Strategic Culture Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Israeli strategic culture is offensive and militaristic. However, in the pre-state period the Labor Zionist elites which later dominated the Israeli security and antimilitaristic approach. This article explains that its security policy was designed to perpetuate domestic political hegemony. Since the Jewish people had not developed an approach to the use of force in centuries, the formulation of Labor Zionist approaches to security allows an insight into the process by which security narratives are initially derived and the process by they may (or may not) become a reified strategic culture.

The paper attempts to describe and explain the characteristic features of the Russian strategic culture and how this concept influences that country's political and foreign policy practices, traditions and behavior. The concept of strategic culture is useful to understand the apparent support of the Russian government to separatist movements in Eastern regions of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea.

- by Marcos Degaut
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- International Security, Political Violence and Terrorism, Strategic Culture, Russia
- by Michael Davies
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- Strategic Culture, Irregular Warfare, Unconventional Warfare (UW), Strategy

As events have unfolded in Ukraine, many theories as to why Russia has acted so aggressively have been bandied about. My area of interest is in deciphering the Russian “strategic culture” – a combination of political and security elements that can serve to explain the actions of a nation in a geopolitical context.
The strategic culture creates a strategic image, a notion of the state that informs its decisions and relationships within the international system. The construction of this image involves input from actors within the state, as well as external actors. Internally, there are many aspects to Russian political culture that can be examined, but my primary area of interest is in Russian nationalism and its effects on Russian foreign policy. Regarding external actors, it is my contention that Russia has been treated as the “loser” of the Cold War and that the West has continually treated them as a second-rate power, regardless of their vast wealth, powerful military, cultural heritage and their sheer size. This treatment is evident in several key areas: the economic response by the West to the problems of the former Soviet Bloc states, the expansion of NATO, and now our potential meddling in the Ukraine. The paper and presentation will help to make clear the interactions between these elements, and help Western audiences understand why the combination has expressed itself as an aggressive foreign policy.

- by Patrick Lopez
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- Russian Nationalism, Strategic Culture, Russian Foreign Policy

This thesis contextualizes U.S. security policy in Africa by discussing the evolution of the strategic culture within U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). AFRICOM’s views on the relationship between security and development have changed substantially from the intellectual framework that spurred its creation in 2008. AFRICOM was intended to play a broad
interagency role and act as an enabler to U.S. development and diplomatic initiatives. Its policies, organizational structure and operations reflect the strategic reappraisals from post-Cold War development and civil engagement, to countering violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and toward an era of great power competition. This thesis assesses the evolution of AFRICOM’s strategic culture through theater security cooperation as a means of influence during declared great power competition. The first question set contextualizes AFRICOM’s role in security policy: how security policy is formulated, to what degree does policy involve interagency coordination, and how do disparities in capabilities and resources allow AFRICOM to define U.S. security policy? The second question set examines operational methods as an output of strategic culture: how does theater security cooperation impact U.S. access and influence and what are its potential effects on security and development? U.S. counterterrorism initiatives in West Africa from 2004 to present are examined as a longitudinal case study on AFRICOM’s strategic culture. Recent counterterrorism activities and
associated security sector assistance are responses that leverage AFRICOM’s culture and capabilities to preserve partnerships, access and influence. This trend is likely to prioritize traditional forms of military assistance over developmental initiatives within AFRICOM as it seeks reliable security partners to balance against the access and influence of malign actors and competition from Russia and the People’s Republic of China.

- by Justin Lowe
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- Military History, Strategy (Military Science), Strategic Culture, Military Studies
- by Michael Davies and +1
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- Sociology of the Military, Strategic Culture, Human Terrain, Special Operations Forces
- by branislava marinkovic
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- Strategic Culture, Serbia

As a nation-state located in a cross-position, Indonesia proposes a maritime strategy approach in the form of the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). To some extent, GMF introduces an advanced concept from the previous maritime strategy. Therefore this explanative research will explore further about concepts related to change or continuity, related to the maritime strategy of Indonesia in the previous periods before GMF. Based on field data, this research found a number of facts that concludes GMF to some extent is a change from previous maritime strategy. Moreover, the debate of Indonesia's geographical position could be interpreted as a response against threats which already exists. Thus this condition experienced a shift due to the dynamics of international politics. This qualitative research also conducts that GMF is a value which inherited from previous administration to further adapt on contemporary situations. Thus in general these findings indicate that GMF is a change from the previous maritime strategy.

- by Juan Pablo Soriano
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- Foreign Policy Analysis, Strategic Culture, Brazil, Neoclassical realism

World culture shapes the way states generate military power: norms of conventional warfare provide the template for military organi- zation, and norms of humanitarian law define what is morally acceptable in military operations. Sometimes, however, local strategic circumstances can challenge these worldwide technical scripts and moral codes for military action. Accordingly, this article advances an approach—cultural adaptation theory—that accounts for the role of power and politics in the worldwide normative structuring of military action. This theory explains how actors may modify their military practices in response to rising threats, in ways that avoid norm violation. Two case studies explore this theory: Irish military organization in the lead up to the Second World War, and NATO air operations in the Kosovo war. Some tentative conclusions are reached regarding suboptimal organization by weak states and operational restraint by powerful states. Overall, the article ad- vances the case for dialogue between constructivist and rationalist approaches to security studies.

- by Theo Farrell
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- Military Science, Constructivism, Strategic Culture

This book analyses the way Dutch forces conducted military stabilization operations in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion in Iraq. It looks at why, in contrast to most allied troops elsewhere in Iraq, Dutch forces in Al Muthanna province met with little resistance and left Iraq self-confident of their ability to deal with this type of military operations. On the basis of extensive archival research and interviews, the authors examine the way the Dutch government consciously framed this mission as different from the American and British occupation and often in contrast to the actual situation on the ground. Furthermore, they unravel the widespread idea of a unique and more effective Dutch approach', by dealing with the Dutch case in detail and by subsequently examining it in the context of the Coalition Forces’ experiences. In the end, they argue that despite effective tactical reflexes by Battlegroup commanders, stability in Al Muthanna was first and foremost conditions-driven rather than the result of a unique approach by Dutch military forces.

The 24th of August 1939 the Soviet Union and Germany signed the fateful Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, paving the way for Hitler´s invasion of Poland and the World War 2 to come. This quiet event a late night in the Kremlin sent colossal shock waves through the international community. But was it actually a break with Soviet thinking at the time, pre-occupied with national security? No, answers this paper.

- by Jens Lindberg
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- Soviet History, Strategic Culture, World War II, Soviet Union (History)

The analysis introduces the Hungarian National Military Strategy (NMS) adopted in 2012, but presents it not only in a conventional manner: it also offers an evaluation of the wider strategic environment in which the strategy was drafted. Thus the au¬thor makes use of the fact that the environment in which strategic documents are born, their nature and contents convey a relatively accurate picture about the state of a nation’s strategic culture and its elements. In this approach it is quite eloquent for example that the first national military strategy was adopted by Hungary in 2009 – twenty years after the change of regime and ten years after joining NATO – and had to be revised as soon as 2012. International experience shows that the state of a community’s strategic culture is indicated by the fact whether such strategies are ‘white books’ that summarize strategic goals, or are more of a ’planning nature’, be¬ing a functional strategic plan that also includes the means and ways of its realization

- by Péter Tálas
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- Strategic Culture, Hungary, Military Strategy
- by Athanasios Platias
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- Strategic Culture, Sparta, Thucydides, Grand Strategy

This article draws on fourth generation strategic culture debates to show the gap between the rhetoric of Australian defence and the more modest reality. Our analysis shows that these limits derive from tensions between national strategic culture and organizational strategic subcultures. There are serious debates in the nation regarding the preferred course of the Australian military and security policy. This article frames these debates by examining the 'keepers' of Australia's national strategic culture, the existence of several competing strategic subcultures, and the importance of norm entrepreneurs in changing defence and national security thinking. Strategic subcultures foster compartmentalization, constraints, and bureaucratic silos that narrow national conceptions of security threats and opportunities, and impinge on the formation of coherent foreign and defence policy in relation to the Asia-Pacific region. This analysis shows that a distinct national strategic culture and organizational strategic subcultures endure beyond individual governments, placing potential limits on Australia's interface with other Asia-Pacific strategic cultures in the future.

- by Alex Burns
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- Strategic Culture, National Security
- by Dietrich Reetz
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- International Relations, Strategic Culture, Organized Crime, Islam

My latest paper about the Chinese Strategic Culture

- by Frank D Aigner
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- Russian Studies, Strategic Studies, Strategic Culture, Russian History
- by Theo Farrell
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- Constructivism, Security Studies, Strategic Culture

Russia is the biggest country in the world, stretching from Vladivostok in the far east to Kaliningrad in the west. It bridges Europe and Asia not only in geographic terms, but also, as many social scientists observe, in its culture, society, and the way to think about the world. The Russian mindset is neither European nor Asian. Instead, it is a unique puzzle constructed from the ideas, habits, and practices of both. Therefore, this article argues that in an attempt to decode Russian strategic behavior, special attention should be given to the complex interplay in the Russian mind between both Western and Eastern ways of seeing things and interpreting events.

- by Ofer Fridman
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- Russian Studies, Russian Politics, Strategic Culture, Russian Foreign Policy

منذ انتهاء الحرب الباردة، بدأ يتضح أنّ الصين تريد القيام بدور الدولة العظمى، غير أنّها لا تزال في وضعٍ متردد في بعض الساحات، ولم تفعّل أدواتها كاملةً. تحاول هذه الورقة أن تشرح بعض المحركات الكامنة وراء الإطار العام للسياسة الخارجية الصينية، من خلال دراسة "الثقافة الاستراتيجية"؛ يسعى هذا الإطار لإيضاح الأفكار التي تنتج من تاريخ دولة ما وثقافتها وسردها المجتمعي، فالدول تضع عادةً أطرًا عامة تكشف عن خياراتها المفضلة في السياسة الخارجية. ليست "الثقافة الاستراتيجية" مسببة لسياسات معينة، بل هي مساعدة لتحديد خيارات عامة؛ وهي متمّمة لتفسيرات حول تأثير عوامل أخرى مثل توزيع القوى، ومعتقدات صناع القرار الشخصية، وضغوطات الدول الحليفة، وما إلى ذلك. وبالأخص، يساعد إطار الثقافة الاستراتيجية على فهم الشكل العام للسياسة الخارجية على المدى الطويل.

- by Imad Mansour
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- Strategic Culture, Chinese foreign policy

Today, nation-states are integrating cyber tactics into their political and military strategies. Professor Wirtz posits that when it comes to the use of cyber, ‘national styles’ might be emerging as states attempt to use cyber capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. He suggests that it is wrong to treat cyber attacks as a silver bullet, and that it is better to consider how a sort of combined arms approach will prevail. On a positive note, the need for legal and bureaucratic integration of policies and programmes should produce national idiosyncrasies on the cyber battlefield that can help with the vexing challenge of attribution.

- by James J Wirtz
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- Strategic Culture, Russia, Strategy, Cyber Security

This article examines the influence of Turkey's strategic culture on its foreign and security policy during the Justice and Development Party's era. The first part introduces the concept of strategic culture and explains its worth as an analytical tool in general as well as on the specific example of Turkey. The second part describes two dominant paradigms – namely Republican and Neo-Ottoman – in the strategic culture of Turkey. Furthermore, it examines the paradigms' roots and gives some examples of their manifestation. The third part of the article examines Justice and Development Party's stance on Turkey's strategic culture by analyzing the party's ideological roots as well as its actions in the area of foreign and security policy. Special emphasis is put on Turkey's foreign policy towards the so-called Arab Spring, which revealed some interesting restraints relevant to the strategic culture. The article ends with conclusions that show one of the biggest dilemmas Turkey will have to face in the near future.

Pakistan remains a staunchly revisionist state that both continues to assert territorial equities in Kashmir and seeks to resist India’s rise in the international system. Its revisionism motivated it to start wars in 1947–48, 1965, and 1999, all of which it failed to win, as well as to sustain a proxy war in Kashmir, the most recent campaign of which began in 1989. Pakistan has adopted several strategies to manage its security environment, which include ideological tools, the pursuit of strategic depth in Afghanistan, and the use of proxy fighters under its expanding nuclear umbrella. Pakistan continues to pursue these strategies even though they are very unlikely to succeed and have imposed a high cost on the state. Much of its behavior, however, can be explained by the strategic culture of the Pakistan Army. This culture is characterized by (1) the belief that Pakistan is an insecure and incomplete state, (2) the belief that Afghanistan is a source of instability, (3) the belief that India rejects the two-nation theory and seeks to dominate or destroy Pakistan, and (4) the belief that India is a regional hegemon that must be resisted. The Pakistan Army controls most levers of power with respect to national security and foreign policy, as well as domestic policies that influence these domains. Moreover, this strategic culture is enduring and unlikely to change, as will be demonstrated by a study of Pakistani military publications.

- by C. Christine Fair
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- South Asian Studies, South Asia, South Asian History, Strategic Culture

In lieu of an abstract: this paper reviews the debates surrounding strategic culture and their application to the Turkish case. I conclude that Neoclassical Realist models that are able to combine structural variables with strategic... more

- by Onur Erpul
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- Strategic Culture, Realism (Political Science), Turkish Foreign Policy

Pakistan remains a staunchly revisionist state that both continues to assert territorial equities in Kashmir and seeks to resist India’s rise in the international system. Its revisionism motivated it to start wars in 1947–48, 1965, and 1999, all of which it failed to win, as well as to sustain a proxy war in Kashmir, the most recent campaign of which began in 1989.
Pakistan has adopted several strategies to manage its security environment, including ideological tools, the pursuit of strategic depth in Afghanistan, and the use of proxy fighters under its expanding nuclear umbrella. Pakistan continues to pursue these strategies even though they are very unlikely to succeed and have imposed a high cost on the state. Much of its behavior, however, can be explained by the strategic culture of the Pakistan Army. This culture is characterized by four beliefs: (1) that Pakistan is an insecure and incomplete state,
(2) that Afghanistan is a source of instability, (3) that India rejects the two-nation theory and seeks to dominate or destroy Pakistan, and (4) that India is a regional hegemon that must be resisted. The Pakistan Army controls most levers of power with respect to national security
and foreign policy, as well as domestic policies that influence these domains. Moreover, this strategic culture is enduring and unlikely to change, as will be demonstrated by a study of Pakistani military publications.

- by C. Christine Fair
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- Strategic Culture, Pakistan, Pakistan Studies, Pakistan Army

The debate on strategic culture was initiated almost four decades ago and it encouraged the rethinking of the origin of strategies and strategic choices in international politics. Strategic culture provides an analytical lens to comprehend the motivations of the state's action, which are often dominated by the state’s historical tendency to "preserve its perceived spheres of influence". In this issue brief, the author provides an overview of strategic culture and its evolution as a field of study in international relations and security studies. This is followed by the case study of Pakistan's strategic culture, which includes the potential sources of Pakistan's strategic culture, its strategic beliefs and how it operationalises these strategic beliefs. Lastly, the author elucidates the implications of Pakistan's strategic culture for India.

Lo scopo di questi tesi è quello di mostrare il legame esistente tra la guerra, la strategia e la cultura. Si vuole pertanto teorizzare sulla guerra partendo dalla sua concezione e dalla sua applicazione poi materiale (la strategia) e dal rapporto che si instaura tra questa, la cultura e la guerra. Pertanto la guerra (e la strategia) sono da intendersi come un modello culturale come “un fenomeno politico-sociale, non tecnico-materiale. Le caratteristiche delle guerre variano a seconda dell'organizzazione delle società, del tipo di tecnologie disponibili e delle culture strategiche. In questo discorso pertanto rientrerà anche una digressione sulle culture strategiche, quel campo di applicazione in cui guerra e cultura si fondono e danno luogo alla visione attraverso cui una determinata società, o un Paese, legge i conflitti e le minacce future e si organizza per saper rispondere loro efficacemente. Il loro studio ci permetterà di analizzare come l'interconnessione di guerra, strategia e cultura abbia influito sullo sviluppo degli apparati militari, sulle vittorie (o sconfitte) di molti Paesi e sul plasmare buona parte dell'attuale situazione presente a livello regionale, transnazionale e mondiale. Nell'elaborato, dopo un'introduzione atta a porre dei paletti concettuali attraverso al definizione e la genesi delle proposizioni cardine di questo testo, si analizzerà un momento nel quale, sporadicamente, si sono scritte riflessioni circa l'interconnessione tra culture belliche differenti e come avere ragione degli opponenti. Da tale periodo si passerà al presente, notandone i parallelismi e analizzando in quali contesti e situazioni si possa parlare oggi di un "approccio culturologico ai conflitti".

Application for the University of Melbourne's McKenzie Postdoctoral Fellowship Program 2022 round.

- by Alex Burns
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- Artificial Intelligence, International Relations, Political Science, Strategic Culture
- by Alberto Encomienda
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- Geopolitics, Sovereignty, Colonialism, Strategic Culture
- by Ian Hall
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- Strategic Culture, Indian foreign policy, India Strategic Culture

At the dawn of the 21st century, the Greek Civil War (1946-9) still remains a controversial episode of modern Greek history. Academics (Greeks and non-Greeks) have not yet reached a consensus on what caused the outbreak, escalation and defeat of the communist insurgency. The great majority of the academics contend that the anti-communist camp caused the escalation of a low-intensity guerrilla war into a total war. New archival evidence, however, suggests otherwise. This article investigates this transitory phase of the Greek Civil War (January - July 1947) and uncovers that the two sides never really intended to conclude the war peacefully.

Pondering the policy-outlooks on national security that pertains in the small island developing state of Trinidad and Tobago to argue that, barring inculcation of a more strategic culture, its policy approaches to national security will remain sub-strategically focused and thus short sighted. Subliminally, the various strategic review processes have been about the type of military/security force that the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force has become, will always be, or alternatively should not be limited to. There is a need to grapple with and bound the strategic challenges associated with gauging the ambitions or short-sightedness of policy approaches to Trinidad and Tobago’s national security outlook.

- by James Rogers
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- Strategic Culture, United States In The World, Japan, France

The Greek Civil War (1946-1949) was one of the few instances in the post-World War II era of a clear-cut and permanent victory by right-wing government forces over an insurgent communist movement. Spyridon Plakoudas here explores the factors which ultimately caused the downfall of the communist insurgency in Greece which had, at some points, seemed undefeatable. He questions whether the guerrilla movement fell victim to the feud between Stalin and Tito or whether the significant British and, above all, American aid in fact rescued the Greek monarchist regime from collapse. Dr Plakoudas explores the strategies adopted by government forces in order to counter the communist insurgency, how external and internal actors influenced these policies and when, how and why these policies achieved success. Featuring previously unseen sources and documents, this book reveals the strategy and tactics of the monarchist regime.

- by Spyridon Plakoudas
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- Military History, Strategy (Military Science), British History, Cold War

Le Myanmar traverse un processus de libéralisation politique qui a été entamé par le haut. Le régime militaire a tenu des élections générales en 2010, lesquelles ont placé au pouvoir un nouveau gouvernement composé à la fois de civils et de militaires. Depuis, la majorité des sanctions imposées par plusieurs États occidentaux au Myanmar ont été levées, et on observe une diversification des relations internationales du pays. Imbriqué à la sphère d’influence chinoise depuis quelques années, celui-ci rétablit des contacts diplomatiques et économiques avec l’Occident. Peu de chercheurs ont tenté d’expliquer les causes de cette transition politique, et le lien entre libéralisation politique et diversification des relations internationales n’a pas encore été expliqué. Ce mémoire propose de le faire en utilisant un modèle théorique issu de deux types de littérature, celle sur la culture stratégique et celle sur les transitions politiques. Il suggère que la libéralisation politique du Myanmar s’explique par les luttes d’influences au sein du régime entre deux sous-cultures stratégiques, les hardliners et les softliners. L’application des normes favorisées par les hardliners ayant échoué dans l’atteinte des objectifs stratégiques du régime, les softliners ont pu imposer leurs propres préférences normatives. Il propose également que la libéralisation politique était une étape nécessaire pour que le gouvernement birman puisse diversifier ses relations internationales.

Terrorism studies has an enduring puzzle: how do terrorist organisations grow, persist and survive? Using the Japanese new religion Aum Shinrikyo as a case study, this thesis posits that three causal mechanisms—cultural transmission, social learning, and folklore—affect terrorist organisations’ survivability, success, or failure. Original contributions to knowledge include a new analytical theory of strategic subcultures in terrorist organisations, new tests using the qualitative methodology of process tracing, and a new causal analysis of Aum Shinrikyo’s initiatory, religious sub-system (which facilitated founder Shoko Asahara’s paranoid delusions, leadership elite deviance, and follower indoctrinability). A new research agenda is also identified.

- by Alex Burns
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- International Relations, Terrorism, International Terrorism, History of Japan

The central puzzle that this research aims to address is whether instrumental rationality alone is the determinant of an actor’s social behaviour. The problem is framed within the context of the debate between the Rationalist and Constructivist scholarship in the discipline of International Relations. Although there are several epistemological, ontological and analytical angles to this debate but two emerge as most relevant to this inquiry. First, whether ideas have any place in formulation of foreign policy of a state; and second, if that is the case then where do they come from and how do they influence this process? Rationalists, represented in this study by neorealists, have resolved the problem through a major move: that is by making units of the international structure functionally similar, states are expected to pursue similar ends based on utility maximization. Thus, grand strategy, which denotes strategic behaviour of states at the highest level, is agnostic with respect to the ends and becomes only a function of means. Constructivists, represented in this study by all schools of thought who consider ideas as partly or entirely influencing strategic action, have not come up with a coherent response. A major theoretical effort made by Alexander Wendt in response to neorealist claims also ends up subsuming the individual identities of the actors in the larger culture of international politics where actors pursue shared goals; and thus the only distinction in their grand strategies is in terms of means. Another category introduced by Constructivists is of Strategic Culture that aims to explain the departure of actors’ strategic conduct from instrumentality due to influence of their cultural proclivities. This also ends up making distinctions among various grand strategies along the scale of means, not of ends. Strategic culturists such as Alastair Iain Johnston also do not take into account the influence of the strategic environment on an actor’s strategic behaviour. This study takes up the matters from here and makes a simple proposition that ideational categories such as culture and ideology are determinants of the ends of grand strategy, not its means. The major theoretical move made in this study is to challenge the neorealist conception of functionally similar units and introduce the category of Civilization-States which in the contemporary era are successors to their old civilizations and culture. Their formative ideologies, represented as worldviews in this study, transmitted across time exert a major influence in formulating the ends of their grand strategies. Engaging with the major concepts of the English School of International Relations, this study proposes a theory of grand strategy in which the actors’ ends as derived from their worldviews are pitched against the international order which represents the strategic environment, and are measured on the scale of revisionism to status quo with respect to it. The theory is then tested by considering the case of China at four points in time. First, at the formative or pre-dynastic period (before 221 BC) and subsequently during the former Han era (202 BC-9 AD) when the Confucian ideology was adopted as official orthodoxy, during late Qing period (1839-1911 AD) when it clashed with the Western international order, and during late Communist period (1976-2015 AD) when China recovered the material basis of its power. The study concludes that the failure of Qing dynasty to maintain the Sino-centric world order was due to internal contradictions in its worldview generated by external influences, and that the contemporary Chinese worldview is not at a major variance from the precepts of the prevalent liberal international order and, therefore, China is only a mildly revisionist state only aiming to slowly erode the United States’ hegemony.