Nash Bargaining Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

This paper develops and simulates a model of emergence of networks in an interbank, RTGS payment system. A number of banks, faced with random streams of payment orders, choose whether to link directly to the payment system, or to use a correspondent bank. Settling payments directly via the system imposes liquidity costs, which depend on the maximum liquidity overdraft incurred during the day. On the other hand, using a correspondent entails paying a flat fee, charged by the correspondent to recoup liquidity costs and to extract a profit. We specify a protocol whereby banks sequentially choose whether to link directly to the system or to become clients of other banks, thus generating a client-correspondent network. We calibrate our model on real data on the UK payment system, and we compare the networks it produces with i) the true client-correspondent network, ii) the outcomes of two ‘dummy' benchmark models. The model is found to outperform the benchmarks. Its predicted network...

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- Business, Agent Based Simulation, Networks, Agent-Based Computational Economics

ABSTRACT. This paper critically reviews Ken Binmore's non-utilitarian and game theoretic solution to the Arrow problem. Binmore's solution belongs to the same family as Rawls' maximin criterion and requires the use of Nash... more

- by Mohammed Dore
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- Economics, Game Theory, Social Justice, Decision And Game Theory
- by Sylvia Nasar
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- Game Theory, Mental Illness, Motion Pictures, Riemannian Geometry
- by Elizabeth Hoffman
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- Law, Economics, Distributive Justice, Experimental Study

This paper aims at examining the interaction between unemployment and inter-regional mobility in the presence of asymmetric productivity shocks. We present an intertemporal two-regions equilibrium model where unemployed workers can migrate from one region to another. The hiring process is represented by a matching function a la Pissarides. We also analyse the wage setting procedure by introducing Nash bargaining between firms and employees. We compare two extremely different scenarios. The case where there is no mobility with unemployment persistence versus the same economy where perfect mobility is assumed. This paper also studied different types of asymmetries such as changes in "unemployment benefits" and/or the cost of posting vacancies. We show the importance of these changes to explain regional unemployment disparities.Finally, we calibrate the model for Spain and we analyse the relevance of the model in explaining regional disparities and inter-regional labour force...

- by Raquel Fonseca
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- Economics, Migration, Nash Bargaining

When John Nash won the Nobel prize in economics in 1994, many people were surprised to learn that he was alive and well. Since then, Sylvia Nasar's celebrated biography A Beautiful Mind, the basis of a new major motion picture, has revealed the man. The Essential John Nash reveals his work--in his own words. This book presents, for the first time, the full range of Nash's diverse contributions not only to game theory, for which he received the Nobel, but to pure mathematics--from Riemannian geometry and partial differential equations--in which he commands even greater acclaim among academics. Included are nine of Nash's most influential papers, most of them written over the decade beginning in 1949. From 1959 until his astonishing remission three decades later, the man behind the concepts "Nash equilibrium" and "Nash bargaining"--concepts that today pervade not only economics but nuclear strategy and contract talks in major league sports--had lived...

- by Sylvia Nasar
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- Game Theory, Mental Illness, Motion Pictures, Riemannian Geometry

The paper examines the two basic research questions. First, the paper tries to attempt to study how a woman’s tendency to invest in safer investment projects can be linked to her desire to raise her bargaining position in the households. Second, in addition to the project choice, women empowerment is examined with respect to control of savings, control of income, control over loans, control over purchasing capacity and family planning in some sample household in Hooghly district of West Bengal. The analytical framework of underlined the study is based on Nash bargaining game theoretic model. The first part is based on two household members make a few non co-operative production decision regarding a credit contract and risky business projects. This is also an empirical study based on 100 SHG members in the Hooghly district, West Bengal in 2006. The empirical findings show that the empowerment of women is established in weak form using the above indicators. This paper has important po...

- by Jyotish Prakash Basu
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- Economic Growth, West Bengal, Empirical Study, Family Planning
- by Elizabeth Caucutt
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- Market Segmentation, Product Distribution, Government Policy, Nash Bargaining

In this article, we aim to illustrate evolutionary explanations for the emergence of framing effects, discussed in detail in Cristina Bicchieri's The Grammar of Society. We show how framing effects might evolve which coalesce two economically distinct interactions into a single one, leading to apparently irrational behavior in each individual interaction. Here we consider the now well-known example of the

- by Cristina Bicchieri
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- Social Psychology, Political Science, Evolutionary Game Theory, Framing effect
- by David Flath
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- Economics, Applied Economics, Bargaining Power, Nash Bargaining

As a proxy for a Pareto-efficient market economy, we adopt the two-party Nash Bargaining model featuring a qualitative bias in the treatment of the contributions of the parties. The Piketty inequality here is the share in total welfare accruing to the richer party over total welfare attained at agreement point. We show that this inequality can never exceed the inequality in initial contributions if the qualitative bias is zero. The rising Piketty inequality requires that the qualitative bias exceed a positive threshold. The Piketty trajectory emerges if the qualitative bias oscillates around the threshold due to changing social and economic environment.

- by John Hey
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- Experiments, Nash Bargaining

The hospital competition literature shows that estimates of the effect of local market structure (concentration) on pricing (competition) are sensitive to geographic market definition. Our spatial lag model approach effects smoothing of the explanatory variables across the discrete market boundaries, resulting in robust estimates of the impact of market structure on hospital pricing, which can be used to estimate the

- by T. Frech
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- Spatial econometrics, Market Structure, Applied Economics, Price Competition
- by Christian Borgs
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- Economic Theory, Convergence, Network, Dynamics
- by yigal gerchak
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- Applied Mathematics, Economics, Game Theory, Supply Chain Management

Nash's (1950) bargaining solution was axiomatized on a domain of convex problems, where the rationalizability of a bargaining solution raises some technical difficulties. Recently, however, the convexity assumption has been... more

- by James Albrecht
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- Economics, Unemployment Duration, Matching, Labor Market
- by Walter Trockel
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- Economic Theory, Nashbargaining solution, Nash Bargaining

The class of bargaining solutions that are defined on the domain of finite sets of alterna- tives and satisfy Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Covariance (COV), is characterized. These solutions select from the set of max- imizers of a nonsymmetric Nash product - i.e., from a nonsymmetric (multi-valued) Nash bargaining solution - according to a specific decomposition of the indifference curves of this Nash product. We use this characterization in two ways. First, we derive consequences on this domain and on larger domains of compact (non-convex) bargaining problems, and show that most results in the literature are special cases and consequences of our central results - in particular by adding continuity or symmetry axioms. Second, since the conti- nuity axiom prevents nontrivial selections from the Nash bargaining solutions, we use the Axiom of Choice to construct for example non-single-valued discontinuous WPO, IIA and COV bargaining s...

- by Dries Vermeulen
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- Set Theory, Mathematical Economics, Scientific, Publication
- by Javier Ortega
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- Economics, Economic, Nash Bargaining
- by Qian Lv
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- Game Theory, Computer Networks, Nonlinear Programming, Network Economics
- by Leo Sleuwaegen
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- Business, Foreign Direct Investment, Tax Policy, Profitability
- by Francesca Marzo
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- Computer Science, Machine Learning, Computer Model, Human behavior

Abstract: We consider a one-sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and propose a model for the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. Our dynamical model is local, involving iterative updates of'offers' based on estimated best alternative matches, in the spirit of pairwise Nash bargaining. We establish that when a balanced outcome (a generalization of the pairwise Nash bargaining solution to networks) exists, our dynamics converges rapidly to such an outcome. We extend our results to the ...

- by Christian Borgs
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- Game Theory, Economic Theory, Nashbargaining solution, Multiagent System
- by Elias Yaacoub
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- Game Theory, Complexity Theory, Energy Consumption, Wireless Network

This paper provides a theoretical view of the central-local relationships in China. Decentralization and the autonomy of local governments have been a crucial element for the reform process. These intergovernmental …scal relations have been changing since 1978 and they are founded on a bargaining process. We propose a model, based on the Nash Bargaining Solution, to formalize some mecanisms of tax sharing. We try to understand the consequences of (horizontal and vertical) …scal competition on repartition of tax collection.

- by Gregoire Rota
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- Local governance, Nashbargaining solution, Nash Bargaining
- by Edi Karni
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- Economics, Social Policy, Social Justice, Mathematical Sciences

- by Serge Svizzero
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- Stability, Price Elasticity, Business Cycle, Imperfect Competition

- by Jon Strand
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- Economics, Applied Economics, Public Good, Contingent valuation
- by RAQUEL SALAZAR
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- Business, Conflict Resolution, Water Resources Management, Multidisciplinary

We investigate how imperfect competition affects the occurence and properties of endogenous business cycles with underemployment in an overlapping generations model. We consider a competitive product market in association with an imperfect labour market. The latter is presented in two variants. These differ from each other by the game-theoretical concepts used in the description of market equilibria, namely the cooperative concept of Nash-Bargaining and the noncooperative concept of Nash-Cournot. Although they are different, both cases admit the union-monopoly as a limit case. We show that the existence of cycles depends on the degree of market power. Our results are illustrated for specific preferences and technology.

- by Serge Svizzero
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- Stability, Price Elasticity, Business Cycle, Imperfect Competition

Background and objective: The location of facilities is of great importance in healthcare and is of interest to researchers due to its importance. In this regard, a large proportion of classic location-allocation models concentrate on solving problems in an exclusive environment (non-competitive), but this assumption is rarely true in reality. Methods: At first, a basic Non-Competitive Location Model (NCLM) is presented. Then, a Competitive Location Model (CLM) is developed based on the initial model. This study proposes a multi-objective integer programming model based on Nash bargaining game. The first objective function maximizes the two-person Nash product, which in turn maximizes the total number of patients covered by the newly established healthcare centers. The second objective function minimizes the sum of distances between population centers and the newly established healthcare centers. Findings: The results obtained from applying the CLM on Tehran’s Health Centers reveale...

- by Gregoire Rota
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- Political Science, Local governance, Nashbargaining solution, Nash Bargaining

We formulate a model of household behavior in which cooperation is costly and in which these costs vary across households. Some households rationally decide to behave noncooperatively, which in our context is an efficient outcome. An intriguing feature of the model is that, while the welfare of the spouses is continuous in the state variables, labor supply decisions are not. Small changes in state variables may result in large changes in labor supplies when the household switches its mode of behavior. We estimate the model using a nationally representative sample of Italian households and find that the costly cooperation model signfificantly outperforms a noncooperative model. This suggests the possibility of attaining large gains in aggregate labor supply by adopting policies which promote cooperative household behavior.

- by Daniela Del Boca
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- Economics, Maximum Likelihood, Labor Market, Nash Equilibrium
- by Shivendu Shivendu
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- Information Systems, Management Information Systems, Privacy, Property Rights
- by Shivendu Shivendu
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- Information Systems, Management Information Systems, Privacy, Property Rights

We explore the distortions in business cycle models arising from inefficiencies in price setting and in the search process matching firms to unemployed workers, and the implications of these distortions for monetary policy. To this end, we characterize the tax instruments that would implement the first best equilibrium allocations and then examine the trade-offs faced by monetary policy when these tax instruments are unavailable. Our findings are that the welfare cost of search inefficiency can be large, but the incentive for policy to deviate from the inefficient flexible-price allocation is in general small. Sizable welfare gains are available if the steady state of the economy is inefficient, and these gains do not depend on the existence of an inefficient dispersion of wages. Finally, the gains from deviating from price stability are larger in economies with more volatile labor flows, as in the U.S.

- by Carl Walsh
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- Wage dispersion, Monetary Policy, Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Labor Market

The problem of rate control in multi-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) interference systems is formulated as a multicriteria optimization (MCO) problem. The Pareto rate region of the MCO problem is characterized. It is shown that for the convexity of the Pareto rate region it is sufficient that the interference-plus-noise covariance matrices (INCMs) of multiple users with conflicting objectives approach identity matrix. The latter can be achieved by using either orthogonal signaling, time-sharing, or interference cancellation strategies. In the case of high interference, the interference cancellation is preferable in order to increase the Pareto boundary and guarantee the convexity of the Pareto rate region. The Nash bargaining (NB) is applied to transform the MCO problem into a single-objective one. The characteristics of the NB over MIMO interference systems such as the uniqueness, existence of the NB solution, and feasibility of the NB set are investigated. When the NB s...

- by Sergiy A . Vorobyov
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- Game Theory, Information Theory, Rate Control, Multicriteria Optimization

- by Raquel Fonseca
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- Economics, Migration, Nash Bargaining

In this paper we analyze the connection between Nash bargaining and non-cooperative bargaining, the so-called Nash program, to solve the question of whether outside options should be considered as a the disagreement point.

- by Asha Sadanand
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- Game Theory, Working Papers, Nash Bargaining

- by Brian Skyrms
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- Social Psychology, Political Science, Evolutionary Game Theory, Framing effect
- by Federico Valenciano
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- Value, Nash Bargaining
- by Christian Borgs
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- Game Theory, Economic Theory, Convergence, Network