United States Army Research Papers (original) (raw)

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- Military History, Professional Writing, Academic Writing, United States Army
- by Amina Al Sherif
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- Military Science, Tactics (Military Science), Creative thinking, War on Terror
- by John Antonakis
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- Intelligence, Leadership, United States Army

In 1870, a band of Blackfoot Indians called the Piegan Indians was massacred by the United States Army as a literal form of punishment against violence and agression of the Indians in Montana. The Army had targeted Chief Mountain Chief's band of Piegan's for this punishment, but instead massacred the peaceful band lead by Chief Heavy Runner. Around 173 Blackfeet Indians were killed on January 23, 1870 near the Marias river in Montana, including 53 women and children, while another 140 women and children were left without supplies in the -43 degree January weather.

- by Curtis Mullins
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- Native American Studies, Historiography, 19th Century (History), Montana History

The Continental Army entrusted many of its junior officers with a great degree of responsibility and autonomy. Captain Henry Lee’s role in commanding a vital foraging operation in Delaware and Maryland for the Main Army at Valley Forge in February and March 1778 sheds light on the role of a company-grade officer within the broader framework of petite guerre. Lee demonstrated his ability at planning and executing autonomous operations and proved himself a capable, thoughtful, and energetic officer in an important, but overlooked expedition that reveals something of the important operational middle ground occupied by American company-grade light officers.

- by Ricardo A Herrera
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- Military History, Iraqi History, Counterinsurgency, Iraq War

This author wrote his doctorate thesis on post-conflict army reconstruction, submitting it in 2011. Continued research on the subject in the intervening seven years indicates that his theoretical propositions can be refined and improved. This article examines refinements to the model, and then applies those refinements in detail to the Afghan case. In so doing, it shifts the focus from potentially altruistic state-building to a case that was driven by pure national-strategic interests. Issues surrounding the liberal peace ideology dominate recent army reconstruction in conflict-affected states. The liberal peace underpinning is of supreme importance, so much so that in many discussions, it is internalised and accepted virtually without thought. This paper will advance the body of knowledge by establishing, for the first time, a theoretical basis for the widespread failure of army reconstruction in Afghanistan. The empirical basis builds on extensive previous research by other scholars. The resulting model can also be applied to better explain outcomes in other similar cases.

The character of armed conflict continues to change at an alarming rate due to extremist ideologies, the reassertion of global hegemons, climate change, cyber conflict, infectious disease, and technological advances. This provides compelling justification that traditional leadership models used to prepare military organizations to succeed in armed conflict are becoming less useful. Given the hierarchical structure of military organizations and the complex environment described above leaders must now be able to generate teams that can thrive in the chaos and ambiguity associated with war. Teams must provide the innovative and creative solutions formerly left to the individual leader. This monograph explores how the theory of complexity leadership offers a compromise that bridges the gap between the stability commonly associated with the traditional top-down, centralized military structure, and the principles of self-organization, decentralization, and bottom-up refinement associated with complex adaptive systems. Two historical illustrations provide an analysis of leadership through the lens of complexity leadership theory. This research concludes with an analysis of current Army leadership doctrine, identify gaps and propose how complexity leadership theory could fill these gaps.

This article deals with the increasing importance of human terrain and cultural intelligence in the contemporary urban warfare and elaborates on the interfaces between human terrain and cultural intelligence. After defining the concepts and explaining their rationales and necessity we describe the modern historical development of both, emphasizing the American experience in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, and briefly mentioning on the Israeli experience in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Using the theoretical foundations of both concepts enables us to add another analytical and theoretical layer to the existing literature. Our main claim is that acquiring an in-depth understanding of the local culture is an essential condition for ensuring the relevance of a military mission. Cultural understanding and knowledge are outcomes of cultural intelligence which obtained by the Human Terrain System that must be a structural and operational means of each military mission and force participates in contemporary hybrid and urban warfare. Recognizing the importance of cultural intelligence led the American military to develop its Human Terrain System.
Commanders and team members who took part in the program widely agreed that the Human Terrain System contributes to the relevance and success of the military mission. On the other hand, its operation also sparked criticism, both in military and academic arenas. Despite the methodological, operational, and organizational developments of the Human Terrain System in the American context, gaps still exist, and its assimilation in the combat doctrine and in the intelligence methodology also exist among the security and intelligence agencies in Israel.

- by Dr. Omer Dostri and +1
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- Military Science, Military Intelligence, Strategy (Military Science), Terrorism

Learn about the U.S. Army's Nike Missile program during the Cold War.

- by Mary Rasa
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- Cold War, Missile defence, Us Army, United States Army

Reviews "The Lionheads" by Josiah Bunting (New York: George Braziller, 1972). One of the first novels of the Vietnam war is still one of the most compelling. The author based the novel on his own experience with the Riverine Brigade of the Ninth Infantry Division. It addresses leadership, conscience, the media, professional study, organizational inertia, ego, and careerism. It is a book with strong moral content.

- by Donald M Bishop
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- Military History, Military Ethics, Vietnam War, War and Literature

In this essay we seek to address the question on “what can Afghanistan and Iraq teach us about the utility of force in the 21st century?”. To achieve this, we shall firstly understand the evolution of military force in the 19th and in the 20th century to present how it has changed in the 21st century. At the theoretical level, the first step to take is to look at the Clausewitzian and neo-Clausewitzian thinking about the use of force. Endorsed by contemporary military thinkers such as Sir Rupert Smith, the use of force in Clausewitzian terms has been criticised from its roots. Smith as many other prominent – now retired generals – reflects on his own past experiences in command so elucidating how in the 21st century a set of new dynamics has put contemporary military thinking in a far more complicated and delicate equilibrium.
In this essay, we are investigating contemporary conflicts, which namely involved the use of military force. Now on, we consider the military force as a Weberian ideal type of “force”. We choose therefore to pursue this analysis under the assumption that the term “force” cannot be understood if not juxtaposed to its qualifier “military”.
Considered as one of the main theorists of warfare, Clausewitz thinking and its impact is extremely complex and cannot be drawn completely in such a short space. Furthermore, we do not seek to review either the whole Clausewitzian thinking – or the Neo-Clausewitzian one - but to consider it as the foundation for understanding the utility of military force and why it matters. Consequently, we will select the most important concepts of Clausewitz and Neo-Clausewitzian thinkers, which are significant to argue what Afghanistan and Iraq can teach us about the utility of force in the 21st century. This is the object of analysis of the first part of this work: to emphasise the meaning of utility of force from the 19th until the 21st century, to study the evolution of utility of force from its meaning as ‘interstate industrial war’ to ‘war amongst the people.’
The second part of this work instead focuses on Afghanistan and Iraq as single case studies. The first specificity of Afghanistan and Iraq cases is that the “enemy’s annihilation”, once the main explanatory factor to answer the question on why wars ended, did not work in Afghanistan and Iraq cases. Instead, both cases proved that a conflict does not simply end with the enemy’s annihilation but rather with a wide array of variables that we will highlight throughout this work. Afghanistan and Iraq then showed how the utility of force has changed radically considering its causes, its effects and its ends. Drawing from this first set of variables though we can then anticipate that the utility of force had not disappeared in the 21st century but rather – down to both experiences - it needs rethinking and reassessment. This is the scope of this work: to show what Afghanistan and Iraq teach us about the utility of force in the 21st century.

- by Manfredi Morello
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- Military History, International Relations, Irregular Warfare, Warfare

Photos and letters written by Lieutenant R. T. Kowallis and his wife Norma Jensen Kowallis while he was stationed in the Pacific during World War II in 1945. A higher resolution version of this book is available from the author upon... more

- by Bart Kowallis
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- History, Genealogy, Okinawan Studies, World War II
- by Ricardo A Herrera
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- Military History, Republicanism, American Civil War, American Revolution

In this essay we seek to address the question on “what can Afghanistan and Iraq teach us about the utility of force in the 21st century?”. To achieve this, we shall firstly understand the evolution of military force in the 19th and in the 20th century to present how it has changed in the 21st century. At the theoretical level, the first step to take is to look at the Clausewitzian and neo-Clausewitzian thinking about the use of force. Endorsed by contemporary military thinkers such as Sir Rupert Smith, the use of force in Clausewitzian terms has been criticised from its roots. Smith as many other prominent – now retired generals – reflects on his own past experiences in command so elucidating how in the 21st century a set of new dynamics has put contemporary military thinking in a far more complicated and delicate equilibrium. In this essay, we are investigating contemporary conflicts, which namely involved the use of military force. Now on, we consider the military force as a Weberian ideal type of “force”. We choose therefore to pursue this analysis under the assumption that the term “force” cannot be understood if not juxtaposed to its qualifier “military”. Considered as one of the main theorists of warfare, Clausewitz thinking and its impact is extremely complex and cannot be drawn completely in such a short space. Furthermore, we do not seek to review either the whole Clausewitzian thinking – or the Neo-Clausewitzian one - but to consider it as the foundation for understanding the utility of military force and why it matters. Consequently, we will select the most important concepts of Clausewitz and Neo-Clausewitzian thinkers, which are significant to argue what Afghanistan and Iraq can teach us about the utility of force in the 21st century. This is the object of analysis of the first part of this work: to emphasise the meaning of utility of force from the 19th until the 21st century, to study the evolution of utility of force from its meaning as ‘interstate industrial war’ to ‘war amongst the people.’ The second part of this work instead focuses on Afghanistan and Iraq as single case studies. The first specificity of Afghanistan and Iraq cases is that the “enemy’s annihilation”, once the main explanatory factor to answer the question on why wars ended, did not work in Afghanistan and Iraq cases. Instead, both cases proved that a conflict does not simply end with the enemy’s annihilation but rather with a wide array of variables that we will highlight throughout this work. Afghanistan and Iraq then showed how the utility of force has changed radically considering its causes, its effects and its ends. Drawing from this first set of variables though we can then anticipate that the utility of force had not disappeared in the 21st century but rather – down to both experiences - it needs rethinking and reassessment. This is the scope of this work: to show what Afghanistan and Iraq teach us about the utility of force in the 21st century.

For U.S. soldiers in the War of 1812, military service was not only the means by which they shaped, defined, and understood their identity as American soldiers and citizens, but it also helped them understand the role of the Army in the political order. Their beliefs were a source of cultural and intellectual continuity and stability even as the Army’s mission and nature changed.

- by Mary Rasa
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- Military History, Us Army, United States Army, New Jersey History

Italy’s national public broadcasting company (RAI — Radiotelevisione italiana S.p.A.), alleged in a documentary titled, “Fallujah, The Hidden Massacre” that the U.S. used white phosphorus as a weapon. But did the U.S. really use it as a weapon? Or perhaps, like any other weapon, is it possible that the use of it may have been inappropriate? If white phosphorus was used as a weapon, was the U.S. justified in using it as such? U.S. military leaders have already addressed this issue and contended that the use of white phosphorus during military combat operations in Iraq was authorized, just, and in compliance with laws of armed conflict.

Streszczenie: W pierwszych latach I wojny światowej Stany Zjednoczone prowadziły politykę izolacjonizmu. Przystąpienie Amerykanów do wojny w Europie w 1917 r. miało przechylić szalę zwycięstwa na stronę Ententy, niemniej pierwsze doświadczenia wojny okopowej szybko uzmysłowiły amerykańskim dowódcom jak bardzo podlegli im żołnierze nie są przygotowani do realiów konfliktu nowego typu. Dopiero zyskiwane stopniowo doświadczenie wojenne pozwoliło armii amerykańskiej osiągnąć odpowiedni poziom bojowy. O ile udział Amerykanów w wal-kach na froncie zachodnim nie był decydujący o powodzeniu kampanii to i tak stanowił poważny wkład w zwycięstwo nad Niemcami. Summary: In the early years of the Great War the United States of America had decided to maintain the policy of isolationism. Joining of the Americans onto war was believed to turn the tide on the side of the Entente, but the first experiences of the trench warfare quickly realized the US Army commanders how green and unprepared their subordinates were. The early days of fighting showed that the US Army was not prepared for the realities of the new type of conflict. Only gradually gained war experience allowed the US military to achieve an adequate combat level. Even though the Americans did not turn the tide their presence on the Western Front was a great contribution to the victory over Germany.

Australia's long war in Afghanistan saw their Special Operation Forces (SOF) at the "tip of the spear". Australian SOF personnel received more than 150 battlefield awards, including three Victoria Crosses for Australia (one of which posthumous), and six Stars of Gallantry. SOF constituted some 16 per cent of the Australian Army’s contribution to the conflict but suffered 50 per cent of the casualties, including half of all operational deaths. While Afghanistan is Australia’s longest war, it is also the least understood. The stories of those service personnel who saw the most combat, were most frequently in action, and served on multiple deployments, remains untold. Beyond the names of those killed or the

- by Karl James
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- History, Military History, Strategy (Military Science), Terrorism
- by Robert Kłosowicz
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- American History, Military and Politics, Ronald Reagan, United States Army

AMERICAN soldiers from the War for Independence through the first year of the Civil War demonstrated and defined their understanding of the nature of American republicanism and how they, as citizens and soldiers, were active participants... more

- by Ricardo Herrera
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- Military History, Republicanism, American Civil War, Laws of War

Review of "The Lionheads: A Novel" by Josiah Bunting (George Brazillier, 1972). This novel recounts a few days of riverine operations by an infantry brigade of the "Lionheads" division in Vietnam -- and the dilemmas confronting its... more

This lecture suggests that Millenials who serve in the military are not the same as the Millenial "Me, Me, Me" generation described in a previous Time Magazine article. The author first describes four different generations, Traditionalists, Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Millenials. He then provides examples of how military Millenials have embodied the Army Values during a period of military service defined by multiple combat deployments. The lecture concludes with a question and answer session.

- by James J Smith
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- Sociology, Values, Baby Boomers, Military

When Dwight David Eisenhower ran for President in 1952, he, along with his Democratic competitor Adlai Stevenson, was the first presidential candidate to make campaign commercials for television. One of the most notable ones depicted Eisenhower standing next to Soviet Marshal Georgi Zhukov in Berlin in 1945, when the narrator assured viewers: “Ike knows how to handle the Russians,” and that he would effectively lead the American government in the Cold War. Interestingly, nearly all of Eisenhower’s initial experiences with Russian military and government leaders came during a time when the United States and Soviet Russia were allies, during the Second World War. This essay will examine Ike’s complicated views towards the Soviet Union before, during, and after the Second World War, and how they translated into American military and occupation policy. Ike moved from the traditional suspicion of the Soviet government by most American army officers to seeing the Soviet army an essential ally in the attempt to destroy Nazism. After the end of the war, Ike frequently expressed hope the Soviets would be a valuable partner in securing global peace, before finally moving towards Cold War hostility towards the regime in Moscow, although later than many other American military, diplomatic, and political leaders.
Key words: Eisenhower, Soviet Union, World War II, Cold War, “Berlin question”, Nazis.

- by Sean Brennan
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- Second World War, American-Russian Relations, United States Army, Dwight Eisenhower

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