Hempel Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Pozitivizm, geleneksel felsefi anlayışların büyük bir bölümünü ve bu anlayışların açığa çıkardığı problemleri metafizik olarak adlandırarak kendisinden ayırmaktadır. Fakat bununla birlikte, kendisi, Platon ve Aristoteles’te kökleri... more

Pozitivizm, geleneksel felsefi anlayışların büyük bir bölümünü ve bu anlayışların açığa çıkardığı problemleri metafizik olarak adlandırarak kendisinden ayırmaktadır. Fakat bununla birlikte, kendisi, Platon ve Aristoteles’te kökleri bulunan doğruluğun uygunluk kuramının izleyicisidir. O halde, pozitivizm, bu kuramı kabul ederek bilimsel bilgiyi kendisine konu edindiğinde, epistemoloji tarihinin bilgiye ve ‘doğruluk’a ilişkin problemini de devralmış olmaktadır. Ancak, pozitivizmin konu edindiği bilgi, geleneksel felsefi bilgi olan epistemeden farklıdır. Bu bilgi, 19. yüzyıl biliminden doğmuştur ve felsefi düşünce için yeni bir boyuttur. Bu metinde, pozitivizmin ‘yeni’liği ve uygunluk kuramı bağlamında gelenekselliği Hempel düşüncesi üzerinden ele alınacak ve tartışılacaktır.

Breve presentación de las ideas de Hempel en la Serie Episteme de la revista Relaciones.

In this dissertation I present a genealogy of scientific explanation, which in contemporary philosophy of science is almost universally taken to be a central aim of science. Today, philosophers of science constantly reason with and about... more

In this dissertation I present a genealogy of scientific explanation, which in contemporary philosophy of science is almost universally taken to be a central aim of science. Today, philosophers of science constantly reason with and about this aim of science. Through my genealogy I show that this particular way to reason about science should not be taken for granted. It does not constitute a transparent aspect of science that is given to us. Instead it contingently emerged within a period of intellectual migration.

Introduce students to inductivist and deductivist models of science (all of which, Haack will argue, fail, and for related reasons. It doesn't follow, however, as radical sociologists of science imagined, that science isn't a rational... more

Introduce students to inductivist and deductivist models of science (all of which, Haack will argue, fail, and for related reasons. It doesn't follow, however, as radical sociologists of science imagined, that science isn't a rational enterprise... but that's for a later lecture.

A controversy rages in philosophical approaches to mind that goes to the core of the mind/body problem in psychiatry: how is it possible that a physical system, no matter complex, can give rise to the subjective experience of... more

A controversy rages in philosophical approaches to mind that goes to the core of the mind/body problem in psychiatry: how
is it possible that a physical system, no matter complex, can give rise to the subjective experience of consciousness?
Taking this irreducibility of consciousness into account, philosophical approaches to cognitive neuroscience and psychopathology, as well as the rapid evolving cognitive neuropsychiatry, have been forcing new resolutions to the mind/body problem and other traditional dualisms which plague the older psychiatric explanatory models. Attempts to operationalize subjectivity in psychiatric research, however, are more concordant with the present trend to unburden clinical decision making by algorithmic formulas (as dictated by the pressures of managed care and operationalized research) than engaging and developing the skills of the clinician in terms of his or her total potential. Such dilemmas require a renewed reading of classical psychiatrists who have attempted to take account of the subjective experience of consciousness in their seminal psychopathologies.

DSM-III’s (1980) revolutionary neo-Kraepelinians were dedicated to setting up a research program rather than accurately reflecting clinical realities. Embracing Carl Hempel’s logical empiricist agenda, they approached mental disorders in... more

DSM-III’s (1980) revolutionary neo-Kraepelinians were dedicated to setting up a research program rather than accurately reflecting clinical realities. Embracing Carl Hempel’s logical empiricist agenda, they approached mental disorders in terms of operational definitions for the purpose of enhancing reliability in diagnosis. “Spitzer selected a group of psychiatrists and consultant psychologists who were committed primarily to medically oriented, diagnostic research and not to clinical practice.” That is, there was and remains a divide between DSM-III and later DSMs’ prescriptive diagnostic practices for researchers and what clinicians actually do in practice. Far from bridging clinical practice and clinical research, DSM- III inserted a wedge between them. “Operational definitions are too restrictive. They preclude extensions to new situations that are even slightly different from the original defining condition.” The original criteria used as the initial basis for the specified diagnostic criteria for the major diagnostic categories of DSM-III were regarded exclusively as “research diagnostic criteria” (RDCs).5 Even Gerald Klerman, “the highest-ranking psychiatrist in the federal government at the time,” who had at first appraised the movement from the DSM-I and II to the DSM-III as a “victory for science,” later revised his view that DSM-III was largely “a political document.” That is, by adopting Hempel’s logical-empirical approach to science, the neo-Kraepelinians’ presumable “revolution” in conceptualizing and classifying mental disorders actually preempted alternative approaches. In their zeal for reliable diagnosis, DSM-III advocates overlooked that the Hempelian approach they adopted was only one approach that neglected more phenomenological approaches, also informed by philosophy but in a manner completely different than Hempel. In fact, the German psychiatrist, Karl Jaspers largely responsible for introducing philosophic phenomenology to psychiatry, had written that to the extent that psychiatry ignores philosophy, it is inevitably undone by it in one way or another.

From the Malleus Maleficarum to DSM-III, the Rat Man to Son of Sam, shaman to psychopharmacologist, Hippocrates to France, and King David to Senator Eagleton, concepts of mental disorder have fascinated us. It therefore seems surprising... more

From the Malleus Maleficarum to DSM-III, the Rat Man to Son of Sam, shaman to psychopharmacologist, Hippocrates to France, and King David to Senator Eagleton, concepts of mental disorder have fascinated us. It therefore seems surprising that there has never been an extended monograph on the conceptual groundwork of psychiatric nosology. This book is designed to explore some of the philosophical assumptions, trade-offs, compromises, omissions, commissions, possibilities, impossibilities, successes and failures of contemporary psychiatric classification. As an exploration it cannot claim to be a comprehensive review of psychiatric taxonomies or an exhaustive critique of them. We hope that it will accomplish a few modest functions, including bringing some shock of the new. In the Forward, Allen Frances warns of the danger of reifying diagnostic concepts - treating mental disorders as concrete things rather than useful abstractions or constructs. Instead of reifying classification, we intend this book to expand the conceptual scope of it - to be a long essay on the many possibilities of psychiatric classification. Indeed, we conceive an important task of good science to be the uncovering and elaboration of alternative ways of making sense of things, including scientific things themselves.

There are certain 'hard cases' of weakness of will that seem to occur, indeed to be common, but are very difficult to give a non-paradoxical account of. It is just not clear how they are possible. This paper is largely an attempt to get... more

There are certain 'hard cases' of weakness of will that seem to occur, indeed to be common, but are very difficult to give a non-paradoxical account of. It is just not clear how they are possible. This paper is largely an attempt to get them in focus. What conditions must such weak-willed actions satisfy? In what sense must they be intentional, for example? And must the weak-willed agent thinks his action objectively worse than some alternative action open to him? And must that alternative action actually be open to him? The paper concludes by considering the condition that a clear case of weakness of will must be in certain sense non-procrastinatory and this turns out to be particularly difficult to satisfy. Other explanations, ones that do not postulate weakness of will (though they may involve paradoxes of their own), always seem to be available.

Chinese translation of Haack, Defending Science---Within Reason (2003)

El objetivo de esta obra es triple: i) presentar al lector las traducciones al castellano de los textos más relevantes de las distintas teorías de la verdad desarrolladas en el siglo XX y principios del siglo XXI; ii) exponerlas de manera... more

El objetivo de esta obra es triple: i) presentar al lector las traducciones al castellano de los textos más relevantes de las distintas teorías de la verdad desarrolladas en el siglo XX y principios del siglo XXI; ii) exponerlas de manera organizada en siete grupos bien definidos: teorías de la correspondencia, pro-oracionales, fenomenológicas, hermenéuticas, coherenciales, pragmatistas e intersubjetivas; iii) poner de relieve mediante dicha división la idea de que la verdad es un concepto multifacético y que, por tanto, una adecuada aproximación a su problemática ha de incluir las diversas perspectivas que comprende. Palabras clave: correspondentismo, pro-oracionalismo, fenomenología, hermenéutica, pragmatismo, intersubjetivismo.

Empiricism has frequently been said to appeal to non-empirical principles to defend empirical knowledge, which is why it has been accused of falling into some form of self-refutation. With the advent of logical empiricism, this objection... more

Empiricism has frequently been said to appeal to non-empirical principles to defend empirical knowledge, which is why it has been accused of falling into some form of self-refutation. With the advent of logical empiricism, this objection became a questioning of the empiricist criterion of meaning, noting that since it is neither a logical nor an empirical proposition, it does not fulfill its own conditions of meaningfulness. This paper intends to show that, within logical empiricism, responses to this criticism have been developed, which are consistent enough to resist the objection of self-refutation. In addition, the paper claims that the assertion that the empiricist criterion of meaning is self-refuting is based on an inadequate understanding of the linguistic levels involved in its formulation, as well as on some unspecified assumptions regarding its status.

The canonical Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox faces a problem: it entails that black non-ravens disconfirm the hypothesis that all ravens are black. I provide a new solution that avoids this problem. On my solution, black ravens... more

The canonical Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox faces a problem: it entails that black non-ravens disconfirm the hypothesis that all ravens are black. I provide a new solution that avoids this problem. On my solution, black ravens confirm that all ravens are black, while non-black non-ravens and black non-ravens are neutral. My approach is grounded in certain relations of epistemic dependence, which, in turn, are grounded in the fact that the kind raven is more natural than the kind black. The solution applies to any generalization “All F’s are G” in which F is more natural than G.

I argue that Carl Hempel's pioneering work on scientific explanation introduced an assumption which Hempel never motivated, namely that explanation is an aim of science. Ever since, it largely remained unquestioned in analytic philosophy... more

I argue that Carl Hempel's pioneering work on scientific explanation introduced an assumption which Hempel never motivated, namely that explanation is an aim of science. Ever since, it largely remained unquestioned in analytic philosophy of science. By expanding the historical scope of the debate on explanation to philosophers from the first half of the 20 th century, I show that the debate should include a critical reflection on Hempel's assumption. This reflection includes two problems: how to motivate one's position on the aims of scientific knowledge and how to decide which examples count as expressions of those aims.

Davidson and Kolnai in different ways emphasise that practical syllogistic reasoning can only tell one that one has a reason to do or not to do something. It cannot adjudicate between conflicting reasons. It can tell one the means to... more

Davidson and Kolnai in different ways emphasise that practical syllogistic reasoning can only tell one that one has a reason to do or not to do something. It cannot adjudicate between conflicting reasons. It can tell one the means to certain ends but not which ends to pursue. This paper considers possible responses to this predicament. What if anything can be done to put deliberation - the 'weighing' of competing reasons - on a rational basis?

In response to Allen Frances’ DSM in Philosophyland: Curiouser and Curiouser, we agree that diagnostic classification must steer between the Scylla of naïve biological realism and the Charybdis of social constructionism, or alternatively,... more

In response to Allen Frances’ DSM in Philosophyland: Curiouser and Curiouser, we agree that diagnostic classification must steer between the Scylla of naïve biological realism and the Charybdis of social constructionism, or alternatively, logical empriricism and post-modernism (Frances’ First and Third Umpires). But in what way does Frances’ pragmatic compromise (his Second Umpire) provide a solution? Perhaps merely asserting that psychiatrists should be driven by consensus, reliability in diagnosis, or a common language (“calling them as I see them”) is not enough. The pragmatic definition of mental disorders (“forging a common language rather than a common truth”) as ““what clinicians treat” invites circularity. After all, it still begs the essential question, what kind of entities are mental disorders? As Mishara (1994) argued, to the extent that DSM-III and the following DSMs base their putatively reliable descriptions of mental disorders on everyday language, then folk psychological and other kinds of assumptions, including metaphysical assumptions, creep into the classification system. In their neo-Kraeplinian zeal for reliable diagnosis, DSM-III advocates (Umpire I) had overlooked that the Hempelian approach they adopted was only one approach that neglected more phenomenologic approaches (Schwartz and Wiggins, 1987), e.g., Jaspers, Conrad and Ey (see below).
Even Gerald Klerman, “the highest-ranking psychiatrist in the federal government at the time,” who had at first appraised the movement from the DSM-I and II to the DSM-III as a “victory for science,” later revised his view that DSM-III was largely “a political document” (cited by Mayes and Horwitz (2005). That is, by adopting Hempel’s logical empirical approach to science, the neo-Kraeplinians’ presumable “revolution” in conceptualizing and classifying mental disorders actually pre-empted alternative approaches, which were philosophically informed, but in a manner different than Hempel, that is, the German tradition of philosophic phenomenology. In fact, the German phenomenological psychiatrist, Jaspers (1963) had written that to the extent that psychiatry ignores philosophy, it is inevitable undone by it in one way or another.

The article applies K. Hempel’s logical scheme for full-fledged academic explanation of the origin and flourishing of humanism in the Northern Italy city-states (15th–16th centuries). Large consolidated continuous ideological movements... more

The article applies K. Hempel’s logical scheme for full-fledged academic explanation of the origin and flourishing of humanism in the Northern Italy city-states (15th–16th centuries). Large consolidated continuous ideological movements (including Italian humanism) arise not randomly but because of combined circumstances in various social spheres (from geopolitics to everyday practices). Author’s formulation of the “universal hypothesis” (for genesis of any cultural movements) uses Toynbееаn “challenge-response” scheme, the principle of positive reinforcement of successful response strategies, the concepts of legitimacy, social movements, and resource mobilization. The genesis of Italian humanism is conceptualized as a macro-event with a fixed set of well-known ideological characteristics (anthropocentrism, activism, the “renaissance” of Roman and Greek classics, hedonism, faith in magic, etc). Initial data include main challenges-threats and challenges-opportunities for the
Italian elites and the papacy, characteristics of affordable cultural capital (Latin and Greek “antiquities”).
Also ensuing cultural strategies were successful. The movement gained sources of replenishment by young newcomers, rich high-ranking patrons with plenty of cultural resources. Non-institutionalized channels of vertical mobility were open in diplomacy, papal bureaucracy, commerce, literacy, art, and education. The correspondence of these initial data for the late 15th century Italy with the universal hypothesis premises means an obligatory appearance of macro-events: emergence and flourishing of humanism as a cultural movement with given characteristics.
В статье применена схема К. Гемпеля к объяснению расцвета гуманизма в городах-государствах северной Италии (XV–XVI вв.). Подобные идейные течения (в их числе итальянский гуманизм) не бывают случайными и получают широкое признание вследствие стечения обстоятельств в разных социальных сферах (от геополитики до практик повседневности). В формулировке «универсальной гипотезы» (для генезиса любых культурных движений) использованы схема «вызов-ответ» А. Тойнби, принцип положительного подкрепления успешных стратегий, концепции легитимности, социальных движений и мобилизации ресурсов. Генезис итальянского гуманизма концептуализирован как макрособытие с фиксированным набором идейных характеристик. Приведены основные вызовы-угрозы и вызовы-возможности для итальянских элит и папства, характеристики доступного культурного капитала – латинских и греческих «древностей», подтвержден успех ответных культурных стратегий, показаны источники пополнения движения участниками, патронами и меценатами, культурными ресурсами, открытость неинституализированных каналов вертикальной мобильности. Соответствие данных об Италии второй половины XV в. компонентам универсальной гипотезы означает закономерность макрособытия – появления и расцвета гуманизма как культурного движения с заданными характеристиками

Most recent discussions of classification and diagnosis in psychiatry ignore the underlying methodologic and philosophic issues. The authors directly address these issues by redefining a classical approach that was already employed in... more

Most recent discussions of classification and diagnosis in psychiatry ignore the underlying methodologic and philosophic issues. The authors directly address these issues by redefining a classical approach that was already employed in psychiatry by Karl Jaspers in his General Psychopathology, This conceptual approach, termed .'ideal types," was first developed by the sociologist Max Weber. Many diagnostic entities of clinical psychiatry, such as schizophrenia, manic-depressive illness, and the various neuroses and personality disorders, can be best conceived, the authors argue, as ideal types. After contrasting ideal types with monothetic and polythetic concepts, the authors show how ideal types provide a scientific vocabulary that is capable of both guiding the practice of the clinician and of structuring the investigations of the Researcher.

Introduction: In their book, The Perspectives of Psychiatry, Paul R. McHugh and Phillip R. Slavney propose four basic perspectives to undergird and inform the practice of psychiatry. These are the perspectives of diseases, dimensions,... more

Introduction: In their book, The Perspectives of Psychiatry, Paul R. McHugh and Phillip R. Slavney propose four basic perspectives to undergird and inform the practice of psychiatry. These are the perspectives of diseases, dimensions, behaviors, and life stories. The authors redescribe these four perspectives in terms of their underlying " logics " : law-governed causality, comparative and quantitative concepts, teleology, and narrative, respectively. After explicating the general nature of a psychiatric perspective, the authors show how such a perspectivism can resolve disputes concerning the different methods of psychiatry and how it can avoid the shortsightedness of sectarianism.

Nosology has become a widely discussed topic in psychiatry with the appearance of DSM-III. Most current treatments of diagnostic categorization, however, presuppose a particular philosophy of science: logical empiricism. Ideas of Carl G.... more

Nosology has become a widely discussed topic in psychiatry with the appearance of DSM-III. Most current treatments of diagnostic categorization, however, presuppose a particular philosophy of science: logical empiricism. Ideas of Carl G. Hempel, a leading proponent of logical empiricism. can be shown to illuminate the contemporary classification of mental disorders. Moreover, the importance attached by many prominent psychiatrists to operational definitions in nosology can be seen to grow from logical empiricist roots. Even the etiology of mental disorders can be placed within a logical empiricist framework. We describe this logical empiricist position in order to prepare for alternative approaches to classification.

¿Qué es, qué debe ser, según la racionalidad científica, una explicación? La presente ponencia se ocupa de tratar de dar una respuesta a esta pregunta, excluyendo de partida las explicaciones de índole probabilística o teleológica. La... more

¿Qué es, qué debe ser, según la racionalidad científica, una explicación? La presente ponencia se ocupa de tratar de dar una respuesta a esta pregunta, excluyendo de partida las explicaciones de índole probabilística o teleológica. La tesis que se defenderá es que lo que se entiende por explicación científica desde Galileo (aquello que Von Wright denomina, justamente, “explicación galileana”, frente a la “aristotélica”) no cumple los requisitos que diversos filósofos (como Leibniz, con su idea de “explicación total”, ya antecedida en ciertos pasajes de Platón o en las exigencias epistemológicas del propio Descartes) han considerado imprescindibles si hemos de darnos por satisfechos racionalmente con una explicación. Por ello, las explicaciones de la ciencia actual pueden aspirar como máximo a considerarse ejemplos de lo que Hempel y Oppenheim denominan “explicación por subsunción” (bajo una ley general), o hacerse equivaler a “predicciones” (como quisieron los neopositivistas lógicos); pero no reputarse ejemplos paradigmáticos del ejercicio de la racionalidad, como quisiera a menudo cierto cientificismo.

... founding of several impressive, interdisciplinary journals (ie Journal of Consciousness Studies and dealing ... is phenomenological, ie that there is a subjective experience of consciousness which goes ... A structural/functional... more

... founding of several impressive, interdisciplinary journals (ie Journal of Consciousness Studies and dealing ... is phenomenological, ie that there is a subjective experience of consciousness which goes ... A structural/functional account is unable to bridge the 'conceptual gap' that the ...

I argue that Carl Hempel’s pioneering work on scientific explanation introduced an assumption which Hempel never motivated, namely that explanation is an aim of science. Ever since, it largely remained unquestioned in analytic philosophy... more

I argue that Carl Hempel’s pioneering work on scientific explanation introduced an assumption which Hempel never motivated, namely that explanation is an aim of science. Ever since, it largely remained unquestioned in analytic philosophy of science. By expanding the historical scope of the debate on explanation to philosophers from the first half of the 20th century, I show that the debate should include a critical reflection on Hempel’s assumption. This reflection includes two problems: how to motivate one’s position on the aims of scientific knowledge and how to decide which examples count as expressions of those aims.

In this paper I argue that understanding is an indispensable epistemic procedure when historians use texts as evidence. On my account understanding installs a norm that determines what kind of event or object a texts is evidence of.... more

In this paper I argue that understanding is an indispensable epistemic procedure when historians use texts as evidence. On my account understanding installs a norm that determines what kind of event or object a texts is evidence of. Historians can debate which norms should govern over a body of texts, and if they reach consensus, they can use those texts as an empirical constraint over their historical claims. I argue that texts cannot perform this constraining function without understanding – it is thus indispensable. In order to argue for this position I first discuss two available accounts of textual evidence in analytic philosophy of science by Kosso and Hurst. Both defend a coherentist position. I show that their coherentist position is flawed by applying it to the famous case of Lucien Febvre's argument that François Rabelais was not an atheist. Through my description of the case I point out that a coherence between texts leaves the debate concerning Rabelais' religious beliefs underdetermined, even though this should not be necessary. I argue that my account of understanding better captures the actual reasoning with texts by Febvre. In the final section of the paper I show that the two most famous accounts of understanding in analytic philosophy by Hempel and Taylor either ignore the epistemic indispensability of understanding, or the actual success of evidentiary reasoning in the historical sciences that was enabled by understanding.

In its ruling in Daubert (1993) the US Supreme Court made a foray into philosophy of science. It managed, Haack argues, to introduce two important confusions: of the reliable with the scientific, and of Pooper's philosophy of science... more

In its ruling in Daubert (1993) the US Supreme Court made a foray into philosophy of science. It managed, Haack argues, to introduce two important confusions: of the reliable with the scientific, and of Pooper's philosophy of science with Hempel's quite different approach.

Die evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie ist nach dem Verständnis ihrer Vertreter eine naturwissenschaftlich wohlfundierte Theorie, welche über den von ihr beanspruchten wissenschaftlichen Erfolg hinaus - dem Nachweis einer Evolution der... more

Die evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie ist nach dem Verständnis ihrer Vertreter eine naturwissenschaftlich wohlfundierte Theorie, welche über den von ihr beanspruchten wissenschaftlichen Erfolg hinaus - dem Nachweis einer Evolution der Erkenntnisfähigkeiten von den niedersten Organismen bis Zum Menschen - zwei grundlegende Folgerungen aus ihr zu ihren Gunsten in Anschlag bringt: 1. Eine 'kopernikanische Wende' in der Philosophie durch die Lösung einiger uralter Rätsel der Vernunft, und zwar: "das Problem der Realität, .... des induktiven Schliessens, unserer Haltung zur Kausalität, Raum und Zeit, die Kantschen Apriori der reinen Vernunft und das Apriori der Zwecke unserer Urteilskraft" (Riedl) 2. Eine Rückbesinnung darauf, daß die Entgegensetzung Geist versus Natur im Menschen, die einseitige Ausbildung der instrumentellen Vernunft des Menschen zu katastrophalen Folgen für die Lebensbe-dingungen aller biologischen Arten (einschließlich des Menschen) auf unserem Planeten geführt hat. Bis dahin will ich, fortiter in modo et in re, der evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie ihren wissenschaftlichen wie philosophischen Anspruch in folgenden sieben Schritten bestreiten: 1 Die evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie ist keine naturwissenschaftliche Theorie, sondern ein philosophischer Entwurf. 2 Als philosophische Theorie vertritt sie einen naturalistischen Realismus, dem das Epitheton 'hypothetisch' nicht sinnvoll zuzuordnen ist. 3 Eine Analyse der Erklärung der Kategorie 'Kausalität' durch die evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie zeigt deren Widersprüchlichkeit. 4 Das Prinzip 'Fulguration' der evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie leistet nicht, was es soll. 5 Eine durchgeführte evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie hebt sich selbst auf. 6 Die evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie ist ungeeignet, ihre eigenen ethischen Forderungen zu stützen. 7 Nur durch eine Umkehr im Begründungsverhältnis zwischen Philosophie und Evolutionstheorie kann diesen Forderungen Genüge geleistet werden.