Transcendental Aesthetic Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Lacan ha ragione. L’Estetica trascendentale kantiana va revisionata. Il suo spazio è immaginario, egoico, mentale. Nessun reale vi si incontra. Tuttavia, ciò non si deve imputare soltanto al ricorso che Kant fa alla geometria euclidea,... more

Lacan ha ragione. L’Estetica trascendentale kantiana va revisionata. Il suo spazio è immaginario, egoico, mentale. Nessun reale vi si incontra. Tuttavia, ciò non si deve imputare soltanto al ricorso che Kant fa alla geometria euclidea, l’unica disponibile ai suoi tempi. L’idealismo dell’Estetica trascendentale dipende soprattutto dall’esclusione, che vi si opera, della sensazione: il solo contatto con un fuori e un dentro trascendentali, inconsci. Il contrasto tra queste due ‘dimensioni’ si pone al livello empirico della percezione, una sensazione di cui si è coscienti, fantasmaticamente. Cosa che Freud suggerisce nel saggio su La negazione. L’archicorismia originaria della soggettività che vi descrive è una modificazione che produce un’anestesia, o insensibilità, alla luce della quale il senso del suo aforisma – psiche è estesa, ma non ne sa nulla – si chiarisce.

The Immanuel Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic is the science of the a priori principles of senses. The Transcendental Aesthetic shows the difference between the a priori and a posteriori representation and a priori and a posteriori... more

The Immanuel Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic is the science of the a priori principles of senses. The Transcendental Aesthetic shows the difference between the a priori and a posteriori representation and a priori and a posteriori perception in the field of Theory of Knowledge. The main question of this article is: How is possible the concept of space like a priori representation only as essence of senses, but not for “res per se” or “ding an sich” on it’s own nature?

Kant’s two-fold refutation of Berkeleyan Idealism through the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Refutation of Idealism, as an overture to what the ramifications of the latter may be for Kant’s transcendental Philosophy in the face of... more

Kant’s two-fold refutation of Berkeleyan Idealism through the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Refutation of Idealism, as an overture to what the ramifications of the latter may be for Kant’s transcendental Philosophy in the face of skepticism.

2017_Giornale di Metafisica.

In the general frame of an inquiry concerning Lacan and mathematics, the author is interested in the treatment of the probabilities, the theory and decision, all topics that give way to an interpretation of Pascal’s calculus of partition... more

In the general frame of an inquiry concerning Lacan and mathematics, the author is interested in the treatment of the probabilities, the theory and decision, all topics that give way to an interpretation of Pascal’s calculus of partition and, in its wake, of the famous argument of betting. Starting from a critical examination of Kant’s transcendental aesthetics, that Lacan propounds to the philosophers to replace by logical space and time of the theory of game (as substitute), the psychoanalyst attempts to prove that Pascal is probably the forefather of the theory of game and decision. What is disturbing in this affair is that a number of interpretations of the “geometer of chance <hasard>”, which will happen in the 1970s, are in debt, perhaps unconsciously, surely in a secrete way, to the Lacanian interpretation that appeared, ten years before. Résumé Dans le cadre général d’une recherche sur Lacan et les mathématiques, l’auteur s’intéresse ici au sort que Lacan réserve aux p...

This paper deals with the problem of characterizing the content of experience as either conceptual or non-conceptual in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, a topic widely debated in contemporary philosophy. I start out with Kant’s... more

This paper deals with the problem of characterizing the content of experience as either conceptual or non-conceptual in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, a topic widely debated in contemporary philosophy. I start out with Kant’s pre-critical discussions of space and time in which he develops a specific notion of non-conceptual content. Secondly, I show that this notion of non-conceptual intuitional content does not seem to match well with the Transcendental Deduction. This incongruity results in three interrelated problems that are inherent to Kant’s Transcendental Deduction in the Critique : the ‘Independency Disagreement’, the ‘Conceptualism Contradiction’ and the ‘Intuition Inconsistency’. These three problems derive from apparently contradictory claims concerning the possibility of non-conceptual content. Contemporary Kantian conceptualists and non-conceptualists tend to take a stance at either side of the dilemma rather than trying to dissolve these tensions. In response to this, I propose a new solution to these difficulties based on a distinction between two kinds of conceptualism. This will reveal why Kant is a non-conceptualist in one significant sense, but also why he is still better regarded a conceptualist.

2017_Università di Padova