Antitrust, Competition Law, Derecho de la Competencia Research Papers (original) (raw)

Mediante el presente artículo, el autor expone detalladamente las modalidades mediante las cuales el Estado restringe la competencia tanto por su actuación como agente en el mercado como en el ejercicio del ius imperium. Asimismo, analiza los principales remedios establecido en el ordenamiento jurídico peruano para evitar la realización de estas conductas por parte del Estado, así como la efectividad de dichos remedios.

- by STA Law Firm
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- Corporate Law, Mergers & Acquisitions, Competition Law, Antitrust (Law)

The Forth Railway Package approved in 2016 in order to remove remaining obstacles to complete the Single European Rail Area aims, inter alia, to boost competition by adapting the system of governance between railway infrastructure... more

La primera Ley de Competencia de El Salvador fue aprobada al final de 2004. La legislación mercantil previa no prohibía las prácticas anticompetitivas y solo era aplicables a las empresas y comerciantes. La nueva ley establece que todas las entidades que participan en una actividad económica o todos los agentes económicos están obligados a competir, incluyendo empresas, asociaciones sin fines de lucro, empresas públicas y los órganos del Estado. Se trata de un concepto totalmente novedoso que necesita desarrollo y aclaración para ofrecer mayor seguridad jurídica en el mercado

- by Giuseppe Morgese
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- European Studies, European integration, European Law, Antitrust (Law)

Publicado en revista CEDEC, U. Javieriana, Vol. 5, No. 5. Enero – diciembre 2009. ISSN: 1900-6381

Estudio sobre régimen de control de concentraciones en primera Ley de Competencia de El Salvador

Minority share acquisitions between competitors have been mistakenly considered of concern only in case they result in a change of control. First the economic theory, closely followed by courts and doctrine, explained and demonstrated that even the acquisition of non-controlling shareholdings may distort competition and requires a close scrutiny by competition authorities. This article analyzes the impact of minority shareholdings on the incentives of rival firms and ascertains whether the authorities are provided with adequate tools to investigate and address the potential anti-competitive effects. The results of the economic theory are the starting point to assess whether the legal treatment of minority shareholdings under the EU and US antitrust systems is appropriate and adequate.

- by Gian Diego Pini
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- Law, Comparative Law, European Law, Competition Law

This paper is about my sixteen week internship at Small and Medium Entrepreneurship Development National Center of Armenia (SME DNC of Armenia (hereinafter Foundation)) which is a part of my Bachelor studies of the 5th semester at the SRH University of Applied Sciences Berlin. The first section of my paper includes a detailed description about the work I have done during the internship, the responsibilities that I had and changes that I could bring to the Foundation. The second part is a study about consumer rights and anti-competitive agreements in the framework of SMEs. It reflects the knowledge and experience that I got during the internship.
The study consists from analysis, case studies and comparison of Armenian legislation system with the EU legislation system, how they protect consumer rights and prohibit anti-competitive agreements among entrepreneurs. I decided to show the main parts of the legislation systems, open the cases about anti-competitive agreements and market enforcement, than compare them to see that all in all the legislation systems work, but there is need to develop new enforcement mechanism, especially for Armenia. From my knowledge and experience I add some recommendations for the improvement of the field and development of the institutions that deal with those kind of problems.

This chapter highlights a major "cognitive dissonance" problem that affects competition enforcement at several levels. Equilibrium competition models predominant in the competition policy literature do not assess innovation and productive growth as it happens at the firm level, but are rather concerned with attaining mathematical model equilibrium. Due to this lack of attention to innovation and productivity competition metrics are bound to stress model correlations rather than actual market transactions, and to be based on subjective opinion or intuition, thereby generating legal uncertainty among businesses. Also, by stressing a formalistic structural assessment of the markets, the cognitive dissonance overemphasizes merger control as opposed to competition advocacy, thereby curtailing the possibilities of dynamic innovation arising from the elimination of entry legal barriers. The chapter proposes an alternative assessment of “innovation capabilities” as a new focus of competition enforcement.

- by Ignacio L De Leon
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- Industrial Organization, Competition Law, Antitrust (Law), Regulation

The study critically examines the current practice of the classification of abuses under Article 82. It then explores the shortcomings of the current approach and stresses the need for a reconceptualisation of the current categorisation of abuses in Article 82. It finally analyses the Commission
Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82, and considers whether it constitutes a real effects-based approach and its possible implications for competition law enforcement

- by Ioannis Lianos
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- European Law, Competition Law, Antitrust (Law), Competition Policy

Todo acordo de venda casada é anticompetitivo? Com base nesta pergunta - e no caso recente envolvendo tying agreements e o cantor Ozzy Osbourne - procuramos trazer o histórico do embasamento jurídico do Direito Concorrencial... more

Todo acordo de venda casada é anticompetitivo?
Com base nesta pergunta - e no caso recente envolvendo tying agreements e o cantor Ozzy Osbourne - procuramos trazer o histórico do embasamento jurídico do Direito Concorrencial (antittuste) brasileiro ao tratar da venda cansada como um ilicito concorrencial.

We analyze a search engine market from a law and economics perspective and incorporate the choice of quality improving innovations by a search engine platform in a two-sided model of internet search engine. In the proposed framework we, first, discuss the legal issues the search engine market raises for antitrust policy through analysis of several types of abusive behavior by the dominant search engine. We also explore the possible consequences of monopolization of the search engine market for advertisers and users in the form of excessive pricing and deterioration of the quality of the search results. Second, in the technical analysis part we incorporate these considerations in the two-sided market model and analyze the rate of innovation, pricing, and quality choices by the dominant search engine. Our findings show that a dominant monopoly platform results in higher prices and underinvestment in quality improving innovations by a search engine relative to the social optimum. More generally, we show that monopoly is sub-optimal both in terms of harm to advertisers in the form of excessive prices, harm to users in the form of reduction in quality of search results, as well as harm to the society in the form of lower innovation rates in the industry.

- by Ioannis Lianos
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- Internet Studies, Competition Law, Antitrust (Law), Web search

This report presents a critical discussion of the hot topics in the intersection of intellectual property law with innovation and competition law and policy. The report examines first the interaction between horizontal IP rules and sector specific IP regimes. It then delves into the analysis of the interface between competition law enforcement and IP rights in Europe and in the United States, before examining the doctrine of exhaustion in these jurisdictions, which is particularly interesting in view of some recent case law of the US Supreme Court. The final part of the study focuses on issues of governance of IP law and competition law and more generally the need for establishing cross-disciplinary links between these two areas of law and between the institutions in charge of their enforcement.

- by Ioannis Lianos
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- Intellectual Property, European Law, Innovation statistics, Competition Law
- by Miguel Sousa Ferro
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- Law, Law, Law, Competition Law

En un Estado de Derecho se pueden encontrar empresas bajo la competencia imperfecta y El Estado indirectamente los tolera, ¿cómo hemos llegado a esto? Hay dos componentes íntimamente ligados: el Estado y el Derecho. En un Estado moderno impera la división de poderes enarbolado por. Montesquieu: Ejecutivo, legislativo y judicial todos ellos autónomos e independientes pero a la vez estos tres pilares se encuentran limitados por el Derecho. El Estado además de proteger los derechos fundamentales y garantizar la defensa de la libre competencia en todas las áreas y en el campo del mercado, motivo por lo que debe asegurar que no se genere desigualdades en ninguna área. Uno se pregunta ¿En un Estado de Derecho puede existir monopolios legales? Definitivamente la respuesta es no porque atenta la libre competencia pero lamentablemente en gobiernos que flamean el liberalismo y neoliberalismo tal como ocurre en el Perú sea permitido esta clase de competencia imperfecta en el mercado, a pesar que hay leyes antimonopolio, se puede encontrar hasta la fecha empresas que tienen un poder monopólico y oligopólicos, De ahí la importancia del Derecho de alcanzar leyes científicas, es decir integrales, y el Estado cuente con un marco jurídico que regulen los fenómenos sociales y económicos, ¿qué pasos se debe realizar para eliminar la competencia imperfecta?, primero el Poder Ejecutivo debe hacerle frente con una lucha real a la corrupción, segundo que el Poder Legislativo se dedique a legislar y aportar leyes concretas e integrales y contar con un sistema judicial eficiente

Commercial agency agreements benefit from a specific competition law regime with regards to the application of Article 81 of the Treaty of the European Communities (hereinafter Article 81). Although they may contain clauses that can produce anticompetitive effects, such as minimum price fixing, these are generally found outside the scope of Article 81 paragraph 1 [hereinafter Article 81(1)]. In comparison, if a franchise or selective distribution agreement contains resale price maintenance clauses, Article 81(1) may apply. The existence of a distinct competition law regime for commercial agency agreements constitutes a paradox, as from an allocative efficiency perspective it makes no sense to distinguish between the two situations. By adopting a new-institutional economics perspective, this study will provide a justification for this specific competition law regime. The agency agreements exception will be considered as a specific form of the single entity defense that operates in situations of hierarchy. Other vertical restraints are mainly organizational mechanisms used in situations of network forms of organization. The distinction established between these agreements could thus be theoretically defended. More generally, the comparative institutional analysis of vertical restraints will provide a useful insight to delimit the boundaries of Article 81(1).

- by Ioannis Lianos
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- European Law, Competition Law, Antitrust (Law), Competition Policy

La Neutralidad de la Red está de actualidad tanto en EEUU como en Europa y, la Comisión Europea ha pedido al Organismo de Reguladores Europeos de Comunicaciones Electrónicas (BEREC) que lleve a cabo un análisis de la situación respecto a cuestiones cruciales para conseguir una Internet abierta y neutral, como las barreras al cambio de operador, el bloqueo o el estrangulamiento del tráfico por Internet. En la presente comunicación se ofrece una rápida y somera visión sobre las disposiciones relativas a la Neutralidad de la Red del marco regulador de la Unión Europea y las posibles aplicaciones del derecho de defensa de la competencia al objeto de preservar la Neutralidad de la Red. Existen varios mercados implicados en el ecosistema de Internet de acuerdo a su diseño: mercados de infraestructuras de redes y servicios de comunicación electrónica, mercados de servicios relacionados con la organización de Internet, mercados de servicios de la sociedad de la información y mercados de contenidos. En cada una de estas capas deberá aplicarse la normativa “antitrust”. Esta ponencia se centra en contextualizar las implicaciones legales desde la perspectiva del derecho de la competencia de la arquitectura de Internet, así como el rol de la política de la defensa de la competencia al objeto de preservar la Neutralidad de la Red y el ecosistema de innovación generado por su arquitectura.

- by Jose Manuel Pérez Marzabal
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- Law, Technology, Innovation statistics, Regulation And Governance

Trabajo de investigación enfocado en: (1) la cláusula arbitral en los contratos mercantiles como una forma de someterse a un (2) método alterno de solución de controversias, denominado arbitraje, (3) que se lleva a cabo actualmente por organismos internacionales o individuos del sector privado, algunos respaldados por tratados, esto para comprobar que (4) el arbitraje, en contraste con la vía tradicional jurisdiccional, es una mejor alternativa para solucionar un conflicto mercantil contractual.

This study aims to contribute to the cross-fertilization of the fields of competition economics and development economics. For that to happen, however, it is important to focus on the complex intellectual history that placed these different groups of scholars, and the conceptual traditions they represent, in different intellectual itineraries in order to provide an explanation to the relative isolation of each field from the inputs of the other. Our narrative will be the opposition between the dominant intellectual tradition in development economics until recently, which highlighted the role of state intervention through the establishment of protectionist barriers and monopolies to the expense of markets and free competition, and the competition economics’ belief on the superior efficiency of free competition. Our aim is not to be exhaustive, but to sketch the intellectual history of this opposition and to explain why the recent evolution of both fields to the analysis of the micro-foundations of growth, their focus on institutions and their emphasis on empirical methods, might lead to a new synthesis, favoring a useful cross-fertilization between competition economics and development economics.

- by Ioannis Lianos
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- Development Economics, Competition Law, Antitrust (Law), Competition Policy

The study first takes a normative perspective and examines the various goals that have been advanced by competition law literature on the objectives of EU competition law. A critical analysis of this literature shows the weaknesses of an economic welfare approach and the difficulties, as well as some normative objections, to incorporating non-welfare goals in the implementation of EU competition law. The normative perspective is then followed by an analysis of positive EU competition law arriving to the conclusion that the case law of the EU Courts is ambiguous as to the existence of a hierarchy of objectives in EU competition law and that the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty opens the door to a more holistic competition law, in congruent co-existence with the other Treaty provisions and policies instituted by the EU Treaties. The final part criticizes the literature on the goals of EU competition law for its monotonous emphasis on goals. I argue that the choice of a general objective as an enforcement criterion tells us little about whether any particular institution, for example the adjudicative process, should be charged with implementing that criterion. Comparative institutional analysis emphasizes the connections between issues of institutional choice and goals. The question of goals should follow and not precede that of institutional choice. Institutional choice should, however, be comparative and not proceed to choosing an institution without a proper analysis of the weaknesses of the alternative institutions on offer. The conceptualization of the role of courts, and other institutions in a holistic competition law, using comparative institutional analysis, is one of the major challenges faced by EU competition law, and new competition law regimes, in the future.

- by Ioannis Lianos
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- European Law, Competition Law, Antitrust (Law), Competition Policy

Analysis and reflections on the evolution of EU competition law after the Treaty of Lisbon

- by Ioannis Lianos
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- Competition Law, Antitrust (Law), Competition Policy, European Union

Despite the growing sophistication of antitrust regimes around the world, export cartels benefit from special treatment: they are almost universally tolerated, if not encouraged in the countries of origin. Economists do not offer an unambiguous policy recommendation on how to deal with them in part due to the lack of empirical data. This article discusses arguments for and against export cartels and it identifies the existing gaps in the present regulatory framework. The theoretical part is followed by an analysis of the recent case law: a US cartel challenged with different outcomes in India and South Africa, as well as Chinese export cartels pursued in the USA. The Chinese cases are particularly topical as the conduct at stake, apart from being subject to private antitrust actions before US courts, was also challenged within the WTO dispute settlement framework, pointing out to the existing interface between trade and competition. While the recent developments prove that unaddressed issues tend not to vanish, the new South–North dimension has the potential of placing export cartels again on the international agenda. Pragmatic thinking suggests looking for the solution within the WTO framework.

- by Marek Martyniszyn
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- International Economics, Competition Law, Antitrust (Law), WTO law

En la reciente sentencia Kone, el TJUE ha abierto el debate sobre la admisibilidad en la aplicación privada del Derecho Europeo de la Competencia de las reclamaciones de los daños sufridos como consecuencia del efecto paraguas (umbrella effect). En concreto, se cuestiona si el derecho a la reparación de los daños sufridos que tienen las víctimas de un cártel es predicable también respecto de los clientes de una empresa ajena al cártel pero que ha decidido aumentar los precios de sus productos por encima del nivel normal en condiciones de competencia, aprovechando la distorsión en los precios que se ha producido como consecuencia del cártel. Reconocer estos derechos indemnizatorios supone admitir la posibilidad de reclamar daños aún en aquellos supuestos en que el perjudicado por la conducta contraria a la normativa antitrust no se encuentre relacionado directa ni indirectamente con las empresas infractoras. Desde una perspectiva jurídica se plantean importantes dudas sobre la oportunidad de su admisión y la dificultad de su demostración en procesos de aplicación privada del Derecho de la Competencia, especialmente por lo que respecta a la prueba de la relación de causalidad entre la conducta anticompetitiva y el daño sufrido. Ello no obstante, la sentencia Kone supone la reafirmación del efecto directo de las normas de Defensa de la Competencia; confirma, de nuevo, el carácter extracontractual de las acciones promovidas para la aplicación privada del Derecho de la Competencia y, finalmente, implica un paso más en la armonización de la aplicación de las normas de competencia por los órganos jurisdiccionales de los Estados miembros.

- by Diego Tallarico
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- Intellectual Property, Antitrust (Law), Trademarks, Copyright

The fragmentation of EU competition law enforcement in various institutions and legal provisions (Articles 101, 102 TFEU, merger control) have led to the development of ad hoc remedial action without this being backed up by a solid theory of competition law remedies. This study aims precisely to fill this gap by providing the first systematic theoretical analysis of competition law remedies in Europe, including conduct and structural remedies, voluntary and coercive remedies, in the areas of merger control and antitrust. The study challenges the optimal enforcement theory that seems to have provided so far the intellectual backbone of the remedial action of EU competition authorities, although this influence has not been exercised in a systematic and uniform way in all cases. Such theory does not provide an adequate understanding of the remedial discretion of competition authorities and consequently the necessary boundaries of such discretion. The study provides a novel analytical framework integrating both economic and legal principles, taking the view that although deterrence (and economic efficiency) constitutes an important objective of EU Competition law enforcement, this should be achieved in the context of established legal understandings of the concept of remedy. More specifically, the paper examines the impact of the economic approach on the linkage between the competition law wrong and remedies as the foundation for an economically inspired but still respectful to legal tradition concept of remedial discretion in EU Competition Law.

- by Ioannis Lianos
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- European Law, Competition Law, Antitrust (Law), Competition Policy

The present study focuses on the analysis of the anti-competitive incentives arising from the creation of structural and personal links between competitors. The study builds on the results of the economic theory, widely acknowledged by authorities and courts, to proceed with the analysis of the application of competition law. The exam of the legislation and of the interpretation given by courts and authorities over the years presents gaps and inconsistencies motivating the renewed interest by the legislator, both at the national and EU level.

- by Gian Diego Pini
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- European Studies, Law, European Law, Competition Law

ABSTRACT: The Antitrust is essential to
generate conditions of legal certainty that
promote efficient markets, and conditions
of social and economic development in a
country. Mexico has a legal system to
monitor the process of competition, which
so far only has been expanded its power to
traditional markets. This paper aims to
make known whether the current legal
system in Mexico to protect the
competitive process in the physical
markets, is applicable to protect the
competitive process that arise in the ecommerce
markets and limit the
anticompetitive actions of the economics
agents that in this markets converge.

- by Andrés Palacios Lleras and +1
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- Antitrust, Competition Law, Derecho de la Competencia, Teoría Crítica, TEORIA JURIDICA

El trabajo aborda la implantación del sistema de las cuotas lácteas en Europa y en España y el alcance de su extinción para los ganadores. Para ello, se presentan los rasgos más característicos del mercado mundial de lácteos y la incidencia que ha tenido la Política Agraria Común (PAC), y sus continuas reformas, en el sector. Se exponen las posturas de las diferentes instituciones comunitarias y se detallan los desafíos y oportunidades que presenta el sector tras el final de las cuotas lácteas el pasado 31
marzo de 2015. Finaliza con una batería de propuestas y conclusiones.

El autor examina los problemas de la aplicación de multas por el Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, en cuanto puedan afectar a los órganos de la Administración del Estado y propone una posible interpretación a la luz del derecho... more

The study examines the topic of competition law remedies from a theoretical perspective. I consider that there is a risk in providing full discretion to competition authorities to adopt remedies that have a remote link to the scope of the antitrust liability identified. One should not separate questions of remedy from questions of liability as proponents of “discretionary remedialism” often do. The study attempts to integrate the issue of discretionary remedialism and the distinction between the liability and the remedial phases to the broader question of the relation between efficiency, distributive justice, on the one hand, and corrective justice on the other. I then explore the objectives pursued by competition law remedies, in order to show that a coherent theory of competition law remedies is incompatible with a sharp dichotomy between liability and remedy questions. I argue that the emergence of a remedial proportionality test in EU competition law demonstrates the necessary logical connection between the remedy and the liability phase. I conclude by exploring if, and how, the remedial proportionality test will operate in the context of an “effects-based approach” , in the context of Article 102 TFEU.

El mercado no es un fenómeno del todo espontáneo. Necesita que el Derecho establezca condiciones mínimas para que opere el intercambio de bienes y servicios: la garantía de la propiedad y de los contratos, la sanción del fraude y de la mala fe, la fundamentación del justo precio y la tutela judicial de los derechos sociales y económicos.
El mercado debe existir en función de la economía (eficiente y justa) y no al revés. A partir de este presupuesto, la libre competencia ha de existir en función del mercado. Sin embargo, no siempre este modelo asegura el correcto uso de la economía.
El artículo estudia el problema desde dos ángulos complementarios: la filosofía económica y el derecho de la libre competencia.

Latest draft - Ultima bozza

- by Gian Diego Pini
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- European Law, Competition Law, Antitrust (Law), Competition Policy

El presente artículo procura llevar a cabo una aproximación preliminar al vínculo existente entre las ciencias jurídicas y las ciencias económicas. Partiendo de la compilación normativa, explora la incidencia que tiene el comportamiento del mercado y sus agentes en la producción de normas, y a su vez, cómo la regulación desde el ámbito del derecho establece límites a la
actuación de los agentes económicos.