Populist Movements Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Bu kitap Cas Mudde ve Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser tarafından yazılmıştır. Popülizm kapsamında farklı konulara teorik bir çerçeve getirmeye çalışan bir Oxford serisidir. Bu kitap, hem kamuoyunda hem de akademik tartışmalarda yaygın olarak... more

Bu kitap Cas Mudde ve Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser tarafından yazılmıştır. Popülizm kapsamında farklı konulara teorik bir çerçeve getirmeye çalışan bir Oxford serisidir. Bu kitap, hem kamuoyunda hem de akademik tartışmalarda yaygın olarak kullanılan, ancak aynı zamanda çok fazla kafa karışıklığı yaratan popülizme dairdir. Kitabın temel amacı, popülizme iyi ve kısa bir giriş sağlayarak, popülizmin ne olduğunu anlamamıza izin veren ve aynı zamanda dünyanın farklı yerlerindeki popülist fenomenin bir analizini sunmaktır. Popülizmin nasıl işlediğine, dünyanın farklı yerlerinde demokratik rejim üzerindeki etkisine ilişkin özet bir metne sahip olan bu çalışma popülizm hakkında bildiklerimizi sağlamlaştırmada katkı bir değere sahiptir.

This introductory essay outlines some of the issues that surround contemporary engagements with the ‘‘popular’’ as a site of political struggle and change. This piece notes that in the 30 years since Stuart Hall published his seminal... more

This introductory essay outlines some of the issues that surround contemporary engagements with the ‘‘popular’’ as a site of political struggle and change. This piece notes that in the
30 years since Stuart Hall published his seminal essay, ‘‘Notes on Deconstructing the Popular,’’ the power relations that define the term as well as the way in which scholars study the popular have shifted in profound ways. The authors argue that, rather than simply
equating the popular with popular culture, it is necessary to recognize that the popular is a contingent term that marks the possibility of constituting forms of collective agency and the
potential for bringing about social and political change.

Depuis un quart de siècle, plusieurs partis d’extrême droite ou de la droite populiste ont opéré une percée dans leur système politique national : le Front national en France, le FPÖ en Autriche, le parti du progrès en Norvège et au... more

Depuis un quart de siècle, plusieurs partis d’extrême droite ou de la droite populiste ont opéré une percée dans leur système politique national : le Front national en France, le FPÖ en Autriche, le parti du progrès en Norvège et au Danemark, le parti populaire danois, le parti national slovaque, le Mouvement social italien-Alliance nationale, la Ligue du nord, les Republikaner, le NPD et la DVU en Allemagne, la Liste Pim Fortuyn et le parti de la Liberté aux Pays-Bas, Ataka en Bulgarie, le parti populaire de la Grande Roumanie, le Vlaams Belang et le Front national en Belgique, l’Union démocratique du Centre en Suisse, LAOS en Grèce… Au surplus, un fait politique nouveau s’est imposé ces dernières années : outre la progression électorale et politique observée par nombre de ces partis, plusieurs formations d’extrême droite ont accédé aux responsabilités gouvernementales ou ont soutenu des gouvernements de l’extérieur. Par-delà les riches travaux consacrés aux développements des partis d’extrême droite, il s’imposait donc d’analyser les conditions et les conséquences de cette nouvelle donne. Tel est l’angle d’approche de cet ouvrage, qui réunit des contributions des meilleurs spécialistes de la question. La réflexion porte sur la vie et les choix internes de ces partis. Souhaitent-ils accéder au pouvoir ? Cette question suscite-t-elle des débats difficiles ? Observe-t-on un processus de modération quand ces formations rentrent au gouvernement ? Les militants endossent-ils ce choix ? Le parti est-il sanctionné ou conforté aux élections suivantes ?... Mais elle se fixe aussi sur les dimensions extérieures à ces formations. Les thèmes portés par les partis d’extrême droite percolent-ils chez les partis démocratiques ? L’apport de l’extrême droite est-il marquant sur certains thèmes qui lui sont chers ? Embrasser l’extrême droite est-ce mieux l’étouffer ? ... A partir d’études de cas et d’approches comparées, l’ouvrage fournit des réponses inédites à ces questions contemporaines.

Based on a constructivist approach, this book offers a comparative analysis into the causes of nationalist populist politics in each of the five Nordic independent nation states. Behind the social liberal façade of the economically... more

Based on a constructivist approach, this book offers a comparative analysis into the causes of nationalist populist politics in each of the five Nordic independent nation states. Behind the social liberal façade of the economically successful, welfare-orientated Nordic states, right-wing populism has found support in the region. Such parties emerged first in Denmark and Norway in the 1970s, before becoming prominent in Sweden and Finland after the turn of the millennium and in Iceland in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, when populist parties surged throughout the Nordics. The author traces these Nationalist trails of thoughts back to the National Socialistic movements of the 1920s and 1930s (the respective Nordic version Nazi parties) and before, to the birth of the Nordic nation states in the nineteenth century following the failure of integration. Since then, as the book argues, separate nationalisms have grown strong in each of the countries. This study will appeal to students and scholars as well as wider audiences interested in European Politics, Nordic Politics, Nationalism, and Populism.

Are populist governments harbingers of foreign policy disruption? The foreign policy of western Europe's first all-out populist coalition government constitutes a good window to address this question. Italy's ‘Yellow–Green’ government's... more

Are populist governments harbingers of foreign policy disruption? The foreign policy of western Europe's first all-out populist coalition government constitutes a good window to address this question. Italy's ‘Yellow–Green’ government's decision to embrace China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2019 has been understood as an important rupture from Italy's traditional Euro-Atlantic foreign policy. On the basis of substantial empirical research, especially elite interviews and official documentation, this article finds instead continuity with previous administrations' overtures to Beijing, including non-opposition from the EU and active engagement by the bureaucratic establishment. This article makes a contribution to the study of populism and foreign policy by positing that political marketing constitutes the key intervening variable that accounts for populist governments' rhetorical differentiation to local electorate and international counterparts alike. The Italian case demonstrates that populist ‘ruptures’ may well be about style and electioneering tactics, over substance and policy strategy. Considering the still growing number of governments that decide to sign into the BRI, most lately that of Argentina, policy-makers and observers ought to assess to what extent these are real commitments, or rather a smokescreen of marketing practices that does not change the relationship between China and the target country in any substantial manner.

In recent decades, a serious number of studies have been dedicated to defining and conceptualizing populism in order to enable proper and comparative analyses of the phenomenon. They usually studied populism by reducing it to an ideology,... more

In recent decades, a serious number of studies have been dedicated to defining and conceptualizing populism in order to enable proper and comparative analyses of the phenomenon. They usually studied populism by reducing it to an ideology, discourse, or strategy and provided analytical approaches accordingly although some other approaches (style of communication, political project, etc.) are possible to come across in the relevant literature. Critically engaging with the most influential ones, this article ascertains two principal deficiencies in these bodies of work. Firstly, the minimal and generic definitions presented in these studies empty the concept to a broad extent. Secondly, most scholars assume the concentrated dimension of populism as the whole of the phenomenon and undertake its conceptualization with this assumption to a large extent. As a result of a comprehensive discussion on these main and also some secondary deficiencies, this article offers two ways to treat them. Scholars who examine populism and make comparisons between different cases can either carry out their analyses by taking the multi-layered nature of the phenomenon into account or by clearly stating the dimension of populism which they study and, in this way, limit their work to this dimension without further claims. In addition to all these, showing the inadequacy of the Sartorian approaches that dominate the literature, the article discusses that Wittgensteinian approaches can provide appropriate alternative frameworks for the conceptualization of populism.

Populism is the term which dominates every political and public discussion nowadays. However, what does one mean by “populism”? A movement? An ideology? A strategy? A communicative model? A dimension? Is populism something unitary, or is... more

Populism is the term which dominates every political and public discussion nowadays. However, what does one mean by “populism”? A movement? An ideology? A strategy? A communicative model? A dimension? Is populism something unitary, or is it liable to be divided into the classic political categories of right, centre and left, progressive and reactionary? The questions around this word seem to be endless. Also historical sciences are starting to wonder about this word. Can populism be an historic category, or not? Does a history of populism exist, and, if yes, is it a history of political movements or a history of ideas? This contribution tries to reconstruct the origin and the development of the studies of populism, the several attempts to categorize them made in the course of time by human and social sciences, and their links to the different historical periods in which they were produced, trying to arrange a discussion which is more open than ever.

Economic analysis is essential to the understanding of the rise and fall of populism. The conceptual and analytical framework of economics to the study of populism is still in its infancy, but great advances have been made in recent... more

Economic analysis is essential to the understanding of the rise and fall of populism. The conceptual and analytical framework of economics to the study of populism is still in its infancy, but great advances have been made in recent years. This paper reviews some key contributions behind this progress. When analyzing populism, economists face two methodological hurdles: lack of consensus and clarity about its definition and reconciling the populist vote with voter rationality. The former has plagued sociologists and political scientists for decades. As to the latter, it raises a conundrum: if populist policies are detrimental to economic growth, as most economists agree, the vote for a populist candidate suggests some irrationality or inefficiency in the political markets. But accepting that individuals are irrational when making political decisions, would imply that they are irrational when making economic decisions unless, of course, there is something fundamentally different about political markets. The works reviewed in this paper propose alternative approaches to address these issues. The most promising line of research in the economic analysis of populism incorporates and expands concepts developed by academics in other social sciences such as political theory, sociology, history and social psychology.

Occupy Wall Street, the Greek and Spanish indignados, and other important movements swept across the Western world from 2011 onward, redefining political and social conflict during the global economic meltdown of the Great Recession.... more

Occupy Wall Street, the Greek and Spanish indignados, and other important movements swept across the Western world from 2011 onward, redefining political and social conflict during the global economic meltdown of the Great Recession. These movements have earned well-deserved academic attention but the resulting scholarship is lacking a crucial pillar: a comparative analysis of the collective action frames employed by movement entrepreneurs. To identify the master frame at work and uncover shared processes of strategic meaning-making and collective identity construction during this transnational cycle of contention, I analyze primary data, exploring diagnostic, prognostic, and adversarial framing elements as found it the movements' widely circulated manifestos. The populist frame emerges as the master frame of the cycle, encapsulating the adversarial discourse of the dominant dichotomy of a noble " People " and a corrupt " elite " that resonated strongly with mobilized individuals and allowed movement entrepreneurs to construct a transnationally shared collective identity across populations of widely diverging social, political, and economic backgrounds.

Populist constitutionalism is an increasingly discussed topic, but so far the analysis of the interrelation between populism and constitutionalism lacks a more systematic and comparative approach, able to bring out significant variety.... more

Populist constitutionalism is an increasingly discussed topic, but so far the analysis of the interrelation between populism and constitutionalism lacks a more systematic and comparative approach, able to bring out significant variety. Most of the recent literature on the phenomenon focuses on (right-wing) populism as a threat to constitutional democracy. This Article sets out to contribute to a more comparative and comprehensive discussion of the relation between varieties of populism-situated on a continuum from left-to right-wing, but also from national to transnational-with varieties of constitutional projects. The objective of this Article is threefold. First, I argue that it is problematic to consider legal constitution-alism as exhausting the possibilities of constitutionalism. Second, if populism is reduced to right-wing projects and as an unequivocal threat to liberal democracy, it becomes difficult to distinguish between dissimilar manifestations of populist projects, in particular regarding constituent politics. Third, while hardly any attention has been paid to constitutionalism and populist claims on the transnational level, in the European context, transnational forms of populism and constituent politics manifest themselves frequently, articulating an incisive critique on the European constitutional and political status quo, and contributing to a re-imagination and democratization of the European constitutional reality. Populist constitutionalism is an increasingly discussed topic, but the interrelation between pop-ulism and constitutionalism still lacks a more systematic and comparative analysis. Much of the emerging literature on the phenomenon focuses on (right-wing) populism as a threat to constitutional democracy. 1 As such, a comparative and theoretical treatment of populist constitutionalism, which is able to deal with the different manifestations of the phenomenon, is as yet absent. In contrast to a relatively narrow focus on right-wing populism and its relation to constitutional change, this Article sets out to contribute to a more comparative and comprehensive discussion of the relation between varieties of populism-situated on a continuum from left-to right-wing, but also from national to transnational-with varieties of constitutional projects.

Today, populism has gradually become one of the most talked about, most studied phenomena, both within and beyond academia. Most studies of populism focus on its conceptualisation, operationalisation, measurement or its outcomes. However,... more

Today, populism has gradually become one of the most talked about, most studied phenomena, both within and beyond academia. Most studies of populism focus on its conceptualisation, operationalisation, measurement or its outcomes. However, adding to the growing empirical analysis of populism, we propose to study populism as a regional-level phenomenon and explain regional patterns of variation in the populist demand. To do so, we develop a series of theoretical arguments from, which we subsequently test empirically. Specifically, we argue that higher levels of regional populism demand are associated with (i) economic hardship, (ii) strong institutional autonomy, (iii) strong territorial identity, and (iv) greater distance to elites. We construct a populist index for 143 regions across nine countries and combine this with a unique and rich regional database. While we find that populism holds distinct regional patterns and there is support for classic predictors like economic hardship, we are also able to provide some unique insights into the regional foundations of populism, most notably the predictive power of regional identity and the distance to national elites.

The transformation of SYRIZA from a minor party struggling to enter parliament into a major governing party within a short period of time; its rule in the context of a severe economic crisis; and its resilience following four and a half... more

The transformation of SYRIZA from a minor party struggling to enter parliament into a major governing party within a short period of time; its rule in the context of a severe economic crisis; and its resilience following four and a half years of governance is a very interesting story. SYRIZA has been the only radical left populist party that has governed an EU country in recent times. This article briefly accounts for the factors that facilitated SYRIZA’s catapulting to power, while the Special Issue moves on to assess some of the main issues that the SYRIZA-led government dealt with from 2015 to 2019. With the danger of oversimplifying a more complex picture, we argue that SYRIZA emerged as a serious contender to power owing to the concurrence of two factors: i) the errors in the economic policies of the governments that ruled during the 2010–2014 period, and ii) its successful exploitation of the opportunity offered to capitalize on the dynamics of a grassroots protest movement (the ‘Aganaktismenoi’) through the adoption of the movement’s populist discourses. The article explicates the consolidation of SYRIZA as a pillar in the Greek political system and concludes with a brief presentation of the structure of the Special Issue.

En este final de siglo, las sociedades democráticas se encuentran ante un conjunto de dificultades y muy mala preparación para afrontarlas. Los múltiples gritos de alarma ante los peligros del populismo o de un posible retorno del... more

En este final de siglo, las sociedades democráticas se encuentran ante un conjunto de dificultades y muy mala preparación para afrontarlas.
Los múltiples gritos de alarma ante los peligros del populismo o de un posible retorno del fascismo son señales del creciente desasosiego de una izquierda, que ha perdido su identidad y que, al no poder pensar en términos de adversario, busca desesperadamente un enemigo que pueda devolverle una apariencia de unidad. Incapaz de comprender el papel central de las pasiones en política y la necesidad de movilizarlas con vistas a objetivos democráticos, acusa a los demás de jugar con la emoción contra la razón. En lugar de prestar atención a las demandas sociales y culturales que se le escapan, prefiere agitar viejos fantasmas con la idea de poder así exorcizar los supuestos demonios de lo irracional.
Tras haber creído en el triunfo definitivo del modelo liberal-democrático,
encarnación del derecho y de la razón universal, los demócratas
occidentales han quedado completamente desorientados ante la multiplicación de los conflictos étnicos, religiosos e identitarios que, de acuerdo con sus teorías, habrían debido quedar sepultados en un pasado ya superado. Hay quienes, ante el surgimiento de esos nuevos antagonismos, evocan los efectos perversos del totalitarismo, y quienes ven en cambio un supuesto retorno de lo arcaico. En realidad, muchos pensadores políticos habían creído que con la crisis del marxismo y el abandono del paradigma de la lucha de clases podrían prescindir del antagonismo. Por esta razón se imaginaban que el derecho y la moral vendrían a ocupar el lugar de la política y que el advenimiento de las identidades «pos-convencionales» aseguraría el triunfo de la racionalidad sobre las pasiones.

This paper reviews the scholarship on the populist radical right (PRR) in Western Europe. It focuses on three strands in this extensive literature. We first assess political opportunity explanations for the fortunes of these parties and... more

This paper reviews the scholarship on the populist radical right (PRR) in Western Europe. It focuses on three strands in this extensive literature. We first assess political opportunity explanations for the fortunes of these parties and movements. Second, we discuss internal supply-side approaches, referring to leadership, internal organization, and the (shifting) content of programmatic positions. Third, empirical research on the consequences of the emergence and rise of PRR parties and movements is discussed: In what respect do they constitute a corrective or threat to democracy? The review concludes with a discussion of the future direction that theorizing and research could take.

This paper is a critical review of the article titled "The Populist Challenge to Human Rights" by Philip Alston/

How has the Law and Justice Party in Poland (PiS) been able to get significant labor support to introduce far-right policies that undermine pluralist democracy? We look at PiS in the context of the " left fascist " traditions of the past,... more

How has the Law and Justice Party in Poland (PiS) been able to get significant labor support to introduce far-right policies that undermine pluralist democracy? We look at PiS in the context of the " left fascist " traditions of the past, when redistributionist policies won wide support among workers who were accepted as part of the favored " nation. " Labor support breaks down along three lines, with industrial labor most closely aligned with PiS, white-collar labor (in education and health) mostly opposed, and the marginalized small-city precariat being mobilized by PiS, but also finding a place in explicitly fascist parties further to the Right. Left alternatives, weakened due to the collapse of class discourse, are slowly reemerging, but the Right will likely command most labor support for the near future.

This article explores how the MoVimento 5 Stelle (M5S) in Italy and Podemos in Spain thematise the role of the State. We draw from a qualitative analysis of speeches of party leaders and party manifestoes in recent national elections. We... more

This article explores how the MoVimento 5 Stelle (M5S) in Italy and Podemos in Spain thematise the role of the State. We draw from a qualitative analysis of speeches of party leaders and party manifestoes in recent national elections. We argue that Podemos and the M5S coincide in reasserting the principle of popular sovereignty to overcome the present “post-democratic” condition and the distance between citizens and the State. However, they differ in their understanding of the State’s intervention on the economy and society. Podemos proposes a new interventionist state reminiscent of post-war social democracy. M5S has a more liberal view, conceiving of the State as a neutral arbiter of the free market. Furthermore, the two parties have different conceptions of the relationship between the State and the Nation. While adopting a patriotic discourse, Podemos has catered for demands of local autonomy, framing Spain as a “nation of nations” and has
been adamant in defending migrants and refugees. The M5S has instead proposed a more nationalist discourse, as seen in tirades by party leaders against migrants and refugees. These divergences reflect the different positioning of these formations along the Left/Right
axis and how this results in a more inclusive/exclusive view of the State.

This paper examines the rise of two Italian populist movements, the cyber-populism of the Five Star Movement under Beppe Grillo, and the nativist populism of the Lega under Matteo Salvini. I first frame the rise of Italian populism and... more

This paper examines the rise of two Italian populist movements, the cyber-populism of the Five Star Movement under Beppe Grillo, and the nativist populism of the Lega under Matteo Salvini. I first frame the rise of Italian populism and the brief coalition government the two parties formed in 2018-2019 within broader political and institutional trends, and then compare the role of leadership in the two movements and analyse the discursive strategies used in both to mobilize "the people" and win voters' support.

With this paper, we continue a series of publications on the theoretical aspects of Teodor Shanin’s conception of Russia as a ‘developing society’ first published in 1986 in the book Russia as a ‘Developing Society’. The Roots of... more

With this paper, we continue a series of publications on the theoretical aspects of Teodor Shanin’s conception of Russia as a ‘developing society’ first published in 1986 in the book Russia as a ‘Developing Society’. The Roots of Otherness: Russia’s Turn of Century. Vol. 1. In this part, the author considers the characterization of Russia as a “developing society” at the turn of the XX century, which cannot be understood outside the context of capitalism both internationally and intra-nationally. At the same time the unique/specific features that most profoundly characterized the Russian social scene at the turn of the century and made its mark as its past within its present were represented particularly by the state, ethnos and peasantry. The power of the Russian state apparatus, its share of resources, its control over the population and its legal claims exceeded those elsewhere where capitalism was on the march. Massive processes of consolidation and ‘extended reproduction’ of cultural patterns, language usage, fundamental symbols of identification and self-identification, as well as of related political loyalties, wielded together massive populations of different origins. Finally, during two centuries only, the Russian peasants moved all the way from the payment of tribute to unheard-of levels of exploitation and cattle-like enslavement of more than nine-tenths of the Russians; however, within another century came the emancipation from serfdom which made peasantry not only ‘free’ but landowning. The Russian dependent development of that time found its expression not only at the general level of the economic flows malfunctions and transformations but also at the distinct dimension of class generation and conflict. Parallel to the general crisis of the Russian political economy and the growing and increasingly explicit conflict between major social groups was an ideological/moral crisis expressed in perceptions, concepts and values (thus, the Russian intelligentsia confronted directly the state apparatus). The author concludes with the types of dissent initiated by men of knowledge, of ideas and of moral values, which was represented in different populist theorists including revolutionary populism and subjective sociology.

A whole series of pro-Brexit political parties are waiting in the wings for any sign of weakness from Boris Johnson towards Brussels. They also seek new political opportunities - be it in opposing lockdown or the government's green agenda... more

A whole series of pro-Brexit political parties are waiting in the wings for any sign of weakness from Boris Johnson towards Brussels. They also seek new political opportunities - be it in opposing lockdown or the government's green agenda .
Of these, the biggest is Nigel Farage's Reform UK, formerly the Brexit Party.

Discontent is seen as a critical driver for the appeal of populism, yet studies have typically focused on cases of populism in opposition. We argue that scholars' emphasis on populism in opposition led them to overlook the roles of elite... more

Discontent is seen as a critical driver for the appeal of populism, yet studies have typically focused on cases of populism in opposition. We argue that scholars' emphasis on populism in opposition led them to overlook the roles of elite messages and partisanship in the adoption of populist attitudes. Drawing on theories of elite-driven public opinion, we contend that populist attitudes do not need to be rooted in discontent. In cases of populism in power, those who are more satisfied politically and economically, and partisans of the ruling party should display higher levels of populist attitudes. We provide observational and experimental survey evidence in this direction from Turkey, where a populist party has long been in power. We also find that the dominant characteristic of support for populism in power is an emphasis on popular sovereignty at the expense of institutions of horizontal accountability.

An International Conference on "Political Constitutionalism and Constitutional Populism: What Do They Share" will be held at the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies on 20 September 2019. The organizer is Prof. Giuseppe Martinico. The... more

An International Conference on "Political Constitutionalism and Constitutional Populism: What Do They Share" will be held at the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies on 20 September 2019. The organizer is Prof. Giuseppe Martinico. The initiative is possible thanks to the support of the Jean Monnet Program. Join us in Pisa. Here the program

Article on political programs of Labor unions in post Civil War USA

Les protestations des "Gilets jaunes" en France sont un exemple de mouvement social populiste. Le soutien de l'opinion publique s'explique par le biais de conformité que renforce les prétentions des manifestants à représenter "le peuple".... more

Les protestations des "Gilets jaunes" en France sont un exemple de mouvement social populiste. Le soutien de l'opinion publique s'explique par le biais de conformité que renforce les prétentions des manifestants à représenter "le peuple". L’antagonisme spécifique au populisme aggrave le biais de négativité de l'opinion publique.

Sweden and Denmark have presented contrasting relationships between centre-right and populist radical right (PRR) parties. In Sweden, the centre-right has refused cooperation with the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) (SD), even when... more

Sweden and Denmark have presented contrasting relationships between centre-right and populist radical right (PRR) parties. In Sweden, the centre-right has refused cooperation with the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) (SD), even when this cost the centre-right office. However, in Denmark, coalitions led by centre-right parties have cooperated with the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti) (DF) on multiple occasions. Through a controlled comparison, we examine what explains these different outcomes. Using Chapel Hill Expert Surveys and public opinion data, we firstly look at the policy congruence between parties and the social acceptability of cooperation. We then examine interview material with representatives from centre-right and PRR parties in Sweden and Denmark to see their explanations of cooperation and non-cooperation. We conclude that, while the office goals of Danish centre-right parties, along with the policy focus and uncontroversial past of DF, explain that case, the reputation and past of SD has precluded a similar outcome.

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to uncover the nature of the political populism rising within the last crisis. First of all trying to give a clear view of the concept, paying attention to the different interpretations of the term in a... more

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to uncover the nature of the political populism rising within the last crisis. First of all trying to give a clear view of the concept, paying attention to the different interpretations of the term in a national and international frame. Later reviewing the cases of Italy and Spain (embodied in Movimento Cinco Stelle and Union, Progreso y Democracia) and placing them in those previous definitions, so we can understand if they follow the same "populist path" or not and what are the implications of those similarities and differences. As for closure, we will try to explain the magnitude of these new populist movements within politics, emphasizing their effect over the “classical parties”.