Institutional Design Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

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- Economics, Common Property, Multidisciplinary, Cooperation

This background document discusses transnational regulation in an effort to frame policy options for a formal, global approach for public agencies to regulate the supply of medicines. It also explores how the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) can best facilitate the interests of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and other medicines regulatory agencies on this issue moving forward. The background document follows in three parts. The first part sketches the challenges facing public regulators regarding the diversification of global supply chains, including the consequent proliferation of substandard and counterfeit drugs and the need to leverage resources and build regulatory capacity globally to accomplish mandated domestic public health missions. The second part applies a theoretical framework for tackling these challenges and outlines a typology of policy options. The third part discusses how CFR might organize an initial meeting to discuss the experiences of other sectors in order to help advance discussions already underway by the Heads of Medicine Regulatory Agencies.

- by Joseph M . Ntayi
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- Social Interaction, Uganda, Human Capital, Institutional Design

The article discusses the issue of reform in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) through the lens of the theory of heuristics and biases identified by cognitive psychology and behavioural economics. Reform proposals in ISDS have been heavily pathdependent on past theories and existing institutions in the field of international adjudication. A behavioural theory of international institutions can help design ISDS mechanisms that are better suited to the actual decision-making processes in international adjudication. The article presents various debiasing instruments for the ISDS context, such as 'nudges', which could form part of the institutional design of the new dispute resolution fora together with rational design instruments. Transparency mechanisms, levels of review, training and evaluation, consider-the-opposite strategies and new legal default rules should become embedded in the reformed ISDS, alongside a pluralistic rather than specialized court structure.

- by Jan Corfee-morlot
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- Climate Change, Science Policy, Decision Making, Multidisciplinary
- by Gloria ORIGGI
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- Collective Intelligence, Institutional Design, Point of View, Private Information

Despite their many virtues, democracies suffer from well-known problems with high levels of voter ignorance. Such ignorance, one might think, leads democracies to occasionally produce bad outcomes. Proponents of epistocracy claim that allocating comparatively greater amounts of political power to citizens who possess more politically relevant knowledge may help us to mitigate the bad effects of voter ignorance. An important challenge to epistocracy rejects the claim that we can reliably identify a subset of citizens who possess more politically relevant knowledge than others. Roughly put, such knowledge should involve knowledge of various politically relevant social-scientific facts. But since the social sciences are mired in controversy, it’s not clear what the politically relevant facts are. Accordingly, we cannot definitively say of some citizens that they possess more politically relevant knowledge than others. Call this the Argument from Political Disagreement. In this paper I respond to the Argument from Political Disagreement. First, I argue that it conflates social-scientific knowledge with politically relevant knowledge. Even if there were no uncontroversial social-scientific knowledge, there is much uncontroversial politically relevant knowledge. Second, I establish the importance of such non-social-scientific knowledge for political decision-making. I conclude that this knowledge constitutes the minimal body of knowledge which epistocrats need to make their case.

- by Adam F Gibbons
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- Political Philosophy, Social Sciences, Democratic Theory, Democracy

Mandatory voting has received public and scholarly interest as a solution for problems of unequal representation and policies that advantage the wealthy. Yet some oppose mandatory voting because it seems to coerce political expression, in violation of the human right to free expression. This article fundamentally reinterprets the point of mandatory voting as serving the self-identified purposes of citizens and so minimizes concerns about coercion. It uses survey evidence to show that mandatory voting can help the large majority of American citizens who believe they should vote to do so, thereby functioning as a precommitment mechanism. For the minority who do not think they should vote, mandatory voting functions as a nudge to surveillance which helps citizens protect their interests, whatever they may be, through encouraging surveillance of political actors. The argument concludes that mandatory voting would make all citizens better off by their own lights and without troubling coercion.

- by Kevin Elliott
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- Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Democratic Theory, Political Science

Why were the "founding fathers" of Argentina unable to constitutionally organize the country in the Congresses of 1816-9 and 1824-7? And why did the provinces reject the Constitutions of 1819 and 1826?
Historically, the rejection of such constitutions opened one of the harshest and most convulsed periods of our civil wars. For more than 25 years, our country was plunged into circumstances of deep conflicts that culminated in the 1850s, with the secession of Buenos Aires from the rest of the country, and its subsequent reincorporation through force and armed confrontation.
The conceptual questions are equally or even more challenging: can constitutions be written and agreed upon in situations of deep conflict? And if the constituents are aware of such a circumstance of conflict, why and for what do they write constitutions that will be rejected? These are the central questions that this work tries to answer. Our objective is to investigate the reasons why congressmen elected to write a constitution that works and organizes a country design and propose constitutional schemes that are later not accepted.

- by julio saguir
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- Federalism, Argentina History, Institutional Design, Constitution-making

Despite its relatively long existence (which turned 50 in 2017), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations still faces important challenges, stemming from the unwillingness of member states to transfer part of their sovereignty at the international or supranational level, the lack of an ASEAN identity (both among ASEAN elites and the citizens of ASEAN countries), and the lack of a proper institutional structure, mainly due to the resistance of member states to reinforce the organization, resulting in lack of funds, cadres, and proper legitimacy. This chapter draws on neoliberal institutional theory and constructivist theory, arguing that ASEAN member states do not have sufficient interest in the creation of a more cohesive and developed organization, and the lack of a broadly understood ASEAN identity does not allow for the creation of a community despite declarations to this effect in official ASEAN documents.

- by Marcin Grabowski
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- Asian Studies, International Relations, Southeast Asian Studies, Constructivism

El presente trabajo analiza el proyecto de reforma constitucional que crea el cargo de Fiscal Especial de Alta Complejidad en el Ministerio Público, presentado al Congreso Nacional mediante mensaje presidencial en el mes de septiembre de 2014. Previamente, se entregan elementos de contexto respecto de la gestión de delitos denominados “complejos” y las iniciativas que se han presentado en nuestro
país al respecto. Posteriormente, se presentan algunas opiniones respecto de la importancia de esta reforma, desde el diseño institucional, el derecho constitucional y la política pública de justicia criminal.

- by Leonardo Cofré
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- Constitutional Law, Institutional Design, Ministério Público
- by Tamer Cetin
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- Institutional Change, Transaction Cost Economics, Regulation, New Institutionalism

The much-discussed crisis of political parties poses a challenge to democratic theorists as institutional designers: how can the capacity of parties to mediate between society and state be resuscitated? In this paper, we suggest that parties need to become more internally deliberative, allowing partisans to debate policy and more general visions for the polity. We outline a prescriptive model of deliberative intra-party democracy, drawing on the empirical literature on the changing structure of civic and political engagement. We argue that deliberative reforms are the most appropriate response to the demands of an increasingly more cognitively mobilized citizenry which seeks self-expression and non-hierarchical forms of political engagement. We highlight the model’s distinctive strengths and defend it against several objections.

- by Fabio Wolkenstein
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- Political Parties, Political Theory, Democratic Theory, Political Science

El objetivo de este texto es analizar el concepto de “diseño institucional”, el cual expresa la idea de creación intencional de reglas de comportamiento social. La tesis que se defiende en este trabajo es que el concepto de diseño institucional tiene mayor valor normativo que positivo; es decir que es más útil para orientar procesos que busquen transformar las instituciones que para explicar el origen y el cambio de las mismas. La primera parte del análisis se centra en la definición del proceso de diseño como un proceso de toma de decisiones mediante el cual un diseñador intenta plasmar su intención en un objeto. Para ello, el primer capítulo expone los componentes básicos de la teoría intencional de la acción, el segundo capítulo examina la lógica general de un proceso de toma de decisiones y el tercer capítulo muestra una manera de describir el proceso de diseño en el marco de la teoría de decisiones. La segunda parte del argumento se centra en el análisis de la lógica general del cambio institucional, examinada desde el punto de vista de la nueva economía política. Así, en el cuarto capítulo se diferencian dos tipos de instituciones: aquéllas que operan como reglas formales y las que operan como reglas informales. El quinto capítulo presenta la economía política del cambio institucional en términos de la lógica de la transformación de reglas formales. Para ello, se examinan algunas implicaciones de la teoría de elección social, del análisis espacial de decisiones públicas y de la teoría juegos, en términos del valor positivo del concepto de diseño institucional. El sexto capítulo presenta la economía política del cambio institucional en lo que respecta a la lógica de la transformación de reglas informales. Para ello, se examina la teoría del cambio institucional informal propuesta por el neoinstitucionalismo. La conclusión es que resulta sumamente problemático explicar el cambio institucional, tanto de reglas formales como de reglas informales, en términos de diseño. La tercera parte inicia (capítulo séptimo) preguntándose si existe alguna alternativa distinta al argumento de diseño para explicar el origen y el cambio institucional, y presenta algunas teorías evolucionistas que se han propuesto al respecto. El octavo capítulo ofrece algunas reflexiones generales respecto al valor normativo del concepto de diseño institucional, basadas en la argumentación precedente. (Se reserva un epílogo para presentar algunas consideraciones generales respecto a un concepto institucional de diseño.)

- by Pablo Abitbol
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- Political Economy, Philosophy, Institutional Theory, Institutional Design

Energy systems across the globe are going through a radical transformation as a result of technological and institutional changes, depletion of fossil fuel resources, and climate change. Accordingly, local energy initiatives are emerging and increasing number of the business models are focusing on the end-users. This requires the present centralized energy systems to be re-organized. In this context, Integrated community energy systems (ICESs) are emerging as a modern development to re-organize local energy systems allowing simultaneous integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) and engagement of local communities. With the emergence of ICESs new roles and responsibilities as well as interactions and dynamics are expected in the energy system. Although local energy initiatives such as ICESs are rapidly emerging due to community objectives, such as cost and emission reductions as well as resiliency, assessment and evaluation of the value that these systems can provide to both local communities and the whole energy system are still lacking. The value of ICESs is also impacted by the institutional settings internal and external to the system. With this background, this thesis aims to understand the ways in which ICESs can contribute to enhancing the energy transition.
This thesis utilizes a conceptual framework consisting of institutional and societal levels in order to understand the interaction and dynamics of ICESs implementation. Current energy trends and the associated technological, socio-economic, environmental and institutional issues are reviewed. The developed ICES model performs optimal planning and operation of ICESs and assesses their performance based on economic and environmental metrics. For the considered community size and local conditions, grid-connected ICESs are already beneficial to the alternative of solely being supplied from the grid, both in terms of total energy costs and CO2 emissions, whereas grid-defected systems, although performing very well in terms of CO2 emissions reduction, are still rather expensive. ICESs ensure self-provision of energy and can provide essential system services to the larger energy system. This thesis has demonstrated the added value of ICESs to the individual households, local communities and the society. A comprehensive institutional design considering techno-economic and institutional perspectives is necessary to ensure effective contribution of ICESs in the energy transition.

Frente a problemas de decisión colectiva de cierta complejidad, distintos métodos de votación pueden considerarse igualmente democráticos. Ante esta situación, argumento que es posible investigar cuáles de esos métodos producen mejores resultados epistémicos sobre asuntos fácticos. Comienzo ilustrando la relación entre democracia y métodos de votación con un sencillo ejemplo. Muestro cómo el uso de modelos idealizados permite descubrir algunas propiedades de los métodos de votación; varios de estos descubrimientos muestran que, frente a problemas de cierta complejidad, no hay una respuesta clara acerca de cuál es el resultado de una elección democrática. Frente a esto, sugiero que deberíamos tomar en cuenta un rasgo epistémico instrumental de varios métodos de votación: su capacidad para generar respuestas correctas ante varias situaciones. Esta intuición ofrece lecciones importantes para el diseño de instituciones electorales.

- by Marc Jiménez Rolland
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- Epistemology, Social Choice Theory, Formal Epistemology, Electoral Systems
- by Christopher Ansell
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- Decision Making, Political Science, Institutional Design, Policy making

This thesis conducts a cross-national analysis of perceived electoral fairness across 80 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. The main research question is focused on uncovering the determinants of perceived electoral fairness. The thesis analyses two broad groups of variables, with the chapter structures following from this distinction. The first set of variables arises from a meta-analysis of previous studies to ascertain the strongest determinants of electoral fairness. This entails testing as many individual and national level variables as possible across as many countries as possible to reveal any global trends or regional differences. The second set of variables arise from two theoretical models of electoral management body (EMB) design, both of which focus on evaluating the merits of EMB independence or autonomy from the ruling government. Once again, the approach is to examine as many electoral management design variables as possible across as many regions as possible. Results unexpectedly indicate frequent negative associations between EMB independence and perceived electoral fairness. The thesis considers different possibilities for these unexpected negative results, with the most probable cause being the many independent EMBs in authoritarian democracies included in this study. The thesis uses multivariate ordered probit and multilevel mixed-effects regression models to conduct analyses at the national, regional, and global levels. Public survey data comes from the AfroBarometer, ArabBarometer, AmericasBarometer, AsianBarometer, and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. National level indicators come from the Quality of Government, Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Electoral Knowledge Network, and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

U radu se nudi drugačiji ugao posmatranja na kriterijume uz pomoć kojih se klasifikuju relevantne stranke u postdejtonskoj BiH. Autor problematizuje klasifikaciju stranaka u BiH prema programsko-ideološkom kriterijumu lijevo-desno proizašlog iz klasifikacije stranaka u Zapadnoj Evropi jer su stranke u postdejtonskoj BiH proizašle ih drugačijih socijalnih rascjepa unutar drugačije istorijske epohe. Autor primjenjuje teorijsko-epistemološku paradigmu istorijskog institucionalizma i uporedni metod kako bi identifikovao socijalne rascjepe i kritična raskršća koja su uticala na formiranje stranaka i kako bi se ponudili i obrazložili drugačiji kriterijumi klasifikacije. U tom pogledu, autor tvrdi kako ideološki kontinuum lijevo-desno nailazi na problem primjene na stranke u BiH. Na kraju, autor na bazi dva klasifikacijska kriterijuma predlaže tipologiju stranaka u BiH.
Ključne riječi: Bosna i Hercegovina, ljevica-desnica, etničke i multietničke stranke, klasifikacija, kritična raskršća

- by Stefan Vukojevic
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- Ethnic Studies, Comparative Politics, Social Sciences, Political Parties

Au regard de la récurrence des coups d’Etat sur le continent africain, il est impératif d’opérer un changement de paradigme par rapport à la gestion des transitions politiques qui en découlent. Plutôt que de reconduire les mêmes types de systèmes politiques fondés sur des « hommes forts », cet article propose aux pays africains enclins aux risques de coups d’Etat militaires l’adoption d’un modèle politique alternatif fondé sur le consensus et dénommé consencratie. Les réflexions offertes ici tournent autour de quatre points majeurs. Après une brève analyse rationnelle des défaillances des démocraties d’hommes forts actuellement en vigueur en Afrique, une description des piliers du modèle consencratie est offerte. L’article propose aussi un processus de transition politique pouvant aider à mettre en œuvre, de manière consensuelle, ledit modèle. Enfin, il est offert un bref aperçu des impacts que pourrait produire l’adoption du modèle dans les conditions prescrites. Une projection comparative entre consencratie et les régimes d’hommes forts révèle que sa mise en œuvre améliorerait la qualité de la gouvernance publique, augmenterait le taux de représentation des couches habituellement sous-représentées dans la sphère publique (les femmes et les jeunes en particulier), réduirait considérablement les risques d’instabilité sociopolitique (y compris l’avènement des coups d’Etat), et rendrait l’Etat moins vulnérable aux pressions extérieures.

- by Juste Codjo
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- African Studies, Democratization, Governance, Security Studies
- by Svein Jentoft
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- Human Ecology, Ecosystem management, Institutional Design, Complex System

Una de las bifurcaciones en el debate contemporáneo sobre la legitimidad de la democracia explora si ésta ofrece ventajas distintivamente epistémicas frente a otras alternativas políticas. Quienes defienden la tesis de la democracia epistémica afirman que la democracia es instrumentalmente superior o equiparable a otras formas de organización política en lo que concierne a la obtención de varios bienes epistémicos. En este ensayo presento dos (grupos de) argumentos a favor de la democracia epistémica, que se inspiran en resultados formales: el teorema del jurado de Condorcet [TJC] y el teorema ‘diversidad supera habilidad’ [DSH]. Pese a su gran atractivo, sostengo que estos argumentos son incapaces de respaldar dicha tesis: no brindan razones para considerar que la democracia es epistémicamente superior (o equiparable) a algunas alternativas políticas no democráticas. En su lugar, sugiero que, sin requerir un cambio radical en nuestras formas de organización política, la epistemología democrática –el estudio de las ‘circunstancias epistémicas de la democracia’– puede ofrecer valiosas lecciones sobre cómo optimizar, en nuestra situación, instituciones y procedimientos de toma de decisiones. Para ello, primero distingo entre varias maneras de evaluar procedimientos de toma de decisión colectiva. Argumento que, al considerarlos como formas de organización política, un factor importante en la evaluación de tales procedimientos involucra asuntos fácticos sobre los cuales puede aspirarse a obtener o promover algunos bienes epistémicos. En este contexto, presento algunos de los argumentos más importantes a favor de la democracia epistémica. A continuación, reúno algunas de las objeciones sobre la aplicabilidad de dichos argumentos y ofrezco razones independientes para dudar de que ofrezcan apoyo a la tesis de la democracia epistémica. Finalmente, defiendo que la epistemología democrática puede desempeñar un papel significativo en la legitimación de formas de organización colectiva que podrían denominarse ‘democráticas’.

This article considers an overlooked issue of constitutional design. Some federal systems decentralize law-making and administrative power without allowing subnational governments to adopt their own constitutions that structure or limit subnational power. Other federal systems allow subnational units some discretion in structuring and limiting their powers by adopting subnational constitutions. Although scholars and constitution-makers have developed various theories regarding the utilities of decentralizing law-making and administrative powers, they have not separately considered the utilities or normative justifications for decentralizing constitutional choices. This Article takes up that important but neglected question. The goal is to move towards a systematization and critical analysis of possible justifications for introducing subnational constitutionalism into federal systems. By modeling plausible consequences associated with subnational constitutionalism, the Article aims to assist contemporary constitution makers considering federal arrangements.
The Article first offers a description of subnational constitutionalism that is derived from rational-choice theories of political institutions and a survey of the world’s federal systems. It concludes that subnational constitutionalism is best described as a series of rules (both formal and informal) that protect and define the authority of subnational units within a federal system to exercise some degree of independence in structuring and/or limiting the political power reserved to them by the federation. Building upon that working description, the Article argues that there are at least three coherent justifications for subnational constitutionalism. First, it can deepen a federal system’s ability to accommodate multiple political communities within a single constitutional regime. Second, it can uniquely contribute to federalism’s liberty-protecting, check-and-balances function. Third, the Article argues that scholars have largely overlooked the possibility that subnational constitutionalism can improve the deliberative quality of democracy within subnational units and the federal system as a whole.
The Article concludes with a brief assessment of the contemporary role of state constitutions within the U.S. federal system.

- by Jonathan Marshfield
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- Republicanism, Federalism, Deliberative Democracy, Democracy

This article presents a history of international tax governance and offers a rationalist reconstruction of its institutional trajectory. As an unintended consequence of its institutional setup, the tax regime, which originally only dealt with double tax avoidance, endogenously produces harmful tax competition. Despite this negative effect there are only incremental and partial changes of the regime, which are insufficient to curb tax competition. I argue that this development can be explained by considering the properties – and the sequence in which they come up – of the collective action problems inherent in double tax avoidance and tax competition. First, in double tax avoidance, a coordination game with a distributive conflict, governments did not want to endanger the solution they had institutionalized long before tax competition became virulent. Second, governments are unable to resolve the emergent asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma of tax competition due to conflicts of interest among big and small country governments and successful lobbying of corporate capital. As a result, the institutional trajectory is characterized by the simultaneous occurrence of stability in the core principles and indirect and incremental changes of the rules in the form of rule stretching and layering.

La discusión sobre el futuro y la gobernanza de la ia, que tanta atención atrae en los medios de comunicación, puede estar siendo desviada de los problemas reales que su desarrollo suscita en el momento presente debido al énfasis puesto en la creación de una iag y en las posibilidades más peligrosas que esta creación abriría. Prestamos demasiada atención a los problemas que plantea el transhumanismo y a la posibilidad de que máquinas superinteligentes acaben tomando el control y tendemos a perder de vista lo esencial. Los peligros no están ahí, o al menos no lo estarán por mucho tiempo, sino en cosas mucho más perentorias, como la creciente presión para ceder nuestra privacidad y nuestro poder de decisión, no tanto a las máquinas como a los propietarios de las máquinas. No solo los bancos, las instituciones financieras, las empresas,
los hospitales, los tribunales de justicia, sino incluso los gobiernos nacionales confían cada vez más en las decisiones tomadas por algoritmos. Es necesario un control democrático institucionalmente establecido de la calidad de esos algoritmos y sistemas, así como del impacto de esas decisiones. No se trata de dejar de pensar por completo sobre las posibilidades extremas, sino de darnos cuenta de qué es ahora lo importante. Muchas personas podrían estar dispuestas a renunciar a esa capacidad de control mientras se mantenga el espectáculo de la tecnología a pleno rendimiento, con sus innumerables distracciones y satisfacciones a corto plazo, pero lo reconozcan o no, solo si mantenemos la gobernanza de la tecnología tendremos alguna posibilidad de prevenir el cumplimiento de las distopías anunciadas. Por tanto, esto es algo que debe incorporarse en la agenda de todos los partidos políticos.

- by Fernando Contreras
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- Political Philosophy, Technology, Social Media, Institutional Design
- by Hans-jörg Trenz
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- European integration, Political Science, Social Capital, Political communication

This paper, which is borne out of the need to address scarcity of evidence-based studies on barangay financing, analyzes and evaluates key issues on financing of devolved functions at the barangay level, with particular focus on fund utilization and program allocation, and proposes some policy options addressing the issues. Its key findings include : (i) there is a mismatch between financial capabilities and devolved functions owing to limited funds being spent mostly on personal services, with little money left to finance these functions; (ii) different priorities of barangays mean different utilization of their Barangay Development Fund (BDF), with some of them failing to spend on important basic services such as education and health, as well as on economic development sector; (iii) like other barangays, those in the study areas in Agusan del Sur and Dumaguete City are found to be highly IRA- dependent, with IRA comprising 85 to 97 percent of total income; (iv) barangays are not a...

- by Allan Layug
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- Economics, Local Development, Economic Development, Institutional Design

Proponents of epistocracy worry that high levels of voter ignorance can harm democracies. To combat such ignorance, they recommend allocating comparatively more political power to more politically knowledgeable citizens. In response, some recent critics of epistocracy contend that epistocratic institutions risk causing even more harm, since much evidence from political psychology indicates that more politically knowledgeable citizens are typically more biased, less open-minded, and more prone to motivated reasoning about political matters than their less knowledgeable counterparts. If so, perhaps epistocratic institutions will perform worse epistemically than corresponding democratic institutions. Call this 'the problem of epistocratic irrationality'. This paper argues that the problem of epistocratic irrationality can be overcome. First, I argue that critics of epistocracy have overlooked several complications regarding the psychological data they claim shows that more knowledgeable citizens are less politically rational. Second, I argue that appropriately designed epistocratic institutions could overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality even if such critics have interpreted the data correctly. I first explore whether refined selection mechanisms could allow epistocrats to avoid empowering less rational citizens, before assessing the prospects of implementing only those epistocratic institutions with a solid track record of reliable performance.

- by Adam F Gibbons
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- Political Philosophy, Political Psychology, Democracy, Institutional Design

Water institutions in India play a crucial role in managing scarce water resources and are central to economic development and poverty alleviation. Designing appropriate institutional mechanisms to allocate scarce water and river flows has been an enormous challenge due to the complex legal, constitutional, and social issues involved. The Indian water sector has been grappling with poor performance and deterioration of public (canal and tank) irrigation systems, high extraction levels of groundwater, and related economic and environmental problems. The objective of this article is to carry out a preliminary assessment of institutional mechanisms available to manage water resources in India. The article surveys various formal and informal institutional arrangements that are used at present and their design features in order to identify those institutions related to superior performance. The analysis indicates that crafting “winning institutions” and the policy frameworks to strengthen them should take into account not only the proven criteria of institutional design but also the changing socioeconomic, political, and cultural factors.

- by Jayanath Ananda
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- Policy, Economic Development, Institutional Design, Poverty Alleviation
- by Krzysztof Jasiewicz
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- Political Science, Institutional Design, Case Study, Post-Communist Studies
- by Gregory Sidak
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- Telecommunications, Regulation, Competition, Institutional Design
- by Wilfried Swenden and +1
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- Political Science, West European Politics, Institutional Design, Comparative Manifesto Project
- by Jordi Tena-Sánchez
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- Basic Income, Liberal Egalitarianism, Motivation, Institutional Design

Comparative scholars have disagreed for some time now as to whether democratic institutions in a divided society are more likely to remain stable if those institutions are premised on a concern for inclusion or on a concern for moderation. But since the empirical evidence marshalled by such scholars is often open to interpretative dispute, neither side has been able to prove its case conclusively. In order to help move this stability debate forward, this article demonstrates how inclusion and moderation can be recast as co-requirements of an underlying principle of political equality. To this end, it offers a deliberative democratic account of political equality, expressed in terms of requirements of publicity and reciprocity, that enables us to see how inclusion and moderation might be reconciled. Moreover, it shows how this deliberative reconciliation may itself provide for a more effective form of institutional stability than can be achieved under either of the two main contending comparative approaches.

- by Ian O'Flynn
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- Deliberative Democracy, Institutional Design, Divided Societies
- by Éric Sévigny
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- Political Philosophy, Epistemology, Institutional Theory, Institutional Design

- by Adam F Gibbons
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- Law, Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Applied Ethics
- by Natália Sátyro
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- Political Participation, Social Protection, Institutional Design, Labor Supply

After twenty years the third-wave of democratization took place in Africa, democratic regressions have proven a common outcome. Causes are well rooted in the key actors’ attitudes towards the rules of the elec- toral competition. Stabilization of power reflects the institutionalization of authority, which increases to the extent that political elites are able to ensure legitimacy through their conducts. Prior experiences and pro- fessional paths are thus crucial, since their heritage contributes to model preferences of present political actors. Ghana and Benin were both suc- cessful in establishing working multiparty institutions across the 1990s. On the basis of an analysis of political personnel, I argue these countries were capable to install a viable multiparty competition by virtue of the ‘institutionally-oriented’ strategies that political elites deployed across the transition. The return of ‘certain’ former politicians, and political parties, shaped the politics reducing the uncertainty of competition, factor that has reinforced the institutionalization of power.

For the Good of Mankind : On Futurology and Comparative Systems

- by Jamal Al-Homsi
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- Future Studies, Institutional Economics, Epistemology, Political Theory
- by Kari Takala
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- Institutional Design, Cost effectiveness, Payment System, Costs and Benefits