Legal Personality Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Results of the Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act

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- Business, Marketing, Business Administration, Business Ethics

U radu autor analizira pravnu prirodu i međunarodnopravni status Bosne i Hercego-vine kao specifične složene države (državne zajednice) kroz prizmu položaja i uloge među-narodnih institucija i organizacija u njoj. U tom smislu, akcenat je stavljen na period posli-je potpisivanja Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma, sa osvrtom na najznačajnije pojedinosti od 1991. do 1995. godine. Dejtonski ustav (Aneks IV) sa svim kontroverznim izmjenama i pre-nosom nadležnosti, asimetrično unutrašnje uređenje Bosne i Hercegovine, te specifičnosti u funkcionisanju državne organizacije analizirani su u ovom radu. Takođe, međunarodne in-stitucije, na prvom mjestu Kancelarija Visokog predstavnika, ali i međunarodni (politički) voluntarizam pojedinih država neposredno ograničavaju međunarodni subjektivitet Bosne i Hercegovine u međunarodnom pravu čemu je autor posvetio posebnu pažnju u ovom radu. Ključne riječi: Bosna i Hercegovina, ustav, međunarodne institucije, visoki predstav-nik, međunarodnopravni subjektivitet

- by Matej Savić
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- International Relations, International Law, Legal Theory, Public International Law

Can nature or natural objects hold rights or be legal persons? Accounts arguing for the legal personhood of natural objects often rely on what is termed the Anything-Goes Approach: more or less any entity can be a legal person, if the legislator or some other appropriate legal actor declares the entity a legal person. The article scrutinizes two arguments that are used to justify the Anything-Goes Approach. According to the Deference Argument, it is up to the legal authorities to determine which entities can be legal persons. Therefore, more or less anything can be a legal person. According to the Corporate Argument, if the law can treat entities like corporations as legal persons, then surely it can treat virtually any entity as a legal person. The article argues that neither of these arguments work, and that natural objects in fact likely cannot be legal persons. Instead, legal arrangements purporting to extend legal personhood to natural objects should be analyzed, for instance, as foundations with collective beneficiaries.

- by Visa Kurki
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- Environmental Ethics, Legal Personality, The Rights of Nature
- by Marvin Rowe
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- Critical Theory, Business, Business Administration, Business Ethics

The Article analyzes the notion of legal " thinghood " in the context of the person–thing bifurcation. In legal scholarship, there are numerous assumptions pertaining to this definition that are often not spelled out. In addition, one's chosen definition of " thing " is often simply taken to be the correct one. The Article scrutinizes these assumptions and definitions. First, a brief history of the bifurcation is offered. Second, three possible definitions of " legal thing " are examined: Things as nonpersons, things as rights and duties, and things as property. The first two definitions are rejected as not being very interesting or serving any heuristic function. Conversely, understanding legal things as property is meaningful, useful, and helps to understand what it means to say that animals are legally things. Defining things as property has certain rather important implications, which are analyzed at the end of the Article. For instance, not everything needs to be either a person or a thing: The historical institution of outlawry involved treating individuals neither as legal persons nor as legal things. One must conclude that the person–thing bifurcation is less fundamental than is often assumed.

- by Visa Kurki
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- Property Law, Legal Theory, Slavery, Philosophy Of Law
- by Fabio Raimondi
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- Private law, Legal Personality, Conceptual History, Diritto Privato
- by Wolfgang M. Schröder
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- Robotics, Ethics, Philosophy of Science, Legal Ethics

This paper seeks to investigate the proposal to create a legal (electronic) personhood for robots with artificial intelligence based on the European Parliament resolution with recommendations on Civil Law and Robotics. To this end, we highlight the various risks and problems present in this type of initiative, especially in view of the current trend of expanding legal subjectivity in various jurisdictions. In addition to an anthropomorphic rhetoric, we can observe the prevalence of a pragmatic line that seeks to be guided, mainly, by the model of corporations, without taking into account, however, problems present in the process of embodiment of companies and the particular function of the term legal person in the grammar of Law.

- by Sergio Avila Negri
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- Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, Private law, Legal Personality
- by Bagas Bimo Seto and +1
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- Legal Personality

Resumo O presente trabalho procura investigar a proposta de criação da personalidade jurídica (eletrônica) para robôs com inteligência artificial a partir da resolução do parlamento europeu com orientações de Direito Civil sobre Robótica. Destacam-se, para tanto, os vários riscos e problemas presentes nesse tipo de iniciativa, tendo em vista, principalmente, a tendência atual de ampliação da subjetividade jurídica em vários ordenamentos. Além da retórica antropomórfica, nota-se a prevalência de uma linha pragmática que procura se pautar, principalmente, no modelo da sociedade limitada personificada, sem levar em conta, contudo, problemas presentes no processo de personificação das sociedades e a própria função do termo pessoa jurídica na gramática do Direito. Palavras chave: Personalidade jurídica. Robótica. Inteligência Artificial.

- by Sergio Avila Negri
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- Artificial Intelligence, Legal Personality, Direito Civil, Direito Digital

Cette étude propose d’analyser deux notions, l’une (le patrimoine) subordonnée à l’autre (la personnalité juridique), à travers le même laboratoire d’analyse (l’absence) pour aboutir à une conclusion sur le droit de l’absence en général... more

- by Kouroch Bellis
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- Law, Legal Personality, Civil Code, Patrimoine

The article is devoted to clarification of the notion of legal entity (or legal person), as well as exploring its compulsory and dispositive characteristics. The definition of legal en- tity is also provided since among legal scholars in Latvia there a wide discussion still exists about the very notion of the legal entity. Author argues that a legal entity is a specific legal institute existing over and above private and public law, as well as that in private law legal entity has the same full legal capacity as any other person.

Legal metamorphoses between persons/things have been recurrent in history: Persons can become things, animals can turn into persons, and even ghosts can obtain personhood in the legal domain. Law would work then as a form of magic, a powerful instrument to create realities that, although fictional, have very real effects. Drawing on anthropology and legal scholarship, I will show the links between law and magic. In this endeavor, I examine two groups of legal cases from Argentina where people and animals respectively obtained personhood through the magic of law. First, I analyze the so-called human rights trials that are judging the crimes of the last military dictatorship (1976–1983), and I argue that these are working to restore the legal personhood of those who enforcedly disappeared. Second, I examine a series of judgments that have recently ruled—for the first time in modern legal history—that orangutans, chimps, and elephants are " non-human persons. " I conclude this Paper by contrasting legal magic with shamanic practices. I argue that even if these two are linked, it is possible to find in some forms of shamanism a different way of framing the relationship between persons/things that can offer an alternative (to) law. * PhD Candidate and Graduate Teaching Assistant, School of Law, Birkbeck, University of London (a.alvareznakagawa@bbk.ac.uk). A previous and shorter version of this Paper was read in the " Persons/Things " Workshop held at the University of Turku, Faculty of Law, Finland, on May 12–13, 2016. I deeply thank the organizers of this event, Toni Selkälä and Mikko Rajavuori, for the invitation to present my work, and to all the participants for the invaluable comments and discussions. As editors of this volume, Toni and Mikko have made very important suggestions to improve this Paper, either indicating sources to explore, things that went unnoticed to the author, or offering incredible ideas to continue exploring. I would like to think that I have reciprocated their intellectual generosity by presenting a work that is now less imperfect than what it was before.

- by Alexis Alvarez-Nakagawa
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- Legal Anthropology, Critical Legal Theory, Legal Theory, Magic

19/08/2016 tarihli ve 6741 sayılı Türkiye Varlık Fonu Yönetimi Anonim Şirketinin Kurulması ile Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun, 26/08/2016 tarihinde 29813 sayılı Resmî Gazete’de yayımlanarak yürürlüğe girmiştir. Söz konusu Kanun’un yürürlüğe girmesi ile Türkiye Varlık Fonu Yönetimi Anonim Şirketi kurulmuştur. Ancak Türkiye Varlık Fonu Yönetimi Anonim Şirketinin kurucu kanunu olan 6741 sayılı Kanun’da Şirketin tüzel kişiliğinin özel hukuk tüzel kişiliği mi yoksa kamu tüzel kişiliği mi olduğuna dair bir hükme yer verilmemiştir. Anonim şirket statüsünde kurulan ve öğretide tüzel kişiliğinin türü konusunda farklı görüşler ileri sürülen bu Şirketin sahip olduğu tüzel kişiliğin bir kamu tüzel kişiliği olup olmadığının tespit edilmesi, kamu tüzel kişisi olmaya bağlanan sonuçlar bakımından
önem arz etmektedir. Bu sebeple çalışmada, öğretideki görüşler ile içtihatlar dikkate alınarak Türkiye Varlık Fonu Yönetimi Anonim Şirketinin hukuki statüsü ele alınmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra, yine 6741 sayılı Kanun’a dayanılarak Türkiye Varlık Fonu Yönetimi Anonim Şirketi tarafından kurulan Türkiye Varlık Fonu ve buna bağlı alt fonların hukuki statüleri de değerlendirilmiştir.

- by Özge Ceren YAVUZ KILIÇ
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- Law, Law and Economics, Legal Personality, Administrative Law

This essay takes as its starting point a recent judgment by the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, which denied habeas corpus from the chimpanzee Tommy. The conclusion of the judgment is not challenged, but rather its underlying premise: that legal personhood could be straightforwardly equated with right-holding and/or duty-bearing. The Tommy case was not about granting the first legal right to the chimpanzee, because it already holds numerous rights. Neither can it be claimed that legal personhood concerns the capacity to be a party in legal relations, as nonpersons participate in Hohfeldian legal relations, too. The essay argues that legal personhood should rather be understood as being encompassed in the specific legal institutions that distinguish legal persons from nonpersons.

- by Visa Kurki
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- Jurisprudence, Analytic Philosophy, Personhood, Animal Law

This chapter examines the relationship between Law and Life and the making of the juridical person through the exemplary case of the Court of Miracles. The inhabitants of this seventeenth-century courtyard, a spatial amalgam, or 'immense dressing room' as Victor Hugo described it, could not be said to form a "people"; rather, the inhabitants resembled a multitude, with their own laws, system of knowledge, temporality, language and jargon, in short, a mode of life. In the violent process of 'including' the inhabitants of the Court into the juridical composition of the nation state, the specificity, and singularity of their way of being and living was destroyed, and the miraculous expelled from the city, from sociality. For the language of power could not tolerate the vice of acedia nor the life of pleasure and play, both sinful and irrelevant to use-value and production. I argue that the Court presents a paradigmatic case of the tension between the particular and the universal, with the universal being only one form of the particular that has been generalised. This critique of the generalising tendency of law leaves open a different idea of universality. One understood instead as allowing for the potential for modality, of a manner or style of being, a quality that humanity shares in common, to take place.

- by Serene Richards
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- Jargon, Legal Theory, Law and Literature, Giorgio Agamben

RESUMO: O presente trabalho, a partir de uma nova perspectiva de repersonalização do Direito Privado, procura analisar a assimetria de razões que separam os processos de personificação do ser humano e das pessoas jurídicas. Será demonstrado que os conceitos de personalidade e capacidade de direito são aplicados indistintamente à pessoa natural e à pessoa jurídica. Assim, o trabalho endereça uma crítica a esse modelo de análise, na medida em que as razões que determinaram a personificação do ser humano são negligenciadas, como se fosse possível equipará-las aos motivos presentes na atribuição de personalidade jurídica às sociedades, associações e fundações. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Pessoa jurídica; personalidade; subjetividade; imputação. SUMÁRIO: 1. Introdução;-2. Razões da personificação, relações normativas e condições de uso;-3. A personalidade como valor: do sujeito (filtro) à pessoa (valor);-4. As razões da pessoa jurídica;-5. A expropriação da subjetividade e o discurso dos direitos da personalidade da pessoa jurídica;-6. Conclusão;-7. Referências
ENGLISH TITLE: The reasons of legal entity and the subjectivity expropriation
ABSTRACT: This paper, from a new perspective, of Private Law repersonalization, seeks to analyze the asymmetry of reasons that separate the personification processes of human being and legal entities. It will be argued that the concepts of personality and legal capacity are indistinctly applied to human beings and legal entity. Therefore, the paper addresses a criticism to this analysis model, to the extent that the reasons underlying the personification of the human being are neglected, as if it were possible to equate them to the reasons present in the attribution of legal personality to corporations, associations and foundations.

In this paper, the author deals with current theoretical issues of international legal personality. Special attention is paid to the growing conflict between the factual and normative dimensions of general legal capacity of subjects of international law. Contemporary trends and respective theoretical concepts are analyzed, especially regarding actual processes and challenges that are imposed in the definition of legal personality in international law.

- by Matej Savić
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- Jurisprudence, International Relations, International Studies, International Law
- by Natasha Wheatley
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- European History, International Relations, International Law, Human Rights

Abstract: Nel diritto civile la piena personalità giuridica, per alcuni sistemi di Intelligenza Artificiale, rappresenta una conditio sine qua non? Utilizzando una metodologia imperniata sul dialogo tra Diritto e Tecnica, questo elaborato mira anzitutto ad evidenziare e riconfermare alcuni profili problematici, non solo giuridici, che affliggono la tematica. In secondo luogo, l’intento è di contribuire ad un corretto inquadramento della stessa e rispondere alla duplice questione che si nasconde nella domanda iniziale.

- by Alessandro Drigo
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- Private law, Legal Personality, Artificial Intelligence and Law, Diritto Privato

When should Legal Personhood begin?

- by Charles Tay
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- Law, Philosophy Of Law, Legal Personality, Legal Personhood

A critic approach of the concept of "subject" of international law

In 1977, Professor Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, defined for the first time the idea of Islamic University. The Islamic University, instead of reflecting the state, reflects the perfect man. This idea of an Islamic University is his solution to the most profound problem facing the Muslim Community, what he termed as the problem of knowledge, which he defines as not simply a problem of ignorance but the confusion and error in knowledge that stems from the loss of adab.
The Islamic University as a reflection of the perfect man (al-Insān al-Kamīl) provides us with profound insight into the nature of organisations in Is- lam in general. Modern organisations are largely manifested in the form of corporations, or legal persons, whose legality and existence is derived from the nation-state. It is known that legal persons do not reflect any concrete body. They are set afloat to roam free to take any form limited only by the nation-stateʼs legal structure that forms the basis of their laws and subject to change. By highlighting the person as man, not just any man but the perfect man, whose ultimate source of emulation being the Prophet himself peace be upon him, serves not only as the real ethical grounding of such organisa- tions, but also its ontological underpinning.
This study incorporates also al-Attas’s thought on the concept of man (in- sān), knowledge (‘ilm), education (ta’dib) and Islamic University; and the em- pirical testimonial of his refined contribution of the institutional building, from the IBKKM until the establishment of ISTAC. His thoughts serve as an insight into what Islamic University is and what it could be, which is a rec- onciliation between the intellectual-spiritual framework and the concept of legal person.

Монографію присвячено дослідженню природи корпорації як окремої моделі юридичної особи, для якої характерним є стан відносин між нею та її учасниками, що полягає в концентрації приватного інтересу її бенефіціарів навколо мети діяльності. Проведено сучасний аналіз теорій юридичної особи, за результатами якого наголошено на втраті значення теорії Personificationstheorie.
Досліджено структуру корпоративних юридичних відносин, встановлено підстави їх виникнення. Доведена цивільно-правова інституціональність корпоративних відносин. Визначена поліваріативність їх змісту, яка складається з комбінації організаційних, майнових і особистих немайнових сегментів.
Розкрито міждисциплінарний аспект проблеми корпоративного управління юридичною особою. Через аналіз бінарного та монотипового підходів розкрита морфологія моделі управління корпорації, встановлена їх варіативність.
Окрему увагу приділено субстандартним механізмам захисту корпоративних юридичних відносин, зокрема прав учасників в умовах облігаторної консолідації корпоративного контролю.
Видання адресовано науковим та науково-педагогічним працівникам, аспірантам, студентам закладів вищої освіти, іншим суб’єктам правореалізації та всім, хто цікавиться актуальними проблемами корпоративного права

Riassunto
Nel presente articolo l’autore pone l’accento sullo stretto legame che intercorre tra il diritto e la cultura. Il mondo del diritto allo stesso tempo trova spunti di riflessione nella tradizione e diventa manifestazione della cultura. In materia di diritto ambientale questa connessione trova il proprio apice nei diritti bioculturali e nei diritti delle entità naturali non umane. Nei nuovi sistemi di protezione ambientale poggiati sulle solide basi della cultura, l’autore indaga anche il nuovo ruolo dell’essere umano. Lo scopo del presente lavoro consiste nel dimostrare come, partendo dalla cultura, si possa giungere all’innovazione giuridica. L’esempio offerto dai nuovi sistemi di protezione ambientale, che si pongono come soluzioni alle problematiche ambientali, muove la riflessione dell’autore nell’intero lavoro ed egli giunge alla conclusione che l’ordinamento giuridico possa trovare soluzioni utili per risolvere i problemi del presente traendo ispirazione dal sapere antico e dalla cultura dei popoli che compongono i Paesi.
Abstract
In this article, the author emphasizes the close link between law and culture. The world of law at the same time finds food for thought in tradition and becomes a manifestation of culture. In the field of environmental law, that connection finds its apex in the biocultural rights and in the rights of non-human natural entities. In the new environmental protection systems based on the solid foundations of culture, the author also investigates the new role of the human being. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate how, starting from culture, legal innovation can be achieved. The example offered by the new environmental protection systems, which act as solutions to environmental problems, moves the author’s reflection throughout the work and he comes to the conclusion that the legal system can find useful solutions to solve the problems of the present, drawing inspiration from ancient knowledge and from the culture of the peoples that make up the Countries.
Resumen
En este artículo, el autor enfatiza el estrecho vínculo entre el derecho y la cultura. Al mismo tiempo, el mundo del derecho encuentra alimento para el pensamiento en la tradición y se convierte en una manifestación de la cultura. Con respecto al derecho ambiental, esta conexión encuentra su ápice en los derechos bioculturales y en los derechos de las entidades naturales no humanas. En los nuevos sistemas de protección ambiental basados en los sólidos cimientos de la cultura, el autor también investiga el nuevo papel del ser humano. El propósito de este trabajo es demostrar cómo, a partir de la cultura, se puede lograr la innovación legal. El ejemplo ofrecido por los nuevos sistemas de protección ambiental, que actúan como soluciones a los problemas ambientales, mueve la reflexión del autor a lo largo del trabajo y él llega a la conclusión de que el sistema legal puede encontrar soluciones útiles para resolver los problemas del presente, inspirándose en el conocimiento antiguo y en la cultura de los pueblos que componen los Países.

- by Livio Perra
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- Environmental Law, Cultural Heritage, Culture, Legal Personality

Systems based on artificial intelligence techniques are more and more important for the modern information society. Uses of artificial intelligence may violate rights of their users or of third parties, but the application of civil liability rules is complicated by the complexity of the relevant technical objects. Based on an analysis of the processes involved in the creation and use of artificial intelligences, this article (in Portuguese) discusses the possible sources within the Brazilian legal system of non-contractual liability issues involving intelligent systems, and the contemporary scholarly debates over legal institutes proposed for dealing with the opacity of artificial intelligence.

- by Marco Almada
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- Artificial Intelligence, Legal Personality, Civil liability
- by Alexandre Lillo
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- Legal Theory, Environmental Ethics, Legal Ethics, Legal Personality

Dans ce mémoire, nous nous proposons d’abord de rappeler que, si le projet de loi devait être adopté, les animaux seraient toujours soumis au régime de propriété du droit civil québécois, ce qui nuit considérablement à l’évaluation équitable de ce qui constitue une exploitation jugée nécessaire des animaux et permet de justifier que nous leur imposions des douleurs aiguës pour le moindre de nos caprices. Ensuite, nous souhaitons présenter brièvement les arguments en vertu desquels les animaux qui sont sensibles devraient être considérés comme des personnes à part entière dans notre système juridique. Nous rappellerons que nos principes de justice les plus élémentaires exigent que soit évitée toute discrimination arbitraire ; qu’il semble arbitraire d’accorder la personnalité juridique à tous les êtres humains mais à aucun autre animal ; et que rien ne s’oppose théoriquement à ce que les animaux soient des sujets de droit. Nous terminerons notre court mémoire en exposant plus concrètement les risques que l’adoption de ce projet de loi nous ferait encourir ainsi qu’en évoquant quelques suggestions politiques et juridiques paraissant davantage opportunes.

- by Frédéric Côté-Boudreau and +1
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- Animal Welfare, Animal Law, Animal Rights/Liberation, Legal Personality

This article focuses on domestic slavery, kinship, and the early modern market in 17 th-century Ottoman Istanbul. By drawing on the notarial registers (sicils) kept by the legal courts of Istanbul as well as on jurisprudential (fiqh) works, this article dismantles the interplay amongst notions of freedom, kinship, and the economic value not only of slave bodies but also of their labour, which could be detachable from the body as an object of commercial contract. While grappling with these questions, the article also unravels the fictional capacity of Islamic jurisprudence in fabricating kinship ties between the master and the slave. Hence, this article aims at exploring the servile component of the market and the social in 17 th-century Istanbul.

Why, if at all, does it make sense to assign some responsibilities to states rather than to individuals? There are two contemporary answers. According to the analogical theory, states can be held responsible because they are moral agents, much like human beings. According to the functional theory, states can be held responsible because they are legal persons that act vicariously though individuals, much like principals who act through agents. The two theories of state responsibility belong to parallel traditions of scholarship that have never been clearly distinguished. While the analogical theory dominates IR, political theory, and philosophy, the functional theory prevails in International Law. The purpose of this article is to bridge the gulf between ethical and legal approaches to state responsibility. I argue that IR scholars and political theorists have much to gain from the functional theory. First, it provides a plausible alternative to the analogical theory that avoids common objections to corporate moral agency. Second, the functional theory helps us to understand features of international law that have puzzled IR scholars and political theorists, such as the fact that states are not held criminally responsible. I suggest that states can be 'moral principals' instead of 'moral agents'.

- by Deirdre Barrett
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- Neuroscience, Psychology, Abnormal Psychology, Applied Psychology

Legal personality of natural person, i.e. the legal capacity to
have rights and assume obligations, was deduced from combination of several indicias, whereas the absence of any of them caused the loss of legal personality. Position of an individual in
the hierarchy of the period society, being major, good state of credit and, in some cases, also sex, belonged to these indicias.

- by Vilém Knoll
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- Civil Law, Medieval History, Legal Personality, History of Law
- by Марта Мурська
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- International Law, Legal Personality

This article investigates the relationship between legal personality for nature and Indigenous philosophies by comparing two cases: the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008 and the 2014 Te Urewera Act of Aotearoa, New Zealand. Through these case studies the article considers the nature of Indigenous relations with the concept of rights of nature, arguing that this relation is primarily strategic, not genealogical. The article engages with the concept of legal personality and shows that it is not a direct translation of Indigenous conceptions, but rather a potential straitjacket for Indigenous emancipatory politics. The radical character of Indigenous ontologies is not fully reflected in the concept of legal personality. Furthermore, the way in which rights are granted to the natural environment is an important part of the effect that such rights might have on Indigenous communities. Despite some affinities between rights of the environment and Indigenous philosophies, overstating the connection might constrain the radical political and legal implications of Indigenous thought.

- by mihnea tanasescu
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- Legal Pluralism, Legal Personality, The Rights of Nature, Rights of Nature

Although legal personality has slowly begun to be granted to non-human entities that have a direct impact on the natural functioning of human societies (given their cultural significance), the same cannot be said for computer-based intelligence systems. While this notion has not had a significantly negative impact on humanity to this point in time, that only remains the case because advanced computerised intelligence systems (ACIS) have not been acknowledged as reaching human-like levels. With the integration of ACIS in medical assistive technologies such as companion robots and bionics, our legal treatment of ACIS must also adapt-least society faces legal challenges that may potentially lead to legally sanctioned discriminatory treatment. For this reason, this article exposes the complexity of normalizing definitions of "natural" human subjects, clarifies how current bioethical discourse has been unable to effectively guide ACIS integration into implanted and external artefacts, and argues for the establishment of legal delineations between various ACIS-human mergers in reference to legal protections and obligations internationally.

- by Tyler L Jaynes
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- Artificial Intelligence, Bioethics, Human Rights, Biotechnology

Процесс концентрации и централизации капитала, обусловленный переходом от натурального хозяйства к товарному привел к изменению экономического представление о юридическом лице, совершенствования правовой составляющей этой конструкции. Бесспорно, что с помощью теории фикции Ф. К. Савиньи раскрывается основная концептуальная идея обоснования природы юридического лица через концентрацию имущества и денежных средств в руках автономного субъекта права, ограничения гражданско-правовой ответственности физического лица за результаты деятельности такого субъекта, обеспечило быстрое развитие этой правовой конструкции. Однако, сегодня мы наблюдаем потребность в положительной деформации этого концепта. Через собственные особые черты, которые раскрываются в признаках самостоятельной юридической ответственности и автономной участия в гражданском обороте юридическое лицо становится средством неправомерных действий в гражданском обороте связанных с ней физических лиц. Компенсаторностю этого обстоятельства выступает расширение границ юридической ответственности физических лиц за результаты деятельности юридического лица, а также фрагментарное сужение автономии ее участия в гражданском обороте, в частности в части защиты своих субъективных гражданских прав. Итак, определяя современный взгляд на природу юридического лица мы синтезируем положения теории фикции Ф. К. Савиньи и положения о сущности человеческого субстрата в жизни юридического лица, которые развернуты в теории интереса Р. Иерингу в единую интегративную теорию.

Testamentary burden enables the testator to realize objectives impossible to realize with help of traditional testamentary dispositions as appointment of heir or legacy. Depiction the essence of the testamentary burden is impossible without reference to Roman law. In systematic exposition of the Roman law testamentary burden (modus) is mostly presented commonly with condition and term, as the so called additional dispositions of legal acts (accidentalia negotii). In historical development of Roman law modus was however taken over by legacy. Enforceability of testamentary burden is highly controversial in Polish legal writing and judicature. However any doubts it this matter are ungrounded. Statements denying enforceability of testamentary burden can be simply evaluated as being contra legem. After all, art. 985 Polish Civil Code allows for particular persons to demand the performance of a burden. Enforceability of testamentary burden is thus element of its nature as legal institution.
Keywords: testamentary burden; enforceability of testamentary burden.

- by Grzegorz Gorczyński
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- Legal Personality, Law of succession, Hardship Clause