Libya rebels Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

The "Arab Spring" which first broke out in Tunisia and disseminated to many countries in the Arab world has become one of the most actual topics of the international political agenda in the recent years. The protests that began against... more

The "Arab Spring" which first broke out in Tunisia and disseminated to many countries in the Arab world has become one of the most actual topics of the international political agenda in the recent years. The protests that began against the Gaddafi regime after the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt led the opponents to unite under a single umbrella in a short time and form the main opposition in the country. The opponents which first came to the fore with civilian protest movements then continued their struggle against the government with armed attacks. In this article we are going to analyse the ―Arab Spring‖ in Libya which broke out in February 2011 leaving its mark that year and investigate the positive and negative effects.

In "Gheddafi: le mia verità", il raìs illustra la sua dottrina politica e sociale. Si tratta di un testo ideologico, pensato per masse incolte, in larga parte ispirato alla tradizione socialista, che attinge a piene mani dal pensiero... more

In "Gheddafi: le mia verità", il raìs illustra la sua dottrina politica e sociale. Si tratta di un testo ideologico, pensato per masse incolte, in larga parte ispirato alla tradizione socialista, che attinge a piene mani dal pensiero filosofico e politico degli ultimi 2.500 anni, adattando teorie elaborate dai maggiori pensatori del passato. Il Colonnello espone la Terza teoria universale, che vorrebbe essere alternativa al capitalismo, ma anche al socialismo, esattamente come il fascismo nel Novecento. L’obiettivo è la costruzione di uno Stato totalitario, nel quale la nazione viene ad essere identificata indirettamente con il legame di sangue del clan o del gruppo gentilizio allargato che fa riferimento alla famiglia del leader della Jamahiriya. Il raìs affronta il problema della democrazia e del potere del popolo, attaccando l’istituto del parlamentarismo ed il sistema dei partiti. Gheddafi si sforza di dimostrare l’inutilità di tutti gli istituti tipici della rappresentanza democratica, compreso il referendum e la Costituzione, per giungere all’assunto di uno Stato senza diritto, nel quale l’unica fonte della legge è la sharia. Il leader libico propugna un sistema di democrazia diretta su imitazione dei Soviet, nel quale il popolo è l’unico titolare del potere politico. L’uomo forte di Tripoli nega spazio a qualsiasi forma di iniziativa privata: i mezzi di informazione, così come le organizzazioni e le attività sportive, e tutta l’economia, devono essere demandati alla gestione statale. Aberrante la posizione sulla donna, che viene considerata alla stregua di un mammifero destinato alla riproduzione, negando ad essa il diritto al lavoro. In "Gheddafi: le mia verità" è condensata la summa theologica in salsa maghrebina del raìs di Tripoli, con il commento inedito del prof. Marco Marsili.

This article details the life of Libyan General Khalifa Hiftar based on a close reading of historical Arabic sources. It details his links with the CIA, his fallout with Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi and his participation in the... more

This article details the life of Libyan General Khalifa Hiftar based on a close reading of historical Arabic sources. It details his links with the CIA, his fallout with Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi and his participation in the Libyan revolution and its aftermath

Based on my theory, I expected that the number of fatalities was caused by strong Islamist factions in the period 2011-2015. This paper shows that Islamist factions did play a huge role in the number of fatalities and violence in Tunisia,... more

Based on my theory, I expected that the number of fatalities was caused by strong Islamist factions in the period 2011-2015. This paper shows that Islamist factions did play a huge role in the number of fatalities and violence in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, but they are not necessarily the one and only cause. This conclusion seems plausible, even though the conclusion comes with some uncertainties as a result of incomplete and untrustworthy data. Tunisia was democratic and less violent during the period 2011-2015. Violence increased when the Islamist Ennahda party governed the country, trying to find a midway between democratic and Islamist ideals. This lack of clear direction caused some moderates and Islamists to turn their backs on the party, while Islamists became more militant. Egypt saw a massive increase of violence since 2013, correlating with the military coup by general Al-Sisi against the democratically elected president Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. Libya became a tribal civil war in 2011. Supported by the UN and other foreign powers Ghaddafi was deposed. The deposition of dictator Ghaddafi gave the necessary chaotic environment for Islamists to organize and grow in strength. They became increasingly violent since 2014, triggering a second civil war when a protest of moderate secularists and Islamists became violent on the famous Martyr’s Square. Libya started to resemble its Egyptian counterpart, because a moderate-Islamist divide came on top of existing tribal cleavages. Islamists gained strength as the amount of militants and territorial gains in Libya increased. The Arab Spring in these three countries started to develop into an Islamist fall, especially in Egypt and Libya. Violence and fatalities are not necessarily caused by Islamist strength alone. In Tunisia and Egypt it had more to do with their belief in transforming society on Islamic principles. In Libya a new Islamist-moderate divide is only more clearly visible since 2014, while tribal violence and fatalities were already tearing the country apart since 2011.

In this exchange in International Security, I contest Barbara Walter's thesis that groups like ISIS benefit from being super extreme. I argue that extremism is counterproductive -- a point developed in far greater detail in my book, Rules... more

In this exchange in International Security, I contest Barbara Walter's thesis that groups like ISIS benefit from being super extreme. I argue that extremism is counterproductive -- a point developed in far greater detail in my book, Rules for Rebels, which comes out in fall 2018.

The Arab Spring is not a united experience. The intention of this paper is to acknowledge that Libya and Syria constitute two distinctive cases within the 2011 Arab uprisings. To understand why two different outcomes have occurred we must... more

The Arab Spring is not a united experience. The intention of this paper is to acknowledge that Libya and Syria constitute two distinctive cases within the 2011 Arab uprisings. To understand why two different outcomes have occurred we must first look to the historical context which preceded the conflicts in 2011. These contexts – their economies and civil societies, military and social compositions – provide us with a better understanding of why they represent different cases. Libya and Syria where not the same before the Arab uprisings began. Libya’s closed society and state subsidised economy, coupled with a divided and easily fragmented military/security framework stood in contrast to Syria’s quickly but unevenly liberalizing economy, shifting support base and strong and united military component. The first part of this paper will explore these contexts. The second section will examine how these contexts provided for two very different uprisings, specifically looking at two key factors: the composition of the rebels and their territoriality, and the international response to the uprisings. In both cases we see different outcomes.

The arming of rebel groups is one of the most notable ways that states attempt to realise their foreign policy goals. This was especially obvious during the Arab Spring, during which various states supplied arms to the rebel movements in... more

The arming of rebel groups is one of the most notable ways that states attempt to realise their foreign policy goals. This was especially obvious during the Arab Spring, during which various states supplied arms to the rebel movements in Libya and Syria. Yet, despite its frequency and political importance, there has been very little engagement with the ethical issues surrounding the arming of rebels. This article aims to address this lacuna. It considers if and when it is morally permissible to arm rebels. It presents two central arguments. The first is that arming the rebels typically leads to several notable problems and so is generally impermissible. The second is that arming the rebels can nevertheless permissible in exceptional cases, including even when the rebels are engaged in unjust wars. The final part of the article considers the relation between these two arguments and its import for the ethics of war.

The election of Khaled al-Mishri, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, to the chairman of the High Council of State (HCS) will bring new dynamics in the dialogue between the east and west of Libya, especially in the context of Haftar’s... more

The election of Khaled al-Mishri, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, to the chairman of the High Council of State (HCS) will bring new dynamics in the dialogue between the east and west of Libya, especially in the context of Haftar’s ongoing treatment in Paris and the uncertainty regarding his
current health status. Haftar has not been seen in public in the last few weeks.
The killing of two high-ranking al-Qaeda commanders in an US-airstrike in the southern city of Ubari is an expression of the US strategy in Libya, which does merely go beyond isolated air strikes against terror networks. The ongoing construction of a US drone base in Agadez, Niger, can be explained in
this context, particularly due to the Islamic State and al-Qaeda establishing a permanent foothold in southern Libya.
The clashes in the outskirts of the capital of the Fezzan, Sebha, are continuing since several weeks, causing dozens of victims. Numerous attempts to establish a sustainable ceasefire failed. Simultaneously, the LNA launched Operation Law Enforcement in southern Libya, which is directed against foreign militias, and deployed troops to Kufra and the surroundings of Sebha.
The number of migrants passing Libya decreased significantly since February 2018. Nevertheless, dozens died trying to reach Europe.

Ο ανταγωνισμός για την επόμενη ημέρα στη Λιβύη, αυξάνεται εκθετικά. Η Τουρκία και η Αίγυπτος είναι οι δύο χώρες οι οποίες κυρίως συνδράµουν τις δύο πλευρές του εµφυλίου. Μάλιστα, τον τελευταίο χρόνο η Λιβύη έχει γίνει το μεγαλύτερο θέατρο... more

Ο ανταγωνισμός για την επόμενη ημέρα στη Λιβύη, αυξάνεται εκθετικά. Η Τουρκία και η Αίγυπτος είναι οι δύο χώρες οι οποίες κυρίως συνδράµουν τις δύο πλευρές του εµφυλίου. Μάλιστα, τον τελευταίο χρόνο η Λιβύη έχει γίνει το μεγαλύτερο θέατρο επιχειρήσεων πολλαπλών δρώντων, μία μεγάλης έκτασης διαμάχη δι' αντιπροσώπων στην οποία δύο είναι οι βασικές εµπλεκόµενες πλευρές: Από την µία η Τουρκία, η οποία στηρίζει τη διεθνώς αναγνωρισμένη κυβέρνηση Σαράτζ (GNA), απέναντι στον συνασπισμό της Αιγύπτου, των Ηνωμένων Αραβικών Εμιράτων και της Ρωσίας, που στηρίζουν τον αυτοαποκαλούμενο "στρατάρχη" Χαλίφα Χαφτάρ (LNA).

• 08.09: The UN special envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salamé, announced the return of UNSMIL to Tripoli and negated former statements that blue helmets will be deployed to Libya. • 13.09: The exterior minister of the Arab League asked the UN to... more

• 08.09: The UN special envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salamé, announced the return of UNSMIL to Tripoli and negated former statements that blue helmets will be deployed to Libya.
• 13.09: The exterior minister of the Arab League asked the UN to unfreeze libyan assets abroad and make them available to the Presidential Council (PC). Serraj called for the same thing at the UN general assembly.