Philosophy of Agency Research Papers (original) (raw)

Bajo el término "Epistemología de virtudes" se dan cita un conjunto de posiciones cuyo denominador común es la sustitución de una concepción pasiva del sujeto de conocimiento por una concepción activa del mismo. Esto quiere decir, por una... more

Bajo el término "Epistemología de virtudes" se dan cita un conjunto de posiciones cuyo denominador común es la sustitución de una concepción pasiva del sujeto de conocimiento por una concepción activa del mismo. Esto quiere decir, por una parte, que se prioriza la agencia en la adquisición de bienes epistémicos como el conocimiento o la creencia justificada (Code 1984, 32); y, por otra, que se pone énfasis en las disposiciones estables (virtudes, competencias, habilidades) del sujeto, ya sea en la explicación de la adquisición y/o constitución del conocimiento o en la formación del carácter del investigador.

Feministische Interventionen gegen geschlechtsspezifische Gewalt führten in den letzten Jahrzehnten zu politisch-institutionellen Maßnahmen. Dieser Entwicklung steht eine wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung gegenüber, die ihren Blick... more

Feministische Interventionen gegen geschlechtsspezifische Gewalt führten in den letzten Jahrzehnten zu politisch-institutionellen Maßnahmen. Dieser Entwicklung steht eine wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung gegenüber, die ihren Blick zunehmend auf Handlungsmacht von *Frauen richtet und die Debatte um queere sowie postkoloniale Sichtweisen erweitert. Die Autor_innen stellen sich der Frage, wie feministische Ansätze die vielgestaltigen Gewaltformen adäquat erfassen können.

Thinking posthumanly – from a post-Enlightenment, critical, new materialist perspective – things, including concepts, become more permeable and topological – they leak and stretch. Freed from limiting notions of agency, things behave.... more

Thinking posthumanly – from a post-Enlightenment, critical, new materialist perspective – things, including concepts, become more permeable and topological – they leak and stretch. Freed from limiting notions of agency, things behave. Rivers have established the same legal rights as humans in New Zealand and India, stones have been reported slithering across the desert floor in California, an electrical power grid in the USA has revealed a unique agential dexterity and walls have been spotted walking over mountains in the UK’s Lake District. Thinking with a posthuman partiality, we begin to witness a democracy of objects rather than an anthropocentric dictatorship over inorganic materials. If agency is reworked into an ‘enactment’ as opposed to something that is ‘held’, conceivably humans and other biological organisms are not necessary for agency (or life) to emerge as inorganic material agency erupts from unchoreographed assemblages of spacetimematter(ing). And if cognitive and dermatological boundaries are no longer organ-ised by an Enlightenment prescription, how might pedagogies perform differently and more equitably?
This article draws on the empirical materials from two psychogeographic walks that agitate lithic spaces with a posthuman affection. Part One examples a radical mobile classroom that I undertake regularly with university students where the use of it-narratives exposes the distributed agency of buildings. I explore what a posthuman gaze might do to/for performative pedagogies as my students attempt to interview a building. Part Two offers an example from my previous post-qualitative PhD inquiry which – by manipulating the practices of psychogeography and schizocartography – highlights how a shopping centre assemblage called Liverpool ONE diagnosed itself with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), thus reinforcing the notion of inorganic agential distribution. The pedagogic implications of this posthuman diagnosis are discussed.

In the context of the free will debate, both compatibilists and event-causal libertarians consider that the age t s mental states and events are what directly causes her de isio to a t. Ho e er, a ordi g to the disappeari g age t o je tio... more

In the context of the free will debate, both compatibilists and event-causal libertarians consider that the age t s mental states and events are what directly causes her de isio to a t. Ho e er, a ordi g to the disappeari g age t o je tio , if the age t is othi g o er a d a o e her physi al a d e tal o po e ts a d the de isio remains undetermined up to the moment when it is made, then it is a chancy and uncontrolled event. According to agent-causalism, this sort of problem can be overcome if one realizes that the agent herself, as an irreducible su sta e, is the true origi ator of her a tio s. I ll prese t argu e ts that fa or this ie. Event-causalists have countered that if the agent identifies with some of the inner states that play the selfdetermining causal role in bringing about the action, then it is as though the action was directly caused by herself. I ll o je t that this is ot a distinctive aspect of free agency. Agent-causalism has been criticized from most naturalistically inclined fronts, and it must address risks of i plausi ility, o tradi tio a d u i telligi ility. E e though I ll acknowledge these challe ges, I ll still argue that libertarian free will cannot be defended by any reductionist alternative, and that agent-causalism does not conflict with contemporary science but only with some of its unproven assumptions.

Er is de laatste jaren veel aandacht voor hoe verslaving de hersenen verandert, en hoe dit self-control beinvloedt. Bij self-control ligt de nadruk vaak ‘control’, maar het ‘self’ aspect is minstens even doorslaggevend in hoe we ons... more

Er is de laatste jaren veel aandacht voor hoe verslaving de hersenen verandert, en hoe dit self-control beinvloedt. Bij self-control ligt de nadruk vaak ‘control’, maar het ‘self’ aspect is minstens even doorslaggevend in hoe we ons gedrag sturen, of daarin falen. Ik laat zien hoe verslaving persoonlijke identiteit beinvloedt (via hersenveranderingen en andere factoren), en hoe dit vervolgens self-control beinvloedt.

This (preprint) chapter argues that the 'thick' constructivism to which many prominent Feminist Security Studies authors currently subscribe is incapable of providing this sub-field of International Relations with adequate philosophical... more

This (preprint) chapter argues that the 'thick' constructivism to which many prominent Feminist Security Studies authors currently subscribe is incapable of providing this sub-field of International Relations with adequate philosophical grounding. This is the case, it claims, because the textualist framework that results from this form of constructivism is unable to provide a basis and rationale for the kind of integrative, interdisciplinary research that is required to do justice to the events/ phenomena with which Feminist Security Studies is concerned. In contrast, the chapter contends that critical realist philosophy-especially its emergentist/stratified ontology and power-/ mechanism-based understanding of causality-does pave the way for such research. Moreover, it stresses that the heterodox and synthetic/preservative nature of this philosophical approach allows it to avoid the persistent theory/praxis inconsistencies which plague constructivist work.

The theory of agency has found applications across the social sciences as well as in management fields; there are literally thousands of papers that employ it. Unlike many popular theoretical approaches in social science, however, the... more

The theory of agency has found applications across the social sciences as well as in management fields; there are literally thousands of papers that employ it. Unlike many popular theoretical approaches in social science, however, the theory of agency has no standard citation. Most applications to date have employed variations on the economic theory of agency, with the most cited article being Jensen & Meckling (1976). Most literature using agency has featured the assumptions, terms, logics, and domain common to approaches in economics. Agency theory did in fact have a distinct origin: It was first proposed, independently, by Mitnick (1973, 1974, 1975), beginning the institutional stream, and Ross (1973, 1974), for the economics stream. Revisionist work on agency theory has taken for granted that the task involves extensions and repairs in the economic theory of agency. This Guidepost argues that many of the criticisms do not necessarily apply to institutional agency theory. Work should return to an institutional approach that focuses on incentive relations rather than incentives, relationships of control such as authority and responsibility not just decisions, attention to how the inevitable imperfections of agency are managed not just how they are corrected, the exploration of complex motivation including terminal values, the influences of social norms on agency, and the design and functioning of systems of assurance that permit imperfect institutions to remain credible.

In my talk, I will present key ideas of my four-year research project "Bio-Agency and Natural Freedom" which aims to defeat free will scepticism on a fresh metaphysical basis informed by biology. I will proceed from the diagnosis that a... more

In my talk, I will present key ideas of my four-year research project "Bio-Agency and Natural Freedom" which aims to defeat free will scepticism on a fresh metaphysical basis informed by biology. I will proceed from the diagnosis that a convincing naturalist account of both human free will and human agency is prevented from the outset by the mechanistic-physicalist view of nature espoused by the majority of metaphysicians. More specifically, I will show that mechanistic physicalism, being part of a broadly substance or thing ontological orientation, makes it impossible to explain how human agency fits into the natural world and that, as a consequence of this, we are at a loss with respect to human free will too. In other words, we need to solve the problem of agency first before we can hope to solve the problem of free will, and to this end we need to radically revise our most fundamental ontological commitments. On this basis, I will then propose a therapy that reflects and brings together two recent developments in the philosophy of biology: the increasing interest in, and appreciation of, bio-agency, i.e., the capability of organisms to interact with the environment in an adaptive manner, and the emerging turn towards an understanding of organisms as processes rather than as substances or things. Human as well as non-human agents, I will argue, are biological beings and, i.e., a particular type of process. They are dynamical from tip to toe and endowed with agential capacities as a function of their dynamical organisation. Metaphysically speaking, this means to endorse a process ontology of both biological agents and their actions. I will explain how the resulting bio-process account of agency solves the metaphysical problem of agency, and I conclude by indicating how this may also help us with tackling the problem of free will.

Adaptive control in the face of uncertainty involves making online predictions about events in order to plan actions to reliably achieve desirable outcomes. However, we often face situations in which the effects of our actions are... more

Adaptive control in the face of uncertainty involves making online predictions about events in order to plan actions to reliably achieve desirable outcomes. However, we often face situations in which the effects of our actions are probabilistic (e.g., returns on our investments), and the environment itself is dynamic, - it can change irrespective of any action we decide to take, and in a relatively stable or unstable way (e.g., economic climate). Therefore, the problem of control concerns learning to isolate the effects that are generated directly by our actions, from those that occur independently of them. We face this problem in a host of uncertain dynamic environments: ecological (using fertilizers to increase crop yield), economic (investing in real estate), industrial (operating nuclear power plants), mechanical (driving cars) and medical (stemming outbreaks of disease). Thus far there has been little attempt at a synthesis of the amassing research directed towards understanding control in the face of uncertainty. The aim of this book is to bring together theoretical and empirical research from disparate disciplines spanning Social, Cognitive and Clinical Psychology, Human Factors and Neuroscience to Engineering and Machine learning. It serves as a round up of the different techniques used to examine issues concerning control (prediction, agency, causality, uncertainty) and unifies a substantial amount of disparate research. The general framework (Monitoring and control- MC framework) used to achieve this proposes two central ideas (agency, uncertainty) that have important ramifications across disciplines. In sum, control processes involve self-regulatory mechanisms that enable us to make subjective estimates of success, which helps to anchor our interpretation of uncertain events. In addition, these estimates are integrated with estimations of rates of change of the events in the environment which helps us track the outcomes we aim to control.

Although European travelers to the Ottoman Empire often noted the inhabitants’ “fatalism,” historians have never seriously examined this intellectual phenomenon. Whether or not we can credit such sources, the testimony of seventeenth- and... more

Although European travelers to the Ottoman Empire often noted the inhabitants’ “fatalism,” historians have never seriously examined this intellectual phenomenon. Whether or not we can credit such sources, the testimony of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Turkish and Arabic sources points to a robust debate over fate, free will, and predestination. What were the reasons behind these discussions? What issues were at stake? This article outlines the context and content of the debate. It then offers some observations about the wider significance of free will and predestination in the Ottoman intellectual universe – particularly their relation to early modern bureaucratic and military reform.

In Holocaust fiction, narrated children act as catalysts for adult behaviour, which reinstates agency and thus responsibility in the persecuted and largely powerless adults. Since child figures help reclaim an ethical dimension for human... more

In Holocaust fiction, narrated children act as catalysts for adult behaviour, which reinstates agency and thus responsibility in the persecuted and largely powerless adults. Since child figures help reclaim an ethical dimension for human interaction, they point to the ethical foundations of the texts. Thomas Scanlon's contractualist approach to moral philosophy in his What We Owe to Each Other (1998) is used to compare two German Holocaust novels: Bruno Apitz's successful Nackt unter Wölfen (1958) and Edgar Hilsenrath's Nacht (1964), a book with a far more protracted and conflicted reception history. Exploring the relationship between (1) the role of child figures in these books, (2) the ethical issues thus raised, and (3) the publication and reception history of the texts concerned, shows that the radically different responses to the novels are rooted in their fundamentally different ethical cores: while Apitz reassuringly uses his communist Buchenwald prisoners' heroic saving of an infant boy to demonstrate that moral motivation is rationally grounded and that the demands of rational choice do not conflict with those of morality, in Hilsenrath's dire ghetto Prokov, chances for making ethical choices such as those posed by children in need are recognized as such – but mostly not heeded in the inexorable struggle for survival, so that the ethical is equated with the irrational, and the unethical with the rational. Child figures create opportunities for adult characters to respond to moral dilemmas, which is more significant than their potential as generic, iconic figures of suffering in the service of the Holocaust ›industry‹.

This paper reflects on the role of computation in speculative design. It suggests that found, unexpected traces of computational processes can amplify designers’ imagination. This theme is considered through a reflection on a practical... more

This paper reflects on the role of computation in speculative design. It suggests that found, unexpected traces of computational processes can amplify designers’ imagination. This theme is considered through a reflection on a practical workflow that pays close attention to the artifacts of algorithmically generated mesh geometries. The resulting interpretation of found artifacts as active participants in design processes is innovative in the field where computational objects (such as meshes) are typically thought of as neutral tools. Reconsideration of meshes as objects with agency can be extended to other computational entities, resulting in significant implications for design thinking and design craftsmanship.

We present a synthetic theory of skilled action which proposes that cognitive processes make an important contribution to almost all skilled action, contrary to influential views that many skills are performed largely automatically.... more

We present a synthetic theory of skilled action which proposes that cognitive processes make an important contribution to almost all skilled action, contrary to influential views that many skills are performed largely automatically. Cognitive control is focused on strategic aspects of performance, and plays a greater role as difficulty increases. We offer an analysis of various forms of skill experience and show that the theory provides a better explanation for the full set of these experiences than automatic theories. We further show that the theory can explain experimental evidence for skill automaticity, including evidence that secondary tasks do not interfere with expert performance, and evidence that experts have reduced memory for performance of sensorimotor skills.

The emerging field of Normative Multi-Agent Systems has the twin goals of providing tools for simulating human societies and coordinating activities among heterogenous autonomous software agents in an open environment. Norms are... more

The emerging field of Normative Multi-Agent
Systems has the twin goals of providing tools for simulating
human societies and coordinating activities among heterogenous
autonomous software agents in an open environment. Norms are
frequently modelled as either observable regularities or explicit
precepts. We consider arguments from analytic philosophy that
neither approach can account for the origins of norms as both are
prone to regress problems, and we note that a sample of
simulation models all assume some form of built-in normativity.
We conclude by sketching some implications for agent design.

The objective of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of the Kantian notion of freedom (especially the problem of the third antinomy and its resolution in the critique of pure reason); its significance in the... more

The objective of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of the Kantian notion of freedom (especially the problem of the third antinomy and its resolution in the critique of pure reason); its significance in the contemporary debate on free-will and determinism, and the possibility of autonomy of artificial agency in the Kantian paradigm of autonomy. Kant's resolution of the third antinomy by positing the ground in the noumenal self resolves the problem of antinomies; however, invites an explanatory gap between phenomenality and the noumenal self; even if he has successfully established the compatibility of natural causality and non-natural causality through his transcendental argument. This paper is also devoted to establish the plausibility of the knowledge claim that Kantian reduction of phenomenality has served half of the purpose of the AI scientists on the possibility of Artificial Autonomous Agency.

In an effort to carve a distinct place for social facts without lapsing into a holistic ontology, John Greenwood has sought to define social phenomena solely in terms of the attitudes held by the actor(s) in question. I argue that his... more

In an effort to carve a distinct place for social facts without lapsing into a holistic ontology, John Greenwood has sought to define social phenomena solely in terms of the attitudes held by the actor(s) in question. I argue that his proposal allows for the possibility of a “lone collectivity” that is (1) unpalatable in its own right and (2) incompatible with the claim that sociology is autonomous from psychology. As such, I conclude that the relevant beliefs need to be held by more than one person.

This book explores the moral psychology of devotion. In the first part of the book, I provide I analysis of devotion; an examination of its motivational role; and an explanation of its connection to a distinctive form of valuing, in which... more

This book explores the moral psychology of devotion. In the first part of the book, I provide I analysis of devotion; an examination of its motivational role; and an explanation of its connection to a distinctive form of valuing, in which certain values are seen as inviolable and are rendered invulnerable to the typical effects of justificatory reflection. In the second part of the book, I assess the ethical significance of devotion, arguing that certain forms of ethically praiseworthy relationships require devotion. In the third part, I examine how devotion can easily devolve into pathological forms. I focus on fanaticism, arguing that devotion can arise from a particular form of psychological fragility that is linked to group violence. I further argue that this form of fragility can be stoked by group resentment, and that certain social groups can thus be fanatical in the sense that they encourage the emergence of individual fanatics. In the final part of the book, I ask whether there are ways of preserving some of the beneficial features of devotion while avoiding their pathologies. I investigate whether we can be devoted through irony; through affirmation; and through what I call the "Deepening Move." Each of these stances preserves a degree of flexibility and openness in the object of devotion; each one tries to preserve a form of wholehearted devotion despite this openness. (The attached file contains the introductory chapter. Email or message me if you'd like a draft of the entire book.)

The Library of Nonhuman Books centres around a custom-made reading-machine which uses machine-learning to abridge and ‘artificially illuminate’ physical books through a combination of algorithmic interpretation and digital palimpsest.... more

The Library of Nonhuman Books centres around a custom-made reading-machine which uses machine-learning to abridge and ‘artificially illuminate’ physical books through a combination of algorithmic interpretation and digital palimpsest. Newly illuminated texts are offered as alternative futures of the book. The project speculates on the book to come, where a post-literate society defers its reading to nonhuman counterparts.

Drawing on John Dewey’s discussion of habit in Human Nature and Conduct and Simone de Beauvoir’s discussion of the “adventurer” in The Ethics of Ambiguity, I argue that while some of our relations with things and people may very well be... more

Drawing on John Dewey’s discussion of habit in Human Nature and Conduct and Simone de Beauvoir’s discussion of the “adventurer” in The Ethics of Ambiguity, I argue that while some of our relations with things and people may very well be instru- mental, many take a different form in which it is our very setting, and not merely our attainment, of ends that is at stake. Moreover, the fullest realization of our freedom requires us to recognize not only that this different form of relation, which is cooperative rather than controlling, exists but also that it is constitutive of, rather than in opposition to, our freedom. I conclude by briefly examining how our honest acknowledgment of a kind of powerlessness inherent to our powers, to our freedom, might change the way we interact with other things and other people.

The book introduces Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s philosophy of action into the mainstream of contemporary action-theoretical debates. Piotr Makowski shows that Kotarbiński–Alfred Tarski’s teacher and one of the most important philosophers of the... more

The book introduces Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s philosophy of action into the mainstream of contemporary action-theoretical debates. Piotr Makowski shows that Kotarbiński–Alfred Tarski’s teacher and one of the most important philosophers of the renowned Lvov-Warsaw school—proposed a groundbreaking, original, and (in at least a few respects) still fresh perspective in action theorizing. The book examines and develops Kotarbiński’s ideas in the context of the most recent discussions in the philosophy of action. The main idea behind Kotarbiński’s action theory—and thus, behind this book—is the significance of the philosophical investigations of the general conditions of effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of intentional actions. Makowski presents and reinterprets Kotarbiński’s views on these dimensions of our activities and sheds new light on the most important areas of action theory.

It was long assumed that thinking goes on ‘in the head’: indeed, as recently as twenty years ago, many would have regarded it as absurd to examine thinking with reference to events beyond the brain. The chapters in Cognition beyond the... more

It was long assumed that thinking goes on ‘in the head’: indeed, as recently as twenty years ago, many would have regarded it as absurd to examine thinking with reference to events beyond the brain. The chapters in Cognition beyond the brain adopt a different perspective: In thinking, people use dispositions from both sides of the skull. Readily observed phenomena—including neural activity—constitute the object of thinking, which relates conceptually to the construct ‘thinking’. Like all folk concepts, ‘thinking’ is a second-order construct used to ‘explain’ observations or, specifically, how action is — and should be—integrated with perception. As attested in each of the chapters, bodies co-orient to cultural resources while using bidirectional coupling. The focus thus falls on what can be learned about thinking by studying world-side activity. The chapters report empirical, observational and theoretical studies of how people use circumstances (and objects) to act alone, in dyads and in groups. People manage and track attention as they integrate speech and action with gestures, gaze and other bodily activity. In making interactivity part of thinking, a broad range and assortments of parts, procedures and modes of operation are invoked.

"Carter's music poses struggles of opposition, for instance in timbre (Double Concerto), space (String Quartet No. 3) or pulse (String Quartet No. 5). His preference for the all-interval tetrachords, 4–Z15 [0, 1, 4, 6] and 4–Z29 [0, 1, 3,... more

Much of the literature on the desirability of immortality (inspired by B. Williams) has considered whether the goods of mortal life would be exhausted in an immortal life (whether, i.e., immortality would necessarily end in tedium).... more

Much of the literature on the desirability of immortality (inspired by B. Williams) has considered whether the goods of mortal life would be exhausted in an immortal life (whether, i.e., immortality would necessarily end in tedium). However, there has been very little discussion of whether the bads of mortal life would also be exhausted in an immortal life, and more generally, how good immortal life would be on balance, particularly in comparison to a mortal life. Here I argue that there are compelling reasons to favor a mortal over an immortal life because a mortal life offers a higher ceiling for well-being and assigns our agency a greater role in how our lives turn out.

Both the cause and the solution to environmental crisis are parsed in terms that seem intrinsically to sponsor rejection of notions of autonomy. At the level of metaphysics and of ethics, a discourse of human autonomy is generally seen... more

Both the cause and the solution to environmental crisis are parsed in terms that seem intrinsically to sponsor rejection of notions of autonomy. At the level of metaphysics and of ethics, a discourse of human autonomy is generally seen as part of the problem, not part of the solution. I sketch the outlines of an argument as to why environmental discourse, and in particular our capacity to adequately handle and correctly use the notion of environmental crisis, depends on redeeming autonomy; yes from some of its history, but also from an environmental movement that is captivated by an oversimple account of both cause and response to environmental change. This examination allows us to notice, first, how much is at stake in the way we conceptualise that change; second, that we need to pay attention to the moral architecture our conceptualisations presume and require; thirdly, how pervasive is the foundational philosphical problem of environmental discourse – namely that accounts of what it is to be a human person, and accounts of the natural, cannot at all be separated.

Back cover text: Real Social Science presents a new, hands-on approach to social inquiry. The theoretical and methodological ideas behind the book, inspired by Aristotelian phronesis, represent an original perspective within the social... more

Back cover text: Real Social Science presents a new, hands-on approach to social inquiry. The theoretical and methodological ideas behind the book, inspired by Aristotelian phronesis, represent an original perspective within the social sciences, and this volume gives readers for the first time a set of studies exemplifying what applied phronesis looks like in practice. The reflexive analysis of values and power gives new meaning to the impact of research on policy and practice. Real Social Science is a major step forward in a novel and thriving field of research. This book will benefit scholars, researchers, and students who want to make a difference in practice, not just in the academy. Its message will make it essential reading for students and academics across the social sciences.

Back cover text: Real Social Science presents a new, hands-on approach to social inquiry. The theoretical and methodological ideas behind the book, inspired by Aristotelian phronesis, represent an original perspective within the social... more

Back cover text: Real Social Science presents a new, hands-on approach to social inquiry. The theoretical and methodological ideas behind the book, inspired by Aristotelian phronesis, represent an original perspective within the social sciences, and this volume gives readers for the first time a set of studies exemplifying what applied phronesis looks like in practice. The reflexive analysis of values and power gives new meaning to the impact of research on policy and practice. Real Social Science is a major step forward in a novel and thriving field of research. This book will benefit scholars, researchers, and students who want to make a difference in practice, not just in the academy. Its message will make it essential reading for students and academics across the social sciences.

Prophecy becomes interpreted as a revelation from a deity to a prophet. The nature of Martin Heidegger's work deals with Being and one major component in his book Being and Time is about the freedom that Dasein holds. From this freedom,... more

Prophecy becomes interpreted as a revelation from a deity to a prophet. The nature of Martin Heidegger's work deals with Being and one major component in his book Being and Time is about the freedom that Dasein holds. From this freedom, Dasein could live an authentic life. This clashes with the idea of prophecy. In this essay, I will examine the primary and secondary literature to determine if there is enough adequate information to determine if Dasein remains authentic to himself in fulfilling prophecy. For the sake of simplicity, I will be referring to Abrahamic prophets in this essay. Heidegger does establish his various secular projects as atheist testaments, but there is a whole section where Azadpur writes how Dasein is a religious and existential hero because Dasein's potential is ownmost and always discloses possibilities. In Being and Time's division II temporality becomes a focal point for Heidegger that completes his project for Dasein that he set out in the division I. Death also comes into focus for Heidegger as an important structure for his argument, and it does lend itself for my topic.

In this essay, I argue that a proper understanding of the Cartesian proof of the external world sheds light on some vexatious questions concerning his theory of sense perception. Three main points emerge from the discussion: a picture of... more

In this essay, I argue that a proper understanding of the Cartesian proof of the external world sheds light on some vexatious questions concerning his theory of sense perception. Three main points emerge from the discussion: a picture of the mind, conceived as the power of understanding, as essentially related to the physical world; an extension of rationality such that it includes a set of necessities that neither can be deduced from the principles furnished by pure understanding alone nor are to be found among the particular items of sense experience; and a conception of human sense perception as a composite power that includes sensory awareness as well as understanding, and so that establishes a sharp distinction between human and animal sensory awareness. As far as agency is a constitutive ingredient of human sense perception, Descartes’ doctrine is in line with some current versions of a virtue epistemology.

The conviction underlying this book is that if we accept vulnerability as a dominant condition of contemporary life, then we should question the philosophical image that understands vulnerability as the negativity of a so-called full... more

The conviction underlying this book is that if we accept vulnerability as a dominant condition of contemporary life, then we should question the philosophical image that understands vulnerability as the negativity of a so-called full life. Rather, vulnerability should be thought of as a new condition with its challenges and resources. My goal in this book is to suggest a way for people to live their vulnerability as a transformative power. I focus on the ways in which vulnerability can become an effective resource that connects people and supports their transformative political actions. I argue that focusing thusly on vulnerability holds a productive potential for suggesting new modalities of transformative processes and individual agency, as well as a new attentiveness on behalf of critical discourses in general and feminist philosophy in particular.

The need to tackle the discrepancy between research outputs and the execution of the findings into real practice is a crucial factor in establishing evidence-based practice in a selected government agency. There is a need to increase the... more

The need to tackle the discrepancy between research outputs and the execution of the findings into real practice is a crucial factor in establishing evidence-based practice in a selected government agency. There is a need to increase the number of experts in our education sector who can synthesise, translate, and package the evidence for ready use by decision-makers and to foster entrepreneurship in Africa. To achieve this, the activities of a 28-man Evidence Leaders in Africa (ELA) team were recruited to drive the project through capacity building training and workshop sessions. Thereafter, a non-random purposive sampling technique targeted at policy makers at various government and non-governmental organizations was adopted as the study design. In all, purposive administration of 424 copies of questionnaire to individuals in different governmental and non-governmental organizations was done by the recruited personnel. The retrieved data from the questionnaire were analyzed using s...

Everyday experience indicates that when we reason intelligently about how to craft a democratic process, which treats persons as "free and equal," we reason about procedures, virtues, and cultural practices in conjunction. This suggests... more

Everyday experience indicates that when we reason intelligently about how to craft a democratic process, which treats persons as "free and equal," we reason about procedures, virtues, and cultural practices in conjunction. This suggests that normative democratic theory should aid us in so reasoning. Yet, the prominent theories of Robert Dahl, Jürgen Habermas, and Joshua Cohen push us away from this recognition. The explanation for this concerns the procedural minimalism that characterizes each theory and the tenuous relationship each has to empirical inquiry. These criticisms point toward an attractive account of the status and function of normative democratic theory in democratic practice: such theory should emerge out of lived experience with the values of "free" and "equal" treatment and should guide inquiry into the procedures, virtues, and cultural practices that, in some particular context, are most apt to promote those values. The argument appropriates two ideas from John Dewey. First, our moral or ethical theories should offer interpretations of relevant aspects of "moral or ethical experience," based on observation of humans as they pursue certain values in their actions. Second, we should treat these theories as "tools" for practical reasoning, which function to extend the goods that inhere in the relevant kinds of experience.

This article examines five common misunderstandings about case-study research: (a) theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge; (b) one cannot generalize from a single case, therefore, the single-case study cannot... more

This article examines five common misunderstandings about case-study research: (a) theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge; (b) one cannot generalize from a single case, therefore, the single-case study cannot contribute to scientific development; (c) the case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building; (d) the case study contains a bias toward verification; and (e) it is often difficult to summarize specific case studies. This article explains and corrects these misunderstandings one by one and concludes with the Kuhnian insight that a scientific discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one. Social science may be strengthened by the execution of a greater number of good case studies.

How many thousand images does it take an architect to learn what Gothic is, or Baroque or Modern? How many more to differentiate between good and bad architectural solutions? This article strives to de-mystify the nature of design choice... more

How many thousand images does it take an architect to learn what Gothic is, or Baroque or Modern? How many more to differentiate between good and bad architectural solutions? This article strives to de-mystify the nature of design choice in architecture by interrogating the underlying processes of Neural Networks and thus the extent of their ability to inform architectural design. The presented approach strives to explore the design problem not only through the lens of expediency, but also by considering the cultural transformation that comes along with the possibilities of a technology that profoundly asks about the nature of agency in a posthuman environment.

В книге предложена логико-когнитивная формализованная теория аргументации, предназначенная для моделирования трех видов аргументации – обоснования, убеждения и практической аргументации. Аргументация – это интеллектуальная познавательная... more

В книге предложена логико-когнитивная формализованная теория аргументации, предназначенная для моделирования трех видов аргументации – обоснования, убеждения и практической аргументации. Аргументация – это интеллектуальная познавательная деятельность, в ходе которой участники спора изучают, насколько выдвигаемые ими позиции состоятельны, т.е. способны противостоять критике. Формально состоятельность позиции агента спора представлена как способ упорядочивания выражающего ее аргументационного множества на аргументационной структуре данного спора. Объектом аргументации выступает когнитивный агент – участник спора в аспекте своих знаний, убеждений, целей и намерений, составляющих его позицию в споре. Формальная часть теории проиллюстрирована на примерах известных споров: Кухонного спора Н.Хрущева и Р.Никсона и спора Протагора и Эватла. В книге дается классификация современных подходов к анализу аргументации.
Книга адресована логикам, философам, специалистам в области речевой коммуникации, а также всем, интересующимся теорией аргументации, и может служить учебным пособием для изучения и преподавания курсов по теории и практике аргументации.

According to contemporary hierarchical views of the self and agency, the distinctive feature of human agency is that we have the ability to distance ourselves from our immediate desires (Frankfurt) and from those socially prescribed norms... more

According to contemporary hierarchical views of the self and agency, the distinctive feature of human agency is that we have the ability to distance ourselves from our immediate desires (Frankfurt) and from those socially prescribed norms that guide our actions (Korsgaard) and choose which desires/practical identities we want to identify as being truly reflective of our own selves. The ironic agent is able to achieve this reflective distance, but is not able to take the second step of fully identifying herself with any desires/identities. Instead, the ironic agent plays at being a certain type of person or having certain desires. The problem for the ironic agent, broadly speaking, is that she is not able to be an agent in the fullest sense of the term, something which requires that we have at least some desires or practical identities with which we have reflectively and fully identified. In Kierkegaard’s thought, we find an in-depth description of ironic agency and its problems, as well as a recommendation for how to move beyond ironic agency. In this paper, I will argue that Kierkegaard’s solution to the problem of ironic agency (a move to the ethical sphere of existence) is not a tenable one, but that a solution to the problem of ironic agency can be worked out by giving a reconstructed reading of Kierkegaard’s understanding of faith.

Discusses modes of moral agency of historical figures such as Hannibal and Julian of Norwich, and tries to locate Hamlet as a moral agent, looking at work by Michael Bristol, Julia Reinhard Lupton, Richard Strier, and Peter Holbrook.

How accurate is the picture of the human mind that has emerged from studies in neuroscience, psychology, and cognitive science? Anybody with an interest in how minds work - how we learn about the world and how we remember people and... more

How accurate is the picture of the human mind that has emerged from studies in neuroscience, psychology, and cognitive science? Anybody with an interest in how minds work - how we learn about the world and how we remember people and events - may feel dissatisfied with the answers contemporary science has to offer.
Sensorimotor Life draws on current theoretical developments in the enactive approach to life and mind. It examines and expands the premises of the sciences of the human mind, while developing an alternative picture closer to people's daily experiences. Enactive ideas are applied and extended, providing a theoretically rich, naturalistic account of meaning and agency. The book includes a dynamical systems description of different types of sensorimotor regularities or sensorimotor contingencies; a dynamical interpretation of Piaget's theory of equilibration to ground the concept of sensorimotor mastery; and a theory of agency as organized networks of sensorimotor schemes, as well as its implications for embodied subjectivity.
Written for students and researchers of cognitive science, the authors offer a fuller view of the mind, a view better attuned to the experiences of people who live, work, love, struggle, and age, thrown into a world of meaningful relations they help create. Additionally, the book is of interest to neuroscientists, psychiatrists, and philosophers of science.