Nuclear Submarines Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

In the Asia-Pacific region, submarine forces have continued to grow, though the greatest number are obsolescent diesel-attack submarines based on late-World War II designs posses by China and North Korea (DPRK). About 139 submarines remain in active service; 109 belong to China (PLAN). The range of submarines includes nuclear-powered and diesel-attack designs, the latter the main focus of Southeast Asian navies.

- by
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- Armed Forces, Ship and Submarine Design, Nuclear Submarines, Submarines

O presente trabalho apresenta alguns aspectos relevantes para o projeto e operação das instalações propulsoras nucleares propriamente ditas e da especificidade do navio nuclear em si mesmo. É apreciada, dos pontos de vista teórico e tecnológico, a escolha dos reatores do tipo PWR, quase universalmente adotados para as aplicações de propulsão naval, considerando as diversas realizações e protótipos construídos. As particularidades dos reatores de propulsão naval em comparação com os reatores de centrais núcleo-elétricas comercias são comentadas. Alguns dos principais critérios de projeto e base para dimensionamento são apresentados.

- by Leonam L S Guimaraes
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- Nuclear Submarines, Nuclear Propulsion

RICARDO JORGE CRUZ DE ARAGÃO Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso - Monografia apresentada ao Departamento de Estudos da Escola Superior de Guerra como requisito à obtenção do diploma do Curso de Altos Estudos de Política e Estratégia.... more

RICARDO JORGE CRUZ DE ARAGÃO
Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso - Monografia
apresentada ao Departamento de Estudos da
Escola Superior de Guerra como requisito à
obtenção do diploma do Curso de Altos Estudos de
Política e Estratégia.
Orientador: CMG (RM-1 FN) Pedro Fonseca Junior.

Written for Dr. Guerrier's Cold War grad course.

- by Joe Wilson
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- Cold War and Culture, Cultural Cold War, Cold War Culture, Ship and Submarine Design
- by Leonam L S Guimaraes
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- Nuclear Ship Propulsion, Nuclear Submarines

Theodore Guillory
September 1988

- by Leonam L S Guimaraes
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- Nuclear Submarines, Submarine Warfare

Thomas Dominic Ippolito Jr. B.S.N.E., University of Lowell, Lowell, Massachusetts (1987) SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE at the MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY May, 1990 @... more

Thomas Dominic Ippolito Jr.
B.S.N.E., University of Lowell, Lowell, Massachusetts
(1987)
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF
SCIENCE
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
May, 1990
@ Massachuaetts Institute of Technology 1990

- by Leonam L S Guimaraes
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- Nuclear Submarines, Nuclear Fuel
- by Parveen Bhardwaj
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- Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Disarmament, Defence and Security, Nuclear Submarines

Executive Summary
From the birth of the United States Nuclear Navy until today, all nuclear-power ships have used
highly enriched uranium (HEU) to fuel the onboard nuclear reactors. In the late 1970s, there
began an initiative by the US Department of Energy to minimize the amount of HEU in civilian
reactors by converting them to use low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in an attempt to reduce the
proliferation risks.
In 1995, at the request of Congress, the Office of Naval Reactors wrote a detailed report that
addressed the potential to convert nuclear-powered ships to use LEU fuel in place of HEU. This
document stated the conversion would be “technically feasible, but uneconomic and
impractical.” In addition, that LEU as a fuel “offers no technical advantage to the Navy,
provides no significant non-proliferation advantage, and is detrimental from environmental and
cost perspectives.”
At the request of Congress, in early 2014 the Office of Naval Reactors issued another report on
this issue. This report again states the conversion is technically feasible, but it is not economic
or practical. However, the Navy offers that, “the potential exists to develop an advanced fuel
system that could increase uranium loading,” so that LEU fuel could be utilized to meet the
rigorous performance requirements; however, “it is not practical ... to work on an advanced fuel
system without additional sources of funding.” Further, it is stated that “success is not ensured.”
This paper presents a thorough review and analysis of technical literature on the topic of using
LEU for nuclear propulsion. It analyzes different technical issues and identifies a few that were
not directly addressed by the Navy report. These include topics such as reactor control, fuel
material properties and fuel cycle. A brief review of nuclear policies that influence any decision
regarding nuclear materials or technologies is conducted. In particular, the Nuclear NonProliferation
Treaty (NPT) is analyzed with an emphasis on Paragraph 14, a section, which
authorizes a state to withdraw nuclear material from safeguards if it is being used for a “nonproscribed
military activity.” In addition, an overview is provided of nuclear activities in key
geographical regions including South America, Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia.
The second half of this document addresses a number of “unintended consequences” of the
conversion from HEU to LEU fuel for nuclear propulsion. These unintended consequences are
split into two categories: technical and geopolitical. Technical unintended consequences are
driven by the fundamental difficulties of using LEU fuel: decreased 235U concentration and 238U
presence. Geopolitical unintended consequences represent the ways in which using LEU-fueled
submarines may adversely affect the regional stability and power balance; these are broken down
into high-level topics: easier access to LEU fuel, increased submarine range, use of nuclear
submarines by non-democratic governments and possible “surrogate nuclear arms race.” For
each unintended consequence discussed, a list of possible “future studies” is presented; these
provide the reader with some concepts that have not yet been thoroughly investigated and should
be addressed before action is taken toward conversion of the US Navy’s nuclear fleet.

O PROJETO DO SUBMARINO NUCLEAR NA VISÃO DE SEUS PROTAGONISTAS: UMA ANÁLISE HISTÓRICA DE GEISEL A LULA (1974-2009) Fernanda das Graças Corrêa Este trabalho é uma análise histórica do projeto de construção do submarino de propulsão nuclear... more

- by Fernanda Corrêa and +1
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- Nuclear Submarines, Submarinos Nucleares
- by Igor Delanoe
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- Asia Pacific Region, Mediterranean, Russia, Nuclear Submarines

The UK Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme (NNPP) is highly dependent upon
the United States for reactor technology and, in the past, highly enriched
uranium (HEU) for its submarine reactor cores. The extent of this dependency is
exemplified in the recent transfer of reactor design and technology from the US
to aid development of the UK’s third generation naval nuclear reactor, the PWR3,
intended to power the UK’s planned ‘Successor’ ballistic missile submarine fleet.
The UK is highly unlikely to deviate from US reactor technology based on HEU
fuel as a consequence of this dependency and the limited perceived benefits of
moving to a reactor fuelled with low enriched uranium (LEU) following the
French example. Independent exploration, development and research reactor
testing of LEU fuel for next generation attack submarines (SSNs) or ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs) is therefore highly unlikely.

In 1972, the US Navy installed a base for nuclear submarines in the Archipelago of La Maddalena off the northeastern shore of Sardinia, Italy. In response, Italy established a radiation surveillance program to monitor the impact of the base on the environment and public health. In the first systematic study of nuclear expertise in Italy, Davide Orsini focuses on the ensuing technopolitical disputes concerning the role and safety of US nuclear submarines in the Mediterranean Sea from the Cold War period to the closure of the naval base in 2008. His book follows the struggles of different groups—including local residents of the archipelago, US Navy personnel, local administrators, Italian experts, and politicians—to define nuclear submarines as either imperceptible threats, much like radiocontamination, or efficient machines at the service of liberty and freedom.
Unlike inland nuclear power plants, vividly present and visible with their tall cooling towers and reactor containers, the mobility and invisibility of submarines contributed to an ambivalence about their nature, perpetuating the idea of nuclear exceptionalism. In Italy, they symbolized objects in constant motion, easily removable at the first sign of potential harm. Orsini demonstrates how these mobile sources of hazard posed special challenges for both expert assessments and public understandings of risk, and in contexts outside the Anglo-Saxon world, where unique social power dynamics held sway over the outcome of technopolitical controversies.

- by Davide Orsini
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- Disaster Studies, History of Technology, Environmental History, History of Science
- by Leonam L S Guimaraes
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- Emergency Management, Nuclear Submarines, Nuclear Safety

Observatoire des Armes Nucléaires Françaises
Cahier 3 - Janvier 2000

A B S T R A C T Recently many methods for reducing the risk of human extinction have been suggested, including building refuges underground and in space. Here we will discuss the perspective of using military nuclear submarines or their derivatives to ensure the survival of a small portion of humanity who will be able to rebuild human civilization after a large catastrophe. We will show that it is a very cost-effective way to build refuges, and viable solutions exist for various budgets and timeframes. Nuclear submarines are surface independent, and could provide energy, oxygen, fresh water and perhaps even food for their inhabitants for years. They are able to withstand close nuclear explosions and radiation. They are able to maintain isolation from biological attacks and most known weapons. They already exist and need only small adaptation to be used as refuges. But building refuges is only " Plan B " of existential risk preparation; it is better to eliminate such risks than try to survive them.

- by Alexey Turchin and +1
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- Future Studies, Ethics, Disaster Studies, War Studies

This work is divided into three parts. First, the definition and description of a model to Special Industrial Facilities (SIF) are presented. These are in land-based facilities as to provide support to a nuclear submarine. This model is composed of a system and a set of requirements that relate to this system.
After, arguments on application of Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process to Special Industrial Facilities are presented; in the other words, a discussion about the RIDM application in those facilities which are intended to follow both the purpose and the model above are presented.
In the last part, comments about absence of specific regulation in this country to allow the licencing process of this kind of Special Industrial Facilities by Nuclear Safety Authority are presented. The set of SIF requirements presented in this dissertation and the argument on employment of RIDM complement the Safety Doctrine existing in the literature and could serve to base preparation of future regulation in Brazil.

A Provisional Memorial to Nuclear Disarmament is an Arts Catalyst Nuclear Culture Commission. It has been exhibited as part of Material Nuclear Culture, KARST, Plymouth, UK 17/6/16–14/8/16. Perpetual Uncertainty, Bildmuseet, Umea, Sweden 02/10/16-16/04/17, Z33, Hasselt, Belgium 17/9/17-10/12/17 and Konstmuseum, Malmö, Sweden 24/2/18- 26/8/18. Parade, Broadway Gallery, Letchworth, UK 13/12/19-16/2/20

- by David Mabb
- •
- Military History, Aesthetics, Peace and Conflict Studies, Art

Atualmente, somente Estados Unidos, Rússia, Reino Unido,
França, China e Índia possuem submarinos com propulsão
nuclear. A situação singular do Brasil, por ser o primeiro país
sem armas nucleares a ter essa tecnologia e por, provavelmente,
ser o primeiro país a colocar o combustível nuclear naval sob
salvaguardas faz com que ele receba pressões para aderir ao
Protocolo Adicional (PA) da Agência Internacional de Energia
Atômica (AIEA). O artigo tem como finalidade a apresentação
de um projeto preliminar de uma simulação, como ferramenta
de auxílio à tomada de decisão de alto nível, a fim de fazer
frente às tendências e incertezas que possam interferir com
o projeto do Submarino Convencional de Propulsão Nuclear
Brasileiro (SCPN). Para tal propósito, são usadas as teorias
dos jogos, as de tomada de decisão, as de simulações/jogos de
guerra e de análise. Foi verificado que, partindo da premissa
que o SCPN será comissionado em 2029 é importante que o
Brasil tenha tomado uma decisão em relação ao PA da AIEA
antes desse ano e que cenários prospectivos possam ser
revistos ou reformulados anualmente ou a cada dois anos para
estejam atualizados, de modo a aumentar a probabilidade de
se atender aos interesses brasileiros.
Palavras-chave: SCPN. Simulação. Defesa.

- by Victoria Viana Souza Guimaraes and +2
- •
- Game Theory, Decision Making, Brazil, Simulation

Several Third World countries are contemplating the development of nuclear attack submarines to augment their diesel-electric fleets-like the Brazilian Tupi seen here. Are nuclear submarines a first step toward the acquisition of nuclear... more

Since the RFS "Neustrashimyy" missile frigate returned from duties in the western Arabian Sea in February (2009), of which the Russians were clearly proud of, the world's economics have taken further nosedives - ayongwith declining prices for Russian oil. Is the Russian military likely to return to the days of the post-Cod War period? Some analysts think so. A widely asked question is: Can the Russian Navy achieve its shipbuilding goals set out in 2007 by 2015?

- by G. Keith Jacobs
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- Nuclear Submarines, Aircraft, Russian Navy, Frigates

International efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states or terrorists
are complicated by the routine use of nuclear weapons-usable, highly enriched uranium (HEU) as fuel
for naval propulsion. Naval HEU fuel raises two major security risks: theft, by terrorists or criminals; and
diversion, by states that would employ a naval program as deceptive cover to acquire fissile material.
Accordingly, this paper explores the prospects and challenges of a global phase-out of naval HEU fuel,
starting with a bilateral phase-out by the United States and Russia, the two countries that use the vast
majority of naval HEU fuel. The following analysis proceeds through six steps. First, it elaborates the
rationale behind such a phase-out. Second, it examines the potential timeline for a bilateral phase-out,
based on a new analysis of the United States’ and Russia’s existing naval nuclear fleets and schedules for
modernization (see Table 2). Third, it explores the technical feasibility of converting next-generation
naval vessels from HEU to low-enriched uranium fuel (LEU) fuel. Fourth, it assesses the potential costs
and savings of such conversion. Fifth, it assesses potential methods to verify a prospective ban on the
use of HEU fuel for naval propulsion. Sixth, it explores options for diplomacy to achieve such a ban.

Review of Indian navy's acquisition of its first nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSGN), named CHAKRA. Acquired via lease from the then-USSR, the Project 670-M ("Charlie-I" ) SSGN - the former K-43. Initial agreement was for three years... more

- by G. Keith Jacobs
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- Nuclear Submarines, Submarines, Indian Navy, Indian Navy submarines

Por que tragédias como Mariana, Fukushima, Chernobyl, Exxon Valdez e Bhopal ocorreram? Esses acidentes seriam evitáveis? Ou seriam a inevitável consequência da utilização generalizada de tecnologias de risco no mundo moderno? Existem duas escolas de pensamento antagonistas sobre essa questão específica. A primeira encarna a visão otimista, chamada “Teoria das Organizações de Alta Confiabilidade”. A segunda escola, chamada “Teoria dos Acidentes Normais”, apresenta um prognóstico muito mais pessimista. O presente artigo examina as duas escolas de pensamento mais importantes na literatura de teoria organizacional relativa à questão da confiabilidade e segurança de sistemas tecnológicos complexos, abordando em especial sua aplicação aos submarinos de propulsão nuclear.

- by Leonam L S Guimaraes
- •
- Safety Engineering, Sociotechnical Systems, Nuclear Submarines

Review of the status of the U.S. Navy submarine service, as it moves into the decade of the Nineties, with large numbers of nuclear-powered submarines being decommissioned, as the service looks forward to the new "Virginia" class and... more

- by G. Keith Jacobs
- •
- Nuclear Submarines, U.s. Navy, Submarines, U.S. Navy History

Il rapporto riferisce delle indagini straordinarie di monitoraggio della
radioattività ambientale nell’Arcipelago di La Maddalena, svolte secondo quanto stabilito dal Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio, d’intesa con la Regione Autonoma della Sardegna, in relazione all’evento incidentale occorso nell’autunno 2003 al sottomarino USS HARTFORD, ed in generale alla presenza di sottomarini a propulsione nucleare nell’area.
L’indagine straordinaria costituisce integrazione delle attività ordinarie condotte nell’ambito della sorveglianza radiologica ambientale dell’Arcipelago di La Maddalena e di quelle effettuate, su scala regionale, ai fini dell’art. 104 del D.L.vo 230/1995 e successive
modifiche. Le indagini sono state svolte dal gruppo di lavoro costituito dall’ Agenzia per la Protezione dell’Ambiente e per i Servizi Tecnici (APAT), dall’ Istituto Centrale per la Ricerca Scientifica e Tecnologica Applicata al Mare (ICRAM) e dall’ Agenzia Regionale Protezione
Ambiente Sardegna (ARPAS), rappresentata dall’Azienda USL 1 - Presidio Multizonale di Prevenzione (PMP) di Sassari e dall’Azienda USL 8 – Presidio Multizonale di Prevenzione (PMP) di Cagliari.
Le attività sono state finalizzate ad evidenziare l’eventuale presenza di anomalie della radioattività ambientale nell’Arcipelago di La Maddalena ed a determinarne l’eventuale origine antropica. In particolare, sono stati definiti i seguenti obiettivi specifici:
1. determinare l’eventuale presenza di contaminazione radioattiva associabile all’evento incidentale verificatosi al sottomarino HARTFORD nell’autunno 2003;
2. determinare la concentrazione di attività dell’Uranio 238 e dei suoi figli (Torio 234), in matrici di alghe marine rosse;
3. stabilire l’eventuale origine antropica della concentrazione di attività di Uranio 238 e dei suoi figli in matrici ambientali significative.
A tal fine è stata svolta una campagna di campionamento in siti rappresentativi dell’Arcipelago di La Maddalena e della Sardegna, nei quali sono state prelevate le seguenti matrici ambientali: acqua marina, Posidonia oceanica (pianta marina), Corallina elongata e
Jania rubens (alghe marine rosse), sedimenti, Paracentrotus lividus (riccio di mare). Inoltre, al fine di ampliare il quadro conoscitivo, sono stati analizzati campioni di fauna marina stanziale.

This study draws on ethnographic and archival evidence from the Italian Archipelago of La Maddalena, offshore from the northeastern corner of Sardinia, where in 1972 the U.S. Navy installed a base for nuclear submarines. It addresses two questions: (1) How do non-experts make sense of radiological risk absent knowledge and classified information about its instantiations and consequences? (2) How do objectifications of risk change and stabilize within the same community over time? STS scholarship has emphasized the epistemic and relational dimensions of lay/expert controversies over risk assessment. Many case studies, mostly focused on the Anglo-Saxon world, have assumed lay and expert ways of knowing are incompatible due to clashing cultural identities. I use Keane's concept of “semiotic ideologies” and Peircean semiotic theory to critically reassess the validity of that assumption and examine the role of material evidence in processes of signification to explain how experts and...

- by Davide Orsini
- •
- History of Science and Technology, Sociology, Anthropology, Italian Studies

The UK Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme (NNPP) is highly dependent upon the United States for reactor technology and, in the past, highly enriched uranium (HEU) for its submarine reactor cores. The extent of this dependency is exemplified in the recent transfer of reactor design and technology from the US to aid development of the UK’s third generation naval nuclear reactor, the PWR3, intended to power the UK’s planned ‘Successor’ ballistic missile submarine fleet. The UK is highly unlikely to deviate from US reactor technology based on HEU fuel as a consequence of this dependency and the limited perceived benefits of moving to a reactor fuelled with low enriched uranium (LEU) following the French example. Independent exploration, development and research reactor testing of LEU fuel for next generation attack submarines (SSNs) or ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) is therefore highly unlikely.

The US Navy will still arrive for crises - the question to be answered is: will it be there in the beginning of crises or will it arrive later - when? With how many and what kind of ships? The Navy's admirals have already given up on the issue of "how many" ships the service will have in the coming decade. As CNO Admiral. Vern Clark warns, the Navy faces greater operational risks unless the service finds way to buy more ships and aircraft.

- by G. Keith Jacobs
- •
- Nuclear Submarines, Submarines, United States Navy, Aircraft Carrier

CONSTRUÇÃO DO ESTALEIRO E BASE NAVAL

MARINHA DO BRASIL

2011

- by Leonam L S Guimaraes
- •
- Nuclear Submarines, Shipbuilding, Submarines
- by Víctor M Mijares
- •
- Geopolitics, Brazil, Defence and Security, Geopolitics of Energy