Definitions of Art Research Papers (original) (raw)

The cluster theory of art Berys Gaut has recently defended a cluster account of art. He proposes it as superior to other anti-essentialist positions. I argue that his defense of this claim is unconvincing. Not only is the cluster theory consistent with the current crop of disjunctive definitions, it is at its most plausible when seen in such terms.

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- Definitions of Art
- by Stephen Davies
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- Definitions of Art
- by Jasper Liptow
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- Aesthetics, Art, Nelson Goodman, Arthur Danto

The paper looks back to Jakobson’s definition of poetry as formulated in his “What is Poetry?” and “Linguistics and Poetics”. It begins with a polemic essay written by Petr Fidelius that criticized Jakobson’s functional approach to poetry for its reliance on a specific attitude of the reader. Is an artistic status of a text determined by its author’s intention (as Fidelius believes), by properties of an artifact (as, according to Miroslav Červenka, is suggested in Jakobson’s later reformulation of the poetic function), or by a recipient’s attitude? These questions are discussed in view of several key studies asking “What is Art?” (Shklovsky, Beardsley, Goodman, etc.). In conclusion, the author of the paper emphasizes the present signifi cance of Jakobson’s conception of poetry that, despite the fact that it does not provide us with a universal defi nition of what is art, continues to give us very stimulating answers to a question that might be even more important: “What does art do?”

Modern art remains a mystery because most people – including art critics and even artists themselves – are unable to see beyond the imprisoning confines of classical fine art. Everything is judged in terms of beauty and technical skill, when it should be viewed from a quite different perspective, namely that of the imaginative world that the modern artwork is a part of. Successful and authentic modern art is about creating worlds of the imagination - like a film, or a novel - only this time using different media. Modern artworks are like lobby cards and film stills to imaginative worlds, and they should not be seen as aesthetic ends-in-themselves. And for an artwork to be authentically artistic, as opposed to merely crafted, it must invoke a ‘strange and disturbing’ imaginative world, not a variant of the world we currently inhabit, as that world is the world of crafted and aesthetic objects.

- by Jakob Zaaiman
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- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Art History, Performing Arts
- by Constant Bonard and +1
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- Aesthetics, Ontology of Music, Art Criticism, Ontology of Art

This paper focuses on the work-related aspects of the creation of an artwork (as traditionally construed). First, we briefly look into the Hegelian foundations of the emergence of the "artist" in opposition to the "artisan" (worker). This is then confronted with a proposed interpretation of Dietrich von Hildebrand personalist understanding of the artist's work, especially with regard to the value-response and "benevolence" as a specific attitude. Dietrich von Hildebrand casts new light on the problems considered in this essay with his distinction between three concepts of ethical value: a) value as an importance of an object or activity in itself, attributed to it by the human person; b) the value of an object or activity for satisfying a subjective good or need; and c) the value of an object or activity for guaranteeing the objective good of a person. According to von Hildebrand, although some labour may turn out to be artistic, not all types of work have that chance-even if in their efforts, their agents commit to generating a result of the highest possible aesthetic quality for the given sphere of activity. Such is true for the applied arts, as well as for all types of work whose primary goals are not aesthetic but otherwise, and for which the aesthetic value is a by-product. Von Hildebrand's theory retains the late modern understanding of the distinction between ordinary "work" and "art" as qualitative rather than quantitative.

- by Bogna J . Gladden-Obidzińska
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- Aesthetics, Design, Art Theory, Phenomenology

One of the main tenets of György Márkus’ meta-theory of philosophy (or of history of philosophy) can be summarized as a strict methodological rule: philosophy should fulfil two tasks which are partly interconnected. as Márkus put it: “Philosophy can contribute to such an endeavour [viz. offering plausible interpretation about the historical present] insofar as it attempts, partly though conceptual analysis, partly through the reconstruction of the decisive constituents of our tradition, to shed light on the normative and factual preconditions of the now dominant set of practices [...].” In this paper I fully adhere to this methodological rule: in order to supplement Márkus’ historical analysis (“reconstruction of the decisive constituents of our tradition”) I will carry out an in-depth conceptual analysis of ‘mass art’. I argue that from the very concept of mass art (defined by Noël Carroll in the late 1990s) the claim that the genuine (metaphysical) difference which does exist between high artworks and mass artworks necessarily creates some difference in their respective aesthetic/artistic value simply does not follow. so the philosophical debate on the aesthetic/artistic nature of high artworks and mass artworks is over—nevertheless the alleged difference in aesthetic/artistic value of these two types of artworks occurs frequently in contemporary public discourses about art. This is partly because this value-based conceptual distinction is functioning as a special device for solving the ‘antinomies’ for the concept of “culture” (as Márkus’ historical analysis has revealed it); and partly because it can be used as a useful conceptual tool for any theory of art in resolving the contradiction between normative implications stemming from the theory and empirical facts.

Is a properly reformed notion of aesthetics now able to meet the accusations often levelled against it? This article examines three of the most common ways in which art and literary theorists have attacked aesthetics, along with counters to each of these. 1) that aesthetics is based around overly narrow conceptions of "art" and "the aesthetic" (or that aesthetics and formalism are synonymous). 2) that aesthetics is politically disengaged. 3) That aesthetics fails to engage with actual art objects and their histories.

- by Sam Rose
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- Aesthetics, Art History, Philosophy of Art, Literary Theory
- by Hans Maes
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- Aesthetics, Art, Architecture, Comedy

On the whole, neither those who hold that pornography can never be art nor their opponents specify what they actually mean by `art', even though it seems natural that their conclusions should vary depending on how the concept is understood. This paper offers a `definitional crossword' and confronts some definitions of pornography with the currently most well-established definitions of art. My discussion shows that following any of the modern definitions entails that at least some pornography not only can be, but actually is, art.

- by Simon Fokt
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- Art, Exclusivism, Definitions of Art

This introduction to Journal of Visual Art Practice, guest edited by Alana Jelinek, includes a summary of This is Not Art, summaries of the articles responding to the ideas and challenges presented by This is Not Art and a reply to those responses. The rationale for inviting a philosopher, a curator, an artist, a marxist art historian and a scholar working between art and anthropology to respond is also included. The edition of Journal of Visual of Art Practice is available online and it is available here as a single download which includes the Introduction and articles by Derek Matravers, Jen Clarke, Larne Abse Gogarty, Alberto Duman and Sally de Kunst.

- by Alana Jelinek and +2
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- Contemporary Art, Neoliberalisms and the Transformation of the Cultural Sphere, Definition of Art, Definitions of Art

With regard to the distinction between functional and procedural definitions of art, that has been proposed by Steven Davies, the paper develops a functional account of art that tries to understand works of art as part of a certain kind of reflexive practice. In the first part the definitional proposals of Weitz, Dickie and Beardsley are discussed and their major shortcomings as well as their positive insights are presented. It is argued that Beardsley is on the right track with his functional definition, but determines the function of art in a wrong way. In the second part the papers develops a functional account of art that isn’t relying on the concept of aesthetic experience, but rather relies on the concept of reflexivity that has been developed by Hegel. Questions of an art-specific reflexivity are discussed as well as the problem that works of literature and ready-mades pose for a traditional definition that tries to understand the specifity of artistic reflexivity in terms of sensous materials.

- by Daniel Martin Feige
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- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Art Theory, Philosophy of Art

Con questo volume, insignito nel 2010 del “Premio Internazionale d’Estetica” conferitogli dalla Società Italiana d’Estetica, si offre per la prima volta al lettore italiano un panorama significativo della produzione saggistica di Jerrold Levinson, senza dubbio una delle voci più vivaci e rappresentative dell’estetica americana contemporanea. Come la maggior parte dei filosofi appartenenti alla tradizione analitica, Levinson affida la sua ricerca alla forma del saggio, spesso destinato ad alimentare un dibattito o a intervenire in esso, piuttosto che alla monografia. Raccogliendo strategicamente articoli pubblicati tra il 1987 e il 2006 e provenienti da volumi diversi dell’autore, il presente libro assume quindi il carattere di un vero e proprio inedito.
Nelle tre parti che lo articolano sono espresse le tre direzioni principali della riflessione estetologica di Levinson, vale a dire: la definizione dell’arte, la questione delle proprietà estetiche, il rapporto tra il valore intrinseco delle opere d’arte e la nostra vita. In ognuna di queste direzioni problematiche e nei saggi che, in questo volume, le esemplificano l’autore propone soluzioni originali e, insieme, rispettose della posta teorica di volta in volta in gioco. Questo vale per la definizione “storico-intenzionale” dell’arte proposta da Levinson, capace di gettare un ponte tra lo storicismo tipico di buona parte della tradizione continentale e l’avversione tipicamente analitica per un approccio puramente speculativo alle questioni estetico-artistiche. Così come vale per la sua idea di connettere la trattazione delle proprietà estetiche alla tematica della “sopravvenienza”, capace di lasciarsi alle spalle l’alternativa tra oggettivismo e soggettivismo. Rinnovando una tradizione iniziata con Georges Santayana e John Dewey e proseguita con filosofi come Monroe Beardsley, Levinson dà infine prova, nella terza parte del volume, di avere a cuore l’intimo nesso che lega l’esperienza umana alle opere d’arte. Un nesso, gravido di conseguenze etiche, che si annuncia nella forma specifica e inconfondibile del piacere estetico.
La presente edizione italiana, corredata da una prefazione appositamente scritta dall’autore e da una puntuale presentazione dei curatori Fabrizio Desideri e Filippo Focosi, condotta secondo criteri rigorosi, è corredata di esaustivi apparati critici e bibliografici.

Este artigo trata da proposta apresentada por Morris Weitz de que não é possível definir arte em termos de condições necessárias e suficientes. Ele sustenta que as teorias em estética, ao buscarem uma definição que capture a essência da arte, tentam definir o que não pode ser definido. Este artigo mostra que o argumento de Weitz – centrado no uso do conceito de arte como “conceito aberto” e na análise da extensão do termo “arte” – é refutável por objeções que envolvem a noção de “semelhança de família”. Além disso, aponta-se duas perspectivas para o debate sobre a possibilidade de definir arte: uma que retoma a posição de Weitz e outra que propõe definições nos termos negados por ele.

- by Rosi Morokawa
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- Metaphysics, Philosophy Of Language, Epistemology, Art History
- by nick zangwill
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- Aesthetics, Philosophy of Art, Beauty, Aesthetics of Architecture

Most art is made by people with a well-developed concept of art and who are familiar with its forms and genres as well as with the informal institutions of its presentation and reception. This is reflected in philosophers' proposed definitions. The earliest artworks were made by people who lacked the concept and in a context that does not resemble the art traditions of established societies, however. An adequate definition must accommodate their efforts. The result is a complex, hybrid definition: something is art (a) if it shows excellence of skill and achievement in realizing significant aesthetic goals, and either doing so is its primary, identifying function or doing so makes a vital contribution to the realization of its primary, identifying function, or (b) if it falls under an art genre or art form established and publicly recognized within an art tradition, or (c) if it is intended by its maker/presenter to be art and its maker/presenter does what is necessary and appropriate to realizing that intention. Meanwhile, artworlds—historically developed traditions of works, genres, theories, criticism, conventions for presentation etc.— play a crucial but implicit role in (b) and (c). They are to be characterized in terms of their origins.

- by Stephen Davies
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- Paleolithic Art, Definition of Art, Definitions of Art, Upper Paleolithic Art

In pursuit of a definition of sculptural practice for categorisation purpose
One of the major problems found within the fields of archives, collections and throughout the museum industry is the classification of an item. Often an item is categorised on a subjective basis and as such it becomes increasingly easy for items who's existence spans many categories to become lost in areas where they may not be best placed. A prime example can be found within art, particularly sculpture where the parameters and definitions of what sculpture is change constantly.

- by Erin L Newton
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- Art, Sculpture, Categorization, Museums

How can we be sure that what is presented to us as art is truly art? Is it still reasonable to look for a principled approach to such a question? It has been said that “the project of the philosophy of art as we know it is that its underlying, though not generally explicitly avowed, task has been to provide the theoretical means for establishing that the mutations issued from avant-garde practice belong to the family of art”. If so, philosophy can only ever confirm or justify and can never refute the decisions of the institutional Artworld. Nor can philosophy, on the other hand, extend consequentially these decisions to all objects possessing the same characteristics, because this would literally pulverize the artworld. Thus, philosophy of art is faced with a dilemma: either to be incoherent or to give up defining its own object. Is there a way out?

- by Michele Di Monte
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- Aesthetics, Art History, Art Theory, Contemporary Art

Most modern definitions of art fail to successfully address the issue of the ever-changing nature of art, and rarely even attempt to provide an account which would be valid in more than just the modern Western context. This article develops a new theory which preserves the advantages of its predecessors, solves or avoids their problems, and has a scope wide enough to account for art of different times and cultures. An object is art in a given context, it is argued, iff some person(s) culturally competent in this context afforded it the status of a candidate for appreciation for reasons considered good in this context. This weakly institutional view is supplemented by auxiliary definitions explaining the notions of cultural contexts, competence and good reasons for affording the status. The relativisation to contexts brings increased explanatory power and scope, and the ability to account for the diversity of art.

- by Simon Fokt
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- Cultural Studies, Aesthetics, Art Theory, Institutional Theory
- by Mathew Abbott
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- Aesthetics, Art Theory, Modern Art, Painting

Richard Wollheim threatened George Dickie's institutional definition of art with a dilemma which entailed that the theory is either redundant or incomprehensible and useless. This article modifies the definition to avoid such criticism. First, it shows that the definition's concept of the artworld is not vague when understood as a conventional system of beliefs and practices. Then, based on Gaut's cluster theory, it provides an account of reasons artworld members have to confer the status of a candidate for appreciation. An authorised member of an artworld has a good reason to confer the status on an object if it satisfies a subset of criteria respected as sufficient within this artworld. The first horn of the dilemma is averted because explaining the reasons behind conferral cannot eliminate references to the institution, and the second loses its sharpness, as accepting partial arbitrariness of the conferral does not deprive the theory of its explanatory power.

- by Simon Fokt
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- Aesthetics, Institutional Theory, Definitions of Art
- by Simon Fokt
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- Aesthetics, Art Theory, Philosophy of Art, Ontology of Art

У статті розглянуто питання розмежування мистецтва і немистецтва як актуальне для сучасної культури. Аналіз здійснено з по- силанням на номіналістичну теорію Тьєррі де Дюва, в якій висунуто ідею імені мистецтва як перформативу, що здійснює досліджуване розмежування. Сам акт іменування регулюється естетичним судженням, яке зберігає свої традиційні характеристики і функції, але змі- нює сам предмет. Наша мета – перевірити ці теоретичні припущення. На підставі аналізу ми доводимо, що перформативна сила іменування мистецтвом обумовлена не естетичною природою судження, а соціальними та культурними чинниками, а судження про мистецтво і судження про красу є відмінними за своєю суттю. Причому судження "це – мистецтво" належить розглядати як політичне, оскільки воно регулює не лише розмежування мистецтва і немистецтва, але й розмежування соціальних позицій та прав на судження

This article explores the operability of the so called "turn to things" in re-telling stories about the art of the city, doing so in two major steps: firstly - focusing on the pre-war Breslau, and secondly - on the post-war Wroclaw.
In the first part of this article I wonder if Kurt Schwitters could possibly inspire Martin Heidegger, or vice versa - as both the artist and the philosopher, almost contemporaries, if espousing different political views, were interested in quite similar matters, or things, they use and living in their environment. In the second part, I look in depth into the relation characteristc of Eugeniusz Geppert, the first director of an arts tertiary school in Wrocław.
Following Hayden White (and his reflections on the status of fiction) and Mieke Bal (and her reflections on pre-posterity) I try, then, through conscious fictionalization and narrativisation using the figures of "Schwitters", "Heidegger" and "Geppert" reach the silenced reality of the city of Wroclaw and its art. My point of departure is "Merzzeichnung 225" (1921) from the collection of the National Museum in Wrocław.

- by Anna Markowska
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- Eastern European Studies, Polish Studies, Avant-Garde, Counterfactual History

In "A Defence Of The Institutional Definition Of Art" (Southern Journal Of Philosophy (1988), Vol. XXVI, No. 3, pp.317-334), Stephen Davies argues for the view that George Dickie's institutional definition of art can be amended in a way which renders it immune to the sorts of objections which are most commonly supposed to undermine it, but without leaving the definition open to any new and crippling objections. I think that Davies' argument is interesting, but unsuccessful; consequently, the main purpose of this paper is to explain why Davies' attempt to rehabilitiate the institutional definition of art fails.

- by Graham Oppy
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- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Definition of Art, Definitions of Art

This is a review of the Sinii Divan journal's special issue dedicated to contemporary art

- by Luca Vargiu
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- Art in Context, Definitions of Art, Biomorphic Design, Form and function

While comprising a considerable number of essays spanning over a period of ten years and concerning different philosophical topics, Jerrold Levinson’s Contemplating Art (CA) reveals a remarkable coherence, in employing a limited set of principles in contexts as various as that of the definition of art, the nature of aesthetic properties, the debate on musical expressivity, the interpretative/critical activity of perceivers, and other more circumscribed matters. The recurring, underlying ideas I’m thinking of include intentionalism, the notion of musical persona, and realism about aesthetic properties. But there’s another idea that, despite being usually ignored by commentators, plays a no less relevant role in shaping Levinson’s aesthetic thought. I’m talking of the coalescence of form and content (CFC). My aim in this paper will be twofold: in the first place, I’ll point out and analyse the passages of CA where this paradigmatic aesthetic principle explicitly occurs; secondly, I’ll show how CFC, as is there articulated, can disclose interesting perspectives on other aspects of Levinson’s theories about art and aesthetic
properties.

- by Filippo Focosi
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- Aesthetics, Philosophy of Art, Aesthetic Experience, Definitions of Art

The problem of defining art has occupied analytical aesthetics for more than 50 years. A lot of solutions have been proposed, but none of them seems to be definitive. So, skepticism abounds, despite the great amount and variety of proposals. But less attention has been paid to recent attempts who seek the solution in linking art to traditional concepts such as aesthetic experience, beauty, pleasure, and form, properly revised. In this paper I analyze this kind of attempts (such as that of Dutton, Beardsley, Eldridge, Shusterman, Scruton and, surprisingly enough, the latest Danto) trying to arrive to a unified aesthetic definition of art, which acknowledges the importance of content but states that form is what mostly matters, in being the instrument through which an artwork conveys its meaning and causes the spectator to have pleasurable aesthetic experiences. I also show how such condition rises and receives its force from the history of art in different cultures, there being universal basis for aesthetic appreciation of artworks. I conclude remarking some of the advantages of such a definition, allowing space for a subsequent discussion about possible objections and replies.

- by Filippo Focosi
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- Aesthetics, Contemporary Art, Philosophy of Art, Aesthetic Experience

Można oczywiście stwierdzić, że skoro Schwitters z Heideggerem i Geppertem nigdy się nie spotkali, powinno to raz na zawsze zamknąć sprawę podobnych rozważań. Schwitters musiał uciekać z takich Niemiec, w których Heidegger czuł się komfortowo. Czy historyk może zaaranżować jednak ich spotkanie, wyobrazić sobie fakt do którego nie doszło, ale który mimo tego się zdarza się – a przynajmniej może zdarzyć – tym, którzy po obejrzeniu przechowywanego we wrocławskim Muzeum Narodowym kolażu "Merzzeichnung 225" (1921) wrócą z muzeum do domu lub biblioteki, by zatopić się w Źródle dzieła sztuki Heideggera?
Powody wyobrażonego spotkania Schwittersa i Heideggera oraz wrocławskiego malarza Eugeniusza Gepperta są oczywiste: nie mogło do niego dojść z powodu nazizmu i komunizmu oraz wygenerowanych przez te ideologie uprzedzeń.
To, że „Heidegger” ze „Schwittersem” się wreszcie spotkali stało się więc nie tylko faktem, ale swoistym przezwyciężeniem toksycznych XX-wiecznych ideologii, prawdziwym końcem II wojny światowej. Cóż z tego że Heidegger zmarł w 1976, a Schwitters w 1948.

- by Anna Markowska
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- Alternative History, Definitions of Art, Kurt Schwitters Merz
- by Stephen Davies
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- Definitions of Art

"What Art Is" is the last book of the late Arthur C. Danto. The eminent philosopher once again focused on the incessantly debated question about the real nature of art, trying to justify and explain the great historical differences within the evolution of art forms, but also aiming at saving their grounding unity throughout history. An impossible mission? Maybe a logically impossible dream. Danto’s arguments are bold and, as usual, brilliantly wide-ranging, however relevant conceptual problems remain. The challenge is still open.

- by Michele Di Monte
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- Aesthetics, Art History, Art Theory, Contemporary Art
- by Michele Di Monte
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- Aesthetics, Art Theory, Contemporary Art, Historicism

Aulo Gellio, Noctes Atticae, IX, 2, 4

- by Michele Di Monte
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- Aesthetics, Art Theory, Arthur Danto, Definitions of Art

This article first appeared in 2001 in Kunst als menschliche Universalie: Eine adaptionistische Betrachtung (“Art as a human behavior: an adaptationist view”), in Peter M. Hejl (trans. & ed.), Universalien und Konstruktivismus: Zum Problem der Universalien in den Humanwissenschaften (Universals and Constructivism: On the Problem of Universals in the Humanities). Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp (Delfin), pp. 206-234.
In 2009, it appeared in Polish Translation as Sztuka jako ludzkie uniwersalium: spojrzenie adaptacjonistyczne, Estetyka i Krytyka 15/16 (2/2008-1/2009), Uniwersytet Jagielloñski-Krakow, pp. 247-263.
It appears here in English as a book chapter in Armin W Geertz, ed. (2013) Origins of Religion, Cognition and Culture, pp. 121-139. Durham, UK: Acumen.

In Beyond Art (2014), Dominic Lopes proposed a new theory of art, the buck passing theory. Rather than attempting to define art in terms of exhibited or genetic featured shared by all artworks, Lopes passes the buck to theories of individual arts. He proposes that we seek theories of music, painting, poetry, and other arts. Once we have these theories, we know everything there is to know about the theory of art. This essay presents two challenges to the theory. First, this essay argues that Lopes is wrong in supposing that theories of arts were developed to deal with the 'hard cases' – developments such as Duchamp's readymades and conceptual art. This is a problem since Lopes holds that the buck passing theory's capacity to deal with the hard cases is one of its virtues. Second, this essay argues that the buck passing theory has no account of which activities are arts and no account of what makes some activity an art.

- by James Young
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- Aesthetics, Philosophy of Art, Definitions of Art

Para incluir a variada produção artística do século XX, alguns filósofos negam que haja qualquer condição estética que algo deva satisfazer para ser arte. Mas será que é preciso abandonar condições estéticas para se definir arte, a fim de que, assim, se possa incluir casos como os ready-mades de Duchamp e da Arte Conceitual como casos de arte? As principais objeções às definições estéticas de arte centram-se no argumento de que elas excluem esses casos como casos de arte e que esses seriam, portanto, contraexemplos às definições estéticas de arte. Neste artigo, pretendo mostrar que a definição estética de Monroe Beardsley pode responder à objeção da arte “não-estética” de Timothy Binkley, uma vez que a base para esta objeção é uma concepção puramente perceptual da experiência estética.

- by Rosi Morokawa
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- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Art Theory, Contemporary Art

Vouloir définir philosophiquement l'art, est-ce nécessairement être « essentialiste » ? Est-ce postuler qu'il existe quelque chose comme une « essence de l'art » ? Pour répondre à cette question, je propose d'abord de distinguer entre deux formes d'essentialisme : un essentialisme du contenu, qui met au fondement de la notion d'art un ensemble de propriétés nécessaires et suffisantes que la philosophie aurait pour tâche de mettre au jour, et un essentialisme du statut, qui se contente d'affirmer la relative stabilité du statut artistique conféré aux objets par la définition. J'examine alors le lien entre ces deux formes d'essentialisme et différentes définitions de l'art historiquement attestées. Une fois mis en évidence l'échec philosophique des unes et des autres, je propose finalement une réhabilitation de la notion d'essence, non plus comme outil ou contenu philosophique, mais comme négativité et moteur intra-artistique. Mots-clés Définition de l'art-George Dickie-Essentialisme-Nelson Goodman-Jerrold Levinson-Philosophie de l'art-Morris Weitz. Abstract Is a philosophical attempt to define art necessarily essentialist ? Does such an approach posit that that there is such a thing as an essence of art ? To respond to this question, I will first distinguish between two forms of essentialism: an essentialism of content that regards art as a set of well-defined and sufficient properties which philosophy must reveal; and an essentialism of status which is content with asserting the relative stability bestowed on objects by its own definition. I will then examine the links between these two forms of essentialism and several definitions of art. After showing the various limitations of previous attempts at philosophical definitions of art, I propose to bring back the notion of essence by envisioning it not as a philosophical tool or content but rather as a form of negativity and as an intra-artistic driving force.

- by Frédéric Pouillaude
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- Philosophy of Art, Definitions of Art

confermano poi le debolezze dell'impianto: «Lo psicoanalista sa che le rappresentazioni mentali possono essere dislocate, così come il musicista sa che le armonie possono modulare, essere trasposte o manipolate tonalmente, atonalmente e serialmente» (p. 23); «È stato suggerito che la struttura musicale è "analoga al sogno, al sogno a occhi aperti o allo scherzo" e può essere "analizzata mediante tecniche psicoanalitiche per rivelare il suo contenuto latente"» (p. 47). In realtà, come ha osservato fra gli altri Oliver Sacks, se c'è qualcosa che sembra restare immune dalle deformazioni della logica onirica, quello è proprio la melodia. "Condensare" un'immagine o un'enunciazione è possibile e sensato, ma condensare una melodia sarebbe impossibile e assurdo. Considerazioni simili, solo un poco più complesse, dimostrerebbero che lo stesso vale per lo "spostamento". Il linguaggio musicale, poi, non appare affatto in prima istanza come un linguag-

- by Filippo Focosi
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- Definitions of Art
- by Filippo Focosi
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- Clive Bell, Definitions of Art, Aesthetic formalism, Aesthetic Value

This paper presents a critical discussion of the philosophical discussion of minimal artworks: Initially it's suggested that there are two basic ways in which art has been said to be minimal: It can be minimally made (absence of effort)... more

- by Matthew Rowe
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- Minimalism (Art), Definitions of Art
- by Daniel Martin Feige
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- Aesthetics, Art Theory, Theodor Adorno, Philosophy of Art

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