Free Will and Moral Responsibility Research Papers (original) (raw)

This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences affect brains,” a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will. Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile the commonsense view that voluntary acts are freely chosen with the evidence that conscious wishes and decisions are determined by preconscious processing in the mind/brain. I consider alternative interpretations of how “conscious free will” might operate by Libet and by Mangan and respond to doubts about the extent to which the operations of mind are revealed in consciousness, raised by Claxton and Bouratinos. In reconciling commonsense attributions of freedom and responsibility with the findings of science, preconscious free will can be shown to have practical consequences for adjudications in law.

- by
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- Cognitive Science, Criminal Law, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind

It is a common idea, and an element in many legal systems, that
people can deserve punishment when they commit criminal (or
immoral) actions. A standard philosophical objection to this
retributivist idea about punishment is that if human choices and
actions are determined by previous events and the laws of nature,
then we are not free in the sense required to be morally responsible
for our actions, and therefore cannot deserve blame or punishment.
It has recently been suggested that this argument can be backed up
by neuroscience, since neuroscientific explanations of human
behavior leave no room for non-determined free actions. In this
thesis, an argument of this sort is discussed. According to this
argument, that I call “the Revision Argument”, we should revise the
legal system so that any retributivist justification of punishment is
removed. I examine some objections to the Revision Argument
according to which compatibilism about free will and responsibility is
a morally acceptable basis of retributive punishment. I argue that
these objections have difficulties in providing a plausible account of
the relevant difference between people who deserve punishment for
their actions and people who do not. Therefore, I argue that they fail
to refute the conclusion of the Revision Argument.

ABSTRACT: This paper serves two purposes: (i) it can be used by students as an introduction to chapters 1-5 of book iii of the NE; (ii) it suggests an answer to the unresolved question what overall objective this section of the NE has. The paper focuses primarily on Aristotle’s theory of what makes us responsible for our actions and character. After some preliminary observations about praise, blame and responsibility (Section 2), it sets out in detail how all the key notions of NE iii 1-5 are interrelated (Sections 3-9). The setting-out of these interconnections makes it then possible to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the purpose of the passage. Its primary purpose is to explain how agents are responsible for their actions not just insofar as they are actions of this kind or that, but also insofar as they are noble or base: agents are responsible for their actions qua noble or base, because, typically via choice, their character dispositions are a causal factor of those actions (Section 10). The paper illustrates the different ways in which agents can be causes of their actions by means of Aristotle’s four basic types of agents (Section 11). A secondary purpose of NE iii 1-5 is to explain how agents can be held responsible for consequences of their actions (Section 12), in particular for their character dispositions insofar as these are noble or base, i.e. virtues or vices (Section 13). These two goals are not the only ones Aristotle pursues in the passage. But they are the ones Aristotle himself indicates in its first sentence and summarizes in its last paragraph; and the ones that give the passage a systematic unity. The paper also briefly consider the issues of freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice and free-will in the contexts in which they occur (i.e. in the final paragraphs of Sections 6, 7, 12, 13).

- by Giulia Battistoni
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- Plato, German Idealism, Philosophy Of Law, Hegel

An overview of Augustine of Hippo's views about freedom. I argue that Augustine the bishop was one of the first theological compatibilists, who believed that responsibility is compatible with at least certain kinds of necessity and that... more

- by Jesse Couenhoven
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- Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophy Of Religion, Theology

In the context of the free will debate, both compatibilists and event-causal libertarians consider that the age t s mental states and events are what directly causes her de isio to a t. Ho e er, a ordi g to the disappeari g age t o je tio , if the age t is othi g o er a d a o e her physi al a d e tal o po e ts a d the de isio remains undetermined up to the moment when it is made, then it is a chancy and uncontrolled event. According to agent-causalism, this sort of problem can be overcome if one realizes that the agent herself, as an irreducible su sta e, is the true origi ator of her a tio s. I ll prese t argu e ts that fa or this ie. Event-causalists have countered that if the agent identifies with some of the inner states that play the selfdetermining causal role in bringing about the action, then it is as though the action was directly caused by herself. I ll o je t that this is ot a distinctive aspect of free agency. Agent-causalism has been criticized from most naturalistically inclined fronts, and it must address risks of i plausi ility, o tradi tio a d u i telligi ility. E e though I ll acknowledge these challe ges, I ll still argue that libertarian free will cannot be defended by any reductionist alternative, and that agent-causalism does not conflict with contemporary science but only with some of its unproven assumptions.

- by Joana Rigato
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- Philosophy, Philosophy of Agency, Philosophy of Action, Free Will

In this chapter, I consider the relationship between intellectual difficulty and moral responsibility. In particular, I am interested in this question: if it is difficult for us to come to believe the truth about some matter, and we do not in fact come to believe the truth about that matter, so that we are ignorant of that matter, does that affect our responsibility if we then act from our ignorance? Answering this question requires getting clearer on both intellectual difficulty and moral responsibility for actions done from ignorance. I take up both tasks in this chapter, moving then to consider the interaction between intellectual difficulty and moral responsibility, focusing particularly on the case of the Ancient Slaveholder.

- by Alexander Guerrero
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- Philosophy, Ethics, Moral Philosophy, Free Will and Moral Responsibility

In this piece, Wenzel explores how the ancient Chinese philosopher, Zhuangzi, approaches issues of freedom and moral responsibility. Zhuangzi’s writings are very different in form from traditional Western philosophy, but there is significant overlap in the treatment of freedom and moral responsibility. Distinctive of Zhuangzi’s approach is the method of “fasting of the mind,” where one is less focused on extensive practical deliberations and is more attuned to the environment and task at hand. In this way, acting and deciding are more like skills such as woodworking or swimming, as opposed to more theoretical activities. And while Wenzel thinks that approaching freedom and moral responsibility as Zhuangzi suggests does have some appealing features, he also argues that it faces some important difficulties, particularly when it comes to understanding moral responsibility.

- by Christian H Wenzel
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- Philosophy of Mind, Free Will, Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Does having a mental disorder, in general, affect whether someone is morally responsible for an action? Many people seem to think so, holding that mental disorders nearly always mitigate responsibility. Against this Naïve view, we argue for a Nuanced account. The problem is not just that different theories of responsibility yield different verdicts about particular cases. Even when all reasonable theories agree about what's relevant to responsibility, the ways mental illness can affect behavior are so varied that a more nuanced approach is needed.

- by Matt King
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- Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Applied Ethics

According to many criteria, agency, intentionality, responsibility and freedom of decision, require conscious decisions. Freud already assumed that many of our decisions are influenced by dynamically unconscious motives or that we even perform unconscious actions based on completely unconscious considerations. Such actions might not be intentional, and perhaps not even actions in the narrow sense, we would not be responsible for them and freedom of decision would be missing. Recent psychological and neurophysiological research has added to this a number of phenomena (the "new unconscious") in which behavior is completely unconscious or in which the decision or its execution is influenced by unconscious factors: priming, automatic behavior, habitualized behavior, actions based on plain unconscious deliberations, intrusion of information from the dorsal pathway, etc. However, since this makes up the largest part of the behavior which is generally regarded as action, intentionality, yet agency, responsibility and even compatibilist freedom of decision for the largest part of our behavior may be threatened. Such considerations have led to a lively debate, which, however, suffers from generalizations that lump all these unconscious phenomena together. In contrast, the aim of this article is to discuss individual unconscious influences on our behavior separately with respect to what extent they require changes in traditional conceptualizations. The first part (sections 2-4) of the article outlines the "traditions" and their elaborations: the intentional causalist concept of action, an associated empirical theory of action and standard concepts of responsibility and compatibilist freedom of decision, as well as the challenges for them. In the second part (sections 5-9), the aforementioned unconscious influences on our actions (except for automated and habitualized actions, which I discuss elsewhere) are examined: 1. unconscious priming, 2. dynamically unconscious motives, 3. dorsal pathway information influencing conscious decisions, 4. unconsciously altered execution of conscious intentions, and 5. unconscious deliberations and decisions. To what extent do these phenomena C1. require a change in the concept of action, C2. curtail intentionality or agency, C3. responsibility, and C4. freedom? The result is: The curtailments prove to be far less dramatic than they initially appear; they require more watchfulness but no conceptual change.

In "Freedom and Resentment" P.F. Strawson, famously, advances a strong form of naturalism that aims to discredit kcepticism about moral responsibility by way of approaching these issues through an account of our reactive attitudes. However, even those who follow Strawson's general strategy on this subject accept that his strong naturalist program needs to be substantially modified, if not rejected. One of the most influential and important efforts to revise and reconstruct the Strawsonian program along these lines has been provided by R. Jay Wallace, who presents a "narrower" construal of our reactive attitudes in his own account of what is involved in holding an agent responsible. In this paper I argue that Wallace's narrow construal of responsibility comes at too high a cost and that naturalists of a broadly Strawsonian cast should reject it. Related to this point, I argue that Wallace's narrow conception of responsibility is a product of his effort to construct his account within the confines of "the morality system" (i.e. as described by Bernard Williams) and that this way of construing responsibility leads into series of unnecessary and misleading oppositions. A more plausible middle path, I maintain, can be found between Strawson's excessively strong naturalist program and Wallace's narrow and restrictive view of responsibility.

- by Paul Russell
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- Philosophy, Ethics, Free Will, Free Will and Moral Responsibility
- by Juho Honkasilta
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- Discourse Analysis, Medical Sociology, Anthropology, Conversation Analysis

There have been several recent lawsuits in which problem gamblers (or those affected by problem gambling) have sued casinos or other gaming companies for damages relating to bankruptcies, suicides, and other negative consequences of compulsive gambling. Although the legal cases have been decided in favor of the gaming companies, it can seem as though there is a moral residue in some of these cases: perhaps some of the actions of the gaming companies, though legal, have been morally problematic. This case invites students to explore this possibility by introducing them to the facts surrounding the lawsuits and highlighting some of the most salient moral considerations. Students will also be asked to reflect on the public policy implications, if any, of their findings.

- by Garrett Pendergraft
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- Marketing, Business Ethics, Addiction, Gambling Studies

This article shows how the social sciences, particularly human geography, rejected hard determinism by the mid-twentieth century largely on the deontological basis that it is irreconcilable with social justice, yet this rejection came just before a burst of creative development in consequentialist theories of social justice that problematize a facile rejection of determinism on moral grounds, a development that has seldom been recognized in the social sciences. Thus many current social science and human geography views on determinism and social justice are antiquated, ignoring numerous common and well-respected arguments within philosophy that hard determinism can be reconciled with a just society. We support this argument by briefly tracing the parallel development of stances on determinism in the social sciences and the deontological-consequentialist debate in philosophy. The purpose of the article is to resituate social science and human geography debates on determinism and socia...

- by Clint Ballinger
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- History, Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology, Geography
- by Roger B Clough
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- Free Will, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Divine foreknowledge

The free will problem is defined and three solutions are discussed: no-freedom theory, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Strict determinism is often assumed in arguing for libertarianism or no-freedom theory. It assumes that the history of the universe is fixed, but modern physics admits a certain degree of randomness in the determination of events. However, this is not enough for a compatibilist position-which is favored here-since freedom is not randomness. It is the I that chooses what to do. It is argued that the core of the free will problem is what this I is. A materialist view is favored: The I is an activity of the brain. In addition to absence of external and internal compulsion, freedom involves absence of causal sufficiency of influences acting on the I. A more elaborate compatibilist view is proposed, according to which causal determination is complete when we add events occurring in the I (of which the subject is not conscious). Contrary to what several authors have argued, the onset of the readiness potential before the decision to act is no problem here. The experience of agency is incomplete and fallible, rather than illusory. Some consequences of different views about freedom for the ascription of responsibility are discussed.

- by Gilberto Gomes
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- Law, Free Will, Moral Responsibility, Self and Identity, Consciousness

This is a short essay on the ongoing Euthyphro Question regarding morality.

- by Robyn Kelley
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- Ethics, Morality (Social Psychology), Moral Theology, Moral Philosophy

Peter van Inwagen and Colin McGinn hold that there are strong arguments for strict incompatibilism, i.e. for the claim that the free will thesis (F) is inconsistent not just with determinism but with the negation of determinism as well. Interestingly, both authors deny that these arguments are apt to justify the claim that (F) is false. I argue that van Inwagen and McGinn are right in taking the fact that epistemic commitment to (F) is deeply rooted in common sense to cast doubt on arguments to the conclusion that (F) is false. However, instead of declaring free will to be a mystery (van Inwagen) or claiming that the problem of free will amounts to a problem whose correct solution is cognitively closed to human intellect (McGinn), I propose to simply view the problem of free will as a hard problem – its hardness being due to the fact that it involves a large variety of concepts whose correct explication is philosophically moot.

- by Boris Raehme
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- Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Freedom
- by Martin O'Reilly
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- Sociology of Sport, Sports Medicine, Ethics, Normative Ethics

This dissertation aims to examine whether John Searle’s biological naturalism is a more viable alternative to current physicalist and functionalist positions in dealing with the issue of free will. Thus, my strategy is to identify the assumptions of these lines of thought and their philosophical consequences. In order to accomplish this goal the concept of intrinsic intentionality is taken as a guide. I begin by defining what is meant by free will and go on to broadly characterize physicalist and functionalist positions in philosophy of mind. Then, I go on to show how the question of free will arises and can be crucial to such currents of thought. Subsequently, I summarize the biological naturalist position (especially regarding the ontology of consciousness and the question of intentionality) and oppose it to physicalism and functionalism in order to examine the possibility of free will. In this opposition, each theory is decomposed into its main tenets so that they can be critically analyzed. In this analysis, it appears that free will does not seem to find any room in the scenario presented by physicalism and functionalism. It is argued that Searlean biological naturalism is able to explain – better than the other two positions – how free action can be motivated by something that is external to the mental state which is itself performing the action. I then evaluate the ethical implications of these findings, articulating the issues of intrinsic intentionality, free will, strong artificial intelligence in order to conclude that current machines cannot be assigned moral responsibility, since they are not capable of intrinsic intentionality. Then, I argue for the evolutionary origin of intentionality and therefore morality. Finally, I argue that neuroscience does not eliminate moral responsibility since it does not prove that free will is an illusion, i.e., that this branch of science does not contradict John Searle’s biological naturalism.

- by Daniel P Nunes and +1
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- Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy of Mind, Physicalism, Functionalism

2 I argue that the two ought claims Pereboom defends-the ought of axiological recommendation and the demand of hypothetical form-do not qualify as demands. I argue that the ought of axiological recommendation merely recommends a course of action to an agent, but does not demand anything from the agent. I argue the demand of hypothetical form's plausibility qua demand is achieved by illicitly shifting from contexts in which it is plausible that one agent is demanding something from another agent to contexts in which the agents lack alternate possibilities. I then argue that Pereboom's attempt to accommodate moral wrongness without obligations fails. I develop a manipulation argument against Pereboom's attempt to accommodate moral wrongness. I then argue that Pereboom faces a dilemma. If my manipulation argument is successful, then Pereboom's attempt to accommodate moral wrongness fails. If, however, my manipulation argument fails, then so does Pereboom's four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism-in which case a major motivation for free will skepticism would disappear, undercutting the need for obligation skepticism itself.

- by James Ryan
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- Ethics, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Meaning in Life

in "Mind, Self and Person, ed. Anthony O'Hear (Cambridge University Press 2015) - It is often thought that as human agents we have a power to determine our actions for ourselves. And a natural conception of this power is as freedom - a power over alternatives so that we can determine for ourselves which of a variety of possible actions we perform. But what is the real content of this conception of freedom, and need self- determination take this particular form? I examine the possible forms self-determination might take, and the various ways freedom as a power over alternatives might be constituted. I argue that though ordinary ethical thought, and especially moral blame, may be committed to our possession of some capacity for self-determination, the precise nature of this power is probably ethically underdetermined - though conceptions of the nature of the power that come from outside ethics may then have important implications for ethics.

- by Thomas Pink
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- Moral Psychology, Philosophical Scepticism, Causation, Moral Philosophy

Ai sensi della legge sui diritti d'Autore e del codice civile è vietata la riproduzione di questo libro o di parte di esso con qualsiasi mezzo, elettronico, meccanico, per mezzo di fotocopie, microfilms, registrazioni o altro, senza il... more

- by Alessia Farano
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- Philosophy of Action, Neuroethics, Practical Reasoning, Legal Philosophy

This essay is in two parts. The first identifies a dialectic of “fate” and “will” operating in Shakespeare’s Macbeth and analyses the necessitarian features of that play against, first, the Freudian program, and second, Kierkegaard’s “concept of anxiety”. The second part of the essay builds on the foregoing analysis of necessity, and the “aesthetic of fate” that emerges from the issue of sufficiency in Macbeth, to define the terms of a general aesthetic of “tragic will and fate” using as its central text Joseph Conrad’s Lord Jim.

- by Jim G . Packer
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- Conrad, Joseph, Sigmund Freud, Kierkegaard, Shakespearean Drama

Многие открытия в нейронауке и социальной психологии ставят под сомнение наличие свободы воли. Они показывают, что поступки людей определяются социальным контекстом и бессознательными состояниями мозга. Но не следует ли из этого, что человек никогда не может принимать решения сам? И что у нас просто нет альтернатив действиям? А если так, если свобода воли - иллюзия, возможно ли считать других людей ответственными за поведение? Книга позволяет найти ответы на эти сложные запутанные вопросы. В ней автор защищает современную компатибилистская теорию – позицию, согласно которой свобода и ответственность совместимы с современными научными представлениями об устройстве мира. Кроме того, автор предлагает решения и других философских головоломок, связанных со свободой: проблемы тождества личности и ментальной каузальности.
Книга является одним из наиболее глубоких экскурсов в аналитическую философию конца XX-нач.XXI. В ней представлены взгляды современных западных и российских философов. А также разработана собственная теория, которую можно называть нарративной теорией свободы и ответственности. Это результат многолетних исследований автора, доктора философских наук и одного из наиболее активных участников философских дискуссий.
Текст предназначен для философов, историков философии, специалистам по этике и философии сознания, юристов, нейроученых и психологов, занимающимся вопросами принятия решений, свободы и ответственности, а также всех заинтересованных читателей.

- by Alan E . Johnson
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- History, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Free Will, Moral Responsibility

Does having a mental disorder, in general, affect whether someone is morally responsible for an action? Against this Naive view, we argue for a Nuanced account. Sometimes mental illness absolutely excuses, but other times it doesn't. In some cases, mental illness can actually enhance one’s responsibility. The problem is not just that different theories of responsibility yield different judgments about particular cases. Even in cases when all reasonable theories agree about what's relevant to responsibility, the ways mental illness can affect behavior are so varied that a more nuanced account is required.

- by Matt King and +1
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- Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Mental Illness, Moral Blame

This paper considers whether Internet Intermediaries should be proactive or reactive in the face of terror. It (1) reflects on the main arguments made by Internet intermediaries to justify their present passive and reactive policies, and (2) provides counter-arguments that endorse proactivity. It is argued that proactive policy is a responsible policy and that, in the long run, it serves the best interests of all stakeholders: Internet intermediaries, Netusers and society at large. The paper endorses Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) that takes ethical considerations seriously. It is further argued that Internet intermediaries need to adapt to changing circumstances, where the number of anti-social abusers is growing. If not, then governments out of an obligation to public welfare will need to consider intervention. Indeed, some governments have already stepped in. It is preferable that volunteerism, sense of responsibility and ethics will guide business rather than coercive pol...

- by Raphael Cohen-Almagor
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- Business Ethics, Ethics, Applied Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility

This is a contemplative article that examines the question of whether we have a right to end our lives at our own will and timing, that deals briefly with Joiner's Theory of Suicide and that provides a metaphysical answer and demystifies... more

- by Renata Leuffen
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- Sociology, Psychology, Philosophy, Metaphysics

本文评介了温特森(Jeanette Winterson)的自传《寻常便好，何必快乐(Why be happy when you could be normal)?》及其第一步小说《橘子不是唯一的水果(Oranges are not the only... more

本文评介了温特森(Jeanette Winterson)的自传《寻常便好，何必快乐(Why be happy when you could be normal)?》及其第一步小说《橘子不是唯一的水果(Oranges are not the only fruit)》。文章视图说明，世界是强大而险恶的，个体是渺小而脆弱的。然而，世界上总有像温特森那样的个体，他们明知自身渺小却不向强大的外力妥协，他们明知自己脆弱却依然在险恶的环境中坚持信念，他们不仅改变了自己的命运，也改变了自己生活的这个世界。事实上，正是因为有了他们和他们的自由意志，这个世界才在浑噩、堕落、投机与虚华之间，有了变得更好的可能。

- by Yu Tao
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- British Literature, Religion, English Literature, Literature

In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If so, what role or function must it play? Are agents morally responsible for actions and behaviors that are carried out automatically or without conscious control or guidance? Are they morally responsible for actions, judgments, and attitudes that are the result of implicit biases or situational features of their surroundings of which they are unaware? What about the actions of somnambulists or cases of extreme sleepwalking where consciousness is largely absent? Clarifying the relationship between consciousness and free will is imperative if we want to evaluate the various arguments for and against free will. For example, do compatibilist reasons- responsive and deep self accounts require consciousness? If so, are they threatened by recent developments in the behavior, cognitive, and neurosciences? What about libertarian accounts of free will? What powers, if any, do they impart to consciousness and are they consistent with our best scientific theories about the world? In this survey piece, I will outline and assess several distinct views on the relationship between consciousness and free will.

- by Gregg Caruso
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- Neuroscience, Metaphysics of Consciousness, Psychology of Unconscious, Consciousness

Bu yazının hedefi, Inwagen'in Liberteryen Uzlaşmazcı (Incompatabilist) anlayış bağlamında ele aldığı ahlaki sorumluluk düşüncesinin, eleştirel olarak incelenmesi ve ortaya çıkan bazı problemlerin tartışmaya açılmasıdır. Çalışmanın temel hipotezi, Inwagen'in Liberteryen ahlaki
sorumluluk anlayışındaki problemlerin, özgür irade kavramının aktördeki temellerinin soruştulmasındaki eksiklikten kaynaklandığıdır. Özgür iradenin ne'liğine ve nasıllığına ilişkin kişiyi
merkeze alarak geliştirilecek derin bir düşünüm eksik kaldığı sürece; kavramsal ve mantıksal - metafizik düzeylerde, özgür irade ve ahlaki sorumluluk kavramlarının sağlıklı bir şekilde ortaya koyulmasının mümkün olmayabilir. Giriş bölümünde tartışmanın bağlamına ve hedeflerine işaret edilecek. Çalışma kapsamında öncelikle, tartışmamız için temel teşkil edeceğinden Inwagen'in An Essay On Free Will eserinde
geliştirdiği özgür irade anlayışı ortaya koyulacaktır. Üçüncü bölümde, ahlaki sorumluluk kavramı ve ana argümanları ele alınarak; muhtemel sorunlar, muhtelif eleştiriler bağlamında tartışılacak. Bir
sonraki bölümde, Inwagen'in ahlaki sorumluluk kavramının yaşadığı problemlerin sebeplerine ilişkin bir yorum yapılarak bir hipotez teşkil edilecek ve bu hipotezin değerlendirilmesi için

- by Anıl Salar
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- Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Freedom

A teaching paper used with Christian Adults. It can be broken down into three lesson for an Adult Christian Education setting.

This paper explores Macbeth's free will. Since all the prophecies come true in the play, it could be considered that Macbeth was predestined to all the events he experiences. However, it can also be considered that, being only fated to be king, Macbeth makes the premonitions occur the way they occur, being his decision to kill Duncan what triggers his tragedy. To defend this idea, I carry out a throughout analysis of Macbeth's and Lady Macbeth's extreme (self-)awareness, their calculating and speculative reasonings, and their haste for the crown, taking into consideration as well the idea of potentiality of good and evil.

- by Elena Criado
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- Shakespeare, Free Will, Shakespearean Drama, Free Will and Moral Responsibility

This paper reflects on the articles submitted for the Symposium Confronting the Internet's Dark Side. I discuss some of the criticisms of the book's theory and my treatment of hate speech. The responsibilities of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Web-Hosting Services (WHSs) are in the fore, arguing that as they are the gatekeepers, they need to be proactive far more than they are now. This paper, like my book, strives to suggest an approach that harnesses the strengths and capabilities of the public and the private sectors in offering practical solutions to pressing problems.

Qu'est-ce que la liberté ?

- by Florian Cova
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- Philosophy, Free Will, Moral Responsibility, Neuroethics, Free Will

Could it be that Martin Luther was correct in the position he defended in the debate over the human will with Erasmus? There are good reasons to believe so. The human will is not free at all, it is in bondage to a person’s moral nature, which without regeneration is dead, corrupt, and unable to choose the good or God (Matt. 15:19; John 3:1-8; 1 Cor. 2:14; Eph. 2:1-5; 1 John 5:1). The moral nature is what drives a person (Prov. 4:23; Matt. 7:11; Mark 7:21). From this moral nature arise likes and dislikes (Mark 12:38-40). It is from these predispositions that a person makes his choices (Rom. 7:8). Because hatred for Christ resides in the heart of every person that has not been regenerated, it is impossible for such a one to choose what he hates (John 15:18-19). Sinful men do choose between sins that they will commit, but even this is not done with complete freedom (John 8:34; Rom. 7:14). The will by nature is a dependent faculty that does not have the power or independence that Erasmus claims it does (Rom. 7:15-24, 9:16; John 1:13, 15:16). As Augustine taught before him, and Calvin, Edwards, and Dabney after him, Luther is correct when he teaches that every human will is in bondage to sin and Satan unless God rescues such a one by His grace. The will is free to choose what it wants, just not free to choose what it should without an outside influence.

While there are substantial benefits for patients taking role responsibility (Hart) -- "take-charge" responsibility -- for their health care, it is vitally important to separate such responsibility from the moral responsibility of just... more

- by Bruce N Waller
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- Bioethics, Free Will and Moral Responsibility

It is clear that lack of awareness of the consequences of an action can undermine moral responsibility and blame for these consequences. But when and how it does so is controversial. Sometimes an agent believing that the outcome might occur is excused because it seemed unlikely to her, and sometimes an agent having no idea that it would occur is nevertheless to blame. A low or zero degree of belief might seem to excuse unless the agent " should have known better " , but it is unclear how to spell out this normative condition. This chapter combines (a) an independently motivated account of responsibility, blame, and credit as grounded in a normal explanatory relation between agential qualities and objects of responsibility with (b) the familiar Strawsonian idea that moral blame and credit depend on the agent's quality of will. The resulting explanatory quality of will condition on moral responsibility is then further motivated by being shown to account for the effects on moral blame and credit of justifications, as well as of excuses and undermined control in cases not involving ignorance. The explanatory quality of will condition is finally applied to cases involving various degrees of lack of awareness. Though this condition itself involves no awareness requirement, it is shown how it accounts for the degrees to which lack of awareness can excuse. It is also explained how lack of awareness fails as an excuse exactly when the agent should have known better and can be blamed for not doing so.

- by Gunnar Björnsson
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- Free Will and Moral Responsibility

The relationship between self-consciousness, Aristotelian ontology, and Cartesian duality is far closer than it has been thought to be. There is no valid inference either from considerations of Aristotle’s hylomorphism or from the phenomenological distinction between body and living body, to the undermining of Cartesian dualism. The claims that Descartes introspectively encounters the self and that the Cartesian extent of inner space is self-contained are profound errors, distortions through the lenses of modern theories. Descartes’ conception of the self as both a reasoning and willing being informs his conception of personhood; a person for Descartes is an unanalysable, integrated, self-conscious, and autonomous human being.

- by Andrea Christofidou
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- Plato, Aristotle, Phenomenology, Self Consciousness

The much-debated ‘hard problems’ in the emerging field of consciousness studies revolve around the difficulty in reconciling our first-person ‘folk psychology’ account of ourselves with our scientific understanding of the world. Despite the occasional dissident voice, most people are agreed that we all ‘know’ that we have some degree of volitional control over the sort of experiences that we undergo. But when we try to reconcile this with our physics- and biology-based understanding of the world, we run into a number of serious and well documented problems. The editorial introduction concludes that the problem may only be resolved by adopting a radical approach to theology, comparing the monism of Schrodinger's What Is Life? with insights from Spinoza, The Upanishads and Krishnamurti.