Early Modern Philosophy Research Papers (original) (raw)

This paper examines two features of Kant’s 1768 critique of Leibniz’ conception of space. Firstly, Leibniz’ proposed geometrical calculus called ‘analysis situs’; secondly, Leibniz’ relational conception of space. The main thesis of the paper is that Kant’s arguments are more powerful than generally recognized. With regard to the analysis situs, I will show that Kant was quite well informed about this proposed science and that his arguments severely undermine Leibniz’ claims to what it could perform. With regard to the relational theory of space, Kant’s argument would require Leibniz to present a complex story about the relation between God’s act of creation and our spatial experience to defend his relational view, rather than using the simple principle of sufficient reason.

Il De immenso viene composto, in otto libri, nel 1583, in Inghilterra, e poi pubblicato a Francoforte nel 1591. Insieme al De triplici minimo e al De monade esso fa parte di una trilogia dedicata al duca Enrico Giulio di Braunschweig e Lüneburg. Nonostante una ricca bibliografia critica, ampiamente descritta nell’introduzione del volume, mancava fino ad oggi uno studio dedicato interamente al De immenso, nel quale si offrisse una presentazione integrale del contenuto dei singoli libri tenendo sempre presente il contesto intellettuale europeo al quale Bruno risponde e con il quale si confronta. Con questo obiettivo si è tenuto a Barcellona, nell’aprile del 2018, il convegno internazionale «Giordano Bruno, De immenso et innumerabilibus. Letture critiche», dove l’esame degli otto libri dell’opera è stato accompagnato da interventi su aspetti generali del poema. Se ne presentano qui i risultati, nella speranza di offrire agli studiosi una sorta di ‘guida’ alla lettura del De immenso che possa contribuire alla più ampia attenzione, da parte di curiosi e di specialisti, verso questa opera così importante del pensiero bruniano.

- by Dario Tessicini and +5
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- Renaissance Studies, History of Science, Renaissance Philosophy, History of Renaissance Science

David Hume (1711-1776) ranks among the greatest of philosophers and issues of religion lie at the heart of what most concerned him. Although the exact nature of Hume’s attitude to religion is a matter of some controversy, there is general agreement that his basic stance was critical, if not hostile, to the doctrines and dogmas of orthodox religious belief and practice. There remains, however, considerable disagreement about whether or not Hume believed that there is any truth or value in religion. According to some, Hume was a sceptic who regarded all conjectures relating to religious hypotheses to be beyond the scope of human understanding – he neither affirmed nor denied these conjectures. Others read Hume as embracing a highly refined form of “true religion”. On the other side of this spectrum, it is claimed that Hume was committed to atheism, although due to social conditions at the time, this had to be (thinly) concealed or masked. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of Hume’s core concerns and arguments on this subject and to provide the reader with a framework for interpreting and assessing his various contributions.

- by Paul Russell
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- Religion, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, 17th Century & Early Modern Philosophy

This entry examines Locke's notion of persons and, in particular, his thesis that personal identity is constituted by consciousness. It presents an overview over the most influential readings of this thesis and discusses the most debated interpretative questions and problems about it. I argue that, though Locke's theory of personal identity includes a tension which, ultimately, cannot be resolved, it is nonetheless well-placed to achieve the ethical-theological aim Locke pursues in discussing personal identity.

- by David Wörner
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- Consciousness, Personal Identity, Thomas Reid, John Locke

Descartes regularly claims that questions concerning the possibility of causal interaction between mind and body due to their heterogeneous natures are based on a misunderstanding of how mind and body are united. To illustrate this point, Descartes draws an analogy with the scholastic notion of heaviness in an effort to clear up this misunderstanding and to dispel their concerns about mind to body causal interaction. This paper examines the heaviness analogy in some detail. The main conclusions are that Descartes maintains a holenmeric notion of mind-body union such that the whole mind is in the whole body and wholly in each one of its parts while also exercising its function primarily in the pineal gland. This, for Descartes, implies a teleological rather than a mechanistic understanding of how the mind moves the body and thereby avoids this version of the problem entirely. The paper concludes with a short discussion of what these considerations may mean for Paul Hoffman's hylomorphic understanding of Descartes' theory of mind-body union.

- by Deznan Bogdan
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- Theology, Early Modern Philosophy

The paper explains the contextual discrepancy between the grammatically related terms apercevoir/percevoir/percipere, aperception/perception, as well as perceptio/perception in French philosophical vocabulary of the mid-17th century. Bilingual Descartes’s philosophy is a peculiar testing area for changing the traditional meanings of these terms. In the Latin texts of Cartesius the word percipere and the noun perceptio denote, correspondingly, the process and the result of perception. However, the difficulty appeared during the preparation of the French texts of Descartes’s Latin works, since percevoir/perception, the natural French corres-pondents for percipere/perceptio, did not have the epistemological connotations and denoted «getting, collecting» (money, taxes etc.). Therefore Descartes chose for situational correspondents of percipere a number of French verbs with similar meaning (concevoir, connaître etc), sometimes apercevoir («notice») and never percevoir. For the noun perceptio he selected notion, connaissance and very rarely perception in the new epistemological meaning «perception», which was pretty difficult to comprehend for the French-speaking milieu of those days. As to the term aperception, it is totally artificial, and it was suggested by Leibniz in 1714 in order to denote the act of conscious perception.

- by Oleg Khoma
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- René Descartes, Leibniz (Philosophy), Early Modern Philosophy
- by Getty Lustila
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- Ethics, History of Ethics, 18th Century Philosophy, Adam Smith
- by Saverio Ansaldi
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- Art, Renaissance Philosophy, Michel de Montaigne, History Of Modern Philosophy

Norman Kemp Smith in his article “The Naturalism of Hume” formulated standard naturalistic interpretation David Hume’s philosophical project. According to Kemp Smith, the idea of Hume as a skeptic is unsustainable. The first book of A Treatise of Human Nature should be understood as an introduction to the new naturalistic philosophy. However, such approach does not deny the presence of elements of skepticism and empiricism in Hume ‘s philosophy. Hume’s political theory can be viewed as either continuation or empirical confirmation of his philosophy. His skepticism is expressed in his distrust of the rationalistic doctrines and by his unwillingness to adhere to political parties. Elements of empiricism are evident in his observation of human behavior in the present and also in the past. Skepticism and empiricism are an integral part of his naturalistic explanation in political philosophy. He introduced a political theory based upon the scientific methodology, which could be an inspiration for contemporary research in political science.

Anton Wilhelm Amo Timeline ***Updated***

It is generally accepted that Rousseau gave one of the most fierce critique of modern civilization and society in general. He is often claimed to have accurately described or at least anticipated what later on has been named alienation, even if he himself made no use of this term. In my paper I examine what might be regarded as a precursor conception of alienation in Rousseau’s work. In order to highlight theoretical differences and presuppositions, I shall also discuss Marx’s theory of alienation.
I shall argue that what we find in Rousseau can only be labelled as alienation in a broader sense, since the semantic core of alienation, i.e. becoming strange to someone, is not the basic problem in Rousseau’s description. A closer reading of Rousseau’s second discourse on unequality will serve as a point of reference in interpreting the term “alienation”. The treatise essentially claims that (1) human beings under conditions of civilization are unnoticed slaves, and (2) that this slavery to one another was brought about by a socio-cultural development leading to a loss of authenticity. I point out that there is a general scheme of alienation that might be described as possession – disappropriaton – reappropriation, and I shall claim with regard to Rousseau that he has but a short version in form of possession – disappropriation.

- by Csaba Olay
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- Jean Jaques Rousseau, Early Modern Philosophy, Alienation

Mitä jos maailma ei olekaan sellainen, millaiseksi sen kuvittelemme? Mistä voimme tietää, mitkä havainnot vääristyvät omien ajatusmalliemme mukaan ja mikä on asioiden oikea tila? Hakupalvelimet ja uutissivustot syöttävät meille " tietoa " , mutta lähdekritiikki on koetuksella. Mitä oikeastaan tarkoitamme " tiedolla " ? Kenen tietoa se on? Mistä se tullut ja voiko siihen luottaa? Skeptisismi kyseenalaistaa tiedon varmuuden, etsii ja epäilee. Skeptikon suhde tietoon ei kuitenkaan ole aina kieltävä vaan paremminkin tutkiva. Eri aikakausien suuret filosofit muotoilivat kantojaan skeptikkojen asettamaa haastetta vasten, joten skeptisismi on muovannut koko länsimaista ajattelua. Skeptisismi syventyy epäilyn ja etsimisen filosofiaan antiikista nykypäivään. Se avaa uusia näkökulmia skeptisismiin pohtimalla skeptisen filosofian suhdetta tunteisiin, uskonnollisen tiedon kyseenalaistamisen perinteeseen ja nykyajan filosofiaan. Länsimaisen filosofian lisäksi teos sivuaa skeptisiä kysymyksiä arabifilosofiassa ja buddhalaisuudessa. " Paljon keskustelua käydään myös tietona esitettävien väitteiden yhteydestä erilaisiin taloudellisiin, aatteellisiin tai poliittisiin intresseihin. Tieto kytkeytyy valtaan: tiedolliset väitteet paitsi kuvailevat maailmaa myös monin tavoin tuottavat sitä. " Malin Grahn-Wilder " Ne, jotka sanovat skeptikoiden kieltävän ilmenevän, näyttävät minusta kuunnelleen huonosti, mitä me sanomme. Me emme nimittäin kiellä sitä, minkä pakottava vaikutelma saa meidät hyväksymään ilman harkintaa, kuten aiemmin sanoimme. " Sekstos Empeirikos: Pyrrhonismin pääpiirteet (suomentanut Marke Ahonen) " On varmaa, että tervejärkisellä ja kokeneella ihmisellä tulisi olla ja yleensä onkin enemmän luottamusta mielipiteisiinsä kuin tyhmällä ja tietämättömällä (…). Edes järkevimmällä ja kokeneimmalla ihmisellä tämä arvovalta ei ole koskaan täydellinen, sillä hänenkin täytyy olla tietoinen monista entisistä erehdyksistä ja yhä pelätä tulevia samankaltaisia erehdyksiä. " David Hume: Filosofian skeptisestä järjestelmästä (suomentanut Tuomo Aho)

- by Malin Grahn-Wilder and +3
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- Epistemology, Medieval Philosophy, Cicero, David Hume

This paper investigates literary discourse surrounding the early modern stag hunt to explore somatic grounds for empathetic communication between humans and animals. The stag hunt—more than any other form of hunting during the early modern period—is frequently construed in allegorical terms, which sustain human-animal divisions and reinforce notions of human superiority. However, I argue that elements of the stag hunt blur these boundaries, posing a challenge to essentialist conceptions of the human, and opening up more fluid mediums of corporeal communication. I contend that the literary representation of hunting in the early modern period can serve as a model for an embodied understanding of cross-species communication and interaction.
Beginning with George Gascoigne’s treatise The Noble Arte of Venerie or Hunting (1575), I consider how, within the context of hunting, the hunter’s body is initially understood as unified and stable, while the stag’s body is perceived as malleable; it is something which can be made and unmade at the hunter’s discretion. Using the performative element of Gilles Deleuze’s conception of “meat,” and work by contemporary thinkers like Vinciane Despret and Rane Willerslev, I contest these assumptions to explore human-animal “meating places.” I then turn to Jaques’ encounter with the stag in Shakespeare’s As You Like It (1599) to consider the potential for trans-species communication of material “passions.” My approach resonates with current work like that of Ralph Acampora, which attempts to shift the grounds of humans’ ethical consideration for animals from the psyche to the soma.

Course Description: A continuation of the Classical Mind, the Modern Mind is an introduction to modern philosophy focusing on texts from selected early modern and modern thinkers. The class builds upon the history, thought concepts, and themes developed in the Classical Mind and traces the development of Western philosophical thought from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. In particular, this course deals with philosophers that consider the nature of thinking and reasoning, the idea of metaphysics and the foundations of human knowledge, the idea of a universal moral law, the nature of political society and the concept of right, and the idea and value of historical thinking. This course utilizes canonical philosophic texts situated in the history of philosophy to establish the structure and methodology of philosophical thinking. As the second course of the introductory sequence of philosophy classes, this class culminates not only in the identification of philosophic issues, concepts, and questions, but also the practical examination and analysis of fundamental human questions as preparation for students' continuing engagement with their liberal arts education. — Prerequisite for PHIL 202: successful completion of PHIL 201.

En el siguiente trabajo presentamos una reflexión acerca de la cuestión del lenguaje en Descartes, considerando que el lenguaje es la prueba fundamental que establece para diferenciar al ser humano de los animales y el reconocimiento de la posesión de una mente. El lenguaje, como veremos, trata de un elemento de distinción ontológica fundamental en la filosofía del pensador francés y plantea importantes preguntas acerca de la naturaleza de los animales.

La critique spinozienne des miracles est, avec le nécessitarisme et le rejet de l'autorité mosaïque du Pentateuque, une des théories qui ont le plus choqué les contemporains de Spinoza. Nous en avons une preuve dans la réaction de Henry Oldenburg qui, en 1675, demande à son correspondant de s'expliquer davantage sur ce sujet et lui signale très clairement que mettre en doute les miracles revient à saper la révélation qui leur doit sa certitude 1. Le chapitre VI du TTP soulève plusieurs problèmes. Notre but est double : nous voudrions d'une part essayer de mettre en rapport les opinions de Spinoza et celles de certains auteurs qu'il connaissait ou qu'il pouvait connaître ; d'autre part, en généralisant des résultats de l'interprétation avancée par Steven Nadler, nous nous proposons de répondre à certaines lectures de ce chapitre qui l'opposent à d'autres sections du TTP. Nous commencerons par situer le chapitre sur les miracles dans l'économie de l'ensemble du texte. Comme le titre de l'ouvrage l'indique, le TTP est composé de deux parties, l'une consacrée à un examen des Écritures et de la religion, l'autre explorant les fondements de l'État. Il est possible de tracer une autre division : la première section, consacrée à la théologie, se compose de six chapitres qui traitent de notions clé de la religion et de la théologie (la prophétie, les prophètes, l'élection des juifs, la loi divine, les rites, les miracles). Les neuf chapitres suivants détaillent les règles de l'herméneutique

- by Justin Keena
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- Epistemology, George Berkeley, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, John Locke

The Theses LVI belong to a series of hitherto unpublished early manuscripts of the Dutch humanist and jurisconsult Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) that were acquired by the University of Leiden in 1864. It is not certain when the Theses were written, but preliminary research on the physical manuscript and the sources cited indicate two possible windows. The first is around 1602-1605, that is roughly at a time when Grotius was also working on his Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (De Iure Praedae Commentarius). The second dating places the genesis of the manuscrbipt around 1613-1615.
In the context of Grotius’ writings, the Theses LVI assume an important position for several reasons: They raise questions about state formation, the duty of citizens to the state and the right of political resistance in far greater detail than in any other work of the celebrated Dutch humanist. The Theses LVI also feature important reading notes that yield priceless insights into the sources that Grotius directly consulted and their influence on his ideas. The manuscript grants modern scholars a unique glimpse into the working mind of its author. Evidence points not only to the ferocious haste with which Grotius wrote his works, but also the occasional sloppiness of his reading and research habits."""

- by Peter Borschberg
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- Social Theory, Political Philosophy, Political Theory, War Theory

Thomas Hobbes is an exception among early political scientists in his affirmation of gender equality. Carole Pateman and Susan Okin acknowledge this but maintain that, in the final analysis, his gender egalitarianism is disingenuous. There is certainly cause for suspicion. The history of political theory is replete with misogyny, and even theories that purport to be more egalitarian have had their sexist tendencies exposed on analysis. Such criticisms of Hobbes, however, are misplaced. In this essay, I explore the feminist possibilities in Hobbes's work, and argue that his affirmation of gender equality should be taken seriously. Far from reinforcing patriarchal relations, Hobbesian political theory demands a robust and substantive form of gender equality.

- by michael gray
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- Hobbes, Liberalism, Gender, Gender Equality

In the late 1720s and early 1730s, Christian Wolff writes a series of short treatises on general medical concepts such as health, disease, cause of disease, symptom, etc. The paper makes the claim that these texts should be considered as a pioneering attempt at developing a systematic philosophy of medicine based on metaphysical and epistemological investigations on medical concepts, doctrines, and practices. The main focus is on Wolff’s analysis of the concepts of health and disease in functional terms and its connection to his teleological characterization of both natural and artificial machines. This also explains Wolff’s use of the normatively loaded concepts of fitness and nature to clarify the distinction between health as good functioning and disease as dysfunction. The conclusion is that Wolff’s mechanist view of living bodies and his realism about biological functions are just one side of the coin; the other is his commitment to a normative view of the human body’s nature and purposes.

In this monograph, Steffen Ducheyne provides a historically detailed and systematically rich explication of Newton’s methodology. Throughout the pages of this book, it will be shown that Newton developed a complex natural-philosophical methodology which encompasses procedures to minimize inductive risk during the process of theory formation and which, thereby, surpasses a standard hypothetico-deductive methodological setting. Accordingly, it will be highlighted that the so-called ‘Newtonian Revolution’ was not restricted to the empirical and theoretical dimensions of science, but applied equally to the methodological dimension of science. Furthermore, it will be documented that Newton’s methodology was far from static and that it developed alongside with his scientific work. Attention will be paid not only to the successes of Newton’s innovative methodology, but equally to its tensions and limitations. Based on a thorough study of Newton’s extant manuscripts, this monograph will address and contextualize, inter alia, Newton’s causal realism, his views on action at a distance and space and time, the status of efficient causation in the Principia, the different phases of his methodology, his treatment of force and the constituents of the physico-mathematical models in the context of Book I of the Principia, the analytic part of the argument for universal gravitation, the meaning and significance of his regulae philosophandi, the methodological differences between his mechanical and optical work, and, finally, the the interplay between Newton’s theology and his natural philosophy.

This paper aims to provide an account of the main themes in David Hume's philosophy, explaining the interplay between his scepticism, empiricism, naturalism, and irreligion, and resolving some apparent tensions that result from simplistic interpretations of these. Hume's main concerns are identified by reference to his biography, and to the development of his thought as manifested in his main works (e.g. his emphasis on causation in Treatise 1.3, and his mitigated scepticism in the first Enquiry). Overall, Hume's theoretical philosophy turns out to have a consistent underlying core, as presented in the "Chief Argument" that forms the backbone of the Abstract and the Enquiry.

In this paper, I present an interpretation of Descartes that deemphasizes his skepticism. I analyze a selection of remarks from Descartes' correspondence in which he makes judgments about the skeptics. I argue that such remarks display Descartes' attitude of contempt for skeptical philosophy. Since Descartes associates the skeptics with the activity of constant and total doubting and yet presents scenarios that seemingly arise from extreme doubt—like the malicious demon hypothesis—I look at what Descartes says in the correspondence about his own use of doubt in his published works. Descartes distances himself from the skeptics because he claims that whereas they doubt everything and, in so doing, act heretically, he uses doubt for a noble purpose. I suggest that although Descartes is influenced by skeptical ideas and considers skeptical argumentation to be useful, his strategic use of such argumentation should not lead us to believe that he condones skepticism. Quite the contrary, most of his remarks on the subject show that Descartes is highly critical or dismissive of skeptical ideas. Therefore, I argue that it is more accurate to characterize Descartes as a philosopher generally opposed to skepticism.

- by Raman Sachdev
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- Skepticism, Descartes, Early Modern Philosophy, Pyrrhonism

If the greatness of a philosophical work can be measured by the volume and vehemence of the public response, there is little question that Rousseau's Social Contract stands out as a masterpiece. Within a week of its publication in 1762 it was banished from France. Soon thereafter, Rousseau fled to Geneva, where he saw the book burned in public. At the same time, many of his contemporaries, such as Kant, considered Rousseau to be “the Newton of the moral world,” as he was the first philosopher to draw attention to the basic dignity of human nature. The Social Contract has never ceased to be read in the 250 years since it was written. Rousseau's “Social Contract”: An Introduction offers a thorough and systematic tour of this notoriously paradoxical and challenging text. David Lay Williams offers readers a chapter-by-chapter reading of the Social Contract, squarely confronting these interpretive obstacles, leaving no stones unturned. The conclusion connects Rousseau's text both to his important influences and those who took inspiration and sometimes exception to his arguments. The book also features a special extended appendix dedicated to outlining his famous conception of the general will, which has been the object of controversy since the Social Contract's publication.

- by David Lay Williams
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- Intellectual History, Law, Jurisprudence, Philosophy
- by Bartlomiej Staniszewski
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- Philosophy Of Religion, Early Modern Philosophy

Intuition can be seen as the primordial and pre-verbal faculty by means of which the mind gains immediate epistemic access to the phenomena. The concept of structural intuition is premised on the basic principle that an infallible... more

- by Babu Thaliath
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- Calculus, Physics, Materials Science, Mechanics
- by Joël Chandelier and +1
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- History, Modern History, Anthropology, Medical Anthropology

A moral obligation is binding upon us insofar as it has obligatory force. But where does obligatory force come from? Within the early modern theistic framework where Malebranche’s ethics is situated, there are two accounts of the source of obligatory force: rationalism and theological voluntarism. For rationalism, an obligation is binding because it is dictated by Reason, whereas for theological voluntarism, an obligation is binding because it is decreed by divine volition. Most commentators are inclined to read Malebranche as a rationalist, but in this paper I argue that Malebranche is a theological voluntarist. In spite of Malebranche’s commitment to God’s role in morality, I demonstrate that the moral arbitrariness of theological voluntarism, as indicated by the Euthyphro Dilemma, motivates Malebranche to constrain divine volition. Moreover, I show that Malebranche’s strategy of constraining divine volition rests upon a division – whereas obligatory force is grounded in divine volition, the content of obligation is grounded in Reason – so divine volition cannot arbitrarily decree what one is obliged to do. To summarize my reading, Malebranche is a theological voluntarist who tries to solve the Euthyphro Dilemma through a division between obligatory force and the content of obligation that ultimately constrains God’s legislative will.

- by Ziqian Zhang
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- Ethics, Normative Ethics, Metaethics, Early Modern Philosophy

Suddenly Don Quijote doubts his squire’s embassy. It would be miraculous for Sancho to have returned in just over three days because El Toboso is more than thirty leagues away, seventy-five miles or one hundred and twenty-five kilometers... more

This paper offers a close reading of texts of Francis Bacon, who stands at the origins of the modern conception of work as a problem to be solved by the advance of science and technology. From his earliest writings on natural philosophy, Bacon engages in a novel interpretation of the Biblical account of the Fall in Genesis. Bacon reads the work in the Garden (Genesis 2.15) to be a form of contemplation, thereby de-emphasizing labor and departing from both the classical view of contemplation and the Christian exegetical tradition on this Biblical passage.
This paper shows how Bacon operates with four implied concepts of work: Sabbath, God’s work of creation, the work of the corrupted and fallen intellect, and the work of the intellect corrected and guided by Bacon’s method. Sabbath is shown to be a state without the necessities of physical labor. Next, natural philosophy to date is explained as having followed the wrong pattern of intellectual work, being the activity of a corrupted mind trying to comprehend a deceptive natural world and seeking a false Sabbath. This view accounts for Bacon’s wholesale rejection of all existing scientific knowledge. Science must instead be modeled on God’s “arch-type” of creation in Genesis 1. The paper shows how Bacon follows this model which is the only hope for restoring us to the Sabbath Adam once enjoyed. The paper closes with a brief examination of Bacon’s vision presented in the New Atlantis, in which physical labor is unnecessary and scientific research into “the knowledge of Causes, and secret motions of things” enjoys a privileged status.

- by Mike Kane
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- Early Modern Philosophy

In this essay, I argue that a proper understanding of the Cartesian proof of the external world sheds light on some vexatious questions concerning his theory of sense perception. Three main points emerge from the discussion: a picture of the mind, conceived as the power of understanding, as essentially related to the physical world; an extension of rationality such that it includes a set of necessities that neither can be deduced from the principles furnished by pure understanding alone nor are to be found among the particular items of sense experience; and a conception of human sense perception as a composite power that includes sensory awareness as well as understanding, and so that establishes a sharp distinction between human and animal sensory awareness. As far as agency is a constitutive ingredient of human sense perception, Descartes’ doctrine is in line with some current versions of a virtue epistemology.