Transcendental Idealism Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

- by and +1
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- Phenomenology, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger
- by Peter Critchley
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- Philosophy, Kant, Plato, Aristotle

Рассмотрены история происхождения, специфика, основная проблематика и категориальный аппарат немецкой классической философии и системы трансцендентального идеализма И. Канта. Проанализирована перспектива развития системы трансцендентального идеализма И. Канта в контексте немецкой классической философии, а также ее влияние
на современную философскую мысль.
Предназначен для студентов бакалавриата по направлениям подготовки 38.03.01 «Экономика», 38.03.02 «Менеджмент», 38.03.03 «Управление персоналом», 27.03.01 «Стандартизация и метрология», 27.03.02 «Управление качеством», 46.03.02 «Документоведение и архивоведение» всех форм обучения, а также для всех, интересующихся проблемами немецкой классической философии, трансцендентального идеализма и современного философского знания в целом.

What can phenomenological reflection contribute to the ongoing discussion of transcendental thought? What kind of transcendental philosophy is phenomenology? Why does Husserl's unfinished project merit the name transcendental? Can the notion of transcendental phenomenology be defended today, and is Husserl right in insisting upon its uniqueness and indeclinability? To what extent is the very idea of transcendental phenomenology deeply committed to metaphysical prejudices that we have to renounce the transcendental project in favour of other projects? To what extent is speculative realism in a position to overcome the Kantian philosophical framework? This impressive collection of essays is a lucid, insightful and important attempt to answer these questions. Not only does it give new insight into the transcendental character of phenomenology, but it also outlines the dynamic development of phenomenology as a continuing and expanding domain of research. The editors claim that this volume " is motivated by the insight that the novel interdisciplinary situation in which phenomenology conducts fruitful exchanges with several empirical sciences demands that we reconsider thoroughly the fundamental methodological questions concerning the transcendental character of phenomenological inquiries. Phenomenology and the Transcendental brings together original articles that together clarify the transcendental aspects of phenomenology and outline new transcendental versions of phenom-enology in distinction from the naturalistic, vitalist, and poststructuralist approaches that dominate philosophy at the moment " (p. 3). In this review, I provide a brief overview of the contributions to this volume to show how the transcendental standpoint is indispensable for genuine phenomenology and philosophical reasoning in general.

- by Iulian Apostolescu
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- Ontology, Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger
- by Ileana Beade
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- Ontology, Kant, Idealism, Categories

In this paper I examine intellectual Intuition, Aufforderung and Pure Will in J. G. Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre Nova Methodo. After considering the various senses in which Fichte used the term "intellectual intuition," I discuss the... more

L'affirmation de l'individu s'avère paradoxale chez Emerson car, qu'il cherche à s'affirmer esthétiquement ou éthiquement, l'individu se nie nécessairement. L'affirmation doit donc passer par la médiation d'un autre qui l'appelle à devenir unique et irremplaçable, c'est-à-dire un Individu. Chez Emerson, cet autre s'incarne chez le poète, cet hétéronyme d'Emerson. Or Emerson conçoit le poète comme un "dieu libérateur", un individu divin qui possède les mêmes attributs que Dieu. Cet article entend ainsi montrer comment Emerson construit, à l'épreuve du texte, une arche divine sous laquelle l'individu est appelé à mener son existence et l'affirmer. Cet habiter divin doit ainsi permettre à l'individu de procéder à la réforme d'une méthode métaphysique enlisée dans l'impasse logique de la pensée normative et de surmonter cette difficulté par le mouvement, non plus unilatéral mais bilatéral, de transcendance.

- by Yves Gardes
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- Metaphysics, Self and Identity, Poetry, Poetics

In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant identifies space and time as the only two pure forms of sensible intuition of a priori cognition. He constructs the three essential arguments for space and time mainly based on the investigations of visual information: how we form visual representations of objects, of their relations to each other in space, and of their changes and motions in time. The neglect of auditory representations in this discussion, however, is a regrettable state of affairs, as the spatial and temporal unfolding of sound could initiate another discussion of the Transcendental Aesthetic. My task in this paper is to reconstruct Kant's arguments in the Transcendental Aesthetic in the context of a pure auditory perception. The re-evaluations and reconstruction process of the three essential arguments in the Transcendental Aesthetic will lead to the conclusion that our representation of sounds precisely comes from our representation of space and time as a priori and pure intuitions.

- by CHENYU BU
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- Sound studies, Immanuel Kant, Space and Time (Philosophy), Transcendental Idealism

This chapter in an edited collection, published by the CNRS, seeks to establish a new critical approach in Beat Studies; taking the form of a conceptual framework foregrounded in the ontological that intermingles French Existentialist theory with the American philosophical and cultural rationale of Beat writing.
In Part 1, the chapter elucidates the great range of definitions for Existentialism in mid-20th century and proceeds by shaping a version of Existentialism that takes into consideration the variety of cultural and literary legacies referenced in Beat texts. Part 2 explores how the American Romantic tradition in particular – heavily referenced in the writings – may be combined with this ontological model; bringing a vertical and transcendental dimension into the conception of a ‘Beat’ Existentialism.

- by Tanguy Harma
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- Ontology, Aesthetics, Performativity, Intuition
- by Alexis Chen
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- Aesthetics, Continental Philosophy, Transcendental Philosophy, Immanuel Kant

This encyclopedia entry (co-authored with W.H. Walsh) focuses on Kant’s main doctrines of transcendental idealism and theory of knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason. Topics covered: Kant’s Copernican revolution, types of judgment (including synthetic a priori judgments), space and time as forms of intuition, the unity of experience (apperception), the role of the twelve categories, the transcendental deduction, schemata, appearances or phenomena, and the thing-in-itself.

- by Robert R Clewis
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- Intuition, Transcendental Philosophy, Immanuel Kant, Categories

My theme is ‘life-writing’, understood as the shaping of one's life through the contemplation of values, although this activity is mostly unreflective. To become an art so that one's life can be shaped in greater accord with clearly held... more

- by Peter Cheyne
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- British Literature, Aesthetics, Ethics, Kant

Provides a brief, but relatively systematic introduction to the basic elements of Kant's critical methodology. Begins by discussing how Kant conceives of the proper ends of rational inquiry, and how those ends inform his conception of the proper methodology for philosophy. Then discusses the foundational role that self-conscious capacities play within Kant's philosophical system. Concludes by discussing Kant's famous claim that the philosopher - unlike the mathematician - must be a legislator, and not an artist, of reason.

- by Karl Schafer
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- Critical Theory, Kant, Research Methodology, Kant's Practical Philosophy

The paper defends a reading of Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves according to which it amount to one between two kinds of properties of one and the same mind-independent objects: dispositional properties on the one hand, and non-dispositional properties on the other. Spatio-temporal appearance properties are understood as dispositions to have certain effects on minds with space and time as their forms of intuition.

In this essay, I develop a unified account Kant's conception of Erkenntnis or cognition and show that this conception generates two crucial constraints on cognition of an object: (i) a real possibility constraint and (ii) a determinate content constraint. In doing so, I stress the differences between Kant's conception of cognition and our contemporary conception of propositional knowledge, while connecting together important strands in the recent scholarly literature on these topics. Finally, I make use of this improved understanding of cognition to better understand why Kant claims that we cannot cognize things-in-themselves, while also appearing to claim that we can know a good deal about what things-in-themselves are like.

The Immanuel Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic is the science of the a priori principles of senses. The Transcendental Aesthetic shows the difference between the a priori and a posteriori representation and a priori and a posteriori perception in the field of Theory of Knowledge. The main question of this article is: How is possible the concept of space like a priori representation only as essence of senses, but not for “res per se” or “ding an sich” on it’s own nature?

- by Simeon Georgiev
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- Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science, Transcendental Philosophy

In the last fifty years or so, since Yogācāra texts have been available to western academics, there has been a debate as to how Yogācāra Buddhism should be interpreted. This article seeks to establish that Yogācāra Buddhism is most properly interpreted as an idealist school of Buddhist thought. Specifically, it challenges the arguments that have been put forth in recent years that suggest a phenomenological interpretation of Yogācāra Buddhism. The primary target of my argumentation is Dan Lusthaus but arguments of other scholars are also taken into account. In the process of defending my thesis I will explain the fundamentals of Yogācāra Buddhism, provide the reasons why Yogācāra Buddhism should be interpreted as an idealist school, provide reasons why some have interpreted Yogācāra Buddhism as phenomenology, refute non-idealist interpretations of Yogācāra Buddhism, and investigate the relation between Yogācāra Buddhism and other forms of idealism. In order to achieve each of these goals I will utilize the original texts of Yogācāra Buddhism, known as the Trimsika, authored by Vasubandhu and the Cheng Wei-Shih Lun, authored by Hsüan-Tsang. I will also reference and expound upon the philosophies of George Berkeley, Immanuel Kant, and Georg Hegel along with recent scholars who have partaken in this debate.

- by Sean Butler
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- Buddhism, Asian Studies, Philosophy of Mind, Chinese Philosophy

At the heart of today’s return to ontology is Kant and his interlocutors whom we must decide on if continental philosophy can decide what to do with matter, spacetime, the living, the brain, our genes, etc. Speculative realists are simply walking away, disavowing Kant’s canonization, and call us to “Relinquish the Transcendental!” and break with philosophical traditions that take as their foundation the thinking of being beyond empiricism. Research on Foucault as a Kantian as well as a student of Canguilhem is reviewed to show how Foucault’s genealogical approach is adapted from Canguilhem’s Nietzschean historization of medicine and pathology, largely situating himself within a reading of the organized/organizing living-beings of Kant’s Critique of Judgment to do so. Defending a preservation of Kant and the trascendental in following my mentor Catherine Malabou, this essay pushes for a philosophy of life in lieu of pure mathematics, as practiced by speculative realists. Combining these historical thinkers with Malabou's work on epigenesis, this essay ultimately concludes that there is indeed a coming of a philosophy of life sciences that may be able to confront the continental/analytic split as well as the more general split between science and philosophy at-large, a possibility that the fugue and abandon of speculative realism – having cast itself into a post-critical and post-metaphysical position – is simply unable to offer.

- by I. A. Roland-Rodríguez
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- Metaphysics, Philosophy of Biology, Genealogy, Plasticity

Resumen Se defenderá que la verdad trascendental consiste, en línea con la definición tradicional de verdad, en un sentido de correspondencia entre conocimiento y objeto, que la lógica trascendental establece criterios de verdad trascendental, y que es esta noción de verdad la que permite establecer la verdad del conocimiento a priori y delimitar el territorio de la verdad empírica. Palabras clave: criterios de verdad, experiencia posible, objetividad, verdad trascendental. Abstract will argue that this notion is in line with the traditional definition of truth, i.e., that it consists in the correspondence between knowledge and object. I will also argue that criteria of transcendental truth are provided by transcendental logic, and that it is this notion of truth what makes it possible to establish the truth of a priori knowledge and delimitate the field of empirical truth.

- by Stéfano Straulino
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- Kant, Truth, Transcendental Philosophy, Immanuel Kant

Since the word “idealism” came into use in the 18th century, Berkeley and Kant have been considered leading exponents of this diverse, sometimes contradictory cluster of doctrines. While it is commonly argued by contemporary scholars that Kant’s transcendental idealism and Berkeley’s immaterialism represent vastly incompatible systems of thought, I contend that this “received view” harbors a serious misunderstanding of both philosophers. In spite of Kant’s ardent protests to the contrary, I argue that (as an interpretative framework) the received view radically underdetermines important convergences in the Kantian and Berkelean treatments of idealism, skepticism, and the nature of space and time. In this paper, I address these convergences with the aim of bringing Kant and Berkeley closer together.

- by Michael J. Braund
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- Kant, Idealism, German Idealism, 18th Century Philosophy

This paper deals with the question of whether Kant's transcendental idealism allows for an explanation of the a posteriori aspects of mental content by the properties of empirical objects. I first show that a phenomenalist interpretation has severe problems with assuming that we perceive an object as being red or as being cubical partly because the perceived object is red and cubical, and then present an interpretation that allows us to save the realistic intuition behind these claims. According to this interpretation, Kantian phenomenal properties are understood as response-dependent properties of extra-mental objects that also have to have some response-independent (in-itself-) properties. I show that this interpretation is well supported by Kant's remarks about the transcendental object in the A-edition of the first Critique and that it also makes intelligible why Kant took explanations of mental content by means of empirical properties to imply an explanation by means of nouminal properties without thereby violating his own doctrine of noumenal ignorance. This allows us to discern the true kernel in Adickes' infamous talk about Kant's theory of double affection.

- by Tobias Rosefeldt
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- Idealism, German Idealism, Dispositions, Immanuel Kant

Три са съществените силни страни на Тайната сила… . Най-напред, в нея са представени резултати от съвестно и открито философско изследване; поет е риск да се проблематизират смисли и значения, вместо да се приеме спокойствието от представянето им. На второ място, мярата на текста, несъмнено „четиво за специалисти“, успешно единява прецизността с метафоричност, а систематиката – със сдържан усет за хумор. Третата силна страна има общностен смисъл, свързан с добре познатата критическа традиция в България. Поне, а и не само заради работата на Цеко Торбов и проф. Иван Стефанов, освен известна, тя се оказва и една от най-жизнените – например през последните години, с изследванията на Валентин Канавров, Ангел Стефанов, Димитър Денков, Кристиян Енчев, Христо Стоев и др. Книгата на Ивайло Димитров е достоен член на общността и затова като издател ще си позволим убедеността, че става дума за едно хубаво събитие.
Тайната сила… съдържа четири основни части. Пролог очертава контекста и границите на изледването, и въвежда в понятиен лабиринт, на чийто вход се среща предупредително авторово признание за предстоящи срещи със Сцила и Харибда.
Археолог се заема с откриване на подстъпи за реабилитиране и систематично разгръщане на Кантовата критическа метафизика на способностите. Това става чрез екзегетична реконструкция на тройното синтетично различаване между понятията за капацитет (Fähigkeit), способност (Vermögen) и сила (Kraft) в контекста на критиката на синонимната им употреба в българските и английските преводи на Кантовите съчинения.
Третата част, Полилог, реставрира философски и научни дебати около концепта Kraft, като под името „проф. Кин“ (по Е. Канети) авторът окончателно предлага алтернативен български философски превод на Кантовото понятие Einbildungskraft (чрез „сила за въображение“), обоснован в различаването между капацитет, способност и сила.
В Епилог се подготвят подстъпи към критиката на производствената парадигма на знанието чрез частична реконструкция на дистинкцията знание (Wissen, knowledge) ↔ познание (Erkenntnis, cognition), проведена на предварителен етап, само в полето на кантознанието. Дългосрочният проект е определен като радикална критика на продукционизма в мисленето, превъплъщаващ се в актуални прочити на Имануел Кант през призмата на конструктивизма в класическата и социалната епистемология.

- by Ivaylo Dimitrov
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- Metaphysics, Epistemology, German Idealism, Transcendental Philosophy

In this paper, I contest increasingly common "realist" interpretations of Hegel's theory of "the concept" (der Begriff), offering instead a "isomorphic" conception of the relation of concepts and the world. The isomorphism recommended, however, is metaphysically deflationary, for I show how Hegel's conception of conceptual form creates a conceptually internal standard for the adequacy of concepts. No "sideways-on" theory of the concept-world relationship is envisioned. This standard of conceptual adequacy is also "graduated" in that it allows for a lack of fit between concept and world. The possibility for a "maximally isomorphic" fit between concept and world obtains through the teleological realization of concepts, which marks especially the "artificial" world of human culture (law, art, religion, etc.). Some of the most seemingly exaggerated claims Hegel makes about the concept, I contend, can be understood when we consider the significance Hegel ascribes to human making, which is provided for in his conceptual theory. But my framework provides an interpretive key for the way Hegel sees concepts imperfectly realized in the natural world as well.

- by W Clark Wolf
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- Metaphysics, Idealism, German Idealism, Hegel

ايدهآليسم هوسرل نظريهاى است كه به عنوان علم انضمامى، در حوزههاى خاص قابل تبيين است. اين ايدهآليسم، وجود عالَم واقعى و عالم طبيعت را انكار نمىكند؛ با اين حال، نگاه پديدارشناسانه وى به عالم واقع و طبيعت، با ديگر نگاههاى معرفتشناختى متفاوت است.
در اين نوشتار، تلاش خواهد شد تا از راه تحليل مفاهيم و اصطلاحات موردنظر هوسرل، در برابر ديدگاهى كه ايدهآليسم هوسرل را ايدهآليسم محض مىداند، موضعگيرى و با بيان دلايلى، نشان داده شود كه در تحليل دقيق، نظريه او را بايد ايدهآليسم استعلايى ناميد مفاهيم كاربردى شامل مفهوم «آگاهى و همدلى»، «تأويل يا احاله»، «حيث التفاتى»، «شهود» و «ماهيت» مىباشند كه هركدام در معناى خاص خود، استعلايى بودن پديدارشناسى هوسرل را توصيف و تبيين مىنمايند.
نگارندگان مقاله حاضر بر آن هستند تا نشان دهند كه در پديدارشناسى استعلايى هوسرل، هر آنچه متعلّق به اين عالم است، ضرورتآ تمام تشخّص معنايى خود را علاوه بر وضعيت وجودشناختى آن به دست مى آورد؛ به همين لحاظ، هوسرل در كتاب ايدهها همه كوشش خود را به كار مىگيرد تا به تمايز دقيقى ميان پديدارشناسى به عنوان روش، و پديدارشناسى به عنوان معرفت دست يابد. پديدارشناسى هوسرل توانايى خود را در توصيف همه جنبههاى فلسفى و علمى به نحو گسترده پوشش داده است.

- by Hamidreza Ayatollahy
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- Idealism, Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, Transcendental Idealism
- by Zachary Little
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- Ontology, Epistemology, Kant, Empiricism
- by Toni Kannisto
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- Metaphysics, Immanuel Kant, Metametaphysics, Transcendental Idealism

The World as Will and Representation is the major achievement of Schopenhauer’s life, and the backbone of his intellectual career. In 1844 he published a revised and extended edition of it, and now added a whole second volume of ‘supplementary’ essays. It is this second volume, even longer than the first, that we have here in translation. In 1859, the year before he died, Schopenhauer revised both volumes for a final time, making many further additions.

- by Alistair Welchman
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- Idealism, German Idealism, Schopenhauer, Immanuel Kant

Les cinq leçons de 1907 sur l’idée de la phénoménologie ont une double pertinence à la fois exotérique et ésotérique. D’un point de vue exotérique, L’Idée de la phénoménologie constitue une introduction à l’entreprise phénoménologique et à sa visée interprétative du monde. D’un point de vue ésotérique cependant, on peut y dénoter une plaque tournante dans l’orientation à venir de la phénoménologie vers un idéalisme transcendantal. Ces leçons s’inscrivent alors au cœur des débats opposants Husserl à certains de ces disciples sur la tâche de l’entreprise phénoménologique comme compréhension – voire comme transformation – du monde.

- by Emmanuel Chaput
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- Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, Transcendental Idealism, Realist Phenomenology

Hegel scholarship of the past several decades, especially in the English-speaking world, has been dominated by non/anti-metaphysical interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy. Slavoj Žižek is far from alone in resisting these still-fashionable deflationary variants of Hegelianism. However, his ongoing work, particularly as elaborated in 2012’s Less Than Nothing, challenges in especially powerful ways attempts to downplay or jettison the ontological, materialist, naturalist, and realist dimensions of Hegelian thinking. Herein, I focus on Žižek’s disagreements with perhaps the most influential deflationist Hegelian, namely, Robert Pippin (with his thesis that the core of Hegel’s entire apparatus consists in a certain appropriation of Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception and, along with it, the subjectivist anti-realism of Kantian transcendental idealism). Although I am fully sympathetic to the broader cause of combatting deflationary Hegelianism, I opt in what follows, by contrast with Žižek, both: one, to contest directly Pippin’s construal of the importance of the Critique of Pure Reason’s “Transcendental Deduction” for Hegel; and, two, to problematize the very idea that the Logic alone forms the ground-zero foundation of the Hegelian System (an assumption arguably underpinning aspects of both Pippin’s and Žižek’s otherwise strikingly divergent approaches to Hegel).

- by Adrian Johnston
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- German Idealism, Hegel, Slavoj Žižek, Slavoj Zizek

Unfinished essay on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.

- by Kelly Maeshiro
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- German Idealism, Truth, Hegel, Immanuel Kant

Recent developments in Continental metaphysics have involved calls to leave behind the transcendental as first forged by Kant. Against such calls, I plead for a gesture of, to paraphrase Marx, extracting the rational kernel of transcendentalism from the mystical shell of transcendental idealism. I lay claim to Hegel as the key forerunner for this maneuver. Moreover, debates about “transcendental arguments” in Analytic philosophical circles from the mid-twentieth century through today likewise explore the option of a de-idealized transcendentalism. For both Kant and Hegel as well as Analytics participating in the just-mentioned debates, the specter of skepticism looms large over the transcendental. Through putting Hegel’s tarrying with ancient and modern skepticisms into conversation with Analytic altercations between transcendentalists and skeptics, I propose a meta-transcendental, genetic-diachronic “error-first ontology” (EFO) as a necessary supplement to any transcendental, static-synchronic epistemology concerned with true knowledge. Prior to the problem of minded subjects coming to know worldly objects, there is the problem of how subjects capable of falling into falsity, illusion, etc. come into being in the first place. This intervention is a prelude to a rapprochement between transcendentalism and a (quasi-)naturalist materialism allied with the natural sciences.

- by Adrian Johnston
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- German Idealism, Hegel, Transcendental Philosophy, Immanuel Kant

The chapter discusses Quentin Meillassoux's recent interpretation and critique of Heidegger's philosophical position, which he describes as "strong correlationism." It emphasizes the fact that Meillassoux situates Heidegger in the post-Kantian tradition of transcendental idealism that he defines in terms of a focus on the correlation between being and thinking. It is argued that Meillassoux's "speculative" attempt to overcome the Kantian philosophical framework in the name of absolute contingency should be understood as a further development and dialectical overcoming of its ultimate contemporary form, the Heideggerian philosophy of finitude.

- by Jussi Backman
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- Philosophy, Kant, Phenomenology, Continental Philosophy

It seems certain to me that I will die and stay dead. By “I”, I mean me, Greg Nixon, this person, this self-identity. I am so intertwined with the chiasmus of lives, bodies, ecosystems, symbolic intersubjectivity, and life on this... more

- by Gregory M Nixon
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- Self and Identity, Buddhist Philosophy, Death, Death Studies
- by Dr. Alkım Saygın
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- Schelling, Sanat Tarihi, Felsefe, Sanat

The problem of metaphysics counted as a crucial field for Husserl throughout his entire philosophical career, both as the ultimate science of reality and the discipline of the “highest and ultimate questions” (cf. e.g. Trizio 2019). In my presentation I would like to show, how Husserl’s “transcendental turn” around 1906/07 influenced his metaphysical ambitions. It helped him in a crucial manner to articulate a phenomenologically grounded metaphysics, and in particular it made him possible to elaborate a phenomenologically articulated notion of God. This conception implied a peculiar proof of the existence of God in Husserl, which was never explicitly developed by him, but whose main steps could be clearly found in his writings. The most important elements of this argument could be found in texts that stemmed between 1906 and 1914. The main focus of my presentation will be to reconstruct this argument.
A fundamental feature of his transcendental idealism, that enabled him to create a phenomenologically rearticulated notion of God, was the supposed strong metaphysical connection between consciousness and Being. The cornerstone of this argument is Husserl’s conception according to which “the idea of an actually existing thing prescribes that there should be an actually experiencing consciousness too” (Husserl 2003, p. 77). The next main step of this argument is that the intentional structure of constituting consciousness refers to an infinite horizon of phenomena, in the end, to an actually infinite phenomenal world. The third important part is that – in Husserl’s opinion – the transcendental consciousness could unfold in an objective manner an infinite number of axiological potentialities and realities in the world, which are increasing in their perfection and refers to the ideal of ultimate excellence. The final step is Husserl’s claim, according to which we need an actually infinite mind (God) as a guarantee that the infinite reality – with its axiological aspect – could be constituted and conceived in a coherent and unitary way through the finite forms of subjectivity.

- by Bence Marosan
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- Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, Philosophy of God, Transcendental Phenomenology

2017_Giornale di Metafisica.

- by Luigi Filieri
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- Kant, Emmanuel Kant, Immanuel Kant, Transcendental Idealism

[Winner of the 2022 Hegel PD Prize and Awarded a Special Mention by the Metaphysical Society of America for the 2024 Findlay Prize] Contemporary philosophical discourse has deeply problematized the possibility of absolute existence.... more

- by Gregory S Moss
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- Philosophy, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Plato

The treatment of the question of transcendental idealism mirrors the different self-understandings of phenomenology in the 21st century. While in the context of French phenomenology it has been announced that “idealism is overcome” (Tengelyi) by a phenomenology of meaning-events, in the context of philosophy of mind, Husserl’s philosophy is appreciated as the most thought-out form of a “supervenience-idealism” (Meixner). It is clear that Husserl’s anti-representational theory of intentionality is not to be confused with any other “garden varieties” of idealism, but does that mean that we should better avoid the term altogether (Zahavi) and only talk about “the transcendental”? The paper wants to get clear about this question by sharply contrasting Kant’s transcendental idealism with Husserl’s transcendental idealism. The decisive difference is that for Kant appearance has its ground in something which is absolutely independent of experience, which makes him a “fundamental realist” (Allais) apart from his empirical realism; Husserl, by contrast, who argues that transcendentally reduced consciousness has “no outside” anymore, insists that the “thing in itself” is a “counter-sensical” thought. My thesis is thus that it is a misunderstanding to believe that in phenomenology there is a similar potential for drawing a limit against metaphysics as there is in Kant’s conception of the transcendental. Is such a limitation nevertheless necessary? And is it maybe implied in genetic phenomenology which claims that subjectivity develops in its interaction with the world and other subjects? While I do not agree that phenomenology’s idealistic constellation is tied to a “sovereign subject” and that relocating the constitutional force on other side of the correlation could solve the “problem,” I believe that we have to take seriously the transcendental stakes in phenomenology, which, in the form of a “strong correlationism” (Meillassoux), is still the best line of defense against a naturalization of consciousness, the world and intersubjectivity.

- by Sophie Loidolt
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- Kant, Idealism, Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl

Uvođenje u Fihteovu filozofiju kroz osnovne pojmove

- by Kosta Kurćubić
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- Philosophy, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Transcendental Idealism

In this paper, I aim to account for Kant's position on space and time that he takes in the Critique of Pure Reason: that they are a priori intuitions that we bring to the world exclusively through our minds, and one of the conditions for the possibility of experience in general. He makes his case in the form of a series of arguments in the section The Transcendental Aesthetic, and I go through them here.

- by James Cartlidge
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- Metaphysics, Epistemology, Kant, Transcendental Philosophy

This paper examines the development of J. G. Fichte's philosophy of religion during the Jena and Berlin periods.

This is a longer version of what will appear as a chapter in a forthcoming volume on Žižek and his critics. In it, I raise some problems for Žižek's dialectical materialist rendition of quantum mechanics by elaborating a series of Hegelian criticisms of the Schellingian philosophical framework favored by Žižek in his appropriations of the physics of the extremely small. Apropos Naturphilosophie and its relations to the natural sciences, both Schelling and Hegel propose what fairly can be characterized as emergentisms avant la lettre. However, whereas Hegel advances an emergentist layer cake model, in which the upper layers of Spirit arise from the lower layers of Nature, Schelling advances an emergentist layer doughnut model in which the top layer of the autonomous transcendental subject is nothing other or more than the resurgence of the bottom layer of something on the order of Spinoza's Deus sive natura. Schelling's pseudo-emergentism, by contrast with Hegel's genuine emergentism, explains away free sapient subjectivity through what Lacan would characterize as a conjuring trick in which the rabbit of Spirit Schelling pulls out of the hat of Nature is the one he put there in the first place. Schelling's hylozoism, panpsychism, pantheism, and vitalism, his spiritualization of nature, is neither dialectical nor materialist. As such, Žižek would do better to stick to his typical Hegelian guns when engaging with such sciences as quantum physics.

- by Adrian Johnston
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- Emergent Phenomena, German Idealism, Hegel, Slavoj Žižek