Vagueness Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Susan Haack, “The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth.” Abstract: “Much truth is spoken, that more may be concealed,” wrote Mr. Justice Darling in 1879. Opening with an articulation of the distinction between truth (the concept) and... more

Se si parla delle analisi condotte da Bertrand Russell sulle descrizioni definite, è inevitabile tenere conto di un elemento: le sue tesi linguistiche sono intrecciate con altre posizioni che sconfinano dall'ambito prettamente semantico.... more

Se si parla delle analisi condotte da Bertrand Russell sulle descrizioni definite, è inevitabile tenere conto di un elemento: le sue tesi linguistiche sono intrecciate con altre posizioni che sconfinano dall'ambito prettamente semantico. In "Vagueness" (1923), Russell affronta la questione della vaghezza, realizzando delle riflessioni destinate a durare nel tempo. Egli ritiene che l'influenza del simbolismo porti inevitabilmente a nozioni erronee. L'intento è quello di dimostrare, attraverso il fenomeno della vaghezza, che «tutto il linguaggio è vago». 1 La vaghezza è caratteristica che può appartenere solo ad una rappresentazione, e ha a che fare con il rapporto tra la rappresentazione e ciò che essa rappresenta. Le cose, quindi, sono ciò che sono. Per Russell il conoscere è accadimento che ha relazione con altri accadimenti, gruppi di accadimenti, o caratteristiche di tali gruppi. Quando la conoscenza è vaga, ci si riferisce esclusivamente alla conoscenza per descrizione : la vaghezza è una caratteristica della relazione tra l'atto del conoscere e il conosciuto. Attraverso una serie di esempi Russell cerca di convincere il lettore che tutte le parole che esprimono qualità sensibili hanno un certo grado di vaghezza. 2 In merito ai nomi propri, Russell si pone la domanda circa l'associabilità del nome ad un individuo e il momento in cui ciò avviene. In maniera più chiara: è il nome attribuibile prima della nascita? No, in tal caso l'ambiguità sarebbe più ovvia, «poiché nessuno può decidere a partire da quale intervallo di tempo prima della nascita il nome diviene attribuibile» 3. A questo punto, Russell, risponde a ciò ponendo il riferimento alla morte. La morte, come la nascita, è un processo e anche in questo caso si pone la stessa problematica: nel processo di decomposizione deve accadere un momento a partire dal quale il nome non è più attribuibile. Chiaro è che questo momento nessuno può determinarlo. Viene fatto riferimento a una cosiddetta «zona di penombra», i cui contorni non sono definibili. È l'intera vaghezza che viene applicata anche al tentativo di fissare un limite alla applicabilità delle parole. La vaghezza, anche se applicabile in primo luogo a ciò che è cognitivo, è applicabile ad ogni tipo di rappresentazione. Come viene espresso da Russell: «una rappresentazione è vaga quando la relazione del sistema rappresentativo col sistema rappresentato non è uno a uno, ma uno a molti». Esplicativo è l'esempio della fotografia che se macchiata può portare a raffigurare tre individui differenti. Questo perché meno accurata. La vaghezza dunque risulta connessa al concetto di accuratezza, il quale rappresenta

RESUMO Este artigo apresenta reflexões sobre a margem das investigações que Hart realiza a partir da hipótese de que a textura aberta deve ser caracterizada por uma zona de penumbra onde as regras primárias e secundárias estão si-tuadas.... more

RESUMO Este artigo apresenta reflexões sobre a margem das investigações que Hart realiza a partir da hipótese de que a textura aberta deve ser caracterizada por uma zona de penumbra onde as regras primárias e secundárias estão si-tuadas. Segundo o autor, o espaço do discurso não é preenchido exclusiva-mente pela legalidade advinda do próprio universo jurídico. O presente arti-go tem por objetivo problematizar regras que são conduzidas para além da-quilo que seria o interesse delas, aqui pensada como um elemento aberto cuja validade está empenhada, por um lado, com a estrutura estatal e, por outro, com o papel legislativo exercido pelos Tribunais. Os resultados reto-mam a importância de um esforço filosófico desenvolvido por Hart que con-siste em mostrar os pontos obscuros da linguagem antecedentes da aplicação da própria regra. A semântica, neste caso, não representa apenas um mo-mento dialógico entre o fato e o significado, mas a própria condição que subjaz ao exercício do trabalho jurídico e filosófico. Palavras-chave: Textura aberta. Regras. Hart. Wittgenstein. ABSTRACT This article presents reflections on the margin of the investigations that Hart conducts based on the hypothesis that the open texture must be characterized by a penumbra zone where the primary and secondary rules are located. According to the author, the discourse space is not filled exclusively by the legality that comes from the legal universe itself. The present article aims to problematize rules that are conducted beyond what would be in the interest of the same, here considered as an open element whose validity is committed , on the one hand, with the state structure and, on the other hand, with the legislative role exercised by the Courts. The results return to the importance of a philosophical effort developed by Hart, which consists of showing the

Ce recueil d’articles réunit douze contributions consacrées à la précision et à l’approximation. Ces travaux de linguistique française touchent à des périodes et à des domaines très variés, de l’ancien et moyen français au français... more

Ce recueil d’articles réunit douze contributions consacrées à la
précision et à l’approximation. Ces travaux de linguistique
française touchent à des périodes et à des domaines très variés, de l’ancien et moyen français au français contemporain, de la syntaxe à la sémantique au lexique et à l’histoire de la langue. En dehors de la diversité d’approches, l’originalité de ce volume est due au fait qu’un grand nombre de phénomènes traités ont été peu élaborés auparavant. On y trouvera des études d’ordre général telles que : l’approximation dans les structures subordonnées, la précision sémantique du texte littéraire, le discours scientifique et technique en moyen français, un article sur la quantification approximative et la quantification floue et un travail qui passe en revue les derniers travaux dans le champ élaboré. D’autres contributions sont dédiées à des études de cas : le parcours sémantique du mot assez, le parcours d’évolution de plusieurs, l’identification appro ximative : une sorte de, un genre de, une espèce de + N, le quantifieur tant et une étude diachronique de presque

Without exception everything is in vagueness. Would Socrates be the same we know today, when his wife Xanthippe didn´t tormented his life and not expelled him from home? Perhaps Aristotle would become a wrestler if he had no weak legs,... more

Without exception everything is in vagueness. Would Socrates be the same we know today,
when his wife Xanthippe didn´t tormented his life and not expelled him from home? Perhaps
Aristotle would become a wrestler if he had no weak legs, small eyes and would not lisp?
Epicurus would probably not have to puke by twice as much food on the day when he was two
months living in Africa? Thomas Aquinas who walked several times about 1400 km from Rome
to Paris would not have had that much time to think if he had hitchhiked? What would have
happened if the twelve-year-old Pascal would get a slap from his father, because he draws
triangles on the floor in the house? What would have happened if it had come out that a large
part of Voltaire's letters, whose number exceeds twenty thousand, are dedicated to God and to
the world, and one would therefore put him in the loony bin? When Kant was a burly man and
had beaten his servant who is waking him up every morning with toil, in a fit of rage, so that she
no longer could have done her tasks? Or if Kierkegaard had lived for ten years longer and
Nietzsche had not lost his mind? Or if Wittgenstein hadn´t played tennis and there wouldn´t
have been a playfield on his way? The answers / probabilities to these questions are "vague".
Why does the day have twenty-four hours? Who has determined that a week has seven days?
What is beautiful? Who can be called stupid? Is death bad? It is not possible to give an
"absolute" answer on this and thousands of similar questions. The answers are vague. To deal
with the vagueness, first the vagueness must be understood in the language. To understand one
of the first and most important steps to the vagueness in the language is to understand the
"Sorites paradox".

Nietzsche “Dili ciddiye alın!” diyor. Dilin daha ziyade iknâ vasıtası olarak hizmet verdiği zamanlardan, onun teorisi üzerine kafa yorulduğu çağa atlamak bizi “pratik” ve “teori” çatışması ile karşı karşıya bırakmaz. Mukayeseden... more

Nietzsche “Dili ciddiye alın!” diyor. Dilin daha ziyade iknâ vasıtası olarak hizmet
verdiği zamanlardan, onun teorisi üzerine kafa yorulduğu çağa atlamak bizi
“pratik” ve “teori” çatışması ile karşı karşıya bırakmaz. Mukayeseden çıkarılacak
çok daha mühim neticelerin olması böylesine basit bir değerlendirmeyi gölgede
bırakır. Sofistlerin para kazanma aracı olarak kullandıkları “dil” aslında sadece
yüzeysel olandır. Yani her ne olursa olsun muhatabı ikna etmek için odaklanmış bir
“konuşma” ortama ve zamana göre büyük değişiklikler gösterebilir. Oysa doğrunun
bir tek olması, zamana ve mekana göre dayanıklılık göstermesi gerekir. Bu noktada
mantıksal bakımdan mükemmel, muğlak olmayan, tam/kesin bir dilin günlük
konuşma için uygun olmadığını zaten tespit etmiştir Russell. Peki bu iki
kullanımdan (ideal lisan ve hatibin dili) hangisi “ciddiye alınmalı”dır?

I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up. Charles Pigden has argued that the notion goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke,... more

I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up. Charles Pigden has argued that the notion goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it. In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first 'nonsensicalist', whether Kant was a 'nonsensicalist' at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically. I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.

How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness? If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with... more

How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness? If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity? How do people react to being accused to talking nonsense themselves? Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life? In dream-reports perhaps? Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs? Or in certain jokes and hoaxes? Are contradictions felt to be meaningless? I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties. First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others. Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.

This paper looks at the margin for error

There exist various sentence types in natural language that, under certain circumstances, are evaluated as neither true nor false. For instance, in a context in which the presupposition of a sentence is not satisfied, it is intuitively... more

There exist various sentence types in natural language that, under certain circumstances, are evaluated as neither true nor false. For instance, in a context in which the presupposition of a sentence is not satisfied, it is intuitively rather difficult to assess what the truth value of the sentence should be. A common theoretical approach is to characterize the status of such a sentence with a third value of one kind or another. In this paper, we consider children’s ac- quisition of four linguistic phenomena that can give rise to ‘gappy’ judgments that correspond neither to True nor False: scalar implicature, presupposition, homogeneity, and vagueness. We discuss how young children’s interpretations of such sentences can provide insight into how these phenomena should be treated within semantic theories.

Sass, like R. D. Laing before him, wants to make sense of schizophrenic discourse. In 'Paradoxes of delusion – Wittgenstein, Schreber and the schizophrenic mind' he uses Wittgenstein’s later work, particularly the Blue Book, to this... more

Sass, like R. D. Laing before him, wants to make sense of schizophrenic discourse. In 'Paradoxes of delusion – Wittgenstein, Schreber and the schizophrenic mind' he uses Wittgenstein’s later work, particularly the Blue Book, to this end. Read criticises Sass for not taking Wittgenstein’s nonsensicalism seriously enough and suggests that some schizophrenic utterances cannot be understood at all. I argue that Sass’s position is more consistent than Read’s, though it is probably true that Sass is the less thoroughgoing Wittgensteinian. Read’s way of arguing his case exhibits all the difficulties that those who employ the notion of philosophical nonsense are apt to get themselves into. The denigratory vocabulary he uses to characterise schizophrenic discourse – ‘confused’, ‘inchoate’, ‘incoherent’, ‘empty’, ‘without content’ – is itself confused and confusing, but, more importantly, his talk of ‘transitional remarks’ and his admission that he is himself ‘trafficking in nonsense’ suggest that he is falling into the very error of which he accuses Sass.

Is it possible to maintain classical logic, stay close to classical semantics, and yet accept that language might be semantically indeterminate? The article gives an affirmative answer by Ramsifying classical semantics, which yields a new... more

Is it possible to maintain classical logic, stay close to classical semantics, and yet accept that language might be semantically indeterminate? The article gives an affirmative answer by Ramsifying classical semantics, which yields a new semantic theory that remains much closer to classical semantics than supervaluationism but which at the same time avoids the problematic classical presupposition of semantic determinacy. The resulting Ramsey semantics is developed in detail, it is shown to supply a classical concept of truth and to fully support the rules and metarules of classical logic, and it is applied to vague terms as well as to theoretical or open-ended terms from mathematics and science. The theory also demonstrates how diachronic or synchronic interpretational continuity across languages is compatible with semantic indeterminacy.

Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’). To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet... more

Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’). To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet others: nonsensical, i.e. meaningless. And often one is left guessing.

In natural language, we encounter various sentence types that, under certain circumstances, are evaluated as neither true nor false. For instance, it is intuitively difficult to assess the truth value of a sentence whose presupposition is... more

In natural language, we encounter various sentence types that, under certain circumstances, are evaluated as neither true nor false. For instance, it is intuitively difficult to assess the truth value of a sentence whose presupposition is not satisfied in the context. A common theoretical approach is to characterize the status of such sentences with a third value of one kind or another. In this chapter, we consider children’s acquisition of four linguistic phenomena that can give rise to 'gappy' judgments that correspond neither to True nor False: scalar implicature, presupposition, homogeneity, and vagueness. We discuss how young children's interpretations of such sentences can provide insight into how these phenomena should be treated within semantic theories.

A text that was published in its first version already in 2002, in a book titled TransUrbanism (V2_publishing). The essay was reworked many times; for the last time in The Architecture of Continuity, a collection of essays from 2008. It... more

A text that was published in its first version already in 2002, in a book titled TransUrbanism (V2_publishing). The essay was reworked many times; for the last time in The Architecture of Continuity, a collection of essays from 2008. It considers the analog-computing methods of Frei Otto and Gaudi as material and generative techniques that are inherently configurational, as opposed to many formalist techniques, such as parametricism. Otto’s “form-finding” techniques led me to the notion of vagueness, a word that I distinguish from the more familiar architectural concept of neutrality.

slides to accompany the paper of the same title.

El presente trabajo tiene por objeto esclarecer cuál es el margen de discrecionalidad que corresponde a la Administración cuando la norma que le ha atribuido una determinada potestad contiene palabras o conceptos que, por su vaguedad o... more

El presente trabajo tiene por objeto esclarecer cuál es el margen de discrecionalidad que corresponde a la Administración cuando la norma que le ha atribuido una determinada potestad contiene palabras o conceptos que, por su vaguedad o ambigüedad, no tienen un campo de aplicación unívoco, es decir conceptos cuyos límites son imprecisos. A tal efecto, evaluaré la doctrina de los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, sostenida, entre otros, por García de Enterría. En el curso de este examen intentaré poner de relieve tanto los aciertos como los límites de dicha posición. Estos últimos evidenciarán la conveniencia de sostener una tesis que introduzca otras dimensiones de análisis al momento de evaluar las facultades interpretativas de la Administración.

Vagueness and ambiguity are key problems in theories of legal interpretation. The article first delimits vagueness and ambiguity and sets it into relation to related phenomena like the generality of legal expressions (1). Vagueness proves... more

Vagueness and ambiguity are key problems in theories of legal interpretation. The article first delimits vagueness and ambiguity and sets it into relation to related phenomena like the generality of legal expressions (1). Vagueness proves to be a multi-faceted phenomenon which can be systematised along three distinctions: vagueness of individuation and classification, degree and combinatory vagueness, and semantic and pragmatic vagueness. For law pragmatic vagueness seems of specific import (2.). As for the origins and accounts of vagueness the different approaches are sorted into logic, ontic, epistemic and semantic accounts with epistemic and semantic accounts showing the closest relations to legal theories of interpretation (3.). The last section argues that vagueness is not a threat to legal interpretation and rule of law values properly understood. It is cautious, though, with regard to some suggested values of vagueness. However, it sees a value of vagueness in reducing decision costs, which cannot be completely accommodated by other semantic features of vague concepts like generality (4.).

Thomas Nagel in ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ suggests that we don’t yet have much idea of how mental entities could be identical with physical ones (though he wisely stops short of accusing physicalists of not meaning ANYTHING... more

Thomas Nagel in ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ suggests that we don’t yet have much idea of how mental entities could be identical with physical ones (though he wisely stops short of accusing physicalists of not meaning ANYTHING WHATSOEVER by their identity-claims). Colin McGinn goes further by suggesting that we may forever remain in this state of ignorance and incomprehension because of the inherent limitations of the human intellect. I argue that the mere possibility that McGinn is right shows that it is over-hasty to conclude from philosophy’s failure to solve its problems that there must be something wrong with the problems themselves. I also try to relate Nagel’s and McGinn’s view to David Stove’s response to philosophy’s apparent failure to make much progress. He seems pessimistic about whether we will ever fully understand what is wrong with some philosophical claims.

This study is intended to examine the deceptive strategies utilized in the well-renown Agatha Christie's (1926/2002) detective fiction The Murder of Roger Ackroyd to fill a gap in the literature by conducting a pragma-stylistic analysis... more

This study is intended to examine the deceptive strategies utilized in the well-renown Agatha Christie's (1926/2002) detective fiction The Murder of Roger Ackroyd to fill a gap in the literature by conducting a pragma-stylistic analysis of the novel. To do so, the researchers have set two objectives which are phrased as follows: firstly, examining the pragma-stylistic choices that are used to surface the deceptive strategies on the character-character level in the pre-dénouement stage and secondly, investigating the pragma-stylistic choices that are used to surface the deceptive strategies on the narrator-reader level in the pre-dénouement stage. The stylistic idiosyncrasies of Christie's Dr. Sheppard are carried out through an eclectic pragma-stylistic approach to expose his deceptive strategies for the fulfillment of his selfish ends. Therefore, the study at issue follows an eclectic conceptual framework which comprises Merzah and Abbas's deceptive principle (2020) and Chen's (2001) self-politeness, along with the stylistic effects achieved via the manipulation of such linguistic tools, to explore the two levels of discourse, namely, character-character level and narrator-reader level proposed by Black (2006). The qualitative analysis of the novel has exhibited that Dr. Sheppard is an expert deceiver who principally relies on indirect strategies, as he is cognizant of the power of what is insinuated but left unsaid.

he paper examines speakers’ possible goals in employing vague expressions in a gas bill, as well the harmful effects such expressions can have on addressees (i.e. consumers). The paper tries to demonstrate that vagueness does not... more

he paper examines speakers’ possible goals in employing vague expressions in a gas bill, as well the harmful effects such expressions can have on addressees (i.e. consumers). The paper tries to demonstrate that vagueness does not exclusively boil down to lexical vagueness, i.e. uninformative words (Channell 1994). Vagueness also means not explicitating relevant information but giving them as presupposed, the speaker taking for granted that the addressee is already familiar with such content.

Ambiguity is a term used to characterize phenomena that have more than only one meaning. These meanings are distinct from each other and have no close

(Proceedings of the 17th Amsterdam colloquium conference on Logic, language and meaning) This paper provides an analysis of statements with predicates of personal taste (tasty, fun, etc.) Rather than directly relativizing semantic... more

(Proceedings of the 17th Amsterdam colloquium conference on Logic, language and meaning)
This paper provides an analysis of statements with predicates of personal taste (tasty, fun, etc.) Rather than directly relativizing semantic interpretation to a judge (cf., Lasersohn, 2005), this paper aims to capture the phenomenon called ‘faultless disagreement’ (the fact that one can deny a speaker’s subjective utterance without challenging the speaker‘s opinion) by means of pragmatic restrictions on quantification domains. Using vagueness models, a statement like the cake is tasty is analyzed as true in a partial context c iff it is true in the set of completions t consistent with c (Kamp, 1975), wherein tasty denotes different, contextually possible, taste measures (Kennedy, 1999). Phrases like for me restrict the set of completions to those with taste measures consistent with the speaker’s taste. Faultless disagreement naturally follows assuming speakers accommodate or reject implicit restrictions of this sort (Lewis, 1979).

In the first part of this paper I briefly present the life and work of multilingual poet Amelia Rosselli (1930-1996). I then focus on – often multilingual – lexical fusions and distortions in Rosselli’s texts, questioning Pasolini’s... more

In the first part of this paper I briefly present the life and work of multilingual poet Amelia Rosselli (1930-1996). I then focus on – often multilingual – lexical fusions and distortions in Rosselli’s texts, questioning Pasolini’s interpretation based on the notion of Freudian slip. After a detailed analysis of a poem and a range of textual examples, and with the aid of hermeneutical tools borrowed from the philosophy of language, I claim that Rosselli’s poetry aims on the one hand at mirroring reality, and on the other at making textual experience potentially infinite, thus engaging the reader in a never-ending interpretation

This chapter suggests that the musical concept of timbre can function as an ideational “trading zone,” or Unscharfer Begriff. It explores some diverse treatments of timbre in Western and in Chinese music performance practice, in... more

This chapter suggests that the musical concept of timbre can function as an ideational “trading zone,” or Unscharfer Begriff. It explores some diverse treatments of timbre in Western and in Chinese music performance practice, in composition, and in musicological scholarship. The chapter discusses a parallel between the respective epistemic function of “atmosphere” and of “timbre,” as vague concepts in music scholarship. A combination of phenomenal dimensions together, atmospherically, form a gateway to such experiential possibilities. That they can be loosely conceived of as a single conceptual entity, timbre, Klangfarbe or yinse, speaks to the epistemological productiveness and affective power of vagueness. The chapter argues that in the West the notion of timbre has served as a mid-level conceptual “placeholder,” in the absence of more concrete analyses of acoustics and perception. As such it has travelled between music, aesthetics, psychology, physiology, acoustics and studies of culture more generally.

Epistemicism is one of the main approaches to the phenomenon of vagueness. But how does it far in its treatment of moral vagueness? This paper has two goals. First, I shall explain why various recent arguments against an epistemicist... more

Epistemicism is one of the main approaches to the phenomenon of vagueness. But how does it far in its treatment of moral vagueness? This paper has two goals. First, I shall explain why various recent arguments against an epistemicist approach to moral vagueness are unsuccessful. Second, I shall explain how, in my view, reflection on the Sorites can inform normative ethics in powerful and interesting ways. In this connection, I shall be putting the epistemicist treatment to work.

Within the sociology of science there is a constant debate of how we acquire knowledge of reality and whether this knowledge can be considered " true " and if, how reliable this knowledge might be. This is often referred to as the... more

Within the sociology of science there is a constant debate of how we acquire knowledge of reality and whether this knowledge can be considered " true " and if, how reliable this knowledge might be. This is often referred to as the epistemological problem. In the process of aiming at true knowledge, if true knowledge exists, I will in this paper take a closer look at concepts in social science, characteristics of vagueness in concepts, how we define concepts in social science and what consequences choices regarding definitions might have for the outcome of research in education. When discussing vagueness and the definition of concepts I will use the concept national identity as an example. My interest in the concept national identity is grounded in my own research project looking at how secondary school teachers in South Sudan develop the sense of nationalism, patriotism and national unity, as stated in the Syllabus for Southern Sudan Certificate of Secondary Education (GOSS, 2007), among their students when teaching the recent history.

12 Ovviamente dovrei parlare del significato ordinario di "mountain" dal momento che la lingua dei cartografi era l'inglese. Prescindo dai dettagli dell'esempio per una questione di comodità (cfr. supra n. 4). 13 Vedi infra §3.2.1 e §4.1.... more

12 Ovviamente dovrei parlare del significato ordinario di "mountain" dal momento che la lingua dei cartografi era l'inglese. Prescindo dai dettagli dell'esempio per una questione di comodità (cfr. supra n. 4). 13 Vedi infra §3.2.1 e §4.1. 14 Sto qui usando intercambiabilmente "concetto vago" con "espressione [per per quel concetto] vaga" perché Waissman parla di concetti. Si potrebbe però sostenere che le espressioni di una lingua siano vaghe senza che i concetti corrispondenti, intesi come entità mentali, lo siano (o viceversa). Per semplificare tralascerò queste possibilità.

This paper starts from Tractatus, 6.53, and ask how one could show someone ‘that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions’. Once one has fully mastered the ‘austere’ conception of nonsense – that nonsense has... more

This paper starts from Tractatus, 6.53, and ask how one could show someone ‘that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions’. Once one has fully mastered the ‘austere’ conception of nonsense – that nonsense has neither meaning, form, content, nor logic – the difficulties of the enterprise become evident. It is not clear how one could be in a position to conclude much about an utterance without first finding a meaning in it. Suggestions made by Guy Robinson, Edward Witherspoon and Hans-Johann Glock are considered but it is concluded that the last, best hope for nonsensicalism lies in a therapeutic approach. I end with a plea for someone who is sympathetic to this aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to make a serious attempt to work out the details.

ABSTRACT. This programmatic paper is an attempt to connect some worries on the philosophy of language with some traditional views in artificial intelligence. After a short introduction to the notion of context in philosophy (§1),... more

ABSTRACT. This programmatic paper is an attempt to connect some worries on the philosophy of language with some traditional views in artificial intelligence. After a short introduction to the notion of context in philosophy (§1), starting from the inventor of mathematical logic, Gottlob Frege, I list three debates in the philosophy of language where the solution is strongly undecided: (§2) the debate between holism and molecularism, (§3) the debate on the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics, (§4) the debate between explicit and implicit view of incomplete descriptions. These debates may be considered case studies on what is happening to the notion of context in philosophy in the first two decades of XXI century; they push us to look for a unifying framework in which to frame those worries: I propose to shift the attention towards a representation of the basic abilities required to navigate across contexts (§5). In the conclusion, I use some suggestions from computer sciences as a contribution towards a better definition of what is meant by " pragmatic competence " , strictly connected to the philosophical enterprise (§6).
https://www.openscience.fr/Contexts-in-philosophy-pragmatic-competence-as-filter

The subject of this thesis is the problem of the many - a problem which presents the challenge of there being many objects in situations in which we putatively take there to be one. The problem demands attention since it is paradoxical,... more