H.L.A. Hart Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

- by
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- Distributive Justice, Theories of Justice, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin
- by Orlando Luiz Zanon Junior
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- Legal positivism, Ronald Dworkin, Legal Philosophy, Hans Kelsen

O trabalho pretende apresentar os principais aspectos da obra “O Conceito de Direito” de H. L. A. Hart e analisar sua importância para o Direito Internacional. Expõe sinteticamente os métodos analíticos e o projeto explicativo do autor, tal como sua concepção de um caso central da expressão “direito” como a união de regras primárias e secundárias fundamentado em uma regra de reconhecimento. Analisa o Direito Internacional com base nesse caso central e as críticas do autor à necessidade de uma norma fundamental internacional e às teorias voluntaristas como fundamentos da ordem internacional.

Este artículo presenta, en una primera parte, las dos principales y más conocidas teorías que recurren al modelo que en general puede denominarse de la norma básica: la de Hans kelsen sobre la norma fundamental y la de H. L. A. Hart sobre la regla de reconocimiento. Después de esta rápida presentación, una segunda parte está consagrada a desarrollar algunas observaciones criticas que es posible plantear frente a los argumentos y consideraciones de tales teorías.

- by Andrés Abel Rodríguez Villabona
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- Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, Sistemas Juridicos, Validez

This article aims to reconstruct and theorise the autonomy of the European Union (EU) legal system by drawing on Hartian legal theory. It comprises four claims. First, the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) 'foundational case law' on autonomy-and direct effect and supremacy as its corollaries-is conceptualised as a second-order thesis about the genus to which EU law belongs (the 'autonomy thesis'). Second, the ECJ's reliance on the full effectiveness of EU law as a justification for the autonomy thesis alludes to the deep connection between legality and effectiveness, but this connection cannot rationally explain the normativity of the autonomy thesis as an internal statement of law. Third, in order to provide such an explanation, the autonomy thesis is reconceptualised as an 'internal recognitional statement' by which the ECJ asserts a normative formulation of an autonomous EU rule of recognition. Fourth, within this Hartian analysis of the EU legal system, the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy lack self-standing analytical value. This article finishes with some very preliminary observations on a well-known objection against the autonomy of EU law based on the attitudes and perspectivism of national courts. two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. The usual disclaimer applies.

RESUMO: As afirmativas tais como: os juízes decidem segundo as suas íntimas convicções morais e políticas, usando as regras apenas para uma justificativa posterior ou secundária; ou, para conhecer profundamente o Direito deve-se ab initio saber como os juízes decidem e não o que as regras estabelecem, ou que o Direito é parcialmente determinado, são algumas das proposições que erroneamente são tomadas por muitos estudiosos que fazem uma leitura completamente desastrada e precipitada acerca da obra O Conceito de Direito do filósofo Herbert L. A. Hart. O presente estudo se propõe a elucidar e expor a leitura correta, precisamente no que tange o entendimento acerca da unidade lógica entre legislação e precedente num contexto de aplicação de regras.

- by Roberta Maciel da Costa
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- Ronald Dworkin, H.L.A. Hart, Teoria do Direito, Filosofía

RESUMO Este artigo apresenta reflexões sobre a margem das investigações que Hart realiza a partir da hipótese de que a textura aberta deve ser caracterizada por uma zona de penumbra onde as regras primárias e secundárias estão si-tuadas. Segundo o autor, o espaço do discurso não é preenchido exclusiva-mente pela legalidade advinda do próprio universo jurídico. O presente arti-go tem por objetivo problematizar regras que são conduzidas para além da-quilo que seria o interesse delas, aqui pensada como um elemento aberto cuja validade está empenhada, por um lado, com a estrutura estatal e, por outro, com o papel legislativo exercido pelos Tribunais. Os resultados reto-mam a importância de um esforço filosófico desenvolvido por Hart que con-siste em mostrar os pontos obscuros da linguagem antecedentes da aplicação da própria regra. A semântica, neste caso, não representa apenas um mo-mento dialógico entre o fato e o significado, mas a própria condição que subjaz ao exercício do trabalho jurídico e filosófico. Palavras-chave: Textura aberta. Regras. Hart. Wittgenstein. ABSTRACT This article presents reflections on the margin of the investigations that Hart conducts based on the hypothesis that the open texture must be characterized by a penumbra zone where the primary and secondary rules are located. According to the author, the discourse space is not filled exclusively by the legality that comes from the legal universe itself. The present article aims to problematize rules that are conducted beyond what would be in the interest of the same, here considered as an open element whose validity is committed , on the one hand, with the state structure and, on the other hand, with the legislative role exercised by the Courts. The results return to the importance of a philosophical effort developed by Hart, which consists of showing the

- by Léo Peruzzo and +1
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- Philosophy Of Language, International Law, Philosophy Of Law, Vagueness

This book analyzes the cases of influence of morals over legal validity described as the only form of existence of legal provisions. The validity of law has multi-level nature: we can analyze the validity of the legal system, legal norm and individual rule of conduct. I offer to the reader my opinion about the concept of morality, genesis and definition of legal positivism. I analyze the theories of the most influential positivists (Kelsen, Hart, Raz, Coleman, Marmor) and antipositivists (Radbruch, Finnis, Fuller, Dworkin, Alexy) of the past century.
A key point of my statement is the analysis of the inclusive-exclusive debate concerning the possibility of a moral criteria of legal validity. In the final chapters I draw the conclusion, that neither the exclusive, nor the inclusive model of decision over hard cases through moral reasoning is convincing enough. I propose my own model for explaining the so called “hard cases”. It is not based on the validity of the legal norm, but on the validity of the legal principles, applied to the case by a judge, who is using judicial discretion. I defend the idea, that legal principles have their own “open texture” (in the meaning, used by Hart) and are applied with reference to the specific moral context of the concrete society.

- by Simeon Groysman
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- Legal Theory, Philosophy Of Law, Morality (Social Psychology), Legal positivism

This article analyzes the shifting concepts of law in Western law and thought in early modern times and today. It first shows how the modern movement of interdisciplinary legal studies emerged as a corrective to the narrow positivist concepts of law that prevailed before the 1960s. It then shows how, in anticipation of modern methods, earlier Protestant legal thinkers had already worked hard to reconcile biblical and human laws, natural and positive laws, canon and civil laws, cases and legal codes in pursuit of a more integrated jurisprudence.

- by John Witte, Jr.
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- Canon Law, Civil Law, Natural Law, Protestantism

This article considers HLA Hart’s influence in the making of John Finnis’s book Natural Law and Natural Rights. In the style of an intellectual biography it traces the history of the interaction between the two Oxford legal philosophers using their correspondence as a starting point. It also delves into Finnis’s years in Africa —a period of his life both crucial for the writing of the book and utterly unknown. It argues that Hart’s role was significant not only insofar as he was behind the idea of the book but also (and this has been little known as of yet) because of the restrained way in which he freely chose to conduct his role as editor despite the extent of the reservations he had regarding Finnis’s work, fully revealed here. Given the importance of Natural Law and Natural Rights for what has been called the ‘new natural law theory’ the article concludes by awarding Hart his due credit in the making of one of that theory’s main sources of inspiration.

- by Santiago Legarre
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- Natural Law, Oxford Philosophy, H.L.A. Hart, John Finnis
- by Giovanni Bisogni
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- Philosophy Of Law, H.L.A. Hart, Enviromental Law

Il volume di Brian H. Bix, qui offerto nell’edizione italiana, vuole costituire un’introduzione ai maggiori autori ed ai più rilevanti problemi (metodologici e sostanziali) della filosofia del diritto. Il libro è diviso in quattro sezioni: nella prima, essenzialmente metodologica, Bix s’interroga sullo status delle tesi concettuali; nella seconda vengono presentate le teorie di cinque tra i più importanti filosofi del diritto del ’900: H.L.A. Hart, Hans Kelsen, John Finnis, Lon L. Fuller e Ronald Dworkin; nella terza sezione vengono esaminati i temi più ricorrenti del pensiero filosofico giuridico: dalla giustizia alla pena, dal diritto soggettivo all’interpretazione giuridica. Infine, nella quarta sezione viene offerta una panoramica sulle maggiori correnti e tendenze giusfilosofiche contemporanee.

- by Andrea Porciello
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- Legal Education, Legal Theory, Ronald Dworkin, H.L.A. Hart

Евразийский юридический журнал. 2015. №7. С. 28-31

- by Anton Didikin
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- International Relations Theory, International Law, Legal Theory, Legal Philosophy

Taking Rights Seriously is concerned above all with due process, both in law and politics. In this respect, his theory of law and critique of legal positivism frames his theory of politics. He conceives both law and politics in terms of a "right to equality," the aim being to show individuals equal concern and respect. However, whereas he regards legal process as a matter of principle, orientated toward viewing our relations with others in terms of justice, he treats political process as dealing only with policy and focused on promoting the general welfare. The result is an account of law and politics that is original yet idiosyncratic. Though he sees rights-based judicial review as legitimately trumping utilitarian democratic decisions, his account of legal deliberation is in its way democratic, as his view of civil disobedience illustrates, and could apply as much-if not more-to legislatures as to courts.

- by Richard Bellamy
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- Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Human Rights, Democratic Theory

This paper addresses the question of the relationship between law and coercive force. It defends, against Frederick Schauer’s claims in his book, The Force of Law, the following propositions:
(a) the force of law consists in three things, not one: the imposition of duties, the use of coercion, and the exercise of social power. These are different and distinct.
(b) Even if coercion is not part of the concept of law, coercion is connected to law in a variety of ways. These are amply recognized in contemporary jurisprudence.
(c) We cannot determine how important coercion is to the efficacy of law until we know what counts as coercive force. This question is not a matter for empirical generalization or bare stipulation. It requires an explanation of the concept of coercion.

- by Leslie Green
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- Jurisprudence, Philosophy Of Law, Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart

Дидикин А.Б. Аналитическая философия права: истоки, генезис и структура. Монография. Томск, Изд-во ТГУ, 2016. - 244 с. В приложении к монографии - переводы статей Г. Кельзена "Абсолютизм и релятивизм в философии и политике", "Причинность... more

Kelsen’s legal monism – the claim that it is impossible for legal science to recognize the existence of more than one legal system – is often held to be one of the least plausible aspects of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. This paper challenges the criticism of Kelsen’s monism in the work of H.L.A. Hart. In particular, it will argue that Hart failed to show that Kelsen’s monism rests on a mistaken criterion of the identity of legal system and that it is therefore descriptively inadequate. Kelsen’s monism is not only descriptively viable, but potentially able to provide an interesting counterpoint to the prevalent legal pluralist orthodoxy in the theory of legal system.

- by Lars Vinx
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- Legal Pluralism, Legal Philosophy, Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart
- by Quentin Montpetit
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- Law, Jurisprudence, Philosophy Of Law, Justice

Edited by: Moreno-Cruz, P.

- by Pablo MORENO CRUZ
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- Legal Realism, Legal positivism, H.L.A. Hart, Norberto Bobbio

Las concepciones sobre la interpretación por parte de los jueces suelen ser diferenciadas en función de la posición que asumen con respecto al valor de verdad de los enunciados interpretativos. en este trabajo, analizo una serie de argumentos para defender y rechazar que los enunciados interpretativos tienen valor de verdad, tomando especialmente en cuenta los argumentos que el realismo moderado ha dirigido contra el formalismo moderado. en la última parte del trabajo, cuestiono que el valor de verdad de los enunciados interpretativos constituya un candidato idóneo para diferenciar las teorías acerca de la interpretación jurídica.

- by Lorena Ramírez Ludeña
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- H.L.A. Hart, Interpretación jurídica, Corrección, Riccardo Guastini

Validity, efficacy and coerciveness are all central concepts in legal theory. Every major legal theoretician has somehow touched upon in each of these concepts. However, their meaning and interrelationship remain problematic. Some of these problems originate from the adopted definitions of these concepts, some others from the ambiguous tone of legal philosophers. This article can be viewed as an effort to reconcile these three concepts and rediscover their central position in legal theory. In this regard, the article examines the work of three important positivists, each leading a different understanding of positivism: Austin, Kelsen and Hart. The article reaches the conclusion that the concepts of efficacy and validity are intertwined as the efficacy of the legal system has always been conceived of as the precondition for its validity. On the other hand, an individual norm's efficacy should have no effect on its validity. The connection of sanctions as the tool of coerciveness to these two concepts depends on the adopted definition of sanction. There are two understandings of sanctions: Normative and factual. In case the normative understanding or definition is adopted, sanction and coerciveness have very little to do with either validity or efficacy. If sanction is considered to be a factual "evil", however, its effect on the system's efficacy and validity increases.

- by Yahya Berkol GÜLGEÇ
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- Legal Theory, Philosophy Of Law, Legal positivism, Hans Kelsen
- by Boris Barraud
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- Legal Pluralism, Philosophy Of Law, Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart

W książce Autor omówił debatę uznawaną za najważniejszą w ﬁlozoﬁi prawa XX wieku oraz prześledził jej współczesną recepcję w naukach prawnych. Pokazał m.in., w jaki sposób treści poruszone podczas debaty Hart – Fuller, tradycyjnie identyﬁkowanej ze sporem o relacje prawa i moralności, oddziałują na rozważania istotnych aktualnie zagadnień badawczych, takich jak np. sprawiedliwość transformacyjna, wielokulturowość, ochrona praw człowieka czy ﬁlozoﬁczne podstawy prawa karnego. Przedstawił też ocenę znaczenia dyskursu naukowego jako narzędzia badawczego uczonego – prawnika. Tym samym lektura pracy może stanowić zachętę nie tylko do reﬂeksji nad rozumieniem prawa i jego aksjologicznych podstaw, lecz również nad warsztatem badawczym prawnika, w którym warto znaleźć należyte miejsce dla ﬁlozoﬁi prawa.

- by Tomasz Snarski
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- Philosophy Of Law, Transitional Justice, Philosophy of Criminal Law, H.L.A. Hart
- by Juan Carlos Silén
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- Human Rights, Ronald Dworkin, H.L.A. Hart, Taking Rights Seriously
- by Benjamin Brown
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- Religion, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Language, Epistemology

Winner of The Christopher Young Memorial Essay Prize in 2014.

- by Dannial Budhwani
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- Law, Jurisprudence, Philosophy, Political Philosophy
- by Pierre Brunet
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- Legal Realism, Legal interpretation, Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart

Despite the burgeoning literature on the consequences in international law of Israeli practices and policies in the territories it occupies, there has been only limited legal consideration of the intentions that drive Israel’s practices and the structures and processes that underpin them. This essay assesses Israel’s administration of justice in the occupied Palestinian territory in light of Hart’s category of the pathology of legal systems, which offers a normative perspective on the ends and means of a state’s relationship to international law. The essay examines the posture of Israel’s legal system towards international law to provide a distinct normative perspective on the thick background rules of Israel’s internationally unlawful acts. It analyses the presumptions underlying the operation of its administration of justice in the occupied territory, and explores how the systemic denial of Palestinians rights is based on the rejection of Palestinian sovereignty over the territory Israel occupies. The essay’s review of Israeli practices as manifestations of a legal pathology concludes with reflections on the utility of this analytical category, particularly for the determination of the nature of state responsibility in international law.

On February 6th 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada issued an anonymous, unanimous landmark judgment. In Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), the Court recognized that a blanket prohibition of physician-assisted dying violates the constitutional rights of certain individuals. Indeed, a competent adult person should be allowed to seek help from a doctor to end her life if she meets two criteria: clearly consent to the termination of life and have a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring suffering that is intolerable to the said individual. This legal decision constitutes an judicial overrule, because a reverse judgment was made in 1993. In fact, twenty-two years ago, the Supreme Court ruled five to four in favour of the ban on assisted suicide. In Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), the majority ruled that the protection of the sanctity of life in all circumstances, both for vulnerable people for capable adults, was reason enough not to invalidate the sections of the Criminal Code concerned with assisted suicide. The majority then feared that any opening to assisted suicide would cause a gradual widening of the eligibility criteria, what many have called the argument of the “slippery slope”.
As part of this Master's thesis, the Rodriguez-Carter judicial overrule will be analyzed in light of the debate between H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. While the former is known for his defence of a new version of soft positivism, the latter offers a new and innovative theory, named interpretivism. The goal is simple: to establish which of these two theories best explains the Canadian legal overrule regarding physician-assisted dying. The initial hypothesis is that both theories may explain said reversal, but one will do so better than the other.

O Direito, qualquer que seja a tradição de pensamento, tem sido objeto de preocupação dos juristas. Este livro trata de obras cuja tarefa assumida foi a de explicá-lo em seus lineamentos principais.
Os autores selecionados e seus respectivos escritos foram designados aqui de “clássicos” por duas razões elementares: porque não se pode ser indiferente a eles; e porque provocam incessante debate a cada leitura.
Para tanto, foram concebidos sete capítulos assim distribuídos: Capítulo 1, “Jeremy Bentham: As Leis em Geral”; Capítulo 2, “John Austin: A Delimitação do Objeto do Direito”; Capítulo 3, “Hans Kelsen: Teoria Pura do Direito”; Capítulo 4, “Alf Ross: Direito e Justiça”; Capítulo 5, “Herbert L.A. Hart: O Conceito de Direito”; Capítulo 6, “Ronald Dworkin: Levando os Direitos a Sério”; Capítulo 7, “John M. Finnis: Lei Natural e Direitos Naturais”.
Desta forma, quer-se com este volume oferecer aos professores e estudantes de direito material de apoio às disciplinas de teoria e filosofia do direito. Como tal, é obra de formação jurídica.

- by Adrian Sgarbi
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- Ronald Dworkin, Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, Teoria do Direito

Il manuale presenta in forma agile gli scritti didattici di Alfonso Catania, filosofo e teorico generale del diritto di orientamento giuspositivista critico. Normatività ed effettività sono i poli intorno ai quali si struttura, secondo l'Autore, quella tecnica-progetto che è il diritto: 'tecnica umana' volta a ridurre i conflitti, orientata all'ordine, ma che può diventare essa stessa fonte di conflitto, nonché 'progetto', che tende a modificare la realtà sociale, venendo da quest'ultima profondamente modificato. L'ordinamento giuridico è caratterizzato dalla delegazione: "il passaggio da una norma a un'altra è reso possibile solo ed esclusivamente dal fatto che vi è un atto dell'uomo che si tramuta in un'azione, in un comportamento, in una decisione". Pertanto, dietro il diritto positivo "c'è sempre l'uomo e la sua volontà": in una parola, la sua responsabilità.

- by Francesco Mancuso
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- Sovereignty, Natural Law, Legal Theory, Legal interpretation
- by Samuel Tschorne
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- Constitutional Law, Constitutional Theory, H.L.A. Hart, Public Law
- by Mario Ricciardi
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- History of Ideas, Natural Law, General Jurisprudence, Natural Law Theory
- by Bruno Orrego Morales and +1
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- Ronald Dworkin, H.L.A. Hart, Derecho, Filosofía del Derecho
- by Alexandre Lefebvre
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- Jurisprudence, Political Theory, Stanley Cavell, H.L.A. Hart

Açık metinde hâkimin takdir yetkisi sorununa geçmeden önce Hart'ın hukuk kavramını ve açık metin kavramını açıklamak konunun daha iyi anlaşılması için yerinde olacaktır. Hart'a göre hukuk, tanıma kuralı ile belirlenen birincil ve ikincil kuralların birliğidir. 1 Ama hukukun bu belirlenmiş merkezi alanından uzaklaştıkça hukukun farklı nitelikteki diğer unsurlarının da ele alınması gerekecektir. 2 Ele alınacak bu unsurlardan biri yargıcın takdir yetkisiyle doğrudan ilişkili olan kuralların açık metni sorunu olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Hart kuralların açık metnini ayrıntılı bir şekilde açıklamasa da Şule Şahin Ceylan'ın H.L.A Hart'ın Hukuk Kavramı adlı kitabında yer alan örnek hem açık metni anlamamız açısından hem de makalenin ilerleyen kısmında tanımlanacak olan kavramların anlaşılmasında yarar sağlayacaktır. Örnek olay şu şekildedir: 3 ''Bir kişinin D durumunda olursa E eylemini gerçekleştirmesini gerektiren bir kuralın bulunduğunu varsayalım. D, hiçbiri diğerinden daha önemli olmayan beş tane tanımlayıcı özelliğe sahip kümelenmiş bir kavram olsun ve bu özelliklerden dördü veya beşi D'ye uygulanabilsin. Eğer üç özellik mevcutsa, somut olayın D tipinde olup olmadığı, dolayısıyla kuralın uygulanıp uygulanmayacağı ve E'nin yapılıp yapılmayacağı belirsiz olacaktır. Mahkeme bu üç özelliğin mevcut olduğu davayla karşı karşıyadır. Yargıç, bu özelliklerin somut olayı D kategorisine sokmak ve kuralı uygulamak için yeterli olup olmadığına karar vermek zorundadır. Yargıcın bu kararı vermesinin çok sayıda dayanağı bulunduğu için, buradaki takdir yetkisine mekanik bir kural uygulaması olarak bakmak hatalıdır.'' Yukarıda verilen temsili örnekteki gibi birçok hukuk kuralı genel ifadeler kullanarak davaları, uyuşmazlık tipini ya da suç tiplerini tanımlayıp sınıflandırır. Hukuk kurallarında belirlenmiş sınıflandırmalar yargıca mevcut uyuşmazlığın hangi kural alanına girip girmeyeceğini belirlemesinde yardımcı olacaksa da bazı olgular genel sınıflandırıcı kavramlarla ifade edilemeyebilir, hukuk kuralının sınırında ya da kural dışı bir örnek olabilir. Bu durumda kuralın açık metin problemi ile karşı karşıya kalırız. Hart'a göre kuralın tereddütsüz doğrudan uygulanabildiği davalar kuralın çekirdek alanındadır. Yani kuralın belirlenmiş alanındadır. Bu tür davalara çekirdek, açık, kesin, net davalar denirken; Yukarıdaki gibi D durumunun oluşması için beş özellikten sadece üçünü taşıyan bir davada hem kuralın uygulanması hem de uygulanmaması için haklı nedenler vardır. Dolayısıyla burada yargıç kavramı ya da kuralı açıkça uygulayamayacaktır. Hakkında şüpheye düşülen ve kuralla örtüşmeyen bu tarz davalar gölgeli alanda yer alacaktır. 4 Bu davalar ise düşünür tarafından gölgeli, zor, sınırdaki davalar olarak tanımlanır.

- by Berfin Balık
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- H.L.A. Hart, Lon L. Fuller, hakimin takdir yetkisi
- by Ahmet Ulvi Türkbağ
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- Ronald Dworkin, H.L.A. Hart