Sextus Empiricus Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Mitä jos maailma ei olekaan sellainen, millaiseksi sen kuvittelemme? Mistä voimme tietää, mitkä havainnot vääristyvät omien ajatusmalliemme mukaan ja mikä on asioiden oikea tila? Hakupalvelimet ja uutissivustot syöttävät meille " tietoa " , mutta lähdekritiikki on koetuksella. Mitä oikeastaan tarkoitamme " tiedolla " ? Kenen tietoa se on? Mistä se tullut ja voiko siihen luottaa? Skeptisismi kyseenalaistaa tiedon varmuuden, etsii ja epäilee. Skeptikon suhde tietoon ei kuitenkaan ole aina kieltävä vaan paremminkin tutkiva. Eri aikakausien suuret filosofit muotoilivat kantojaan skeptikkojen asettamaa haastetta vasten, joten skeptisismi on muovannut koko länsimaista ajattelua. Skeptisismi syventyy epäilyn ja etsimisen filosofiaan antiikista nykypäivään. Se avaa uusia näkökulmia skeptisismiin pohtimalla skeptisen filosofian suhdetta tunteisiin, uskonnollisen tiedon kyseenalaistamisen perinteeseen ja nykyajan filosofiaan. Länsimaisen filosofian lisäksi teos sivuaa skeptisiä kysymyksiä arabifilosofiassa ja buddhalaisuudessa. " Paljon keskustelua käydään myös tietona esitettävien väitteiden yhteydestä erilaisiin taloudellisiin, aatteellisiin tai poliittisiin intresseihin. Tieto kytkeytyy valtaan: tiedolliset väitteet paitsi kuvailevat maailmaa myös monin tavoin tuottavat sitä. " Malin Grahn-Wilder " Ne, jotka sanovat skeptikoiden kieltävän ilmenevän, näyttävät minusta kuunnelleen huonosti, mitä me sanomme. Me emme nimittäin kiellä sitä, minkä pakottava vaikutelma saa meidät hyväksymään ilman harkintaa, kuten aiemmin sanoimme. " Sekstos Empeirikos: Pyrrhonismin pääpiirteet (suomentanut Marke Ahonen) " On varmaa, että tervejärkisellä ja kokeneella ihmisellä tulisi olla ja yleensä onkin enemmän luottamusta mielipiteisiinsä kuin tyhmällä ja tietämättömällä (…). Edes järkevimmällä ja kokeneimmalla ihmisellä tämä arvovalta ei ole koskaan täydellinen, sillä hänenkin täytyy olla tietoinen monista entisistä erehdyksistä ja yhä pelätä tulevia samankaltaisia erehdyksiä. " David Hume: Filosofian skeptisestä järjestelmästä (suomentanut Tuomo Aho)

- by and +3
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- Epistemology, Medieval Philosophy, Cicero, David Hume

with Clifford Roberts, co-author. An overview of Sextus' system, with special reference to recent influential critics. To appear in "Skepticism, from Antiquity to the Present," edited by Diego Machuca and Baron Reed, Bloomsbury Press... more

with Clifford Roberts, co-author.
An overview of Sextus' system, with special reference to recent influential critics.
To appear in "Skepticism, from Antiquity to the Present," edited by Diego Machuca and Baron Reed, Bloomsbury Press forthcoming.

- by Tad Brennan
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- Sextus Empiricus, Skepticism, Pyrrhonism

The study of the figure of Socrates is necessary not only for understanding the work of Plato and the platonists of every time, where it is a fundamental piece, but also for the study of the so called “socratics”. Then, necessarily we must appeal to the work of his famous disciples in order to try to retain the concrete images of his legacy. And, although this could discourage the search of a personality that does not have direct evidence, its wealth of anecdotes and semantically homogeneous allusions within the classical culture would help us to glimpse, if not a picture, a non-evanescent watermark: there is some continuity in the various descriptions of Socrates that allow us to affirm stable traits in his personality and his professed philosophy.
However, with a specifical Hellenistic stream, the Academic skepticism, the legacy of Socrates and certain Socratics folds itself to a very peculiar history: that of the Academy and the unwritten teachings of Plato. That is, the latter should be treated in a double way, as for Pyrrhonism and as for Academic skepticism. Certainly, it is the latter that has more to do with the teachings of Socrates and Plato as well as with the historical transformation that these teachings had. Yet, Pyrrhonism through its primal figure, Pyrrho, although it has no direct relations with Plato or Platonism, is related to Socrates and the Socratics. And also is linked to the mentioned through Arcesilaus of Pitane, suggesting a triple connection between this stream and the ideas of Socrates, the teachings of Plato and those of the Academy throughout its changes.

- by Tristán Fita
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- Socrates, Sextus Empiricus, Phyrronism and Ancient Skepticism, Elenchos
- by Stefano Malfitano
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- Philosophy, Late Middle Ages, Middle East Studies, Arabic
- by Máté Veres
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- Ancient Greek ethics, Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonism

Dans un article paru en 2010 dans la Revue de métaphysique et de morale, Stéphane Marchand pose la question suivante : « le sceptique cherche-t-il vraiment la vérité ? ». Cette interrogation trouve son origine dans un passage des Vies et doctrines des philosophes illustres, dans lequel Diogène Laërce définit le néo-pyrrhonisme comme une philosophie « zététique », qui « recherche continuellement la vérité », et « sceptique », qui « examine toujours et ne trouve jamais ». Cette citation semble révéler le caractère paradoxal de la démarche sceptique des néo-pyrrhoniens, telle que rapportée par Sextus Empiricus dans ses Esquisses pyrrhoniennes. Pour Sextus, le sceptique ne trouve pas la vérité et suspend son jugement ; il atteint par là la tranquillité. Dès lors, le sceptique peut-il chercher la vérité sans penser pouvoir la trouver, sans volonté de la trouver ? La recherche de la vérité a cela de problématique qu'elle semble exiger du sceptique un cadre de pensée en contradiction avec sa philosophie. Et c'est toute la philosophie sceptique qui est alors inquiétée, et en premier lieu en tant que philosophie. Si le sceptique se soumet à la recherche de la vérité, n'entre-t-il pas déjà dans un cadre qu'il veut pourtant mettre en doute ? Si au contraire il ne recherche pas la vérité, peut-il seulement justifier sa démarche et sa qualité philosophique ?

- by Thomas Sentis
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- Epistemology, Philosophical Scepticism, Sextus Empiricus

Pyrrhonisme ancien et problème de la connaissance

- by Lola Jallais
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- Scepticism, Philosophical Scepticism, Sextus Empiricus, Belief in Conspiracy Theory
- by Rodrigo Pinto de Brito
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- Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonism, Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Sexto Empírico

From the forthcoming collection: *Revisiting Aristotle's Fragments. New Essays on the Fragments of Aristotle's Lost Works*, ed. A-P. Mesquita, Brill, 2020.
In this paper I argue that several passages containing arguments from design that have been collected as fragments of Aristotle's lost dialogue *De Philosophia* are spurious. In the process, I highlight many of the common features and non-Aristotelian influences present in these passages.

- by Jason Rheins
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- Theology, Hellenistic Philosophy, Plato, Aristotle

It is by now well known that ancient Pyrrhonism was intended to be a way of life rather than a doctrine. Various objections to Pyrrhonism as a way of life have been raised—that it is psychologically impossible and that it makes life grind to a halt. While there are answers to those objections, I’ll argue that there are aspects of Pyrrhonism that make it nonetheless an unappealing way of life and unsuitable in modern circumstances. One crucial change from ancient times is that the Greek skeptics found themselves puzzled by disagreement, while modern philosophers have been worried by doubt. This helps to explain why skepticism is now seen as a challenge to be overcome rather than as a possible way of life. I argue, however, that a deeper understanding of the nature of doubt and its relation to knowledge will allow us to move past the current stalemate between skeptical and anti-skeptical arguments, recover a more accurate history of epistemology, and identify the best sort of epistemic lives available to us. In particular, I argue that a life lived in accordance with a Neo-Academic form of skepticism is more attractive than one guided by dogmatism.

- by Baron Reed
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- Epistemology, Cicero, Philosophical skepticism, Sextus Empiricus

This article is concerned with the writings of Sextus Empiricus (second century CE), a Sceptic philosopher whose works show a remarkable plenitude of similar elements that occur frequently within various Indian philosophies. Following Aram M. Frenkian’s investigation, this study re-examines one of the three elements identified by Frenkian as Indian influences on Sextus’ oeuvre: the smokefire illustration, the snake-rope analogy, and the quadrilemma. The same elements, among others, were identified by Thomas McEvilley as evidence of Greek influence
on Madhyamaka Buddhism. After inspecting the supposedly earliest occurrences in both Greek and Indian philosophy and literature, we must acknowledge, at least until other evidence arises, that these three elements are not indicators of direct borrowing. The presence of the same similes and verbal expression in both Indian and Greek philosophical contexts, however, is most probably an indicator
of intellectual exchange, even if this is not due to direct influence out of textual contact but more likely arising from verbal communication. It seems practical to postulate a “common pool” of philosophical expressions, a certain distinct philosophical language, which was available to philosophers of both cultures.
Various authors used these similes as building blocks in the expression of their theories, and they used them as it best suited their purposes.

In this essay, I propose that there is at least one modern theory that has adopted the approach of Pyrrhonian Skepticism as outlined by Sextus Empiricus (third century CE), namely the brand of Behaviorism, associated with the name of Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904-1990), which has become known as Radical Behaviorism. The parallels between the two systems have to do with two aspects of the Skeptic programme, its approach to daily life, and its view of language as the product of conditioning and habituation. Both aspects are closely connected to ethical matters.

- by kees versteegh
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- Ethics, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sextus Empiricus, Skepticism

Según lo expresara Richard Popkin en su ya clásica The History of Scepticism, Michel de Montaigne fue, entre los pensadores del siglo XVI, quien mayor impacto acusó en la recepción de los argumentos pirrónicos en torno a la “duda completa”, y, al mismo, quien mejor supo aplicar a los problemas intelectuales de su propia época los elementos que le brindaba la presentación del escepticismo realizada por Sexto Empírico. Siendo al mismo tiempo un fiel heredero del Humanismo renacentista y un testigo privilegiado de los conflictos político-religiosos que asolaron a su Francia natal luego del inicio de la Reforma, Montaigne tuvo el ingenio que se requería para ajustar esa herencia humanista a las inmoderaciones de una época en la que -en palabas de Stefan Zweig- se produjo “una horrible recaída del humanismo en la bestialidad”. En tal sentido, retomando el juicio de Popkin, y con la intención de avanzar en esa línea de interpretación, en este trabajo nos proponemos explorar en los textos del ensayista con el fin de sostener la siguiente hipótesis: la lectura de las Hipotiposis Pirrónicas de Sexto Empírico brindó a Montaigne una serie de herramientas filosóficas que le permitieron bosquejar -tomando la expresión de Sylvia Giocanti- una ética de la tolerancia.

- by Manuel Tizziani
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- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Scepticism, Philosophical Scepticism

This paper pursues two tasks: first, to criticize a number of prominent contemporary interpretations of the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, especially Jonathan Barnes’s; and second, to outline an alternative interpretation of Sextus that (a) reconciles the opposing sides of the long-standing dispute over the scope of Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment, and (b) suggests a sympathetic alternative to some of the most influential accounts of the Pyrrhonian way of life.

- by Roger E Eichorn
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- Ethics, Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy, Sextus Empiricus

What, exactly, is puzzling about induction? While the so-called problem of induction is normally introduced through David Hume’s famous argument, this essay shows how Sextus Empiricus gets to the heart of the matter. When properly understood, Sextus’s argument shows how the very power of inductive reasoning—its ability to move from particulars to universals—is at the same time what makes it “totter.” The argument has only been analyzed in any detail by the formal learning theorist Kevin Kelly, who uses the formal tools of computability theory and topology to mount a principled response. It is shown that this response depends on questionable assumptions and thus that they have not resolved Sextus’s riddle of induction.

- by Justin Vlasits
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- Epistemology, David Hume, Induction (Philosophy), Sextus Empiricus

En el presente trabajo hemos tratado de exponer una visión unitaria de la génesis del pensamiento escéptico en su doble vertiente histórica y temática. Por ello, la estructuración interna evita el mero orden cronológico intentando, por el contrario, agrupar las corrientes objeto de estudio en función de la proximidad de sus contenidos doctrinales y también del modo de comprensión de estos contenidos por parte de la propia tradición escéptica. Así, la aproximación a la filosofía escéptica que aquí se ofrece pretende especialmente clarificar el decurso de la línea filosófica que, según el propio escepticismo, se inicia en los albores de la tradición griega y que termina dando lugar al corpus ideológico de la escuela pirrónica a partir de Enesidemo. La comprensión de este decurso filosófico se muestra como requisito previo imprescindible para cualquier investigación que pretenda poner en claro los presupuestos y categorías subyacentes a la filosofía escéptica. Por ello, hemos tratado de analizar y discutir con detenimiento las nociones fundamentales que funcionan como marco de referencia del pensamiento pirrónico, así como el papel que cada una de ellas desempeña en la concepción filosófica escéptica en su conjunto. Nuestra intención fundamental ha sido la de trazarnos como línea de investigación uno de los aspectos a nuestro entender más interesantes de la concepción filosófica que caracteriza a la corriente escéptica: el alcance teórico y las características específicas de su posición, determinadas por el tipo de supuestos con los que el filósofo escéptico cuenta a la base de su actividad.

- by Ignacio Pajón Leyra
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- Metaphysics, Scepticism, Philosophical Scepticism, Ancient Philosophy

Even though there were some contributions from Plato and Aristotle, a more developed linguistic thinking does not evolve until the time of the Stoics; some even argue that linguistics in the modern sense started only with the Stoics. The central notions of their understanding of time, language and the Greek tenses are found and preserved in the doxographies of others, such as Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus and in the scholia (a commentary on grammar etc) of the commentator Stephanos.This paper looks into the Stoic philosophy of time and briefly how it relates to their tense system.

- by Jan H. Nylund
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- Metaphysics of Time, Philosophy of Time, Time Perception, Sextus Empiricus

This article is focused on answering the question to what extent one can be a sceptic. Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Scepticism serves as a guide. In section 1, it is investigated whether three logical laws have a certain foundation or are subject to doubt. In section 2, Sextus’s way to deal with these laws is examined; the question arises how dogmatic his approach is. After that, a possible ‘reply’ by Sextus to the criticism receives attention. Section 3 is concentrated on a possible alternative to Sextus’s approach. Besides logical laws, some important methods are concerned.

- by Jasper Doomen
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- Logic And Foundations Of Mathematics, Calculus, Philosophy, Metaphysics

Despite their divergences, I argue that Sextus, Montaigne, and Hume are committed to several substantive points of commonality and that these commonalities justify us in speaking of them as belonging to a unitary Pyrrhonist tradition. In this tradition, Pyrrhonizing doubt serves to chart the boundary of that-which-resists-doubt, thereby simultaneously charting the shape of that complex of nature and custom which constitutes the bedrock of human life—the life that remains after doubt has done its worst.

- by Brian Ribeiro
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- Michel de Montaigne, David Hume, Greek Skepticism & Montaigne, Sextus Empiricus
- by Emidio Spinelli
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- Ancient Philosophy, Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonism
- by Roger E Eichorn
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- Scepticism, Philosophical Scepticism, Sextus Empiricus, Skepticism
- by Máté Veres
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- Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonism

Is music just matter of hearing and producing notes? And is it of interest just to
musicians? By exploring different authors and philosophical trends of the Roman
Empire, from Philo of Alexandria to Alexander of Aphrodisias, from the rebirth of
Platonism with Plutarch to the last Neoplatonists, this book sheds light on different
ways in which music and musical notions were made a crucial part of philosophical
discourse. Far from being mere metaphors, notions such as harmony, concord and
attunement became key philosophical tools in order to better grasp and
conceptualise fundamental notions in philosophical debates from cosmology to
ethics and from epistemology to theology. The volume is written by a distinguished
international team of contributors.

- by Federico Maria Petrucci and +1
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- Classics, Plato, Neoplatonism and late antique philosophy, Early Christianity

In this paper, we examine Sextus Empiricus’ treatise Against the geometers. We first set this treatise in the overall context of the sceptic’s polemics against the liberal arts. After a discussion of Sextus’ attitude to the quadrivium, we discuss the structure, the sources and the target of the Against the geometers. It appears that Euclid is not Sextus’ source, and neither he, nor the professional geometers, seem to be Sextus’ main targets.
Of course, Sextus never really makes clear his precise target, but his attacks are rather directed against geometry as a means of modelling the physical world, thus ruining the support geometry was intended to bring to the physical part of dogmatic philosophy.

- by Guillaume Dye and +1
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- Art, Literature, Science, Ancient Philosophy

In her book Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher, Ann Hartle argues that Montaigne's thought is dialectical in the Hegelian sense. Unlike Hegel's progressive dialectic, however, Montaigne's thought is, according to Hartle, circular in that the reconciliation of opposed terms comes not in the form of a newly emergent term, but in a return to the first term, where the meaning of the first is transformed as a result of its dialectical interaction with the second. This analysis motivates Hartle's claim that Montaigne is not a skeptic at all, let alone a Pyrrhonian skeptic. In this paper, I argue that Hartle's circular-dialectical interpretation of Montaigne is not only compatible with Pyrrhonism, but is in fact an ideal model for understanding Sextus Empiricus's philosophical therapy.

- by Roger E Eichorn
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- Epistemology, Metaphilosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Montaigne
- by Anna Tigani
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- Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonism, Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Aporia

Em Contra os astrólogos, Sexto Empírico problematiza a suposta capacidade de associar os eventos celestes aos acontecimentos ligados às vidas dos homens. Ao elaborar suas críticas, Sexto fornece minuciosas informações sobre as astrologias da época e propõe uma distinção entre a astrologia, com suas pretensões cosmológicas e antropológicas, e uma forma de astronomia que consiste apenas em observar os fenômenos celestes e codificá-los pragmaticamente. Com isso, o cético acaba por prenunciar uma concepção empírico-experimental de ciência, à maneira dos modernos.

- by Rodrigo Pinto de Brito and +2
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- Astrology, History of Astrology, Sextus Empiricus, Skepticism

This essay proposes an interpretation of Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola’s dialogue Strix sive de ludificatione daemonum as the last part of Pico’s apologetic strategy in defense of Christianity from ‘contamination’ with pagan philosophy. This strategy was carried out against the syncretistic attitude adopted by Ficino and other renowned humanists. In the first part of the essay it is argued that the Strix, following the logic of many Renaissance demonological treatises, uses the demonstration of the reality of witchcraft and demons to certify Christian truth; on the other side, the dialogue clarifies Gianfrancesco Pico’s philosophical attitude. In particular, the main objective of the Strix – the intention to deny the fantastic and illusory character of witches’ night flights to the Sabbath – should be understood in connection with Gianfrancesco’s close examination of the role of the imagination in human life (as it is explained in his De imaginatione) and with his belief that Christian faith does not depend on human imagination. In the last part of the essay is analyzed the relation between the Strix and the skeptical position outlined in the Examen vanitatis in order to highlight conceptual weaknesses in Pico’s demonstration of reality of witchcraft.

- by Lucia Pappalardo
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- Renaissance Philosophy, Demonology, Witchcraft (Magic), Aristotelianism
- by Shaul Tor
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- Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonism

This dissertation examines the relationship of skepticism and philosophy in the work of G.W.F. Hegel. Whereas other commentators have come to recognize the epistemological significance of Hegel's encounter with skepticism, emphasizing the strength of his system against skeptical challenges to the possibility of knowledge, I argue that Hegel develops his metaphysics in part through his ongoing engagement with the skeptical tradition. As such, I argue that Hegel's interest is not in refuting skepticism, but in defining its legitimate role within the project of philosophical science. Hegel finds that historical forms of skepticism have misunderstood their own activity and thus have drawn the wrong conclusions from the epistemological challenges that they raise. For Hegel, these challenges lead not to the suspension of judgment, as many skeptics have assumed, but to an insight into the fundamental nature of reality itself. For this reason, I argue that it is important to distinguish between historical forms of skepticism (e.g., Pyrrhonism) and the "self-completing skepticism" that Hegel describes in the Phenomenology of Spirit. It is the latter sense of skepticism, I argue, that one finds at work in Hegel's own philosophical project at nearly every stage of his career.

- by Miles Hentrup
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- Metaphysics, Epistemology, German Idealism, Hegel

This chapter presents Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary and Samuel Beckett’s Trilogy as modern fictions with ancient-skeptical ambitions. Whether in the affective domain (Flaubert) or in the cognitive (Beckett), the aim is to help the reader achieve a position of studied neutrality—ataraxia, époché—thanks not to an a priori decision but to the mutual cancellation of opposing tendencies. Understanding Flaubert and Beckett in this way allows us, first, to enrich our sense of what “catharsis” may involve; second, to see why the apparently odious Charles, in Madame Bovary, suddenly becomes a deeply touching figure; and third, to recognize the severe limitations of empathy-based moralist theories of fiction.

- by Joshua Landy
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- Flaubert, Samuel Beckett, Catharsis, Sextus Empiricus

In this paper I examine a fragment of Aristotle's lost DE PHILOSOPHIA (Ross 13A) preserved in book II of Cicero's De Natura Deorum. The passage is a thought experiment which owes much to the Allegory of the Cave in REPUBLIC VII. Subterranean people who have lived comfortable and well-furnished lives underground emerge to the surface, and upon witnessing various meteorological phenomena, they conclude that the heavens have "gods", about whom they had long heard rumors. This passage has been widely considered to be an early form of the teleological argument for the existence of god(s). If this is true, it have significant implications for the development of Aristotle's philosophy. I distinguish two kinds teleological arguments: arguments from design and 'deification arguments', and argue that the Subterraneans' Argument is neither. I defend the view that it is an illustration of Aristotle's views concerning the origins of the conception of "gods". I then argue that we should reject as inauthentic several supposed fragments of the De Philosophia that do contain arguments from design but for which there is no evidence of Aristotelian provenance.

- by Jason Rheins
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- Theology, Aristotle, Stoicism, Philo of Alexandria

El tema de esta investigación es el escepticismo de Sexto Empírico, en específico sobre su primer libro de los Esbozos pirrónicos. La problemática principal puede expresarse en la pregunta: ¿Qué se puede responder ante las dificultades que plantea Sexto? Para contestar defenderé dos tesis. Primero, que este tipo de escepticismo es irresoluble. Segundo, que, aunque no hay solución posible, existe una forma general de contestar sin contradecirse, caer en una recurrencia al infinito o convertirse en escéptico.

- by Daniel Vazquez
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- Epistemology, Philosophical Scepticism, Hellenistic Philosophy, Dialectic

O trilema de Agripa, tal como chega até nós no século XXI através das Hipotiposes pirrônicas de Sexto Empírico, estabelece que, em toda busca pelo fundamento último de determinado aspecto da realidade, inevitavelmente caímos numa dessas três dificuldaes: i) ou caímos num regresso ao infinito, buscando as razões das razões das razões e etc., sem encontrar uma que dê conta de explicar a série toda e a si mesma enquanto elo da série, ii) ou caímos num círculo vicioso, no qual explicamos a razão da causa de determinado fenômeno com o efeito produzido por ela, justificando a causa com aquilo que ela justamente deveria explicar ou, por fim, iii) caímos no modo da hipótese – ou parada arbitrária – na qual decidimos, sem apresentar uma razão suficiente, que um determinado elemento da série explica todos os demais e a si mesmo por ser autoevidente. Nosso objetivo, considerando essas dificuldades postas pelo trilema de Agripa (ou trilema de Münchhausen, segundo Hans Albert) é mostrar como o trilema está estreitamente ligado à busca por uma razão de tipo suficiente, e não uma razão meramente parcial – razão esta que, por definição, remete a outras ulteriores a ela. A partir disso, podemos apresentar o princípio de razão suficiente (PRS) e como ele visa, por meio de sua construção (sobretudo na filosofia de Leibniz), superar as dificuldades do trilema na busca pela razão suficiente, que é, justamente, o conteúdo sobre o qual versa o princípio. Contudo, a mesma estrutura do princípio que permite a superação do trilema no âmbito do contingente (ou “imanente”) é o que dificulta a dedução de sua validade objetiva no âmbito do necessário (ou “transcendente”). Com isso, podemos concluir que, a partir da crítica de Kant ao PRS de Leibniz, apesar de podermos superar as dificuldades do trilema de Agripa no que diz respeito à dedução transcendental do uso regulativo do PRS, não o podemos no que diz respeito à dedução transcendental de seu uso constitutivo, que é a versão do princípio que superaria o trilema não só no âmbito subjetivo (que mostra que a busca não só é possível, como também exigida pela própria razão), mas que também constituiria o PRS como um princípio que, além de ser uma máxima regulativa da razão, é também uma lei do universo intrínseca às próprias coisas.

- by Derócio Meotti
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- Philosophy, Epistemology, Immanuel Kant, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

Sextus Empiricus'un felsefesi

- by Hazal Akpinar
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- Hellenistic Philosophy, Sextus Empiricus, Stoacılık, Helenistik Felsefe

published in : P. Adamson/R. Hansberger/J. Wilberding (eds), Philosophical Themes in Galen, BICS supplement 114, 2014, 269-290
This paper focuses on the relevance of the Pseudo-Galenica, by contrast with genuine Galenic works, for our understanding of the boundaries of ancient medical schools; in particular, this paper re-examines the evidence provided by the pseudo-Galenic Introduction, or the physician, better known under its Latin title, Introductio sive medicus, especially its fourth chapter about the ‘heads of the three schools’. After a brief introduction to pseudo-Galenic works, I approach the pseudo-Galenic chapter from three angles: the controversial reference to Sextus Empiricus, the definition of Methodism and related schools, and Pneumatism, in order to demonstrate that our evidence is more problematic than conclusive in assessing the author’s doctrinal preferences, and the very nature of ancient medical schools in the Roman Empire.

- by Caroline Petit
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- History of Medicine, Galen, Ancient Philosophy, Ancient Medicine

The notion that philosophy can be practised as a kind of therapy has become a focus of debate. This article explores how philosophy can be practised literally as a kind of therapy, in two very different ways: as philosophical therapy that addresses ‘‘real-life problems’’ (e.g., Sextus Empiricus) and as therapeutic philosophy that meets a need for therapy which arises in and from philosophical reflection (e.g., Wittgenstein). With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive and clinical psychology, and from cognitive inguistics, the article shows that both philosophical projects address important and literally therapeutic tasks and explains how they can do so with genuinely philosophical argument and analysis. This brings into view new applications for philosophy, a need for therapy in core areas of the subject, and the outline of a new approach to meet what will be shown to be a central need.

- by Eugen Fischer
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- Metaphilosophy, Philosophical Counseling, Wittgenstein, Sextus Empiricus