Extended Cognition Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Offering a radical re-evaluation of current approaches to performer training, this is a text that equips readers with a set of new ways of thinking about and ultimately 'doing' training. Stemming from his extensive practice and... more

Offering a radical re-evaluation of current approaches to performer training, this is a text that equips readers with a set of new ways of thinking about and ultimately 'doing' training. Stemming from his extensive practice and incorporating a review of prevailing methods and theories, Frank Camilleri focuses on how material circumstances shape and affect processes of training, devising, rehearsing and performing. Frank Camilleri puts forward the 'post-psychophysical' as a more extended form of psychophysical discussion and practice that emerged and dominated in the 20th century. The 'post-psychophysical' updates the concept of an integrated bodymind in various ways, such as the notion of a performer's bodyworld that incorporates technology and the material world. Offering invaluable introductions to a wide range of theories around which the book is structured-including postphenomenological, sociomaterial, affect and situated cognition-this volume provides readers with an enticing array of approaches to training and creative processes.

This book argues that thinking is bounded by neither the brain nor the skin of an organism. Cognitive systems function through integration of neural and bodily functions with the functions of representational vehicles. The integrationist... more

This book argues that thinking is bounded by neither the brain nor the skin of an organism. Cognitive systems function through integration of neural and bodily functions with the functions of representational vehicles. The integrationist position offers a fresh contribution to the emerging embodied and embedded approach to the study of mind.

Our world has changed radically over the last decades. Almost every domain of our lives is affected by these disruptions in technology, in our economy, culture, education, as well as social lives. We are living in an environment that is... more

Internalist approaches to epistemic justification are, though controversial, considered a live option in contemporary epistemology. Accordingly, if ‘active’ externalist approaches in the philosophy of mind—e.g. the extended cognition and... more

Internalist approaches to epistemic justification are, though controversial, considered a live option in contemporary epistemology. Accordingly, if ‘active’ externalist approaches in the philosophy of mind—e.g. the extended cognition and extended mind theses—are in principle incompatible with internalist approaches to justification in epistemology, then this will be an epistemological strike against, at least the prima facie appeal of, active externalism. It is shown here however that, contrary to pretheoretical intuitions, neither the extended cognition nor the extended mind theses are in principle incompatible with two prominent versions of epistemic internalism—viz., accessibilism and mentalism. In fact, one possible diagnosis is that pretheoretical intuitions regarding the incompatibility of active externalism with epistemic internalism are symptomatic of a tacit yet incorrect identification of epistemic internalism with epistemic individualism. Thus, active externalism is not in principle incompatible with epistemic internalism per se and does not (despite initial appearances to the contrary) significantly restrict one’s options in epistemology.

What does it take to convert the deliverances of an extended cognitive process into knowledge (i.e., extended knowledge)? This question is explored in the context of a particular way of understanding knowledge, known as anti-luck virtue... more

What does it take to convert the deliverances of an extended cognitive process into knowledge (i.e., extended knowledge)? This question is explored in the context of a particular way of understanding knowledge, known as anti-luck virtue epistemology. It is argued that what is key to extended cognitive processes is how they are cognitively integrated within the cognitive character of the agent. With this point in mind, anti-luck virtue epistemology is shown to be comfortably able to accommodate cases of extended knowledge. Moreover, it is also explained that such a theory of knowledge can allow for a relatively broad range of instances of extended knowledge, including cases that do not essentially involve the manifestation of intellectual virtue, and cases that involve positive epistemic dependence. Finally, it is argued that while the threshold for extended knowledge may be relatively low, this should not preclude us from generally preferring an extended knowledge that involves an epistemic standing that extends far above that threshold.

Personal AI assistants are now nearly ubiquitous. Every leading smartphone operating system comes with a personal AI assistant that promises to help you with basic cognitive tasks: searching, planning, messaging, scheduling and so on.... more

Personal AI assistants are now nearly ubiquitous. Every leading smartphone operating system comes with a personal AI assistant that promises to help you with basic cognitive tasks: searching, planning, messaging, scheduling and so on. Usage of such devices is effectively a form of algorithmic outsourcing: getting a smart algorithm to do something on your behalf. Many have expressed concerns about this algorithmic outsourcing. They claim that it is dehumanising, leads to cognitive degeneration, and robs us of our freedom and autonomy. Some people have a more subtle view, arguing that it is problematic in those cases where its use may degrade important interpersonal virtues. In this article, I assess these objections to the use of AI assistants. I will argue that the ethics of their use is complex. There are no quick fixes or knockdown objections to the practice, but there are some legitimate concerns. By carefully analysing and evaluating the objections that have been lodged to date, we can begin to articulate an ethics of personal AI use that navigates those concerns. In the process, we can locate some paradoxes in our thinking about outsourcing and technological dependence, and we can think more clearly about what it means to live a good life in the age of smart machines.

In Reading in the Brain, Stanislas Dehaene presents a compelling account of how the brain learns to read. Central to this account is his neuronal recycling hypothesis: neural circuitry is capable of being ‘recycled’ or converted to a... more

In Reading in the Brain, Stanislas Dehaene presents a compelling account of how the brain learns to read. Central to this account is his neuronal recycling hypothesis: neural circuitry is capable of being ‘recycled’ or converted to a different function that is cultural in nature. The original function of the circuitry is not entirely lost and
constrains what the brain can learn. It is argued that the neural niche co-evolves with the environmental niche in a way that does not undermine the core ideas of neuronal recycling, but which is quite different from the models of cognitive and cultural evolution
provided by evolutionary psychology and epidemiology. Dehaene contrasts neuronal recycling with a naïve model of the brain as a general learning device that is unconstrained in what it can learn. Consequently a tension develops in Dehaene’s account of the role of plasticity in the acquisition of language. It is argued that the functional and structural changes in the brain that Dehaene documents in great detail are driven by learning and that this learning-driven plasticity does not commit us to a naïve model of the brain.

In this post I discuss the procedural narratives of visual artists with aphantasia, ‘a condition of reduced or absent voluntary imagery’ (Zeman et al 2015, p1). With the aim of finding out how aphantasia informs the individual’s creative... more

In this post I discuss the procedural narratives of visual artists with aphantasia, ‘a condition of reduced or absent voluntary imagery’ (Zeman et al 2015, p1). With the aim of finding out how aphantasia informs the individual’s creative process, I focus on a claim that appears several times in the narratives: that the pictures the artists make stand in for or somehow supplant the mental imagery they lack. I explore what could be meant by this, suggest an answer, then conclude by looking at how the answer might square with aphantasia being specifically a deficit of voluntary imagery. The post is a sketch for a more comprehensive qualitative study.

Defenderé que la tesis de la mente extendida no es un argumento a favor de la posibilidad del transhumanismo. Si la tesis es cierta, el que nuestra mente se extienda en el mundo no es algo que se da exclusivamente por las nuevas... more

Defenderé que la tesis de la mente extendida no es un argumento a favor de la posibilidad del transhumanismo. Si la tesis es cierta, el que nuestra mente se extienda en el mundo no es algo que se da exclusivamente por las nuevas tecnologías, sino que es una característica que poseemos desde hace miles de años. La inscripción de signos en las cavernas sólo difiere en grado de los implantes tecnológicos de un cyborg. Argumentaré lo anterior mostrando que, aunque los cyborgs pueden obtener cierta información que un cuerpo humano normal puede no tener, esta diferencia no es cualitativa. El qualia de la experiencia humana tendría que variar radicalmente para que sea posible afirmar que el cyborg es algo distinto y superior. En últimas, quizás los seres humanos siempre hemos sido cyborgs.

Memory is a hybrid process involving both internal cognitive activity as well as the recruitment of external resources. Despite the dominance of debates concerning the metaphysical nature of external resources and structures of memory,... more

Memory is a hybrid process involving both internal cognitive activity as well as the recruitment of external resources. Despite the dominance of debates concerning the metaphysical nature of external resources and structures of memory, recent research has moved onto understanding the implications of computer technology use, within the framework of cognitive extension. A recent attempt by Sparrow, Liu and Wegner (2011) was made to extend a group memory theory known as ‘Transactive Memory Systems’ (Wegner, 1986) to incorporate technology use, the authors claiming that computers now constitute as a transactive source or partner. The basis of this claim arose from findings from computer tasks that suggested that there appeared to be a preference for remembering where information was saved, rather than remembering the content of the information itself. Using a different experimental paradigm, the present study sought to substantiate the findings presented by Sparrow and colleagues (2011) and investigates the validity of the theory extension. The findings of the present study did not provide support for the theory extension and further theoretical and practical implications of human reliance on technology as an external memory source are examined.

In a recent and provocative paper, Matthew Fisher, Mariel Goddu, and Frank Keil (2015) have argued, on the basis of experimental evidence, that 'searching the Internet leads people to conflate information that can be found online with... more

In a recent and provocative paper, Matthew Fisher, Mariel Goddu, and Frank Keil (2015) have argued, on the basis of experimental evidence, that 'searching the Internet leads people to conflate information that can be found online with knowledge " in the head " ' (2015, 675), specifically, by inclining us to conflate mere access to information for personal knowledge (2015, 674). This paper has three central aims. First, we briefly detail Fisher et al.'s results and show how, on the basis of recent work in virtue epistemology (e.g., Tiberius and Walker 1998; Roberts and Wood 2007; Tanesini 2016), their interpretation of the data supports the thesis that searching the Internet is conducive to the vice of intellectual arrogance. Second, we argue that this arrogance interpretation of the data rests on an implicit commitment to cognitive internalism. Thirdly, we show how the data can be given a very different explanation in light of the hypothesis of extended cognition (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008)—one which challenges the extent to which Fisher et al. are entitled to insist that subjects are actually conflating access to knowledge for personal knowledge in the first place. We conclude by suggesting how, against the background of extended cognition rather than cognitive internalism, we have some reason to think that searching the Internet might actually foster (in certain circumstances) virtuous intellectual humility.

This chapter addresses the nature and role of emotion regulation in grief. Human emotion regulation often involves processes that are interpersonal and social in structure. Given this, the death of a particular person can deprive us of... more

This chapter addresses the nature and role of emotion regulation in grief. Human emotion regulation often involves processes that are interpersonal and social in structure. Given this, the death of a particular person can deprive us of regulatory resources that we would otherwise draw upon in responding to upheaval. A distinctive sense of disorientation and uncertainty therefore arises. The course of grief then depends, to a substantial degree, on how one's emotions, thoughts, and activities continue to be shaped by relations with other people, as well as by wider social and cultural environments. To illustrate these points, we conclude by reflecting on how social restrictions imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic may have affected people's experiences of grief.

First, we provide a theoretical background to the volume's topic, extended epistemology, by outlining briefly its cross-disciplinary theoretical lineage and some key themes. In particular, it is shown how and why the emergence of recent... more

First, we provide a theoretical background to the volume's topic, extended epistemology, by outlining briefly its cross-disciplinary theoretical lineage and some key themes. In particular, it is shown how and why the emergence of recent and more egalitarian thinking about the nature of human cognizing and its bounds has important and interesting ramifications in epistemology. Second, we provide an overview of the papers included in the volume. The 16 contributions are divided (broadly) into two categories: those which engage with foundational issues to do with extended epistemology, and those which pursue applications of extended epistemology to new areas of research.

Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice advances a view of social reproduction as a cognitive phenomenon, predicated upon acts of acknowledgment--primarily embodied and unconscious ones--among a diversity of social agents. Accordingly... more

Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice advances a view of social reproduction as a cognitive phenomenon, predicated upon acts of acknowledgment--primarily embodied and unconscious ones--among a diversity of social agents. Accordingly Bourdieu would appear to have much to offer to debates about the nature of knowledge and mind. Given his tendency to address these matters only obliquely, however, as corollaries to his more prominent sociological concerns, it is not surprising that the bearing of his work on questions of the cognitive has gone relatively unexplored. Our aim is to contribute to the greater appreciation of Bourdieu’s work within debates on embodied, extended and distributed cognition, in particular concerning cognitive externalism in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and its recent uptake within epistemology. We argue that the concepts that form Bourdieu’s central dyad, habitus and field, are remarkably consonant with externalist views: habitus as a form of knowledge that is not only embodied but fundamentally environment-dependent, and field as a distributed network of cognitively active positions that serves not only as a repository of social knowledge but also as an external template for individual schemes of perception and action. Our goal is not so much to “prove” that Bourdieu’s concepts fit the bill of what now travels under the banner of externalism, but to promote Bourdieu’s own theoretical apparatus as a way of refining and advancing externalist accounts of culture and society, two areas that are significantly underexplored within mainstream analytic debates.

An Open Access anthology edited by Matteo Pasquinelli forthcoming (Fall 2015) for Meson Press, Leuphana University Lüneburg. With texts by Benjamin Bratton, Orit Halpern, Adrian Lahoud, Jon Lindblom, Catherine Malabou, Reza Negarestani,... more

An Open Access anthology edited by Matteo Pasquinelli forthcoming (Fall 2015) for Meson Press, Leuphana University Lüneburg. With texts by Benjamin Bratton, Orit Halpern, Adrian Lahoud, Jon Lindblom, Catherine Malabou, Reza Negarestani, Luciana Parisi, Ana Teixeira Pinto, Michael Wheeler, Charles Wolfe and Ben Woodard. Dutch edition forthcoming for Leesmagaziijn, Amsterdam.

Reprint of Doctoral Thesis/Dissertation, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2013

The first part of the book delineates the recent emergence of characteristic psychopathologies of cognitive capitalism, which have resulted from the unique concatenation of socialpolitical- psychological-economic relations that have... more

The first part of the book delineates the recent emergence
of characteristic psychopathologies of cognitive capitalism,
which have resulted from the unique concatenation of socialpolitical-
psychological-economic relations that have produced
distinct stresses and forms of derangement upon the factory
of the brain. This leads to the second stream, referred to as
“the cognitive turn” in cognitive capitalism. For example, as
a result of the necessity for an efficient brain-mind to labor
in the advanced and constantly accelerating conditions of
the knowledge economy highly sophisticated and nuanced
forms of attention have become compulsory well beyond what
was considered essential in the older regimes of the modern.
As such new dispositifs of normalization and governmentalization
have arisen to, on the one hand, diffuse the attention
necessary for multi-tasking, and on the other, to enhance the
production of a hyper-attention. It is upon these and other
similar conditions that this book concentrates. It calls for the
identification of the causative factors of these psychopathologies
as well as attempting to invent the counter conditions with
which to thwart their emergence. Contributors include Ina Blom, Arne De Boever, Pascal Gielen, Sanford Kwinter, Maurizio Lazzarato, Karl Lyden, Yann Moulier Boutang, Matteo Pasquinelli, Alexie Penzin, Patricia Reed, John Roberts, Liss C. Werner, Charles T. Wolfe

As portrayed in Andy Clark’s extended mind thesis (EMT), human minds are inherently disposed to expand their reach outwards, incorporating and feeding off an open-ended variety of tools and scaffolds to satisfy their hunger for cognitive... more

As portrayed in Andy Clark’s extended mind thesis (EMT), human minds are inherently disposed to expand their reach outwards, incorporating and feeding off an open-ended variety of tools and scaffolds to satisfy their hunger for cognitive expansion. According to Steve Fuller’s heterodox Christian vision of transhumanism, humans are deities in the making, destined to redeem their fallen state with the help of modern science and technology. In this chapter, I re-examine Clark’s EMT through the prism of Fuller’s transhumanism, with the aim of unearthing a subterranean influence of theological tropes that are sweeping along beneath the naturalistic veneer of Clark’s thesis. Starting from four theological principles, which Fuller regards as foundational to his version of transhumanism, I review the philosophical narrative which, in Fuller’s view, provides the best philosophical motivation for the contemporary transhumanist project. On the basis of my reconstruction, I show how distant intellectual offshoots of the same principles mobilized by Fuller are also at play in Clark’s EMT – dressed up in secular garb, for sure, and in a materialistically inflected form, yet with a recognizably transhumanist bent. Undertaking this “archeology” of the EMT takes us surprisingly deep into the history of Western thought – to a point where Clark’s evocative “natural-born cyborg” image of humanity, with its emphasis on the radical openness of human nature to transcend itself, comes into view as a subtly blended continuation of certain historically consequential articulations of the Christian doctrine that humans are born “in the image and likeness” of God (imago dei).

“Posthuman” has become an umbrella term to refer to a variety of different movements and schools of thought, including philosophical, cultural, and critical posthumanism; transhumanism (in its variations of extropianism, liberal and... more

“Posthuman” has become an umbrella term to refer to a variety of different movements and schools of thought, including philosophical, cultural, and critical posthumanism; transhumanism (in its variations of extropianism, liberal and democratic transhumanism, among others); the feminist approach of new materialisms; and the heterogeneous landscape of antihumanism, metahumanism, metahumanities, and posthumanities. The struggle over the meaning of “posthuman” can be seen as a way of coping with an urgency for the integral redefinition of the notion of the human, following the onto-epistemological as well as scientific and bio-technological developments of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

With the rise of the Internet, skills, patterns, and ideas are being shared more widely among people engaged in the crafts, which seems to break with some of the underlying assumptions about the lone genius craftsman. Much discourse... more

With the rise of the Internet, skills, patterns, and ideas are being shared more widely among people engaged in the crafts, which seems to break with some of the underlying assumptions about the lone genius craftsman. Much discourse about craft has been focused on the hands of the artisan, or the " tacit " knowledge used by the maker, but as crafters collaborate in a larger extent some other perspectives could be of use, especially since the surrounding environment seems to take a more active involvement in the production than the mere maker. Increasing Internet prevalence has made this even more obvious, as do-it-yourself instruction and the sharing of skills are abundant in craft forums online, blurring the borders between influences, makers, and situated modes of production. This article examines some concepts and metaphors by which some of the potentials of craft collaborations could be understood. Combining theories of cognition from super-organisms like ant colonies and their " bodyhood " with the " capabilities approach " of Amartya Sen and the concept of educational sloyd, the text builds an associative framework for a perspective on how collaborations actualize new craft capabilities. In conclusion, the article proposes a wider understanding of do-it-yourself activities as a shared endeavor toward

The cross-disciplinary framework of Material Engagement Theory (MET) has emerged as a novel research program that flexibly spans archeology, anthropology, philosophy, and cognitive science. True to its slogan to 'take material culture... more

The cross-disciplinary framework of Material Engagement Theory (MET) has emerged as a novel research program that flexibly spans archeology, anthropology, philosophy, and cognitive science. True to its slogan to 'take material culture seriously', " MET wants to change our understanding of what minds are and what they are made of by changing what we know about what things are and what they do for the mind " (Malafouris 2013, 141). By tracing out more clearly the conceptual contours of 'material engagement,' and firming up its ontological commitments, the main goal of this article is to help refine Malafouris' fertile approach. In particular, we argue for a rapprochement between MET and the tradition of Cultural-Historical Activity Theory, based on the 'Vygotskian' hypothesis of scaffolded and/or distributed cognition.

Musical Sense-Making: Enaction, Experience, and Computation broadens the scope of musical sense-making from a disembodied cognitivist approach to an experiential approach. Revolving around the definition of music as a temporal and... more

Musical Sense-Making: Enaction, Experience, and Computation broadens the scope of musical sense-making from a disembodied cognitivist approach to an experiential approach. Revolving around the definition of music as a temporal and sounding art, it argues for an interactional and experiential approach that brings together the richness of sensory experience and principles of cognitive economy. Starting from the major distinction between in-time and outside-of-time processing of the sounds, this volume provides a conceptual and operational framework for dealing with sounds in a real-time listening situation , relying heavily on the theoretical groundings of ecology, cybernetics, and systems theory, and stressing the role of epistemic interactions with the sounds. These interactions are considered from different perspectives, bringing together insights from previous theoretical groundings and more recent empirical research. The author's findings are framed within the context of the broader field of enactive and embodied cognition, recent action and perception studies, and the emerging field of neurophenomenology and dynamical systems theory. This volume will particularly appeal to scholars and researchers interested in the intersection between music, philosophy, and/or psychology.

Complex systems like literacy and numeracy emerge through multigenerational interactions of brains, behaviors, and material forms. In such systems, material forms – writing for language and notations for numbers – become increasingly... more

Complex systems like literacy and numeracy emerge through multigenerational interactions of brains, behaviors, and material forms. In such systems, material forms – writing for language and notations for numbers – become increasingly refined to elicit specific behavioral and psychological responses in newly indoctrinated individuals. These material forms, however, differ fundamentally in things like semiotic function: language signifies, while numbers instantiate. This makes writing for language able to represent the meanings and sounds of particular languages, while notations for numbers are semantically meaningful without phonetic specification. This representational distinction is associated with neurofunctional and behavioral differences in what neural activity and behaviors like handwriting contribute to literacy and numeracy. In turn, neurofunctional and behavioral differences place written representations for language and numbers under different pressures that influence the forms they take and how those forms change over time as they are transmitted across languages and cultures.

Recent philosophy of mind has seen an increase of interest in theories of intentionality in offering a functional account of mental states. The standard intentionalist view holds that mental states can be exhaustively accounted for in... more

Recent philosophy of mind has seen an increase of interest in theories of intentionality in offering a functional account of mental states. The standard intentionalist view holds that mental states can be exhaustively accounted for in terms of their representational contents. An alternative view proposed by Tim Crane, called impure intentionalism, specifies mental states in terms of intentional content, mode, and object. This view is also suggested to hold for states of sensory awareness. This paper primarily develops an alternative to the impure intentionalist account of states of sensory awareness. On the basis of Husserl's phenomenological work, I argue that a focus on intentionality at the level of sensory awareness is phenomenologically implausible. The final part offers an alternative functional account of sensory awareness based on what Husserl called 'immanent association'.

A three-tiered account of social cognition is set out-along with the corresponding variety of social knowledge that results from this social cognition-and applied to the special case of scientific collaboration. The first tier is... more

A three-tiered account of social cognition is set out-along with the corresponding variety of social knowledge that results from this social cognition-and applied to the special case of scientific collaboration. The first tier is socially-facilitated cognition, which results in socially-facilitated knowledge. This is a form of cognition which, while genuinely social (in that social factors play an important explanatory role in producing the target cognitive success), falls short of socially extended cognition. The second tier is socially extended cognition, which generates socially extended knowledge. This form of cognition is social in the specific sense of the information-processing of other agents forms part of the socially extended cognitive process at issue. It is argued, however, that the core notion of socially extended cognition is individual in nature, in that the target cognitive success is significantly creditable to the socially extended cognitive agency of the individual. Socially extended cognition, in its core sense, thus generates individual knowledge. Finally, there is distributed cognition, which generates distributed knowledge. This is where the cognitive successes produced by a research team are attributable to a group agent rather than to individuals within the team. Accordingly, where this form of social cognition generates knowledge (distributed knowledge), the knowledge is irreducibly group knowledge. It is argued that by making clear this threetiered structure of social scientific knowledge a prima facie challenge is posed for defenders of distributed scientific cognition and knowledge to explain why this form of social knowledge is being exhibited and not one of the two weaker (and metaphysically less demanding) forms of social knowledge.

We present an empirically supported theoretical and methodological framework for quantifying the system-level properties of person-plus-tool interactions in order to answer the question: "Are personplus-tool-systems extended cognitive... more

We present an empirically supported theoretical and methodological framework for quantifying the system-level properties of person-plus-tool interactions in order to answer the question: "Are personplus-tool-systems extended cognitive systems?" Nineteen participants provided perceptual judgments regarding their ability to pass through apertures of various widths while using visual information, blindfolded wielding a rod, or blindfolded wielding an Enactive Torch-a vibrotactile sensory-substitution device for detecting distance. Monofractal, multifractal, and recurrence quantification analyses were conducted to assess features of person-plus-tool movement dynamics. Trials where people utilized the rod or Enactive Torch demonstrated stable "self-similarity," or indices of healthy and adaptive single systems, regardless of aperture width, trial order, features of the participants' judgments, and participant characteristics. Enactive Torch trials exhibited a somewhat greater range of dynamic fluctuations than the rod trials, as well as less movement recurrence, suggesting that the Enactive Torch allowed for more exploratory movements. Findings provide support for the notion that person-plus-tool systems can be classified as extended cognitive systems and a framework for quantifying system-level properties of these systems. Implications concerning future research on extended cognition are discussed.

AI and face recognition were used to source digital traces of Rembrandt’s sensibilities and techniques hitherto locked in his paintings in order to realize a new work the master neither contemplated nor ever saw (Fig. 1). This text,... more

AI and face recognition were used to source digital traces of Rembrandt’s sensibilities and techniques hitherto locked in his paintings in order to realize a new work the master neither contemplated nor ever saw (Fig. 1). This text, proposes structurally coupling the mechanics of The Next Rembrandt’s AI and face recognition with another artificial intelligence — AlphaZero — to contemplate face recognition, AI, and machine learning as steps toward artificial consciousness. The ensuing coupling (metaphorical marriage) creates a dialectical unity underpinning living technology and non-invasive surveillance as consistent with Autopoiesis and Cognition. That theoretical coupling bridges biological intelligence and phenomenal sensibilities as entangled harbingers of human-built intelligent machines occupying the category of biological extended phenotypes.
To jump-start a dialectic examining machine intelligence and artificial sensibility I reformulate elements of Hal Foster’s 2018 critique examining Trevor Paglen’s environmental art. The reformulation begins in a discussion of machine proliferation and surveillance. I then contrast Foster’s position on the spectacle of surveillance with AI and face recognition in The Next Rembrandt. To do so, I cite some of Paglen’s views on surveillance Foster uses to anchor his own suggestion to revise the “standard critique that contemporary society is swamped by spectacle, by images directed at us.” Here then is a grounding for the polarity — good AI / bad AI. I use the resulting dialectical friction to reorient debate where, “The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather, it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images” as the Situationist Manifesto emphasized.
Foster writes of machines that make images for other machines as post-spectacle artifacts proliferating in the age of surveillance, AI, and face recognition (I agree). However, existing critique paradigms based in that post-spectacle, do not account for Facebooklike or Amazonlike pernicious surveillance pushing the critique to the verge of irrelevance. Ironically, the society of the spectacle’s former ubiquity might be reinvigorated if inverted to confront images looked at — analyzed — by machines for machines — if that deployment turned, for example toward the eradication of airborne/waterborne toxins or toward environmental bioremediation.
As a self-appointed matchmaker, I present The Next Rembrandt and AlphaZero as generators for environmental and climate remediation duties long ago underwritten by Alan Turing’s theories of thinking machines, AI, and algorithmic plant simulations. In sum, I consider fledging concepts of artificial sensibility and consciousness as emergent components of ALife in which facial recognition and AI self-learning are products of collective human endeavors, reformulated as ecological analysts and actuators.

Proponents of the “literacy” thesis share with proponents of the “extended mind” thesis the viewpoint that communication systems such as language or writing have cognitive implications that go beyond their purely social and communicative... more

Proponents of the “literacy” thesis share with proponents of the “extended mind” thesis the viewpoint that communication systems such as language or writing have cognitive implications that go beyond their purely social and communicative purposes. Conceiving of media as extensions of the mind thus has the potential to bring together and cross-fertilize research programs that are currently placed in distant corners of the study of mind, language, and society. In this issue, we bring together authors with a diverse set of interests to identify promising areas of overlap, blaze new trails for us to explore, but also to highlight dissonances and challenges that will have to be addressed in future work.

This essay offers commentary on my translation of Moysés Pinto Neto's "Outisde Ourselves: Derrida, Stiegler, and Extended Cognitive Systems". Neto's work can be thematized according to the notion of exteriorization of cognitive,... more

This essay offers commentary on my translation of Moysés Pinto Neto's "Outisde Ourselves: Derrida, Stiegler, and Extended Cognitive Systems". Neto's work can be thematized according to the notion of exteriorization of cognitive, subjective, and linguistic features of human organisms. Exteriorization can only be adequately conceptualized as identical to its inverse, incorporation, whereby techniques and media become part of human cognition, subjectivity, and languaging behavior. The situation of a biological human can therefore be understood in terms of human-medium interfaces at which we transform ourselves cognitively and biologically by acting on the structure of our social and technical worlds. This theoretical ground has the potential to become a field of research in which the cognitive sciences, media studies, and various other social and human investigative pursuits can be regarded as not only contiguous but directly comparable and capable of cooperative effort.

Extended and distributed cognition theories argue that human cognitive systems sometimes include non-biological objects. On these views, the physical supervenience base of cognitive systems is thus not the biological brain or even the... more

Extended and distributed cognition theories argue that human cognitive systems sometimes include non-biological objects. On these views, the physical supervenience base of cognitive systems is thus not the biological brain or even the embodied organism, but an organism-plus-artifacts. In this paper, we provide a novel account of the implications of these views for learning, education, and assessment. We start by conceptualising how we learn to assemble extended cognitive systems by internalising cultural norms and practices. Having a better grip on how extended cognitive systems are assembled, we focus on the question: If our cognition extends, how should we educate and assess such extended cognitive systems? We suggest various ways to minimize possible negative effects of extending one's cognition and to efficiently find and organise (online) information by adopting a virtue epistemology approach. Educational and assessment implications are foregrounded, particularly in the case of Danish students' use of the Internet during exams.