition inferences. Rejecting the former is unappealing as there is strong evidence that demographic and environmental influences play some causal role in technological transitions. Rejecting the latter is unappealing as it means abandoning the idea that technological transitions tell us anything about transitions in hominin cognitive evolution. I finish by briefly outlining some conceptual tools from the philosophical literature that might help shed some light on the problem.

- by Ross Pain
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- Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of Archaeology

According to the theory of Roy Bhaskar, in epistemic fallacy statements about world can always be translated to statements about language thereby leaving world outside. I demonstrate how epistemic fallacy is inherent in... more

- by Eero Muurimäki
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- Philosophy of Archaeology

I 2002 trådte den nuværende museumslov i kraft og som noget nyt skal den arkæologiske undersøgelse betales af bygherre. Dette forhold er sammen med de generelle tendenser i samfundet afgørende for at en ny måde at tale om den arkæologiske udgravning har vundet indpas – den italesættes og forstås nu ofte som en forretning. I denne forretnings-diskurs er bygherren centralt placeret: han indtager en position der svarer til en kunde. Dette skaber ikke alene forvirring omkring hvem vi graver for, men kan også på sigt få konsekvenser for den videnskabelige arkæologiske (udgravnings) proces.""

In this paper I sketch the possibilities of so-called transcendental realism for archaeological theory. I The main idea is that the subject of study in archaeology is non-observable, the vanish structures and processes of prehistoric societies. Archaeology is really like “filing a black box” as Edmund Leach has said, but not unknowable. By abandonment of empiristic and idealistic doctrines it is not ”transcendental”, out of the possibilities of knowing. The policy to produce knowledge of the vanished world is to build iconic models, the same procedure with which natural sciences have invited the structure of atoms, viruses etc. I introduce also Roy Bhaskar’s “transformational model of society/person connection, which form a good ontological base for a realist methodology based on iconic models.

- by Eero Muurimäki
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- Philosophy of Archaeology

Archaeological data are shadowy in a number of senses. Not only are they notoriously fragmentary but the conceptual and technical scaffolding on which archaeologists rely to constitute these data as evidence can be as constraining as it is enabling. A recurrent theme in internal archaeological debate is that reliance on sedimented layers of interpretative scaffolding carries the risk that “pre-understandings” configure what archaeologists recognize and record as primary data, and how they interpret it as evidence. The selective and destructive nature of data capture in archeology further suggests that there may be little scope for putting “legacy” data to work in new ways. And yet archaeologists have been strikingly successful in mining old datasets for new insights. I situate these concerns in the broader context of debate about the epistemic standing of the historical sciences, and then consider three strategies by which archaeologists address the challenges posed by legacy data. The first two – secondary retrieval and recontextualization – are a matter of reconfiguring the scaffolding that underpins evidential reasoning. The third turns on redeploying old data in the context of computational models that support the experimental simulation of the cultural systems and contexts under study.

- by Alison Wylie
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- Archaeology, Philosophy of Archaeology, Legacy Data